Plan Colombia and Beyond

A very wide, fair and realistic analysis of the situation.

Colombia should have used more mainstream and legal diplomatic means to capture Mr. Granda, even if such a process would be more complicated. Maybe Uribe's administration believed that it would look "strong" in the face of internal public opinion by doing it this way, but even such an effect's not going to be long-lasting...

Likewise, Venezuela's pulling the plug on all trade and billateral agreements was an overreaction, albeit in an environment of understandable dissatisfaction. It probably was a bit politically motived by the more militant leftwingers within Chavez's administration and his more radical supporters (Chavez himself, despite his personality and lack of protocol, seems to be much more reasonable personally when dealing with Colombia and even with Uribe himself).

As for the U.S. government's "100%" support of Colombia...one could even say that it's playing right into the hands of leftwingers everywhere, and not doing much to actually help Colombia in practice with this complicated situation.

1) HAS Venezuela ended all trade and billateral relations with Colombia?

(I heard Chavez say he would. But I'm reading that it hasn't happened. Any news on that?)

2) Is the FARC a terrorist organization?
3) Is Granda a participating member of the FARC? What, exactly, does "the Chancellor," "Foreign Minister," or "Finance Minister," as he is alternately described, actually do?
4) Or is he just a member of the peaceful left voicing sympathy for the FARC's cause?
5) Did Colombia issue a warrant via Interpol for Granda or not? What are the charges?
6) Is Venezuela a member state in Interpol?
7) When was Granda granted Venezuelan citizenship?
8) Was that citizenship granted in his name?
9) If there WAS an interpol warrant out for him, and his Venezuelan passport WAS in his name... how did he pass through Venezuelan immigration without being arrested?
10) Was he invited to the conference or not? Did the officials attending el congresso not know who he was? Was he in disguise?

"we still don’t know exactly how Granda was captured... since legal channels were not used to bring Granda to justice, Chávez is probably right when he says that Venezuelan law was broken... before trust deteriorates still further, communication between the two governments is necessary to determine... whether perceptions of Venezuelan non-cooperation have any basis in fact."

That's all accurate. But without intending any offense, it all seems a little naive.

1. Probably not - the business community in border towns is still wondering the same thing. At least big projects, like the gas pipeline, are frozen, though.
2. The FARC is on the FTO lists of most countries or entities that keep them.
3. Granda is a longtime member of the FARC. Being the "chancellor" apparently means he spends most of his time outside Colombia, making contacts internationally. He probably hasn't heard a shot fired in anger in quite some time.
4. No.
5. Here's what El Tiempo said on the 16th: In fact, Interpol had rejected an international arrest warrant against Granda, apparently because a crime like "rebellion" is not acceptable for its "red alerts."
6. Yes.
7. Unclear. It might have been resident status, though it does seem that he voted. Juan Forero's piece in today's NY Times says Granda lived in a Venezuelan town outside Caracas for two years.
8. No idea.
9. Venezuela insists it knew of no Interpol warrant, and we're not sure there was one.
10. Not at all clear whether he was invited or recognized.

I stand by the statement that you find naive. While Venezuela's possible protection of FARC members needs to be clarified, it's pretty apparent that whatever happened between Caracas and Cúcuta was illegal.

Adam,

Thanks for the answers. I think I wasn't clear with my last - I'm sorry. I don't find your commentary naive because I think the capture was "legal."

You'll get no argument from me there.

It's that your discussion characterizes this is a missunderstanding between amicable neighbors, best resolved by some clarification and negotiation.

And it seems to me that the problem is that Mr. Chavez tolerates and supports the FARC operating from Venezuela. Punto.

As I asked, are the FARC a terrorist group, or not? What is CIP's postion?

Has Chavez publicly offered them assylum, or does he deny supporting them?

I'm trying to resolve some ambiguities about this warrant.

Bogota claims it exists. The London FT claims that Granda was put on a wanted list a year ago (did they fact check that?).

You are citing EL Tiempo as saying that the warrant was never issued. But the article simply quotes _Ali Rodrigues_ , as saying the warrant doesn't exist. Though he could be correct, but I'm not sure I want to take his word for it given all the conflicting and mendacious accounts of this affair being generated in Caracas.

This is why, BTW, I asked you what this guy really does.

