Copies of this report, complete with charts and helpful graphics, are available for $1.50 apiece from the Center for International Policy, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 312, Washington, DC 20036 / cip@igc.apc.org . Or you can just read this one for free in plain old ASCII. December, 1995 Altered States: Post-Cold War U.S. security interests in Central America By W. Frick Curry The Soviet military threat has disappeared, and with it east bloc assistance to governments and opposition movements in Central America and elsewhere. U.S. policy makers are left with a seemingly welcome challenge: how to redefine U.S. security interests in a world devoid of a competing superpower. The Clinton administration has acknowledged this new reality and proposed a fresh direction: "There is now no credible near-term threat to America 's existence," national-security adviser Anthony Lake said in September 1993. "The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement: enlargement of the world 's free community of market democracies."1 The administration's July 1994 "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" declares that with the end of the Cold War, U.S. national security imperatives have fundamentally changed. Although a complex array of new and old security challenges remain, this "new era" requires efforts "to bolster America 's economic revitalization" and "to promote democracy abroad."2 In Central America, this new reality has been marked by the end of two internal wars and progress toward democratization. After two and a half years, the Clinton administration has made a promising start toward a new post-Cold War national security policy with this neighboring region. In practice, however, this policy has been marked by occasional inconsistencies and troubling reminders that Cold War obsessions have not totally disappeared. U.S. Perceptions of Security Threats in Central America Although now receiving an abruptly reduced portion of the U.S. military and foreign aid budget, Central America has been permanently transformed by the role it played in U.S. national security policy during the 1980s. Moreover, due to the Central American states' size and economic and political fragility, U.S. perceptions of greatly reduced or markedly different threats from this region can entail significant dangers -- and opportunities. The Clinton administration's policy toward Central America has manifested many of the same contradictions evident in its approach to the broader post-Cold War world. On the one hand, there has been frank acknowledgement of the altered situation: "There is no real security threat to the U.S. in this part of the world," U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua John Maisto said early in 1994, and that's why we can get back to the real roots of U.S. values in foreign policy."3 In a May 1995 policy address, Secretary of State Warren Christopher observed that "Central America is no longer a charnel house of conflicts driven by class, race and ideology."4 Significantly, this general assessment was shared by all senior U.S. diplomats and military officers interviewed by the Center for International Policy during a fact-finding trip through the region in December 1994. U.S. officials on the ground in Central America all said, in effect, "There is no threat here."5 On the other hand, CIP interviews revealed that these same officials are still eager to justify continuing U.S. ties with, and support for, Central American military establishments. The justifications cited were similar to many of the post-Cold War dangers cited in "A National Security Strategy" while others date back to the very origins of U.S. military relationships and intervention in the region. Perhaps most worrisome was abundant evidence of the same mindset that led to the establishment and nurturing of Central American military institutions such as the Somoza family's National Guard and El Salvador's Atlacatl Battalion. More than once CIP heard the seemingly innocuous refrain urging continued U.S. assistance for "professionalizing" Central American militaries in order to promote democracy abroad. Corresponding goals, expressed with identical phraseology, appear in "A National Security Strategy."6 This is the same patronal mindset that in the past strengthened the military at the expense of the civil sector in Central America. Interviewees declared that it was in the U.S. interest to help subordinate the military to civil society through professionalization. Education and exposure to U.S. military personnel would "set an example of how to deal with civilian society." U.S. political operatives and military officers interviewed also echoed the same concerns characterized in "A National Security Strategy" as "transnational" threats to U.S. security. These include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows.7 Curiously, despite administration characterization of these threats as "non-military" in nature, the Central American militaries were seen as an effective -- if not the only -- response to these perils. More than one interviewee suggested that the military was the sole functioning institution truly national in reach. Typical was the observation that ". . . the military is predictable, and it can get things done." 8 In addition to so-called "transnational threats," U.S. officials interviewed frequently cited economic stagnation, endemic corruption, the lack of functioning criminal justice systems and rampant crime as threats to regional stability, and therefore of serious and continuing concern to the U.S. Other than "nation building" -- from constructing infrastructure to educating their own recruits -- these officials were less than unanimous in recommending how Central American militaries could ameliorate this set of problems. Indeed, it was not unusual to hear interviewees blame local military establishments for perpetuating at least one of these dilemmas -- that of official corruption. CIP interviews with U.S. officials in Central America uncovered no hint of any concerns with potential military threats to the United States. The days when a U.S. president could spread fear of a Soviet-equipped Nicaraguan army marching into Harlingen, Texas are long since past. Interviewees were equally unanimous in citing the lack of any intraregional military threats. The most formidable potential weapons of regional aggression -- U.S.