Plan Colombia and Beyond

Although my first reaction, one shared by many others I imagine, is to morally reject the fact that the demobilized are receiving more aid that the displaced, I've come to understand part of the reason for that being the case.

If former combatants are not properly handled, they will easily return to the war or to general criminal activities very quickly, resulting in the potential displacement of even greater numbers of people. As the existing data already shows, they aren't receiving all the necessary support either, so that imminent risk continues to exist.

That doesn't mean that the displaced have to be forgotten. On the contrary, I fully support a significant increase in the funds assigned to the displaced, as several Constitutional Court decisions have called for. But, sad to say, in some ways the very nature and complexity of displacement makes it much harder to address than "reintegration" itself.

The number of the displaced is continously growing (so much so that there aren't any absolutely precise figures about them; they have been spread far and wide, following no obvious pattern). As horrible as that is, they do not constitute an imminent threat to the government's current priorities. Rather, it is a gradually growing problem whose effects will be devastating in the long term for all Colombians, but one which is comparatively easy (and wrongly, I know) to downplay in the short term.

The number of the demobilized, on the other hand is quite stable and the bulk of them have been concentrated in specific areas already (relatively good figures about it are available). It is growing at a much slower rate and, apparently, the process hasn't been so heterogenous either. The demobilized are already a serious security threat to the government's expectations in the short term, if their reintegration fails.

In the end, it all comes down to one thing: much greater amounts of money are needed for both purposes and they need to be spend much more effectively.

In Febuary the MoI reported 9,018 individual demobilizations.

I have to check, but I'd say it's safe to assume the number is now somewhere near 10,000.

While treating the theme of demobilizations I think it's vitally important to pay special attention to the significant difference between individual and collective demobilizations.

The difference is basically this: the collective demobilizations are a farce, a big political masquerade, whereas individual demobilizations are not (because they occur at the rank and file level, and not at high-level, thus not easy to be politically manipulated), and have great potential, if seized upon, to make a strategically significant reduction of the fighting power of the illegal groups. Whereas the command structures, loyalties, finances, and fighting cohesion of the 26,000 collective demobilizations remain mostly intact, that of the 10,000 individual demobilizations is broken (This would be called an epic victory if it occured on the battlefield). I say this drawing on my experience working with small groups of individually demobilized combatants (from all sides). They have broken all their ties with their former units, and are in constant danger of being killed by urban milicianos from those units. "If they haven't yet blown up our shelter, it's just because they don't want to yet. They could do it easily at any time." Common to hear this sort of thing. The differences go on, for example USAID has recently gotten approval to open a new Strategic Objective (SO4) to aid the demobilization, but the funds are to be limited exclusively to the collective process. I believe there are GoC initiatives that are similarly exclusive. The argument is that it's difficult for governments to deal with individuals, but it's actually quite easy to think of schemes to "collectivize" the individual reinsertados into macro organizations. Basically it's politics as usual. The land reparations issue needs much closer oversight which it is not receiving. It ought to be mentioned that much of the land doesn't just come from narco-traffickers, but from the supposedly demobilized paramilitary groups. I guess the Procurador didn't discuss it in his speech, but the head and second in command of FINAGRO (the second tier bank responsible for managing the reparations) were removed a couple months ago because they began giving the land back to the paramilitary groups from which it had been seized. I wonder if there's anything NGOs like CIP and WOLA can do to raise awareness about the money and resources that are being robbed or thrown away on the collective process, and the opportunity that's being missed by not allocating more effort where it really might make a difference--in the individual process.

The only adequate treatment of the individual reinsertion process I have seen to date is the book "Las Parias de la Guerra," by Jose Armando Cardenas Sarias (Ediciones Aurora).

I fogot I wanted to comment on the land titling process. This has constituted a major obstacle for reparations, as well as for farmers who need to receive credit to undertake rural development schemes. The two big USAID projects ADAM and MIDAS are trying to make it a central theme in their alternative development efforts. The "Policy Component" of MIDAS is currently doing some heavy lobbying in the Colombian Congress to introduce legislation that would streamline the land titling process--in conjunction with the new Environmental Code, and the recently passed foresty law. We'll see how that all turns out.

I hate to comment on previous posts, but I'm sorry--I 've been away for a while and I can't resist to comment on the "400 Words" post of a few days ago. Adam, as someone who has been a part of the development world (here and in Africa), I can tell you that's just the tip of the iceberg. If you want to have a real laugh (or cry, rather) check out Section C of the RFP for ADAM or MIDAS, released about a year and a half ago (it should be lying around somewhere, it's not classified or anything). There you will see that USAID hasn't even yet learned how to master the cut and paste function, let alone english grammar and spelling, to say nothing at all about reality and the actual situation of Colombia.