AI: "Being the "chancellor" apparently means he spends most of his time outside Colombia, making contacts internationally. He probably hasn't heard a shot fired in anger in quite some time."

What does that mean, "contacts internationally?" Does a Chancellor do things like money laundering, fund raising, trafficing, perhaps purchasing arms? If he simply plays a key support role for a terrorist group (are they, sir?) is he innocent?

He shouldn't be extradited?

(That's a serious question, BTW. As of yet, I haven't been able to unearth the Colombian warrant, and I don't know what, exactly, he is charged with.)

My questions as to whether he was invited or recognized were somewhat rhetorical.

I'll take, "I have no idea" at face value. But do you think it reasonable that nobody knew who he was? Really?

IMHO, chastising Colombia for having broken the rules doesn't make a lot of sense.

THAT seems naive. If Uribe could have simply gotten an extradition by asking for it... why didn't he? Why risk the fallout of a covert operation?

Is it because Granda is innocent of criminal activity?

Or is it because Chavez wouldn't or wasn't honoring Colombia's requests?

Is there a reason we are dancing around the obvious here?

- “It's that your discussion characterizes this is a missunderstanding between amicable neighbors, best resolved by some clarification and negotiation.”

I do think that this crisis could be settled by a face-to-face meeting, as previous crises have been defused. Once the headline-happy advisors are out of the picture (note that Uribe has forbidden Colombian officials from speaking about the case in public), the two leaders do seem to have something of a rapport. The longer this situation drags on, though, the less likely it will be that even a face-to-face meeting will achieve much.

- “As I asked, are the FARC a terrorist group, or not? What is CIP's postion?”

Depends what you mean by “terrorist” – and the squishy definition of this term may cause the entire “war on terror” to run off the rails. If by “terrorist” you mean a group that deliberately targets civilians and tries to weaken the people’s confidence in the state’s ability to protect them, then of course, the FARC are clearly terrorists. If by “terrorist” you also mean a group that has no ideology but nihilism and cannot ever be negotiated with – well, the FARC don’t fit that definition.

The “terrorist” label becomes especially unhelpful when you end up lumping the FARC, ELN and AUC into the same category as Al Qaeda. You don’t combat Colombian guerrillas – which control territory, are organized like an army, and never commit abuses beyond Colombia’s immediate border zones – the same way you would fight Al Qaeda, which controls no territory, is organized in cells, and strikes in cities all over the world. And while the idea of negotiating a peace with Al Qaeda is laughable, it’s certainly a possibility with Colombia’s armed groups.

I give this long answer instead of a simple “yes” because in this case, a simple “yes” isn’t a helpful response.

- “And it seems to me that the problem is that Mr. Chavez tolerates and supports the FARC operating from Venezuela. Punto.” “Has Chavez publicly offered them assylum, or does he deny supporting them?”

If Chávez is truly tolerating and supporting FARC operations, Álvaro Uribe really only has one course of action: cut off all diplomatic relations, go to the OAS and the UN Security Council, and push for an international regime to isolate and sanction Chávez – threatening force if necessary – until he stops supporting the FARC. This is what you do if your neighbor is aiding and abetting people who want to overthrow you!

The fact that Uribe has taken none of those steps indicates that the intelligence supporting claims of FARC toleration and support just isn’t there.

That said, I suspect – though I can’t prove this either, and I’m on shaky ground here – that Chávez may be tolerating the presence of unarmed FARC members in Venezuela on political missions. (I’m not certain what “political missions” would be – probably the functions the FARC office in Mexico City played before it was closed in 2002, which presumably didn’t include drug and arms trafficking.) If so, this toleration may owe to misplaced good intentions. During the failed 1998-2002 peace process, Mauricio Vargas has written, “Chávez was dying to serve as a mediator in the Colombian armed conflict. He had old and good relations with the FARC and the ELN, and he believed he could play a decisive role in negotiations.”

This is highly speculative, of course, but it seems to me to be the most likely explanation why Chávez might allow someone like Rodrigo Granda to remain in Venezuela – if he indeed knew about his presence.

Meanwhile, it’s worth pointing out that Granda also freely entered and exited Ecuador – according to the Miami Herald, “more than 30 times between 1999 and 2004, using both a legitimate Colombian passport and an Ecuadorean government ID card, both in his own name.” Yet nobody’s accusing Ecuador of harboring anybody.

