Plan Colombia and Beyond

As for a possible motivation for an Army "auto-atentado," how about trying to sabotage the incipient negotiations on the negotiations with the FARC?

Everyone knows the military balks at these, especially the idea of any DMZ period.

These acts of violence are notoriously hard to ascribe to a perpetrator. When my school, the Centro Colombo Americano in Medellin, was blown up in 1989, no one ever claimed responsibility. It could well have been Pablo Escobar and his henchmen, but I always preferred to blame the FARC, whom I especially detest (although "Pablo" was incomparably worse). Of course, it might have been--neither. Who knows?

Uribe, somewhat like myself (although with infinitely more reason), might be predisposed to
blame the FARC, which gunned down his father back in 1983.

In short, the FARC is reprehensible enough that it's almost always plausible to blame them.

In the interests of accuracy, the bombing I just referred to was in 1988. On the internet I notice that the bombing is ascribed to the M-19 guerrillas, although no one ever told me that at the time. I also notice that there has been at least one other bombing at the Colombo, a less damaging one back in 1963. The 1988 attack destroyed the Colombo library.

Certainly "jcg" is right in stating on another thread that many Colombians are relatively unaffected by the violence, which is today nothing like it was in 1963 or 1988.

Nevertheless, lives continue to be lost; and the economic cost of this "armed conflict" is incalculable.

Hey, let's go ahead and blame the FARC for everything. Total war in Colombia will probably never happen; but if Colombians ever get so fed up with the FARC that they support a "semi-total" offensive against the FARC, such military action might really be a step toward peace.

I have to agree with richtiger on one point, that is that these attacks are quite difficult to accurately find out the perpetrator, but yet, there are numerous attacks similar to this where perpetrators have been found out, and within a short time period. For example, the car bomb in Bogota this August originally blamed on the FARC but then we found out it was the military, as Adam had listed in his "not the FARC" side.
I have to say that it is a shame Uribe would call off the talks for humanitarian exchange when it is clear, not even with the above list, that we really don't know who it is. It easily could be the FARC, it easily could not be, as is evident above, but I don't think we should jump to conclusions based on who you "prefer" to blame, and this includes Uribe. Obviously it is plausible. It is always plausible to blame the FARC, but also the military, or the paramilitaries, so really, any idea of plausibility should be disregarded.

Lastly, the last 4 years have, according to the Colombian government, been a total offensive against the FARC, not just a semi-total, (though semi-total may be more accurate). This clearly won't lead to peace. We've seen them in the past, and the FARC are still here. Secondly, the FARC are still strong in some very important areas: Arauca, Norte de Santander and Narino. Arauca because of oil extortions and the drug trade, but Norte de Santander and Narino are incredibly important for the drug trade, which the FARC uses to a great extent. They clearly can still fund themselves. Secondly, trying to "rescue" the hostages could easily lead to the death of some of these hostages. That is definately something the FARC could do. They may not due to international attention, but they may want to discourage the government from trying a rescue again in the future as well. Total war may never happen in Colombia, but as is evident with the current situation, and as history shows us, military action won't lead to peace as well.
Finally, that ANNCOL analysis is weak, though I know what they are getting at, maybe it's just poorly worded. Speculation should not led to a final conclusion like ANNCOL seems to have done, but maybe I just need to read the article.

Add to the "FARC are not responsible" column yesterday's comments from Attorney-General Mario Iguarán. He says "there's no evidence" that the FARC set off the bomb.

Adam: Attorney General Iguarán has also recently said, more than once, that there is no proper evidence of the military's participation in the alleged "autoatentados" (which still aren't clear-cut either, and the military's specific involvement, while probable, is not crystal clear at all as far as the exact details are concerned), so make of that what you will.

In both cases, IMHO, Iguarán's words refer merely to the Fiscalía's own duties and to the proper procedures as of the moment he's making the declarations. In other words, the Fiscalía can't, right now, present enough evidence of the FARC's or anybody else's guilt.

I don't really see much more depth to his declarations, in either direction.

As for the rest of the subject, I'm intellectually reluctant to definitely pin the blame on either party as of this moment too.

Personally, however, I do tend to see the FARC as a bit more likely to have done so. For the FARC, attacking a military facility is always a valid act of war, and the recent contacts with the government have not included the possibility of any kind of cease fire on a national level.

