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May 25, 2005

Uribe and the UN

Álvaro Uribe has picked fights with some unusual opponents: human-rights groups, former presidents, and former guerrillas turned politicians, among others. One of his most surprising and frequent targets, however, has been the United Nations – an organization known more for caution and diplomacy than for stepping on toes.

The UN, several of whose agencies have a significant presence in Colombia, can’t do anything to please Uribe. The world body consistently finds itself on the other side of the Colombian government in what Uribe’s High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo, called a “war of concepts.” In a recent speech at Colombia’s military university, Resrepo laid out several fronts in this “war.”

Debates about whether or not an internal armed conflict exists; whether a cease-fire must be a condition to begin conversations with illegal armed groups; whether zones may be temporarily demilitarized in order to hold dialogues; the way in which a humanitarian accord [to free hostages] can take place; whether citizens must collaborate with the security forces or the possibility that civilians may declare themselves neutral before the state’s military actions; the status of international facilitators who help us to find peaceful solutions to our problems of internal violence; these are all authentic points of division, upon which much of the fatherland’s future depends.

UN representatives in Colombia, who have no choice but to make judgments based on international agreements which Colombia has signed, differ from the Uribe government on nearly all of these questions.

Whether or not there is an armed conflict

The UN firmly rejects the notion, repeatedly promoted by Colombian government officials, that the country’s violence, while a terrorist threat, doesn’t qualify as an armed conflict. This is not a semantic trifle. If Colombia works under the assumption that no armed conflict exists, Protocol II of the Geneva Accords (dealing with rules of war for internal armed conflict) goes out the window. Standards would be lowered for humane treatment of prisoners, separation of civilians from combat, and similar issues. In addition, to dismiss the existence of an armed conflict is to reject any negotiation of reforms or political questions, as took place in El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1990s. If there is no armed conflict, terms of surrender are the only issues on the table.

Protocol II is quite clear, however, about what constitutes a “non-international armed conflict.” It specifies that it “shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.” Instead, it defines internal armed conflicts as those in which a government confronts “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”

It’s pretty clear that this language applies to the Colombian situation. The protocol doesn’t specify that the “organized armed groups” must have a high approval rating in national polls, and it doesn’t disqualify groups that wantonly kill civilians. While their behavior is murderous and their political judgment is poor, the FARC undeniably have a clear chain of command and have amply demonstrated their ability to carry out “sustained and concerted military operations” throughout the country. Colombia’s violence, then, meets the definition of an armed conflict.

As a result, even though it enrages President Uribe, the UN continues to use the “C” word to describe Colombia’s situation of violence. The UN Development Program’s 2003 National Human Development Report for Colombia – a must-read document that was well-received by most but blasted by Uribe government officials – was entitled “The Conflict: A Blind Alley with an Exit.” The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ excellent report on the 2004 human rights situation, published in March 2005, uses the term “armed conflict” thirty-six times.

During her visit to Colombia two weeks ago, High Commissioner Louise Arbour said several times that it is important to recognize that an armed conflict exists, given the “seriousness” of the violence and its effect on the civilian population. She added that the current four-year mandate of the High Commissioner’s Bogotá field office, as signed by the Uribe government in 2002, is “to advise the Colombian authorities in the formulation and application of policies, programs and measures for the promotion and protection of human rights ‘in the context of the violence and armed conflict the country is experiencing.’ And that is what the office is doing.”

This view of whether Colombia’s violence is a “conflict” is shared by most of the international community. The U.S. government, in its eagerness to support Uribe, has been shakiest on this question; while Bush administration officials haven’t gone out and repeated Uribe’s view that no conflict exists, they have been careful not to use the words “conflict” or “war” when talking about Colombia.

Negotiations with guerrillas

April 30 saw the formal end of the “good offices” role played by two special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, first Jan Egeland and then James Lemoyne. They were given the usually frustrating task of facilitating dialogues between the Colombian government and guerrilla groups. While Lemoyne played a key role in keeping talks with the FARC alight during the latter stages of the 1998-2002 peace process, his role was diminished after those talks ended. His relations with President Uribe – who was elected by a populace tired of the soft line toward guerrillas epitomized by press photos of Lemoyne embracing FARC leaders – were consistently difficult.

Lemoyne’s job was basically impossible during the Uribe years. A “good offices” mission requires the facilitator to be able to meet with both parties to a conflict. Yet the Uribe government, which denies the existence of a conflict in the first place, was reluctant to see Lemoyne meeting with FARC leaders, which it felt would make the guerrillas appear to be legitimate counterparts to the government. (There was nonetheless at least one attempt, a 2003 plan to meet in Brazil, with the Brazilian government’s permission. The encounter never took place for lack of a guerrilla response.)

In September 2003, Uribe said flatly that “the Colombian state can’t keep being put on the same level as the violent ones,” adding that “more effectiveness is needed in the good offices work. They should talk less and work more.” Added Luis Carlos Restrepo, the government peace negotiator, “We believe that the first task of a UN functionary in a good offices role should be to encourage an immediate cease-fire. Otherwise these armed groups’ actions end up being legitimized. … The United Nations cannot seek to be neutral before Colombia’s terrorist groups in order to build bridges to them. … There can be no neutrality in the face of terrorism.”

Restrepo’s position is misguided, Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, a former foreign minister and UN official, told Cali’s El País. “He confuses neutrality with impartiality. … The trust that so many have for the UN is rooted in its impartiality.”

