Plan Colombia and Beyond

For explanations of some of the law’s more troubling provisions, let’s cite other sources.

El Tiempo, December 12 editorial: “The law creates the concept of ‘vuelo forestal,’ which separates the land from the trees and all else above ground level, opening the possibility for new forms of exploitation. It gives agronomists who are employed by the timber companies the power to ‘supervise’ the commercial harvesting of forests by the same companies. It has been said that the law opens the door to the forests’ exploitation by multinational companies.”

Inter-Press Service: “[F]orests that are collectively owned by indigenous and black communities, amounting to some 28 million hectares, will not be granted in concession to logging interests. But under the new law, the adjoining land, which according to former environment minister Manuel Rodríguez, president of the National Environmental Forum, ‘belongs to these communities as part of their cultural and historical space,’ can be granted in concession.”

El Tiempo columnist María Jimena Duzán: “The law is based not on an interest in preserving primary forests, as the ministers of agriculture and environment disingenuously affirm, but on regulating their exploitation, to the disadvantage of campesino, black and indigenous communities, who were never consulted. Not to mention the way this government reacted to an alert from the government Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), which warned of the theft of lands that indigenous and black communities in Chocó [a department, or province, in northwestern Colombia] are suffering at the hands of paramilitaries and African palm companies. Instead of protecting these communities’ rights, the government chose to give a hand to the businessmen who are planting these [oil palm] crops.”

The law’s impact on forests traditionally owned by afro-Colombian and indigenous communities – a large percentage of the nation’s total – is a major concern. In most cases, these communities hold their lands in common. The national process of titling these properties began only recently. In zones like northern Chocó, the common landholdings of afro-Colombian communities, which have been in their possession for up to a century and a half, are being appropriated by paramilitaries (both active and “demobilized”). The paramilitaries, in tandem with private companies, are clear-cutting these areas and planting exotic African oil palms in their place. In Chocó, “the oil palm plantations expanded in the wake of the rifles,” said Father Napoleón García of the diocese of Quibdó, at a December 5 press conference commemorating the diocese’s receipt of Colombia’s 2005 National Peace Prize.

Due to opposition from many quarters – environmentalists, the government’s comptroller and internal-affairs office (Procuraduría), former ministers of the environment, and indigenous, afro-Colombian and campesino organizations – this law failed to pass during ten previous congressional sessions. This time, thanks a surprisingly strong push from top ministers in Álvaro Uribe’s government, the Forestry Law managed to squeak through. It passed Colombia’s lower house on December 13 with a bare quorum present, 92 out of 166 members. This vote occurred, according to El Tiempo, “without the congressmen who attended the session having seen the text they were to approve.”

What a shameful way to approve a law that could lead to massive, irresponsible, unsustainable exploitation of Colombia’s remaining forests.

But that’s not all. The U.S. government played a role too. It did so through its supposedly well well-intentioned economic aid programs to Colombia, managed by the U.S. Agency of International Development.

Within USAID’s outlay for “Alternative Development” is a sub-category called “Improve Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Environment” (US$7.5 million in 2006). Among other things, this pays for a program called “Colombia Forestal,” a sustainable forestry program run by USAID contractor Chemonics, Inc.

With USAID money, Chemonics lobbied Colombia’s Congress to draft and pass the Forestry Law. According to Inter-Press Service, “Former [Environment] minister [Manuel] Rodríguez said Chemonics brought experts ‘with close links’ to USAID to Colombia, who drafted parts of the new forestry bill ‘behind closed doors.’”

Colombian Congressman Pedro Arenas, a principal opponent of the law and a member of the legislative committee responsible for drafting it, wrote recently about one of Chemonics’ lobbying efforts: a congressional delegation to Chile and Bolivia. (Pedro Arenas’ recent decision not to run for re-election, due to paramilitary threats, is discussed in an earlier posting.)

A year ago, the Environment Minister organized a trip with the goal of giving the members of the congressional environment committees a first-hand look at how forestry laws work in Bolivia and Chile, and thus to gain support for the controversial bill nearing approval in the lower house. … Upon arrival in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, the congressmen were received by personnel from the multinacional Chemonics, a U.S. company that managed the rest of the trip. They paid per diems to the legislators and explained that they paid for the trip to help Colombia establish legal norms to allow it to take advantage of its immense forest resources. … They took us to visit a company called Parket, which left me with many questions. There I learned how Colombia’s Forestry Law might work. … This company pays the municipality of Concepción [Bolivia] one dollar for every hectare “utilized” in the area of the logging concession. This way, if in a year they “utilize” 1,000 hectares they only pay US$1,000. The “utilization” consists of felling and cutting valuable wood trees found in the area. A forestry engineer is in charge of ‘vigilance’ to guarantee that the management plan is respected, and he receives the title of ‘external auxiliary agent’ of the government, although his salary is paid by the multinational allowed to exploit the forest. … The logging company gets a profitable and easy way to make money, while the Bolivian government is left with only a few dollars per year, and the population with only a few jobs cutting down trees, driving trucks and working in sawmills, all of which Parket can pay for by selling a few sheets of hardwood flooring in Europe.

A source at Chemonics acknowledged to me that the company did indeed promote passage of Colombia’s Forestry Law. It did so because “seeking policy reform” is part of its contract with USAID. Since both USAID and the Uribe government supported the Forestry Law, this was the sort of “policy reform” that our economic-aid tax dollars ended up paying for.

We still support a strong increase in non-military aid for Colombia. But the Forestry Law experience makes clear that we urgently need to monitor more closely how this aid gets spent.