-made F-5E tactical fighter- bombers of the Honduran Air Force -- are now grounded for lack of maintenance. In the words of one U.S. official: "The military is looking for something to do. No one 's going to war -- there is nothing on the borders to defend against." The Current Status of U.S. Military Ties with Central America To the credit of both the Clinton administration and Congress, changed perceptions of national security threats emanating from Central America have led to the termination of the huge, overt military-aid programs that dominated the U.S. approach to the region in the 1980s. None of the region's states currently receives military assistance in the form of grants or loans for weaponry, other than direct training, except for some counter-narcotics programs.9 The emphasis of U.S. policy "...has shifted to address problems of poverty and sustainable development in a time of peace."10 The sharp contrast between the current paucity of U.S. assistance for the Central American military establishments and the torrent of aid flowing throughout the Cold War cannot be overemphasized. Between 1950 and 1990 the U.S. provided $2.4 billion in constant 1990 dollars for military grants, official sales and reimbursable credits to the five Central American countries.11 Counter-narcotics programs in Central America With the export of Communist revolution no longer a threat, the 1994 "National Security Strategy" paper could now justify U.S. support for democracy and free markets as a necessary part of the campaign to counter the burgeoning drug trade. United States anti-drug strategy was to adopt a less confrontational stance in source and transshipment countries. Secretary of State Christopher described the administration approach as follows: "Building democracies can better combat narcotics production and trafficking...Our new strategy has broadened the focus of our overseas narcotics efforts from interdiction to a more balanced approach...Our central objective is to strengthen the rule of law, economic and social development, and anti-drug institutions in the host nations.12 The institution-building aspects of the program could indeed be of great benefit to Central America, especially AID programs to build the rule of law and support sustainable development that will relieve the economic pressures that encourage the drug trade. AID has an estimated $1 billion in development programs underway in all of Latin America. Most of the expenditures that directly target drug shipments and narcotrafficking organizations are funneled through U.S. civilian law enforcement and intelligence agency budgets. For its part, the primary contribution to anti-drug efforts by the U.S. military under Southcom (the U.S. Southern Command, currently headquartered in Panama) is to provide ground-based and airborne radar detection and monitoring of drug smuggling flights. "Target packages" and "around-the-clock actionable intelligence" facilitate immediate interdiction by host nations, as well as U.S. law enforcement agencies. Southcom also maintains joint planning and assistance (JPAT) teams to coordinate and advise anti-drug campaigns in Guatemala and Panama.13 The problem remains that the armies with whom the United States collaborates in counter-narcotics programs have accumulated disproportionate influence after decades of U.S. assistance. In some cases, elements in the militaries are engaged in trafficking. Recent experience with similar U.S. efforts in Haiti provides a cautionary tale. The Central Intelligence Agency helped organize an anti-narcotics unit in the Haitian army in 1989, in the course of which it identified Raoul Cedras as "one of the most promising young officers in the Haitian army." Among those who became paid CIA agents under this anti-narcotics program were several prominent organizers of the 1991 military coup. Under the guise of a counter-narcotics program the CIA and Pentagon communicated to top Haitian military officers that they had a powerful patron in Washington. The program's success in curbing drug trafficking was negligible, since the Haitian army itself continued to transship drugs. But the signals sent by this collaboration encouraged both the military coup and the three years of despotism that followed. CIP researchers found a significant difference in the perception of the Central American drug threat between top U.S. officials and those interviewed during the CIP fact-finding trip. Gen. George A. Joulwan, former commander in chief of Southcom, testified before a Senate committee that "The Secretary of Defense directed that combating drugs is a high-priority national security mission." He added, "In my opinion the narcotrafficking threat to Central and South America is more serious than that posed in the past by Cuban and Soviet sponsored subversion."14 The current Southcom commander, Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, further warns that "the scourge of