I don't see why they would realistically balk at doing that, given their previous behavior even during the Caguán talks, which didn't include any kind of permanent national cease-fire either (other than a brief "X-mas truce" and the fact that the subject was indeed discussed, but far too late and far too little for it to matter).

It's also possible that certain sectors within the FARC, such as "Mono Jojoy" and others, may be acting at least tacitly independently from the national leadership, using their own logic. Just as sectors of the military can also do, and as may have been part of what happened during the alleged "autoatentados".

Btw, ANNCOL also has another bit where they tacitly blame the "CIA and DEA", for what it matters.

I wonder why it is that these perpetrating groups so often DON'T claim responsibility for their terrorist acts. Of course, if one group is trying to place the blame on another, one can understand the perpetrator's silence.

In other cases, is there something of a "guilty conscience" that leads to the silence?

Do these various groups believe that silence produces a certain political-social chaos that is helpful to their cause?

Returning to specifics, does the FARC usually claim responsibility for its acts or is it usually quiet?

Of course, I'm not sure I really understand terrorism to begin with. Sometimes it can be (as in Iraq) an effective tool; but sometimes it just seems to be the result of an animalistic, nihilistic urge.

Well, maybe somebody reading this thread can give us a learned disquisition on the subject.

richtiger: In my experience and as far as my knowledge goes, FARC only very rarely claims responsibility for anything, period.

The most you can get out of them are "casualty" reports of the more "traditional" military actions, but they almost never address specific events of a different nature with any sort of regularity.

They do deny some events, but most of the time they don't even address the subject. Silence is their most common response.

Thanks for the information, jcg, about the FARC "patron." I wonder what might be their rationale or motive for not claiming responsibility.

As much as I would like to see a rational, dialogue-oriented FARC, I don't see much wiggle space regarding the message left for Mono Jojoy (point one in "FARC guilty" column). I mean come on, that's pretty conclusive (assuming Uribe's claim is true--I personally believe him in this case).

I haven't done all the reading that Adam has done lately, but it seems to me that the FARC were never too serious about these talks. Their demands were totally unrealistic.

I strongly disagree with Adam's assertion, stated in a previous thread, that the important thing is to get the FARC to the negotiating table even if there is no defined agenda and regardless of their actual willingness and motives.

If the primary motives of this proposed encounter had turned out to be MAchiavelian, and the FARC (or government for that matter) were treating the talks as another kind of military operation, or the FARC or government were internally divided over how to approach the talks, then I don't think CIP would want to throw their weight behind that. Risky business.

"I strongly disagree with Adam's assertion, stated in a previous thread, that the important thing is to get the FARC to the negotiating table even if there is no defined agenda and regardless of their actual willingness and motives."

Put that way, it would be silly. But there are many choices in between the two extremes of "the negotiating table" and the complete lack of contact that reigns today.

Contact - including haggling over terms for real talks - can occur quietly through informal intermediaries, through international-community representatives playing a "good offices" role, through periodic consultations in a third country, or even by e-mail. The "Casa de Paz" experiment with the ELN is another example of a "not-quite-negotiations" model for reducing tensions and keeping the conversation going.

It's called "confidence-building," and it's the best option available if one is unwilling to undergo the enormous sacrifices that the "total war" route would entail.

At early stages, when nobody trusts the other side's motives, these quiet spaces for dialogue are in fact preferable to a big "negotiation" - which often turns into some sort of show, a media circus even. Both sides end up talking past each other before the cameras, and unrealistic expectations are created. Trust is weakened, not strengthened.

So we're not talking about taking the plunge into negotiations. But we do think the conversation should never stop. Even as they fight, both sides should be talking, even if through a third party.

Un comentario sobre los autoatentados de agosto: los comandos del ejército sacaron uno o dos comunicados hablando de sus manzanas podridas (a nivel de altos oficiales).
Por lo demas, mientras la justicia colombiana siga teniendo dificultades para desatollar la verdad de los hechos, seguira vivo el régimen de incriminaciones reciprocas. Este régimen puede funcionar incluso como condicion de autoridad. Cuando deberia haber premura en las investigaciones, interviene el omnisicente, el que tiene la facultad de decir quién si y quién no.

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