




# Rethinking Plan Colombia

**\$4 billion in U.S. aid since 2000;  
\$3.2 billion (80%) for Colombia's military and police**

**U.S. Aid to Colombia 1997-2006**



**Military and Police Assistance Programs**  
(millions of dollars; numbers *underlined and italicized* are estimates taken by averaging previous two years)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005, estimate	2006, requested
<b>International Narcotics Control (INC, also known as "Andean Counterdrug Initiative")</b>										
State Department-managed counter-drug arms transfers, training, and services	33.5	56.5	200.1	688.1	46.4	254.2	431	324.6	321.8	331.9
<b>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</b>										
Grants for defense articles, training and services	30	0	0.4	0	4.5	0	17.1	98.5	99.2	90
<b>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</b>										
Training, usually not counter-drug	0	0.9	0.9	0.9	1	1.2	1.2	1.7	1.7	1.7
<b>Emergency Drawdowns</b>										
Presidential authority to grant counter-drug equipment from U.S. arsenal	14.2	41.1	58	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>"Section 1004"</b>										
Authority to use the defense budget for some types of counter-drug aid	10.3	11.8	35.9	68.7	190.2	119.1	165	122	200	<i>161</i>
<b>"Section 1033"</b>										
Authority to use the defense budget to provide riverine counter-drug aid to Colombia	0	2.2	13.5	7.2						
<b>Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)</b>										
Grants for anti-terrorism defense articles, training and services	0	0	0	0	?	25	3.3	0	3.9	3.9
<b>Excess Defense Articles (EDA)</b>										
Authority to transfer "excess" equipment	0.1	0	0	0.4	0.5	2.4	3.4	<i>2.9</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>2.9</i>
<b>Discretionary Funds from the Office of National Drug Control Policy</b>										
	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>88.6</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>621</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>629.5</b>	<b>590.5</b>
Percentage of total	100%	100%	97%	78%	98%	77%	81%	79%	81%	80%

**Economic and Social Assistance Programs**  
(millions of dollars)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005, estimate	2006, request
<b>Economic Support Funds (ESF)</b>										
Transfers to the recipient government	0	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Development Assistance (DA)</b>										
Funds for development projects	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>International Narcotics Control (INC, also known as "Andean Counterdrug Initiative")</b>										
State Department managed funding for counter-drug economic and social aid	0	0.5	5.8	208	5.7	120.3	149.2	149.3	152.1	152.2
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>152.1</b>	<b>152.2</b>
Percentage of total	0%	0%	3%	22%	2%	23%	19%	21%	19%	20%

<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>88.6</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>977</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>522</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>781.6</b>	<b>742.7</b>
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# Rethinking Plan Colombia


## A growing U.S. presence

**2002: More than \$150 million in aid delivered through sixteen State and Defense Department contractors**

**2003: Three U.S. Defense Department contractors taken hostage by FARC guerrillas**

**2004: Troop cap doubled from 400 to 800; Contractor cap increased from 400 to 600**

US Presence in Colombia




Scott Dalton / AP file



## Disappointing results against the drug trade

**There has been no change in the price or availability of cocaine in the United States. In fact, the drug has become cheaper.**

**Figure 1: U.S. Retail Prices of Cocaine and Crack** (purchases of 2 grams or less of cocaine, 1 gram or less of crack)



\* 2003 figures are based on data for January–June only.

Source: Prepared for the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), obtained by WOLA prior to official release.

Source: Washington Office on Latin America, using ONDCP data.

“Key indicators of domestic cocaine availability show **stable or slightly increased availability in drug markets throughout the country** ... Cocaine use among adults appears to be trending upward overall. MTF 2003 data show that rates of past year use for powder cocaine among young adults aged 19 to 28 and college students aged 19 to 22 have trended upward from 2000 through 2003.” – Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, *National Drug Threat Assessment 2005*




# Rethinking Plan Colombia

## Disappointing results against the drug trade

**Cultivation of coca, the crop used to make cocaine, has changed little from 1999-2000, when Plan Colombia began. In 2004, record levels of aerial herbicide fumigation failed to reduce Colombian coca-growing by even one acre.**

### Andean Coca Cultivation

Source: State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports, 1996-2004