drugs is presently the greatest threat to democracy in several Latin American countries" and advocates increasing security assistance to countries that cooperate with the U.S. in anti-drug efforts.15 However, U.S. officials in the region interviewed by the Center for International Policy tended to see any drug threat in Central America as being more potential than real at this time. One interviewee acknowledged that "civil society is so weak that narco money could gain great power," but added that both civilian and military leaders in Central America were aware of what had happened to Colombia and wanted to avoid it for themselves. Only one of the interviewees identified drug activity -- in the form of maritime transshipment -- as a significant problem in the Central American country to which the official was posted.16 Military Civic Action Programs U.S. interaction with the Central American military has been virtually institutionalized through regularly scheduled HCA (Humanitarian Civic Action) programs in which elements of the U.S. military -- often including National Guard units -- work in conjunction with indigenous militaries on non-combat projects. These can include construction of roads and schools as well as the provision of medical and even veterinary services. The most frequently conducted civic action program in Central America has been the Fuertes Caminos ("Strong Roads") series of exercises carried out in Belize, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. Because of the permanent U.S. presence at the Soto Cano air base in Honduras, that country is a favored location for U.S. military training operations, many of which include civic action. Especially noteworthy is the continuation of civic action in Guatemala, a country still torn by a civil war. Guatemala's military possesses such a dismal human rights record that it has been prohibited from receiving U.S. military assistance since 1990. Nevertheless, the U.S. Milgroup (Military Group) stationed in Guatemala will cycle 350 U.S. troops through Fuertes Caminos exercises in 1995. U.S. officials defended this program to the CIP fact-finding mission, claiming that it takes place in "nonconflictive areas" without Guatemalan troops, and that "local reaction has been favorable." The Pentagon offers a broader rationale for these programs: "Military civic action sees the use of military resources in such a way as to enhance not only the national security posture of a country, but its political stability, social cohesiveness, and economic development as well...(and) would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces within the population."17 Today, the U.S. military also justifies civic action as a way for U.S. reservists and National Guard troops to get much-needed training and exposure to the type of environments they might encounter in wartime. The following opinion voiced to CIP by a U.S. military officer typified the view of civic action held by U.S. officials in the region: "The program has humanitarian intentions. It 's a kind of "make-work" project so members of the National Guard can practice skills they would otherwise have no opportunity to practice." Although civic action is conducted in many developing countries with which the United States has a military relationship, Central America -- perhaps because of its proximity to the United States -- is clearly the favored program location. In fiscal year (FY) 1993, for example, over 71 percent of all funds allocated for civic action world-wide were spent in Central America. However, even that proportion may understate spending for the program in Central America given the difficulty in determining overall spending levels. For more than ten years, the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Congress has been raising questions about the budgeting practices of civic action. In its most recent evaluation of the program in 1993, the GAO reported that "The full extent of the program is unknown because some civic assistance projects are not being submitted to the State Department for approval [as the law requires]."18 The GAO has regularly reprimanded the Department of Defense for funding foreign and security assistance activities -- including civic action -- from its Operations and Maintenance accounts. Showing another way in which actual amounts spent on civic action can be obscured, especially in Central America, a 1994 report from the New York State Adjutant General disclosed that New York State -- not the Pentagon -- had paid $3 million of the $18 million cost of the Fuertes Caminos 94 (North) exercises in Guatemala in which the New York National Guard took part.19 Ultimately, civic action programs may have outlived their usefulness given the changed conditions in Central America. At a time when the region is attempting the difficult transition from war to peace and toward democracy and free market economies, is it appropriate for the United States to continue reinforcing the military's prominence at the expense of the nascent civilian sector? Human rights groups argue that civic action programs increase the political power of the military and give it a legitimate economic role, further complicating efforts to reduce its size. Benjamin Schwarz of the Rand Corporation agrees, suggesting that civic action may be counterproductive at this critical juncture because it "...assigns an expanded role to host militaries just when economic conditions demand their reduction."20 For example, is it helpful for the United States to further the Honduran military's role in non-military activities through extensive civic action programs when that military already controls key economic entities such as the national telephone company and other commercial enterprises? Ironically, projects such as Fuertes Caminos could never be conducted in the continental U.S. -- because in the U.S. the military is not permitted to compete with private industry.21 In El Salvador, the continued cooperation of U.S. forces with the Salvadoran military in community improvement projects may encourage violation of the 1992 peace accord, which specifically limits the role of that country's military to national defense. Joint U.S.