- “I'm trying to resolve some ambiguities about this warrant. Bogota claims it exists. The London FT claims that Granda was put on a wanted list a year ago (did they fact check that?).”

Still no idea. El Colombiano reported on the 18th that Granda’s name was entered into an Interpol database in January 2004, possibly for having ties to FARC and Spain’s ETA. Addition to a database is not the same as a warrant, though. If there was a warrant, Ecuador missed it too.

- “THAT seems naive. If Uribe could have simply gotten an extradition by asking for it... why didn't he? Why risk the fallout of a covert operation?”

They didn’t think they _were_ risking the fallout – they thought they could get away with it by sticking to the “caught in Cúcuta” story.

Regarding extradition – and I’m ignorant about the two countries’ extradition treaty and how often it’s employed – I too wonder why the Colombians did not make a high-profile extradition request. Even if they believed that Venezuela would be reticent about handing Granda over, they had nothing to lose. If Chávez cooperated, they would have had Granda in custody legally. If Chávez stonewalled, Venezuelan “harboring” of FARC members would have been plain for all to see. Either way, Uribe would have won.

Instead, Colombia got Granda through illegal means, and Chávez’s relationship to the FARC is still ambiguous. Sounds like a completely botched operation.

Mr. Isacson -

Thank you for your long answer. I'm enjoying the conversation, though I dissagree with you.

I don't know if you share this desire, but I'd love to see this blog attract a little more discussion. So I'm about to take it up a notch - let me know if I'm out of line.

1) Your long explanation of what terrorism means exploits much of the rhetoric employed by those skeptical of "the war on terror." It seems quisling to me, because this affair has NOTHING to do with OUR "war on terror," Al Qaeda, Iraq, the Patriot Act, or any other favorite bogeymen of those opposed to President Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East.

This is about terrorism in Colombia, and the FARC.

So yes, I think a simple answer as to your or CIP's position on whether the FARC is a terrorist organization would be VERY helpful in this case.

Why? For one, it would illuminate for me how much regard I should give CIP criticism of the School of the America's, for example, or the current peace process with the AUC.

Secondly, it naturally leads me to this question: why do you want to handle Rodrigo Granda - Chancellor for a terrorist organisation - with kid gloves?

"He probably hasn't fired a shot in anger in years?" He is only "the FARC's international representative?"

Who cares? Is he a criminal, or not? If he is a high ranking minister of the FARC, and he supports their activities by any means beyond the rhetorical, then he is subject to arrest and deportation at Colombia's request.

Now - that the Colombians may choose not to demand the arrest of certain members of ANY of the illegal armed groups in Colombia for the purposes of negotiating with them is clearly their prerogative. And I have no doubt that at various junctures they might desire a neighbor to play a third party role.

But that ought to be up to Colombia, no?

It seems to me that if a neighbor dissagrees with the Colombian government, and wants to lend the FARC credibility and treat them as a legitimate political party, then said neighbor needs to make that declaration public, and pay the consequences.

And you - CIP - ought to hold him to that.

Chavez is walking a line too thin to maintain his footing, IMHO, and I am dissapointed to see you buying even a part of his shell game. To whit:

AI: "That said, I suspect – though I can’t prove this either, and I’m on shaky ground here – that Chávez may be tolerating the presence of unarmed FARC members in Venezuela on political missions."

You're on shaky ground? Now? What would it take to convince you? The capture of a high ranking FARC minister with a Venezuelan passport attending a Congresso in downtown Caracas?

AI: "I’m not certain what “political missions” would be – probably the functions the FARC office in Mexico City played before it was closed in 2002, which presumably didn’t include drug and arms trafficking."

Not sure, eh? "Presumably?" I'd like to expect more of you. I've been around a little, and I find it hard to believe that Colombia wanted him because he was talking Marx and looking for advice on how to negotiate a peace with Bogota.

AI: "If so, this toleration may owe to misplaced good intentions... He had old and good relations with the FARC and the ELN, and he believed he could play a decisive role in negotiations."

Without Colombia's consent? That doesn't seem very promising.
_______________

Now, moving away from the big picture to some of the details.

