Plan Colombia and Beyond

The Bush administration submitted its foreign aid request to Congress, along with the rest of the 2007 budget, on February 6. The State Department made public its 682-page “Congressional Budget Justification” for foreign aid on Monday. In the request, Colombia is one of only a few Latin American countries that won’t see an aid decrease in 2007. The text of the request does hint that aid to Colombia may begin to decrease before very long.

• “Thanks to increased Colombian participation in aviation activities, in FY [Fiscal Year] 2005 the number of U.S. contractor pilots and mechanics was reduced by over 100. FY 2005 was also the first year since 2000 without a significant increase in the number of U.S.-supported helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft in Colombia, thus easing the need for new U.S. training programs.” – the Congressional Budget Justification document.
• “Who is satisfied [by the aid request]? We are seeking a way to maintain this aid, which is aid that recognizes shared responsibility in the struggle against drugs, and that Colombia deserves.” – President Uribe, in Washington yesterday.

The Bogotá office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released a strongly worded report Monday reviewing Colombia’s human rights situation in 2005.

• “The Office in Colombia observed an increase in allegations of actions attributed to members of the security forces, particularly the army. This was especially true in the Department of Antioquia, as well as in Chocó, Norte de Santander, and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta region. Most of these executions have been presented by the authorities as deaths of guerrillas in combat, with alterations made to the crime scene. Many were unduly investigated by the Military Criminal Justice System. Cases were recorded in which the commanders themselves had allegedly supported the act of dressing the victims in guerrilla garments to cover up facts and simulate a combat.
  …
  Cases were denounced of coordinated actions in which the victims were allegedly handed over by paramilitaries, subsequently executed by members of the military, and then presented as members of armed groups killed in combat, particularly in the metropolitan area of Medellín (Antioquia). Another modality was observed in allegations regarding victims executed by paramilitaries and presented by members of the army as killed in combat, in Putumayo and in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.”

Only a few thousand paramilitaries remain to be “demobilized,” whatever that means in a context where paramilitary power is at its all-time height, and increasing. Many more paramilitary fighters than expected are showing up for the latest demobilization ceremonies, and less weapons than expected are being turned over.

• “The government told us four years ago there were 12,000 paramilitaries. By the end of all this there will be 30,000 demobilized. Where did they come from?” – Sergio Jaramillo of Bogotá’s Ideas for Peace Foundation.
• “It should be emphasized that the demobilizations do not seem to have led to a decrease in the influence or control of the paramilitary groups in their respective geographical areas. Instead, using parallel strategies involving pressure and threats, they have been consolidated and, in certain cases, strengthened in the economic, social and political fields.” The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on Colombia in 2005, released Monday.
• “In all, the 21,300 AUC members who have demobilized in groups have turned in 10,041 long arms (which includes shotguns, grenade launchers and machine guns as well as rifles).” – El Tiempo editorial, February 7.

Authorities last week arrested Enilse López, a.k.a. “La Gata” (The Cat), on charges of laundering assets. “La Gata,” who controls the “numbers game” (lottery) on Colombia’s Caribbean coast, was thought untouchable due to her close ties to paramilitaries and drug traffickers, and her generous contributions to corrupt local officials.

• I have supported senators and also presidents. When Dr. Uribe came to Magangué [the impoverished, paramilitary-run southern Bolívar town where “La Gata” occupies a large mansion], I received him there and I asked my people to vote for him.” – “La Gata,” interviewed by Cambio magazine, cited in Miami’s Nuevo Herald.
  
  Last Friday, President Uribe admitted that “La Gata” contributed 100 million pesos (about US$40,000) to his 2002 campaign.

Two openly pro-paramilitary legislators, Rocío Arias and Eleonora Pineda, were ejected from “Colombia Democrática,” one of the mainstream pro-Uribe parties participating in the March congressional elections. Though the State Department denies it, a broad consensus in Colombia believes that Arias and Pineda’s departure was forced by the U.S. government. The U.S. embassy in Colombia is believed to have threatened to revoke the visa of Mario Uribe, the cousin and close political ally of President Uribe who heads “Colombia Democrática,” unless he did something about the presence of paramilitary-tied candidates in his party. Arias and Pineda were immediately accepted as the candidates of smaller parties.