- Central American Military Exercises Although few in number and small in scope, the United States on a regular basis conducts combined exercises with Central American militaries that do not have the humanitarian or "nation-building" objectives of civic action programs. Generally speaking, these exercises involve more than one Central American country and appear to be aimed at enhancing coordinated command and control between U.S. and Central American militaries should combined operations during war-time conditions or drug-interdiction efforts be necessary. In practice, prohibitions against military assistance have not precluded a country's inclusion in these military training operations. Although U.S. military aid to Guatemala was terminated in 1990, fifty Guatemalan troops participated in "King's Guard 93" alongside U.S., Honduran and Salvadoran forces in July 1993. Activities included "joint/combined naval command post and field training exercises consisting of maritime surveillance and interdiction exercises." Recent examples include "King's Guard 94," held in both Honduras and El Salvador in June 1994, and Fuerzas Unidas Centam 94 conducted in Honduras during July 1994. Both were described as "joint/combined command post" exercises with the latter including a computer-driven low intensity conflict war game. Honduran and Salvadoran military personnel collaborated with U.S. troops under the U.S. Southcom during each operation. Military units from El Salvador were also recently brought to the United States for participation in "low intensity scenario exercises" at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. U.S. Military Bases in Central America Although slowly being drawn down in compliance with the 1977 Panama Canal treaties, the United States has nearly eleven thousand troops and one thousand civilian support personnel stationed at several major bases in Panama. These include Howard Air Force Base, Fort Kobbe, Rodman Naval Station, the Jungle Operations Training Center and Quarry Heights, the head quarters of Southcom. Although the Southcom headquarters staff will relocate to Miami in 1997, current plans call for a slow reduction in U.S. combat and support forces and phased base closures with departure to be completed by December 31, 1999. Less well-known than the U.S. occupancy in Panama is the permanent U.S. presence at Honduras' Soto Cano air base. Approximately eleven hundred U.S. Army and Air Force troops equipped with thirty-five helicopters are stationed there along with counterdrug personnel and aircraft of the U.S. Customs Service. Although originally established as part of the covert campaign of support for U.S.-backed contras in their war against Nicaragua, Soto Cano has taken on new importance to U.S. military planners with the impending closure of U.S. facilities in Panama. General Barry R. McCaffrey, commander in chief of Southcom, makes the following case for a continued U.S. presence at Soto Cano: "While the circumstances in Central America have changed dramatically for the better in recent years...this organization and its facilities continue to be useful...We fly supplies into this C-5 capable airfield from the United States (and) distribute the supplies throughout the region...our presence in Honduras allows us operational flexibility as we draw down in Panama. Maintaining access to this facility...continues to be cost effective and in our best interest."22 Arms Giveaways and Sales As if to supplement and enhance its position as the world's leading manufacturer and largest exporter of armaments, the United States maintains an Excess Defense Articles giveaway program which it uses to deplete its own inventories of outdated weapons. While it appears that only nonlethal equipment is currently being directly exported to Central America from this program, the final destinations of used, obsolete or excess U.S.-made weapons are not always clear, especially if shipments pass through a third country or are too insignificant to fall within the legal requirements for reporting to Congress or the Defense Department.23 Of the approximately $10 million value placed on excess defense articles reported as directly transferred to Central America in fiscal years 1994 and 1995, $9 million consisted of radar equipment given to Costa Rica. The remainder included such items as used trucks as well as chairs, desks and books shipped to the Salvadoran military. This recent shopping list is in stark contrast to "excess" items such as armed patrol boats, tanks and other weaponry that found its way to Central America from U.S. arsenals in past decades. Although the Clinton administration's 1994 "National Security Strategy" paper declares that "Arms control is an integral part of our national security strategy," the United States has come to dominate the world's post-Cold War arms-sales market.24 However, Central America now accounts for only a minuscule portion of U.S. military sales. Furthermore, nearly all of what little materiel now reaches Central America through the Pentagon-sponsored Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is non-lethal. The total value of reported U.S. arms