Mr. Isacson, how does this argument work?:

"Granda also freely entered and exited Ecuador – according to the Miami Herald, “more than 30 times between 1999 and 2004, using both a legitimate Colombian passport and an Ecuadorean government ID card, both in his own name.” Yet nobody’s accusing Ecuador of harboring anybody."

The earliest date I've seen for the warrant (that we can't seem to confirm) is SEPT 2004 - inclusion in the list, JAN 2004.

So while I would normally reject the above argument as a sophisticated version of, "Look Mom, Jerry did it too!" it doesn't even seem to carry that much weight, because the dates make it largely irrelevent.

I'd like more explanation on this, as well:

"They didn’t think they _were_ risking the fallout [from a covert op] – they thought they could get away with it by sticking to the “caught in Cúcuta” story."

I'm not sure that anbody tasked with running covert ops imagines that they can be executed without risk.

Nor do I see Bogota "sticking" to any story: Uribe discurded the Cucuta lie as soon as soon as the op was exposed - within days - and he doesn't seem too worried about the consequences.

Either way, I return to the central question:

If Uribe could have had Granda delivered simply by requesting extradition... why didn't he?

You answer:

AI: "Regarding extradition – and I’m ignorant about the two countries’ extradition treaty and how often it’s employed – I too wonder why the Colombians did not make a high-profile extradition request..."

(Here's where the citizenship question comes into play. Venezuela's current constitution prohibits extradition. So when, by who, and how did Rodrigo Granda get citizenship in Venezuela? The passport IS in his name, BTW.)

AI: "Even if they believed that Venezuela would be reticent about handing Granda over, they had nothing to lose. If Chávez cooperated, they would have had Granda in custody legally. If Chávez stonewalled, Venezuelan “harboring” of FARC members would have been plain for all to see. Either way, Uribe would have won."

You sure about that?

Bogota's maintains that they notified Venezuela that he was wanted a year ago, and that its request has been ignored. So long as I've been following politics in that region, Chavez has denied these kinds of connections to the FARC. So I'm guessing that a public accusation would have simply resulted in a denial and the rapid dissapearance of Roberto Granda.

As it is, he's in jail. And Chavez HAS been exposed as harboring the FARC.

This is still "ambiguous to you?" Even while he addresses his national assembly with pious words about "sovereignty" while decrying the capture of the FARC's foreign minister in downtown Caracas at a congresso Bolivareano?

It's hard to read the tea leaves at this juncture, but I'm guessing it's not ambiguous to Zapatero who has canceled his trip to Venezuela, or to Lula who has redirected his efforts from Bogota to Caracas, or Washington which has released a circular to regional governments expressing "concern" over Venezuela's position.

"Completely botched operation," eh?

Mr. Isacson - next time I'm in Washington, I hope you're up for a beer.

OK, I see the tone is shifting here. Nice to see some traffic on the blog at least.

I see an effort here to try and tag us as partial to one of the armed groups in Colombia’s conflict, and I reject that. Our position has been the same for years:

(1) Colombia’s armed groups, right and left, can and must eventually be negotiated with.

(2) All three of Colombia’s armed groups are terrorist, because they practice terrorism. I hope that’s clear enough for you. But I stick to my longer answer in the previous posting – and I’d use it in the case of the AUC, too, because of (3).

(3) As you know very well, the “terrorist” label comes with a lot of legal and political baggage that makes U.S. policy toward these groups too inflexible. Look at the paramilitary example, where the Colombian government has been anxious to get the United States involved, but the AUC’s presence on the FTO list has made nearly all contact impossible. Call them “terrorists” if you must, but don’t put policymakers into a straitjacket. Conflict resolution requires flexibility, without which too many opportunities are missed. (CIP supported both State Department officials' meeting with the FARC in 1998 and their meeting with an AUC representative in 2003. Such meetings can be important for reducing tensions, but the "terrorist" label makes them very costly.)

(4) When negotiations are not possible, Colombia has a duty to fight illegal armed groups – all of them – but it must do so within the confines of international human rights and humanitarian law.

(5) Respect for international law should also guide Colombia’s relationship with its neighbors, and Venezuela’s relationship with Colombia.