• “I demand Ambassador William Wood’s resignation. … I ask President Uribe to respect Colombians’ national sovereignty and dignity.” – Rocío Arias.
• “Pineda and Arias may be paracas, but they are Colombians and we cannot allow the Americans to believe that this is their backyard. We now see how supposed acts of honesty [by political leaders like Mario Uribe] end up being examples of submission.” – Liberal Party senatorial candidate Piedad Córdoba. Sen. Córdoba, who is way to the left of most Liberals, was once briefly kidnapped by the paramilitaries, and bitterly opposes the Uribe govrnment’s negotiations with the AUC, is an unlikely supporter of Arias and Pineda.
• “Me, a paramilitary? But paramilitarism is over in Colombia. The only group left is that of Martín Llanos [a paramilitary bloc in eastern Colombia not participating in talks], in which I have no influence, but in the rest of the country paramilitarism doesn’t exist. And it’s not me saying that, but our president, Álvaro Uribe.” – Sen. Luis Alberto Gil, whose “Convergencia Ciudadana” party immediately accepted Eleonora Pineda as a candidate, denying frequent allegations that he has ties to paramilitary groups.

Ramón Isaza, a paramilitary leader since 1978 and the dominant warlord in Antioquia’s far east, “demobilized” his men last week. Isaza was one of the more reluctant paramilitary leaders participating in talks with the Uribe government.

• “[When he carried out a 1996 massacre of 17 people in La Esperanza, Antioquia, Isaza’s late son Omar] was working with General [Alfonso] Manosalva and Major [David] Hernández. They sent my son and eight other guys.” – Ramón Isaza, speaking on the day of his demobilization ceremony.
• “Isaza’s mudslinging against these military officers can only be viewed as a veiled threat against the President, making clear that Isaza knows things about that period in Antioqua which, if revealed, could be uncomfortable for the President.” – a “retired officer who worked with General Monsalva at that time,” cited in Cambio magazine. Many Colombians viewed Isaza’s words as a subtle threat against Álvaro Uribe, who was governor of Antioqua at the time of the massacre and worked very closely with Gen. Manosalva, who headed the army’s Medellín-based 4^th Brigade.

Talks in Cuba between the Colombian government and the ELN guerrillas, which were to resume in Cuba in late January, have yet to convene. The fast-approaching elections are a likely reason for the foot-dragging.

• “The two sides have still not built enough trust to enter into the fundamental issues that the situation requires. … Due to the ongoing electoral campaign, nobody is risking taking the initiative, and these meetings [between the ELN and civil-society leaders, in Havana] are a way to sustain this process as we await the electoral results.” – Moritz Akerman, one of the designated “civil society guarantors” of the ELN-government talks. 

Relations with Ecuador went through a rough patch, after the Ecuadorian government complained about a Colombian military incursion in Ecuador’s airspace and territory, and Colombia’s apology was less than heartfelt.

• “[Ecuador must] stop accommodating these bandits, stop accommodating these terrorists. … These terrorists cross into Ecuador, they hide there, against the will of the Ecuadorian government.” – President Uribe, February 8. Uribe used the verb contemplar which, in his home region of Antioquia, means “to consent to” or “to accommodate.” Ecuador responded by calling its ambassador home for “consultations.”
• “The Colombian government and its armed forces should do something about, and not ‘accommodate,’ its own citizens who carry out illegal activities in its own territory, in zones where, unfortunately, the Colombian security forces do not exercise effective control.” – Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Francisco Carrión.
• “I would say that since Plan Colombia, the number of refugees [into Ecuador] has increased. Colombia says it has decreased, but the reality is otherwise. The problem continues.” – Philippe Lavanchy, director of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ Americas Bureau, speaking in Quito on Februrary 8.