sales to the region in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 amounted to a mere $607,213. Of this amount, only about $45,000 bought actual weaponry -- 215 U.S-made assault rifles destined for the 370 soldiers of the Belizean armed forces. However, even if no significant amounts of new or more sophisticated arms are entering the region, there is a vast overstock already there that can have a destabilizing effect inimical to national reconciliation and U.S. interests. After years of internal wars, the proliferation of military-style weapons exacerbates a growing crime problem. The following comments are typical of concerns expressed by U.S. officials during the CIP interviews: "...there are tons of weapons of war out there, M-16s, AK-47s and grenades. It will get worse before it gets better. Criminal bands are a major threat to stability." Police training U.S. officials in every country visited by CIP cited the growing menace of criminal violence and the degree to which it reflected the weakness not only of criminal justice systems but civil society at large. More than once did we hear "The main threat to internal stability is crime." Receiving blame for this situation was the easy availability of weapons, widespread unemployment and the corruption of criminal justice systems. The United States now justifies a number of specifically targeted programs as responses to the crime problem. These include police aid under the Administration of Justice initiative administered by the International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) in the U.S. Department of Justice. The Drug Enforcement Administration, also operating out of the Department of Justice, posts U.S. agents as trainers and advisors in Central America and elsewhere. In addition, specialized training may also be provided by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters and the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in the Department of State. AID has its own programs promoting the rule of law and good governance. These programs of police aid, fragmented among a number of civilian U.S. agencies, have come about partly in reaction to a congressional ban on the direct transfer of military weapons and service to police forces. However, U.S. assistance to police forces must be included in any analysis of U.S. ties to regional militaries because of the traditional military control of civilian police functions in most Central American countries. For example, there was considerable criticism, especially from human rights groups, of ICITAP aid to the Guatemalan police -- then a part of the military -- in the late 1980s during the height of the government's brutal counter-insurgency campaign. Although the police in Guatemala and El Salvador have now been officially removed from military jurisdiction, in Honduras the police remain a branch of the military. IMET and the School of the Americas As noted above, U.S. officials in Central America interviewed by CIP were nearly unanimous in proclaiming the importance of enhancing the "professionalization" of Central American militaries. Not only combat effectiveness, but respect for democracy, civilian rule and human rights are said to be increased by exposure to U.S. military personnel and doctrine during joint exercises and, especially, through formal U.S. military training. Central American military personnel sent to the United States for training were said to "...come back with a better attitude." Although "professionalization" may contribute to institutional continuity and improve the combat effectiveness of some military units, little empirical evidence exists to support interviewees' assertions that it helps "promote democracy, the peace process and civilian control".25 Because training was until recently primarily budgeted under International Military Education and Training (IMET), this has been one of the most readily quantified U.S. ties with Central American militaries.26 From fiscal years 1993 through 1995 Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras received approximately $4.5 million worth of military training from the U.S. Central American officers and enlisted personnel receive U.S. training and guidance in their own countries from U.S. Milgroup advisers, both civilian and military. With peace has come a significant reduction in the U.S. Milgroup presence in Central America. In El Salvador, for example, the Milgroup has ceased all direct advising activities and been reduced in size from a staff of eighty at the end of the civil war to six today. Typical of the makeup and role of Milgroups currently posted to Central America is the contingent in Honduras, which consists of nine U.S. military personnel, two U.S. civilian employees and a ten-member Honduran support staff. Technical training is often done by North Americans on temporary assignment, such as the fourteen Air Force personnel who were training Hondurans on use of a new radar system at the time of CIP's fact-finding mission in December 1994. IMET also provides for the training of personnel at counter-insurgency warfare schools maintained by the United States in Panama and at selected schools in the continental United States. Small numbers of foreign officers are also offered scholarships at one of the three U.S. service academies. One of West Point 's best-known Central American alumni was Nicaragua 's former president, General Anastasio Somoza. However, most Central Americans are likely to receive their U.S.