Negotiations with paramilitaries

Lemoyne also earned Uribe’s ire by refusing to participate in the Colombian government’s talks with paramilitary groups, insisting that the AUC should not be recognized as a political actor.

The UN has played no role in the ensuing negotiations, though the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Bogotá office has done a superb job of explaining how proposals for dealing with serious AUC human-rights abusers fit within the scope of Colombia’s international human rights commitments.

Since the “Justice and Peace” law working its way through Colombia’s Congress is remarkably weak on crucial issues like impunity, reparations, and dismantlement of paramilitarism, this has required the High Commissioner’s office to point out the legislation’s inadequacy. During her visit, Louise Arbour was quite clear.

I share the concerns expressed by many others that the draft bill currently before Congress … needs to be strengthened with regard to the right to truth. Its current formulation provides no incentive to perpetrators who want to be eligible for benefits to come forward and fully disclose the crimes to which they have been party. Instead, the draft Bill induces them to disclose as little as possible as they do not lose any of the benefits granted if it later transpires that they have not disclosed the full extent of their criminal participation. In my view, the law should also provide better access to reparations to all victims.

Arbour also pointed out an uncomfortable fact about the talks that the Uribe government has consistently downplayed: the proliferation of violations of the paramilitaries’ declared cease-fire, which Uribe had required as a pre-condition for talks. She told El Tiempo, “I have been able to observe that the prerequisite of an absolute cessation of hostilities demanded by President Uribe has not been complied with as might have been expected, and there have been no concrete consequences for the AUC’s failure to comply.”

Contrast that strong statement with the five-paragraph discussion of cease-fire violations in the March quarterly report (Word [.doc] format) of the OAS “verification” mission for the negotiations (MAPP-OAS). “Although the AUCs [sic.] have not totally fulfilled the commitment to the cessation of hostilities,” the report reads, “in the areas where this force has territorial control there has been a marked decline in violations.” It then goes on to confirm only 31 cease-fire violations during the previous three months, and devotes much of the discussion to concerns that guerrillas may return to zones where AUC blocs have demobilized. The Colombian Commission of Jurists, meanwhile, has documented 1,899 in a twenty-month period [PDF format]; even if they are wrong about half of them – which is unlikely – it is clear that the OAS mission is either oblivious to, or deliberately de-emphasizing, a major problem. (Another branch of the OAS, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, has been much more forthcoming about what it characterizes as “constant violations of the cease of hostilities declared by the AUC.”)

Separating civilians from the conflict

The UN has also diverged from the Uribe government on the crucial subject of how civilians should relate to the conflict. Uribe’s “Democratic Security” policy is predicated on the idea that all citizens must contribute to the military’s war effort, primarily by serving as the security forces’ eyes and ears as “informants” and “collaborators.” According to the Colombian Defense Ministry’s guiding Democratic Security and Defense Policy document (PDF format), “Security is … the result of a collective effort by the citizens: it is the responsibility of all. Active citizen participation, co-operation in the administration of justice and support for the authorities all play a major part.”

The UN reminds the Uribe government that, in a situation of conflict where civilians are subject to retribution from armed groups, the level of citizen involvement must be limited. The “principle of distinction,” a core element of international humanitarian law, states that efforts must be made to exclude civilians from combat, and that they must not be compelled to take part.

UN officials, particularly those in the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have expressed concerns that several of the Uribe government’s security policies may infringe on the principle of distinction. These include the creation of civilian informant networks; the passage of a constitutional amendment (later struck down by the Constitutional Court) allowing the military to detain, interrogate, and tap the phones of unarmed civilians; and the recent clampdown on “peace communities” that seek to prohibit entry to all armed groups, including the security forces.

Next target: the UN High Commissioner’s office?

It is likely that, as Colombia’s presidential (re)election year approaches, Uribe government attacks on the UN system may grow more shrill. While Colombian government representatives, after several days of negotiations last month in Geneva, ultimately accepted a critical statement from the UN Human Rights Commission, we can expect the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Bogotá field office to become a principal target.

The office, founded in 1996 at the strong urging of Colombia’s human rights community, has played a crucial role as an interlocutor with the Colombian government, a provider of advice, and a fair and balanced documentor of the country’s human rights situation. Three skilled, measured and careful diplomats have served as its directors: Almudena Mazarrasa of Spain, and two Swedes, Anders Kompass and Michael Frühling.

The office’s annual reports on Colombia’s human rights situation, which acknowledge problems with the security forces including continued collusion with paramilitaries, have often angered the Uribe government. Though the launch of this year’s report was calmer, some officials still complained in Colombia’s press that the UN office has not given them enough credit for what they feel they have achieved.

The High Commissioner’s office’s mandate must be periodically renewed, and expires next in August 2006, when President Uribe leaves office. While the Colombian government doesn’t plan to close down the office as it did with James Lemoyne’s mission, Vice-President Francisco Santos, the official who holds the human-rights portfolio in the Colombian government, has indicated that he wants to “re-evaluate” its role.

“The intention seems to be to lower the office’s profile, so that its work becomes more that of technically assisting the government and less monitoring [of the human-rights situation],” according to El Tiempo. “Santos alleges that improvements [in human rights] have been substantial, and that the UN must accommodate itself to the new prevailing winds.”

The UN agencies in Colombia are unlikely to bend to the prevailing winds, however, since their positions are based on some rather unambiguous guidelines in international law, and since their professional, experienced staff will continue to call them as they see them. This means that President Uribe, who is not known for handling criticism well from any quarter, is likely to continue to keep picking fights with the UN system.

Posted by isacson at May 25, 2005 02:17 AM

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