Working on a USAID project is basically like being in a big Milgram Experiment. It's all about the emperor's new clothes.

Rainer Cale: I believe you make some good points, but I also think (IMHO) that other considerations have to be taken into account.

"The difference is basically this: the collective demobilizations are a farce, a big political masquerade"

I would respectfully have to partially disagree. Parts of them have indeed been a farce, for reasons endlessly repeated here and elsewhere, but not every single part of it. In other words, you definitely have a point there, yet it's not completely accurate to generalize it so easily to the entire process and to every single collective demobilization.

"Whereas the command structures, loyalties, finances, and fighting cohesion of the 26,000 collective demobilizations remain mostly intact"

Again, I would say that's not necessarily true in all cases. Not all of the structures that demobilized remained in such conditions. Several truly demobilized, stopped committing criminal acts and are not a cohesive fighting force but instead are truly undergoing reinseration.

By all means, there are several others that definitely acted exactly as you've stated. Believing otherwise would be naive, but so is universally extending the opposite position without making any distinctions.

"I say this drawing on my experience working with small groups of individually demobilized combatants (from all sides)."

An experience that clearly deserves to be respected and valued according to its own worth, and rightly so, although I must say that I still have some disagreements with some of your positions.

"The argument is that it's difficult for governments to deal with individuals, but it's actually quite easy to think of schemes to "collectivize" the individual reinsertados into macro organizations."

I suppose it may be true, and it would be interesting to see practical proposals about doing just that

"Basically it's politics as usual."

Politics definitely play a role here, a huge one even, but my point is that it is not the only factor that needs to be considered.

"The land reparations issue needs much closer oversight which it is not receiving".

Agreed.

"It ought to be mentioned that much of the land doesn't just come from narco-traffickers, but from the supposedly demobilized paramilitary groups."

Now, although there's surely a grey area, there's also a real difference here: the land taken from the narcos thus far apparently outnumbers the land that the paramilitaries have returned to date and/or that which has been expropiated from them.

"I guess the Procurador didn't discuss it in his speech, but the head and second in command of FINAGRO (the second tier bank responsible for managing the reparations) were removed a couple months ago because they began giving the land back to the paramilitary groups from which it had been seized."

Actually, from what I can remember and have confirmed after doing some quick googling, that was actually land taken from narcos and other criminals, not from the paramilitaries per se. Still, at least it was possible to find that out early on and put a stop to it (at least for now), not years and years after the fact.

"I wonder if there's anything NGOs like CIP and WOLA can do to raise awareness about the money and resources that are being robbed or thrown away on the collective process, and the opportunity that's being missed by not allocating more effort where it really might make a difference--in the individual process."

There definitely should be additional awareness about the lack of resources for the individual demobilization process, because it does need much more aid, but I disagree with the premise implied above: that the entire collective process is a farce, and that nothing should be done about it because it won't work.

Does the collective process have to deal with farces, frauds and simple corruption? Of course. But that means that such issues should be looked into and resolved in their own right, not used as a reason to throw it all away.

Both of the processes constitute, in their own ways, potential opportunities that shouldn't be wasted.

"The only adequate treatment of the individual reinsertion process I have seen to date is the book "Las Parias de la Guerra," by Jose Armando Cardenas Sarias (Ediciones Aurora)."

Curiously enough, I actually have that book in my possession right now and have a good opinion about it thus far.

"I fogot I wanted to comment on the land titling process. This has constituted a major obstacle for reparations, as well as for farmers who need to receive credit to undertake rural development schemes."

That might well be true, but consider that the entire reparation process is practically in its infancy, not to mention much of the other post-demobilization requirements and related activities. Things are barely getting started on that end.

"We'll see how that all turns out."

We'll see, indeed.

Thank you jcg, for correcting me on some of those points. Yes, the FINAGRO debacle involved narco land rather than para land. That was a mistake.

As far as the difference between the collective process and the individual process, I'm sorry if I gave the simplistic impression that the former is "bad" and the latter "good." I only want to call attention to the fact that there is a major distinction to be made between them (since usually they are all just lumped together under the label reinsertados)--and that the individual program probably (IMHO) deserves more attention than the collective. Effort should be put into both, but I personally see a lot more potential value in investing in the individual program. And I wanted to call attention to the fact that despite the higher potential being in the individual program, the majority of the allocated funds are going to the collective program.

I guess I don't know just how many, but a large number (21 new groups, says "Cambio") of the collectively demobilized groups are forming professional units again. The individually demobilized simply don't have that option. They might go and become bandits or something, but the incentive for them to stay in the reinsertion program and make it work is much higher than for collectivos.

I'm glad you're reading "Las Parias...." It's a good survey, isn't it.

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