-based military training at the School of the Americas operated by the U.S. Army. Established in 1946, it has provided courses for more than fifty-eight thousand Latin American soldiers and officers. Although it was moved from Panama to Fort Benning, Georgia in 1984, the SOA has maintained the distinction of being the only large U.S. training facility in which foreign military personnel are not integrated into regular U.S. military training courses. Although a key part of its mission is to "professionalize" military trainees by teaching respect for human rights and civilian authority, the records of many of the SOA's Central American graduates leave much to be desired.27 SOA alumni from the region include Panama's former president, Manuel Noriega, now serving time in a U.S. prison for drug trafficking, and Roberto D'Aubuisson, organizer of Salvadoran death squads. Lesser-known Salvadoran SOA graduates have also made their mark on that country's unhappy modern history. Nineteen of the twenty-six Salvadoran officers cited by the Truth Commission for planning, carrying out and covering up the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests and two associates were trained at Fort Benning. More recently, in Guatemala, the three most senior officers who backed President Serrano's failed "auto-coup" in May 1993 were all SOA alumni. Human-rights and church groups in the United States are leading an ongoing campaign to close the School of the Americas. These critics charge that the extensive record of abuse by many of its graduates demonstrates that SOA fails to instill deference to civilian rule and regard for the rules of war and human rights.28 Efforts to close the SOA in Congress have been led by Representative Joseph P. Kennedy II (D-Mass.), who has lost two increasingly close votes in the past two years to eliminate SOA funding. Representative Kennedy and other SOA opponents point out that closing the facility will not bar U.S. training of Latin American armed forces -- but simply require that it take place in the same way thousands of other foreign troops receive training -- alongside U.S. military personnel in regular classes. For its part, the U.S. Army has reacted to efforts to close the SOA by hiring a civilian research firm to evaluate the school's future. Awarded in May 1995, the consulting contract cites changes in the army 's mission due to the end of the Cold War and adds: "The question of the continued need for SOA has surfaced. There is a need to determine whether the SOA should exist and for what purpose."29 The CIA in Central America For well over forty years the CIA has been deeply involved in Central America. Little is known about the agency's activities, however, since most are carried out in secret. Only when operations are spectacularly successful, or spectacularly unsuccessful, do they come to the public's attention. The first publicized "success" came in 1954, when the CIA helped overthrow the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Arbenz, who had been democratically elected, was a reformer who had clashed with the United Fruit Company. In the 1960s, as part of the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress, the United States spent huge sums to strengthen local militaries throughout the region, and provided the armies with intelligence units. These national intelligence units became firmly established in most countries, and most could now sustain themselves even if all support from the CIA were ended. The CIA was extensively involved in the contra war against Nicaragua's Sandinista government during the 1980s. In March 1981 President Reagan submitted a finding to Congress authorizing $19.5 million for covert actions in the region to undermine the Nicaraguan government.30 The presidential finding laid the ground work for covert paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and Honduras that continued for almost a decade, and ultimately involved activities in every country in the region, including Panama. The veil of secrecy covering current CIA activities in Central America was lifted in March when Representative Robert G. Torricelli (D- N.J.) charged that a Guatemalan army colonel on the CIA payroll was involved in the killing of an American innkeeper in 1990 and the 1992 torture and murder of a Guatemalan rebel leader married to an American attorney. As a result of the widespread outrage in Congress and the press about the U.S. link to the murders, President Clinton suspended all CIA funding of the Guatemalan army 's D-2 intelligence unit. In recent years, according to press reports, the CIA has spent between $5 million and $7 million a year in Guatemala.31 This funding continued even after U.S. military aid was suspended to protest the 1990 murder of the American innkeeper. At the end of March, President Clinton ordered a review of past U.S. intelligence and military activities in Guatemala. An internal CIA investigation concluded that CIA field officers consistently failed to disclose their covert activities in Guatemala to two U.S. ambassadors, Congress, and the agency itself.32 The executive branch reviews and planned House and Senate intelligence committee hearings on American involvement in Guatemala are to be accompanied by the declassification of large numbers of documents. These should provide the first detailed account of how the United States has established and supported a local intelligence operation in Central America. Moreover, the reviews will try to determine how much American military and intelligence officials knew about the Guatemalan army's responsibility for the murders of more than one hundred thousand of its own citizens over the last three decades. U.S. involvement with recent military abuses of human rights in Central America has not been limited to Guatemala. An investigation by the Baltimore Sun uncovered