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July 16, 2005

Human rights certification? Not yet

We’ve been hearing rumors for a while, but it looks like a State Department certification of the Colombian military’s human rights performance – the first since September 2004 – may finally be imminent.

I don’t make this prediction based on any Washington gossip I’ve heard. Instead, like waiting for the groundhog to emerge from his hole, we’ve been watching for sudden signs of progress in human-rights prosecutions of Colombian soldiers.

After a long time without any significant movement on military human-rights investigations, we suddenly have two examples. On July 1^st Colombia’s Attorney-General ordered the arrest of a corporal and five privates for the April 2004 killing of five campesinos in Cajamarca, Tolima. On Tuesday the 12^th, the Attorney-General filed homicide charges against a second lieutenant and three privates for the killing of three unionists in Saravena, Arauca.

These sorts of “breakthroughs” – however minor – are quite rare in Colombia, where it is very difficult to punish human-rights abusers in the security forces. If two high-profile cases move forward in two weeks, the U.S. certification process almost definitely had something to do with it.

For those unfamiliar with this complex but necessary semi-annual ritual, U.S. foreign aid law mandates that every year, 25 percent of aid to Colombia’s military be frozen until the State Department can certify that the Colombian armed forces’ human rights performance has improved. This 25 percent of aid to Colombia’s military (not police) in the foreign aid bill (not the defense budget) adds up to approximately $70-80 million being held up each year.

The law requires two certifications per year, each of which frees up 12.5 percent of the frozen military aid (about $35-40 million). After consulting with “internationally recognized human rights groups,” the State Department must submit to Congress an official certification that the following is happening:

1. Colombia’s armed forces are suspending members who face credible allegations of committing gross human rights violations, or of aiding or abetting paramilitaries.
2. These members of Colombia’s armed forces are being vigorously investigated and prosecuted, and promptly punished if found guilty.
3. Colombia’s armed forces are making substantial progress toward cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities working on these human rights cases, including providing requested information, access to witnesses, relevant military documents, and similar information.
4. Colombia’s armed forces are making substantial progress in severing links with paramilitary organizations (including denying access to military intelligence, vehicles, and other equipment or supplies, and ceasing other forms of active or tacit cooperation).
5. Colombia’s government is dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks by arresting commanders and financial backers.

While the Colombian government often releases statistics indicating improved human-rights performance (such as numbers of paramilitaries killed or captured), the U.S. aid conditions focus on the Achilles’ heel of the Colombian military’s human-rights performance: impunity. The Colombian government can muster no statistics to show progress toward punishing abuses after they happen. In fact, as past State Department certifications have acknowledged, indictments and successful prosecutions for military human-rights abuses are exceedingly rare, especially for high-ranking officers.

To its credit, the State Department has been taking the certification requirements seriously. While their threshold for approval is far lower than where CIP and human-rights groups would place it, U.S. diplomats have shown themselves willing to hold up aid for a long time when they feel they lack enough evidence to issue even an embarrassingly lukewarm certification. (Part of the reason for their fortitude, of course, is an unwillingness to anger the congressional authors of the certification requirement, whose support is necessary to keep the entire aid program flowing.)

State issued a certification only once in 2004 (in September), which means that 12.5 percent of fiscal-year 2004 military aid is still “in the freezer” along with 25 percent of 2005 aid.

As far as we can tell, the certification ritual has tended to play out as follows:

1. U.S. diplomats indicate to the Colombians that they need to be able to demonstrate progress in order to free up aid.
2. Nothing happens – or consultations with congressional staff indicate that whatever “progress” may have occurred is nowhere near enough.
3. Months pass. Pressure for certification builds as military-aid programs start to feel the pinch (in some cases – we’ve heard but can’t confirm – contracts even get postponed, and fuel and spare parts become scarce).
4. Exasperated, U.S. diplomats ask the Colombians to “throw them a bone,” naming a few high-profile cases of abuse in which a sign of judicial progress might help them to certify. Sometimes, the atmosphere for certification is poisoned by a new abuse – such as the August 2004 Arauca unionists’ murder, or the February 2005 San José de Apartadó massacre – which rises to the top of the list of cases. More months pass.
5. Finally, the Colombian government grudgingly allows a few arrests, indictments, or other judicial processes (probably not convictions) to move forward. The State Department issues a certification, the 12.5 percent of aid is delivered, and all human-rights groups complain.
6. Go back to (1.)

With the recent news on the Cajamarca and Saravena cases, we seem to be moving into step (5.) Nonetheless, it is our strongly held view that these two minor “breakthroughs” are nowhere near enough to merit a certification.

It is imperative that the State Departmetn hold out longer, because – perversely – the U.S. certification process has become the main bit of leverage available to those seeking to end impunity in Colombia. Lately it seems that arrests or judicial breakthroughs in high-profile human-rights cases do not happen on their own in Colombia. High-profile cases either languish or are dropped. Forward movement only seems to result from U.S. government pressure, as diplomats seek evidence necessary to prove that Colombia’s human-rights situation is improving, thereby freeing up frozen military aid.

Evidence of improvement is still sorely needed on several high-profile cases. There has been no movement, for instance, in the investigation of the San José de Apartadó massacre. The Colombian government has been blaming the residents of the “peace community” there for this lack of progress, as they have proved to be too fearful and distrustful to speak to investigators from the attorney-general’s office. The community’s members have told other investigators (like these, these and these) that they believe the army killed eight of their neighbors in February. President Uribe, however, continues to insist otherwise, telling the Voice of America on July 1, “The security forces and the citizens of Apartadó have said that this massacre, unfortunately, which cost the lives of so many citizens, was committed by the FARC terrorist group.”

Meanwhile, the trial of Gen. Jaime Uscátegui continues to drag on for his alleged role in allowing paramilitaries to massacre dozens of people in Mapiripán, Meta, in July 1997. There have been no reports of progress in this case since we wrote this update in early February.

In a July 1 letter to Secretary of State Rice [PDF format], 22 senators – mostly Democrats – ask her not to certify yet because of a lack of progress on key cases. In addition to San José de Apartadó and Saravena, they cite:

• The March 2004 dismissal of the case against Gen. Rito Alejo del Río for aiding and abetting paramilitary groups.
• The January 2005 dismissal of the case against Rear Admiral Rodrigo Quiñónez for the 2001 Chengue massacre.
• The November 2004 escape of Major Cesar Alonso Maldonado, convicted for trying to kill union leader-turned congressman Wilson Borja, from a military brig.
• The lack of trials or sentences for the 1998 Santo Domingo bombings.
• The lack of progress in investigating “Operación Dragón,” an intelligence operation targeting union organizers and human-rights defenders in Cali.
• Reports of continued military-paramilitary collaboration in Chocó department, and failure to prevent paramilitary massacres in zones of heavy military presence in Arauca and La Guajira.

“We believe it is time for the State Department to make clear to the Colombian government that further progress regarding its own security forces is necessary prior to certification,” the senators conclude. That’s exactly right. We congratulate the State Department for waiting ten months as they hold out for signs of progress. We ask, though, that they wait a bit longer.

Posted by isacson at July 16, 2005 01:47 AM

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