That’s why my posting on the Granda case argues that _both_ sides are wrong. Chávez is wrong not just to have overplayed his hand with this crisis, but to have – as I suspect he has – knowingly allowed unarmed FARC members into Venezuelan territory. I doubt that he has willingly tolerated an _armed_ FARC presence, any more than Ecuador or Panama are willing to have FARC camps in their territory. (If he has, I repeat my contention that it’s hard to imagine the Uribe government wanting to have any relations with Venezuela whatsoever.)

Why do I say I “suspect” that Chávez knew about Granda’s presence, instead of the certainty you express? Because I work for an organization that values its credibility. We have to footnote. I hear lots of rumors all the time, and I believe many to be true – but if I can’t cite an unbiased source, I don’t put it in print. “Chávez harboring the FARC” still falls into that category. Sorry.

My whole discussion of the role Granda might have been playing in Venezuela – which you interpreted as apologizing for Chávez’s actions – was the closest I could come to proving a pattern of harboring unarmed FARC members. (I prefaced that discussion with “…the intelligence just isn’t there. That said…”) Without that speculation about Chávez’s motives, a knowing toleration of Granda’s presence seems like an utterly irrational provocation, far more trouble for Chávez than anything he would stand to gain from having Granda present.

“If Uribe could have had Granda delivered simply by requesting extradition... why didn't he?”

Why don’t we know yet whether any earlier request was made for his turnover, if not a formal extradition request? If there was such a request, and it was refused, why hasn’t Colombia made that public? Why are we still uncertain about the date of the Interpol warrant? You’d think Colombia would have put that piece of evidence front and center to bolster its position.

Ultimately, what has not been proven is whether Colombia requested Granda’s arrest and was rebuffed, or whether it just went ahead with the abduction. If it’s the latter, then Colombia has no case.

Even if it's the former, though, CIP can’t support the practice of extra-judicial cross-border abductions because of the precedent it sets. Should this sort of thing become the norm, with states reserving the right to carry out such operations on their neighbors’ soil, the targets will not always be members of terrorist groups.

"Mr. Isacson - next time I'm in Washington, I hope you're up for a beer."

I’m buying, Mr. (Ms.?) anonymous-person-with-a-Beck-lyric-for-an-email-address.

"Tone shifting?" You bet Mr. Isaacson! This antiseptic academic environment is doing nothing for your ratings!

I tend to call it like I see it. Am I "trying to tag you as partial to one of the illegal armed groups in Colombia?"

Not really. I wouldn't bother reading this blog if CIP were an obvious apologist for the FARC/ELN. (There are plenty, and they all revolt me.) But I do see... what? An unwillingness to call a spade a spade bleeding through here and there.

I refer to a diffident description of Rodrigo Granda here, followed by an odd reluctance to acknowledge what this whole affair says about the Chavez administration.

And I'm wondering if it were Mancuso or one of his Leiutenants attending, for example, a Liberal Conservative Party convention in Madrid with a Spanish passport if you'd feel the same way?

But thank you for clarifying: yes, I agree that the term "terrorist" is being much abused these days. In fact I agree completely with points 1-4.

"(5) Respect for international law should also guide Colombia’s relationship with its neighbors, and Venezuela’s relationship with Colombia."

That's the part I find rather polyannish.

If Venezuela won't honor her obligations as a member of Interpol, then Colombia has the choice of wanking loudly and inneffectively about it, or doing what it did, no?

Naturally, I aplaud Uribe's action. I realize you can't and won't.

But it seems like you could concede up front some of the known facts in this case - Granda's Venezuelan passport WAS in HIS name (we know this because Chavez waved it about, beating the usual nationalist drum). Granda participated in and, according to El Tiempo, at least, he spoke at the congresso. I think the odds that nobody knew who he was - come on AI, let's be straight - are slim to none.

I appreciate your strong finish - sincerely. These are great questions:

AI: "Why don’t we know yet whether any earlier request was made for his turnover, if not a formal extradition request? If there was such a request, and it was refused, why hasn’t Colombia made that public? Why are we still uncertain about the date of the Interpol warrant? You’d think Colombia would have put that piece of evidence front and center to bolster its position."

I'm eagerly awaiting the answers, too. It's a shame Interpol won't speak up, but I can well imagine why.

AI: "Ultimately, what has not been proven is whether Colombia requested Granda’s arrest and was rebuffed, or whether it just went ahead with the abduction. If it’s the latter, then Colombia has no case."