U.S. collaboration with the Honduran army's Battalion 316, which kidnapped, tortured and killed hundreds of Hondurans in the 1980s. Declassified documents and interviews reveal that the CIA not only equipped Battalion 316 and trained its members in the United States, but hired Argentine counterinsurgency veterans from that country 's "Dirty War" to help CIA instructors further train the battalion near Tegucigalpa. While its exact number of victims will never be known, as of late 1993 the Honduran government still listed one hundred and eighty-four people as missing and presumed dead after being kidnapped by Battalion 316.33 The long-term impact of the recent Guatemalan and Honduran revelations is likely to be limited unless the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies themselves are reformed. The lack of accountability that has allowed the CIA to keep death-squad killers on its payroll in Central America is a systemic problem. The new CIA director, John M. Deutch, who has said privately that he believes the CIA has no business operating in places like Guatemala, is already confronting institutional resistance to investigating and curbing the agency's clandestine activities.34 Conclusion The more the United States attempts to articulate its post-Cold War security concerns in relation to Central America, the less they tend to resemble any credible strategic military threats. The security matters U.S. officials now articulate can more accurately be categorized as social and economic concerns than as dangers to U.S. territorial integrity or national survival. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Alexander F. Watson, "sound political and social conditions are indispensable to a positive long-term trade and investment climate."35 Nevertheless, there remains a web of U.S. military and intelligence collaboration with the military establishments of Central America, while police training has been revived for the first time since the early 1970s. The fact that the military ties are now under the rubric of counter-narcotics and civic action programs and that police and military training emphasizes instruction in human rights and democratic values does not resolve the apparent dilemma of continued U.S. support for the most repressive sectors of Central American society; it merely justifies it in new terms. The rationale has changed: Cold War, ideology-based concerns have been discarded in favor of new ones more consistent with democratic values and post-Cold War concerns. But the liability of collaboration with historically anti-democratic actors remains. Anne Grant contributed to this article. Funding was provided by the United States Institute of Peace. ENDNOTES 1. Stephen Metz, America in the Third World: Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications, Strategic Studies Institute, May 20, 1994, p. 9. 2. The White House, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," U.S.G.P.O., July 1994, pp. i-1. 3. Envoy in Nicaragua Says U.S. Won t Meddle, The New York Times, February 10, 1994. This is a refreshingly different perspective than that expressed early in the Reagan administration by the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick: El Salvador is today the most important country in the world for the United States. 4. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, Remarks to the Council of the Americas, May 22, 1995, p.3 of official transcript. 5. The Center for International Policy conducted inter views with seven high-ranking U.S. civilian and military officials responsible for monitoring events and implement ing U.S. policy in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in December, 1994. All interviews were on a not-for-attribution basis. 6. A National Security Strategy, pp. 1-3. 7. Ibid., p.1; pp.8-10. 8. Emphasis by interviewee. 9. The last military assistance monies in the pipeline to Central America were Foreign Military Financing grants obligated as of FY 1993 to El Salvador ($11 million) and Honduras ($1.5 million). 10. Brian Atwood, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, Senate Committee on Appro priations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs; Hearings on Appropria tions for Fiscal Year 1995, March 2, 1994, p. 392. 11. Robert H. Holden, U.S. Military Power in Central America, The International History Review, Vol. XV, No. 2, May 1993, p. 302. 12. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, Senate Com mittee on Appropriations, Export Financing and Related Programs, Hearings on Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995, March 2, 1994, p. 166. 13. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command, prepared statement for U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings; Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995 and the Future Years Defense Program, part I, 103d Cong., 2nd sess., April 20, 1994, p. 161. 14. General George A. Joulwan, commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command, statement before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Feb. 20, 1992. 15. Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Ibid., pp. 155 and 160. 16. Curiously, this country has not been the recipient of direct U.S. assistance for narcotics interdiction and eradication. In Central America, only Guatemala has recently received such aid: $2 million in FY 1994 and $2.55 million in FY 1995. 17. Captain Craig L. Smith, Military Civic Action, The Journal of International Security Assistance Management, Fall 1985, p. 85. Smith quotes Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication #1. 