	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
<b>Colombia</b>	34,000	42,400	40,100	37,500	37,100	39,700	44,700	50,900	57,200	79,500	101,800	122,500	136,200	169,800	144,400	113,850	114,000
<b>Peru</b>	115,530	121,685	121,300	120,800	129,100	108,800	108,600	115,300	94,400	68,800	51,000	38,700	34,100	34,000	36,600	31,150	27,500
<b>Bolivia</b>	48,925	52,900	50,300	47,900	45,500	47,200	48,100	48,600	48,100	45,800	38,000	21,800	14,600	19,900	24,400	28,450	24,600
<b>Total</b>	198,455	216,985	211,700	206,200	211,700	195,700	201,400	214,800	199,700	194,100	190,800	183,000	184,900	223,700	205,400	173,450	166,100



## Disappointing results against the drug trade

*Attempted coca-growing – the amount of coca eradicated plus the amount left over – has grown sharply. Aerial herbicide fumigation is **not** discouraging coca-growers from cutting down new forest and replanting.*

Total Coca Cultivation Estimates, Dept. of State, 1996-2004



	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Uneradicated Coca Colombia	57,200	79,500	101,800	122,500	136,200	169,800	144,400	113,850	114,000
Eradication Colombia	5,600	19,000	31,123*	43,246	47,371	84,251	122,695	132,817	136,555
Uneradicated Coca Peru	94,400	68,800	51,000	38,700	34,100	34,000	36,000	31,150	27,500
Eradication Peru	1,259	3,462	7,825	13,800	6,200	3,900	7,000	11,313	10,339
Uneradicated Coca Bolivia	48,100	45,800	38,000	21,800	14,600	19,900	24,400	28,450	24,600
Eradication Bolivia	7,512	7,026	11,621	16,999	7,653	9,435	11,839	10,000	8,437
	<b>214,071</b>	<b>223,588</b>	<b>241,369</b>	<b>257,045</b>	<b>246,124</b>	<b>321,286</b>	<b>346,334</b>	<b>327,580</b>	<b>321,431</b>
									<b>Increase 1996-2004: 50.2%</b>

\*No reliable data. Average of previous and subsequent years.






# Rethinking Plan Colombia

## Disappointing results against violent groups

Leftist guerrillas, thought to have been weakened by Plan Colombia, have launched a bloody counter-offensive this year with attacks throughout the country. Neither a military victory nor a negotiated settlement is likely in the near future.




**"Plan Patriota" zone:  
U.S.-supported military  
offensive begun in  
January 2004; area of  
constant combat**



# Rethinking Plan Colombia

## Paramilitary groups are increasing their influence over local governments and economies





## Disappointing results on human rights

**Impunity – whether for human-rights crimes or corruption – remains a serious problem. There has been no progress toward punishing criminal activity against powerful, wealthy or ruthless individuals.**

“Impunity remained at the core of the country's human rights problems.” – *Department of State human rights report, 2/28/05*

“More than 90 percent of violent crimes go unsolved.” – *Freedom House, Freedom in the World annual report*

“There is a climate of impunity that surrounds human rights violations by State security forces and organs.” – *UN Committee against Torture 2004*

“The Attorney General’s Office continues to make little progress in prosecuting commanding military officers against whom there are credible allegations of human rights violations. Prosecutors appear to lack the political will necessary to take on such high-ranking and well-connected suspects.” – *Human Rights Watch World Report 2004*

According to the State Department’s last human rights certification of Colombia (September 2004):

- Only 31 military personnel (21 enlisted men and 10 officers) under indictment for human rights abuses.
- Of those, only two above the rank of major.






## Colombia's own contribution remains low


**U.S. aid cannot substitute for a lack of commitment from Colombian elites. Yet tax collection and military-service guidelines indicate that wealthy Colombians are not making the sacrifices necessary to resolve their country's problems.**

Tax Revenues (% of GDP)  
2000\*



\*IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002

Tax Revenues in Andean Countries, 2002



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations, *Andes 2020*

**"It remains an embarrassing fact that only 740,000 Colombians pay income tax in a country of 42 million people." – Council on Foreign Relations, *Andes 2020***

"According to a law passed in 1962, high school graduates were exempt from combat risk while serving in the military. ... A U.S. State Department official calculated that a Colombian high school graduate has a 1 in 50 chance of being drafted, while the humble nonhigh school graduate of the lower class has a much better chance. ... **Colombia exemplifies the 'rich man's war and the poor man's fight.'** ... Even though some high school graduates do indeed serve in combat, current practice still reflects an elite view that military service is suitable only for those of the lower class. Such an attitude is not conducive to the collective sacrifice that is crucial to winning wars." – Gabriel Marcella, U.S. Army War College, *The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity*