Ceded. How would a pattern earlier refusals for similar figures affect your judgement?

The problem for you and I is that the expectation that Colombia can publish that kind of classified correspondence - even to make its case - is unreasonable.

It's likely to remain he said, she said at this point, whatever the truth.

AI: "Even if it's the former, though, CIP can’t support the practice of extra-judicial cross-border abductions because of the precedent it sets. Should this sort of thing become the norm, with states reserving the right to carry out such operations on their neighbors’ soil, the targets will not always be members of terrorist groups."

Oh, come on Mr. Isaacson! I know you can't condone what Bogota did. But the sky's not falling.

If there is a precedent here, then it was set when the Israeli's grabbed Eichman. It didn't lead to the slippery slope then. I don't think it will now..

AI: "I’m buying, Mr. (Ms.?) anonymous-person-with-a-Beck-lyric-for-an-email-address."

I'll hold you to it. I'll bet you never expected such a diatribe from the galleries, eh? :)

A pleasure meeting you Mr. Isaacson. You get the last word, but I'll be back...

Mr. Wastelandlive (sounds familiar...you've posted on yahoo msgboards in the past, haven't you?), if you're still reading this...two wrongs don't make a right. The government/police Colombia definitely shouldn't have used such means to slight Venezuela, especially when Mr. Granda isn't a big headhoncho and they do not have the necessary legal red tape in order.

Now, thanks to Uribe's well-known stubborness, the FARC are probably celebrating the capture of Mr. Granda and its immediate effects. A low level currier, according to most of the information available as of now, has practically become known throught the world.

All in exchange for a bit of fanfare and a couple of percentage points in polls, basically.

But Chávez, who as far as is publicly known cannot be accused of anything more than neutrality towards the Colombian conflict per se (some of his associates and sympathizers might go further, but that doesn't mean that the entire government of Venezuela can be blamed for that), is taking advantage of the situation for big political gaisn and is apparently toying with the idea of further severing economic and political ties with Colombia.

I'm definitely not just some sort of a "yes-man" for Mr. Isacson and CIP here, but in this case (as in several others), I believe that I have to recognize he's mostly right, from most points of view involved.

Thanks for the discussion, believe it or not people here in Washington are so civil (to your face at least) that debates like this don’t take place very often. OK, here is my last word(s):

On the certainty of Chávez’s relationship to the FARC: I direct you to the article in today’s Financial Times in which Steve Johnson of the Heritage Foundation says “Certainly the Granda case paints Venezuela very much in the light of a country that is harbouring terrorists.” Remember that Heritage is, shall we say, a shade or two to the right of CIP – and the most they can say is “paints very much in the light of”? We all still have to use that squishy CYA language because the definitive proof isn’t there.

- “I'm wondering if it were Mancuso or one of his Leiutenants attending, for example, a Liberal Conservative Party convention in Madrid with a Spanish passport if you'd feel the same way?”

If Mancuso or whoever was thrown in the trunk of a car, flown to Colombia, and “arrested” upon arrival, with reward money for the captors, I sure hope we’d be protesting.

- “‘(5) Respect for international law should also guide Colombia’s relationship with its neighbors, and Venezuela’s relationship with Colombia.’ That's the part I find rather polyannish.”

Given current political realities (such as a U.S. administration that thinks international law is merely a suggestion), of course it’s polyannaish. Part of the mission of our organization is to keep pushing for it nonetheless. The Polyannas who wrote the UN Charter and other agreements for international dispute resolution did so because rules and procedures are better than kidnappings and escalating international incidents.

- “If Venezuela won't honor her obligations as a member of Interpol, then Colombia has the choice of wanking loudly and inneffectively about it, or doing what it did, no?”

Wanking loudly can be effective. If it’s not, it at least has to be tried before taking a unilateral, illegal action (even the Bush administration sent Powell to the UN before going ahead and invading). If everyone knew who Granda was, and that he was at that conference, Chávez could have been publicly shamed and forced to make clear whose side he is on. Now he is able to dodge the issue with wounded cries of violated sovereignty.

This crisis appears to be winding down. Thanks in part to diplomacy from Peru, Brazil, and Cuba, the two presidents have agreed to meet on Thursday.

I wish I could also say "thanks to diplomacy from the United States." But that would be inaccurate.

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