18. U.S. General Accounting Office, Changes Needed to the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, Report to Congressional Requesters, November 1993, p.2. The report also raises serious questions about whether many HCA project are coordinated with U.S. foreign policy objectives, provide beneficial training for U.S. troops or meet the needs of host countries, pp. 6-9. 19. Major General Michael S. Hall, New York Air National Guard, The Adjutant General, letter to Commit tee on U.S.-Latin American Relations, June 28, 1994, p. 2. 20. Benjamin C. Schwarz, Peacetime Engagement and the Underdeveloped World: The U.S. Military 's Nation Assistance Mission, The Rand Corporation, November 1991, pp. 23-4. 21. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff Info Service Center, Public Affairs Guidance on Fuertes Caminos in Guatemala, December 1994, p. 1. 22. General Barry R. McCaffrey, commander in chief, United States Southern Command, prepared statement for U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings; Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995 and the Future Years Defense Program, Part I, 103d Congress, 2nd sess., April 20, 1994, p. 156. 23. The last officially reported shipment of lethal items transferred to Central America at no cost was $7,030 worth of World War II-era small arms ammunition sent to Honduras in FY 1993. 24. National Security Strategy, p. 12. 25. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. See especially pp. 230-237 for documenta tion and analysis of the difficulties in promoting respect for civilian rule and human rights through U.S. military training. 26. Beginning with FY 1995, foreign military training expenditures have been recategorized as part of the congressionally mandated restructuring of IMET intended to emphasize h uman rights training and civilian control of the military. Known as Expanded IMET, the program is now subdivided under the budget headings of Building Democracy and Promoting Peace." Since Building Democracy can include police and civilian training and scholarships, training monies devoted specifically to military personnel have become more difficult to break out. 27. Courses specifically devoted to human rights were made a regular part of the SOA curriculum in 1989. 28. See especially The U.N. Truth Commission Report on El Salvador and the U.S. Army School of the Americas, Washington Office on Latin America, August 27, 1993. More complete lists of SOA graduates responsible for human rights violations, war crimes and military coups are available from Amnesty International and the Latin America Working Group, both in Washington, DC. 29. School of the Americas Will Be Evaluated, The New York Times, May 11, 1995, p. B10. 30. For details about the covert war against Nicaragua, see Peter Kornbluh, The Covert War, in Thomas Walker, Reagan versus the Sandinistas, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 21-38. 31. Defense Department to Investigate U.S. Military Role in Guatemala, The Washington Post, April 1, 1995, p. A2. 32. Tim Weiner, CIA Says Agents Deceived Superiors on Guatemala Role, The New York Times, July 26, 1995, p. A1 and A11. 33. Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson, Unearthed: Fatal Secrets, The Baltimore Sun, June 11, 1995, p. 1 and 10A. 34. Walter Pincus, CIA Officials are Cleared in Slayings, The Washington Post, July 27, 1995, p. 1 and A32. 35. Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Trade and Other U.S. Priorities in the Americas, Remarks to the Council of the Americas, May 22, 1995, p. 8 of official transcript. Additional Reports Available from the Center for International Policy Our Cuba Diplomacy: A Critical Reexamination by Wayne S. Smith The former top U.S. diplomat to Havana evaluates U.S. Cuba policy during 1992-94. "Rather than seeking a peaceful transitional process in Cuba, it seemed more intent on provoking some kind of internal explosion." Critically reviews several key assumptions underlying the policy. Single copies, $1.50. Call to place bulk order @ 25 cents. The Travel Ban to Cuba by Wayne S. Smith The United States opts for the kind of travel controls usually imposed by authoritarian govern ments." Single copies, $1.50. Call to place bulk order @ 25 cents. Human Rights in Cuba: Initiating the Dialogue By Wayne S. Smith Documents a frank exchange between American and Cuban human rights experts in March 1995. Single copies, $1.50. Call to place bulk order @ 25 cents. Haiti: Success Under Fire By James Morrell The successful restoration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti 's presidency, and the challenges ahead for Haitian democracy. Single copies, $1.50. Call to place bulk order @ 25 cents. El Salvador's Death Squads By Lauren Gilbert Presentation of new evidence from U.S. documents. Single copies, $1.50. Call to place bulk order @ 25 cents. U.S. Human Rights Law A portfolio of four reports detailing the laws prohibiting U.S. aid to human rights violators abroad. Booklet 1: Military Aid Booklet 2: Economic Aid Booklet 3: Multilateral Aid Booklet 4: Workers Rights $6.00/portfolio, $1.50/booklet. Call to place bulk order @ $1.00/portfolio or 25 cents/booklet. IPR -- CENTRAL AMERICA Center for International Policy 1755 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 232-3317 Fax: (202) 232-3440 E-mail: cip@igc.apc.org A Publication of the Center for International Policy Copyright 1995 by the Center for International Policy. All rights reserved. Any material herein may be quoted without permission, with credit to the Center. The Center is a nonprofit educational and research organization dealing with U.S. policy towards the Third World and its impact on human rights and needs. ISSN 0738-6508