## What to do instead

**Recommendations from  
Blueprint for a New Colombia  
Policy, published in March 2005  
and available at  
[www.ciponline.org/colombia/  
0503blueprint.pdf](http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/0503blueprint.pdf)**

### Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy



Plan Colombia, or the Broader Counterdrug Initiative, was originally presented to Congress as a six-year plan to reduce drug crop cultivation, improve human rights and the rule of law, and promote a peaceful end to a decades-old war. Of the \$4 billion in aid provided in the past six years (2000-2005), \$3.2 billion—80 percent—has gone to Colombia's security forces, with the remainder barely making a dent in the country's many other urgent needs. Though Plan Colombia has reached its expiration date, the Bush Administration is requesting FY2006 aid at the same level of more than \$700 million, 80 percent of it military and police aid, maintaining Colombia as the top recipient of U.S. foreign assistance outside the Middle East.

At this five-year marker, reevaluation of the program is imperative. While Colombia's crisis is urgent and the United States can and should help, our priorities must shift. Instead of helping Colombia's military to occupy its territory, we must encourage Colombia's elected leaders to strengthen the rule of law and foster more equitable development, governing for the good of all.

This memo briefly examines progress towards Plan Colombia's stated goals and then presents a blueprint for rethinking future aid and policy to Colombia.

By some measures, Colombia's performance has improved since 2000, although the human rights situation remains extremely grave. Bogota government figures show that the number of people kidnapped dropped from 3,372 in July 2001-June

2002 to 1,441 in 2004. Murders have fallen from 28,837 in 2002 to 20,011 in 2004. While nearly 200 of Colombia's 1,092 counties lacked a police presence in 2001, all now have at least a small contingent of police. After increasing steadily from the mid-1990s to 2001, State Department figures indicate that the number of acres planted with illicit crops appears to have dropped by about one-third between 2001 and 2002.<sup>1</sup>

Despite these welcome gains, the stated objectives of Plan Colombia have not been achieved. A variety of deeply disturbing trends make plain that this policy is failing. A fundamental re-thinking is urgently required.

1. Failure to reduce the availability or use of cocaine and heroin in the United States. Despite stable if not rising demand, the U.S. prices of cocaine and heroin continue to decline. The number of current cocaine users is on the rise, including a 1.3 percent increase from 2002 to 2003.<sup>2</sup> The numbers of new cocaine and heroin users in recent years are considerably higher than during the mid-1990s, and use is beginning at younger ages.<sup>3</sup> Cocaine and heroin use among high school students was actually higher in 2004 than in 2001.<sup>4</sup> Between 1996 and 2002, rates of cocaine- and heroin-related hospital emergencies rose by one-third and one-fifth, respectively.<sup>5</sup> Cocaine and heroin supplies remain robust, and these drugs remain readily available in the United States.<sup>6</sup> Despite considerable efforts to discourage illicit drug use by driving up prices, in the third quarter of 2003 the U.S. wholesale and retail prices of cocaine and heroin were

By Lisa Haggard, Latin America Working Group Education Fund; Adam Isaacson, Center for International Policy; and Kimberly Stanich, John Walsh, and Jarrett Voss, Washington Office on Latin America.



## Low-cost:

- Use U.S. leverage far more vigorously in support of **human rights** and the rule of law.
- Support the **recommendations** of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for Colombia
- Insist upon the complete **dismantlement of paramilitary forces** and structures, within an effective legal framework for justice, truth, and reparations.
- Make **trade** consistent with sustainable drug policy and human rights.
- Encourage **negotiations** with the guerrillas for a just and lasting peace.
- Encourage Colombia's elite to use **more of its own resources** to improve governance.

## Fund by reducing security assistance:

- Support a strong **judiciary** and an independent human rights sector.
- Expand alternative development within a comprehensive **rural development strategy**, and end aerial spraying.
- Encourage the strengthening of **civilian governance** in rural areas, including local peace-building initiatives.
- Increase and improve humanitarian assistance, and expand protection, to **displaced persons and refugees**.
- **Reduce U.S. demand for drugs** through evidence-based prevention strategies and improved access to high-quality treatment.