The State and Defense Departments have just released their annual Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR) covering 2005. The report, required by Congress, documents the U.S. training of foreign forces through a wide variety of military-aid programs.

The report’s most important implications for Latin America are: 1) even if Congress prohibits training through traditional funding sources (the State Department and the Foreign Operations appropriation), the Administration can continue training through other funding channels (like DOD - see the ASPA section); and 2) training continues to migrate from DOS to DOD.

Here’s what else the FTMR says about US military training with Latin America.

**While Latin America is far from the focal point of the “War on Terror,” significant training continues in Latin America.** The United States provided military training to 17,008 Latin Americans in 2005. This is the second-highest total number of trainees since 1999, when the report was first released.

![U.S. Trainees from the Western Hemisphere](image-url)
Training is funded through many different programs within the State and Defense budgets.

Colombia is still the main training destination in Latin America.

Training for Colombia dwarfs all other training with Latin America and the Caribbean combined, as it has every year since 2003. That year, Colombia posted its highest trainee total since reporting began, due to the launch of a large military-aid program to protect an oil pipeline near the Venezuelan border.

There are Winners and Losers

The following five countries received the most training in 2005:

New to the top-five chart this year is Paraguay, where the number of trainees almost doubled between 2004 and 2005. To no one’s surprise, fallen from grace is Venezuela. In 1999, the United States trained more than 900 Venezuelans. The FMTR lists 33 Venezuelans trained in 2005, and the number today is likely close to zero. This has to do with Venezuela’s lack of interest in U.S. training, as well as U.S. withholding of assistance.

Four countries with greatest growth in trainees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>% change in 2005 over 1999-2004 average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>159%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>111%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,476</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>6,477</td>
<td>12,947</td>
<td>8,801</td>
<td>10,393</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Four countries with greatest drop in trainees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3,012</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>-89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way

In 2005, the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) prohibited some training funds to twelve Western Hemisphere countries that did not grant U.S. personnel immunity from the International Criminal Court. However, as seen above, this prohibition did not reduce overall U.S. training with the region, as some have argued. The number of trainees from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, affected by the sanctions, did decrease. However, training funded by other, unaffected sources increased region-wide.

Because training is funded out of so many different pots of money, even if Congress prohibits training to a specific country, training can still take place.

Most individual countries subject to ASPA sanctions, Bolivia among them, did show a decrease in overall training as IMET was eliminated. The decline would have been far steeper, however, had the difference not been made up by unaffected programs in the Defense budget, such as DOD counter-drug funds or DOD’s new Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program.

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2 The Article 98 restrictions on IMET training were lifted in the FY 2007 Defense Authorization Bill, though the restrictions still apply to Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Funds.
The following graphs show how Ecuador avoided deep cuts in trainees despite the ASPA sanctions – and how Paraguay has in fact seen a sharp increase.

Ironically, much of this DOD-funded training occurs on these countries' soil, despite the alleged risk to U.S. personnel of extradition to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)

Created by law as a Defense-budget program in 2002, the CTFP is now the third largest funder of U.S. military training in Latin America, behind DOD-budget counter drug programs (known collectively as “Section 1004”) and IMET. This is interesting because terrorism potentially directed toward the United States is not a central problem in Latin America.

Almost 40% of those trained with CTPF funds were from Mexico (357). Ecuador was second with 133. Both countries are subject to ASPA sanctions in 2006, which do not affect CTFP training funds.

DOD vs. State

The steady tendency toward funding U.S. military training in Latin America through the Defense budget took another leap in 2005. Even though foreign military training has traditionally been the purview of the Department of State, 74% of trainees from the hemisphere were funded through the Defense budget in 2005, the highest proportion since the FMTR began.

It’s Still the Drug War.

The fine line between what differentiates counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics is not clear, as so many drug traffickers are now considered “narco-terrorists.” Nonetheless, counter-drug aid accounts funded at least 70% of military trainees from Latin America in 2005, the highest level since the FMTR began.
Concerns Raised By the FMTR

Is the spin out of control?

“Ecuador’s military has a great deal of independence and political influence, and they have some funding sources of their own which reduce their dependence on the budget process,” the FMTR reads approvingly. Let’s try to remember that military “independence,” political influence and lack of accountability are not good things.

Not last time we checked

Guatemala has “…eliminated internal security as a military role.” Someone should tell that to the hundreds of troops patrolling the streets of Guatemala City.

It Pays to be Nice

“The Government of El Salvador (GOES) granted the concession to base our operations in their country at great political expense, and our continued close relations with their military through IMET is vital to the longevity of this operation.” This language portrays IMET as a quid pro quo arrangement for use of the Comalapa airbase.

The report also says “The new roles of patrolling borders and disaster relief have created a needed and positive role for the (Salvadoran) military, helping to erase years of distrust by the population of the armed forces.” While it is always important to use all resources available to respond to natural disasters, improving its image is not a good reason for giving the military previously civilian roles.