President Barack Obama is entering a crucial
decision-making phase on Afghanistan at a time
when geopolitical mythology is dominating the
debate, the Pentagon is requesting additional
forces in Afghanistan.
The military bureaucracy is particularly vulnerable
to such mythology. It is unfortunate that the
intelligence community has not prepared a National
Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan, which
would better inform the White House debate.
The military has accepted five major myths with
respect to Afghanistan.
Myth #1: Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who commands
more than 100,000 US and international forces,
has endorsed a counterinsurgency strategy that
views the Taliban as a collection of armed groups
with different political and economic objectives.
McChrystal believes that an additional 40,000
US troops would make it easier to divide the
Taliban and wean a significant number of Taliban
fighters away from the insurgency. In fact,
it is the international coalition that lacks
clear direction, and it is Taliban forces that
currently have the strategic initiative. The
Taliban have demonstrated an increasingly coordinated
and centralized approach in their tactics and
operations over the past several years, and
there is ample evidence that the Afghan population
recognizes this fact and has provided greater
support to the insurgency. Conversely, the US
offensive in Helmand this summer, which involved
nearly 20,000 troops, failed to weaken the Taliban
on the southern front; the British offensive
there three years ago also failed. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates' belief that a significant
number of Taliban forces can be brought to our
side is dead wrong, and this is the kind of
wishful thinking that appears to be central
to McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy.
The Taliban may not be monolithic, but they
have political control of their forces. Increasing
US forces will likely strengthen the Taliban
and enhance Taliban recruitment efforts.
Myth #2: A Taliban presence would lead to
a renewed sanctuary for al-Qaeda and, once again,
the United States would be vulnerable to a terrorist
attack. There are very few al-Qaeda forces in
Afghanistan, and both the Bush and Obama administrations
have been successful in using Predator strikes
against the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan,
Somalia and Yemen. In the past year, US and
Pakistani intelligence have enabled the Predator
and other means to eliminate a significant number
of al-Qaeda leaders, restrict al-Qaeda's ability
to operate and to eliminate some of its financial
support. More importantly, al-Qaeda's leadership
does not need a sanctuary or safe haven in Afghanistan
to plan its operations. The training and preparations
for the 9/11 attacks in Washington, DC, and
New York City, after all, took place in US flight
schools as well as in several apartments in
German cities. Paul Pillar, the former deputy
chief of the CIA's counterterrorist center has
argued that al-Qaeda's terrorist threat is "less
one of commander than of ideological lodestar,
and for that role a haven is almost meaningless."
Myth #3: Any loss in Afghanistan would have
a domino effect in the region that would affect
Pakistan, India and Iran, with the United States
and NATO suffering a significant loss of credibility.
The domino effect and the credibility argument
represent old saws from the Vietnam era that
were discredited 35 years ago and should be
dismissed today. Internal political machinations
in Afghanistan, even the restoration of a Taliban
government in Kabul, would not have significant
implications outside the country, and there
is no indication that the Taliban has aspirations
beyond Afghan borders. The international community
has a good sense of US military capabilities,
and a reduced US military footprint would not
lessen the international perception of US power.
Myth #4: As part of its counterinsurgency
strategy, the United States must invest billions
of dollars to create more capable, accountable
and effective governments in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. US nation building will enhance civilian
control and stabilize constitutional government
in both countries. This myth ignores the fact
that Afghanistan and Pakistan are two of the
most corrupt nations on the face of the earth.
US aid to both countries has been siphoned off
to individuals and institutions that do not
contribute to US national security. US assistance
strategy has been particularly ineffective in
Afghanistan, which is 70 percent rural, and
there is no indication that the weak Pakistani
government is in a position to make the reforms
needed to use US assistance effectively. We
have been supplying military and economic assistance
to Pakistan since the 1950s, when we based U-2
spy planes there, and the Islamabad governments
have continuously misused and diverted this
aid to the military front against India. It
is estimated that between 2002 and 2008, while
the Taliban and al-Qaeda regrouped in Pakistan,
very little of the $6.6 billion in US aid actually
funded Pakistani military efforts against insurgents
and terrorists.
Myth #5: The Pakistani army would give up
its fight against the Taliban if the United
States reduced its own military efforts in Afghanistan.
No matter what strategy the United States adopts,
Pakistan is in no position to give up its efforts
to defeat or co-opt the Taliban. The Pakistani
Taliban represents a domestic problem for Islamabad
because of the short distance between the Pakistani
capital and the Taliban zone of operations.
The Pakistani army will defend its nuclear weapons
against the Taliban and it will resist Taliban
military and terrorist attacks. If the ineffective
and corrupt government of President Asif Ali
Zardari is not up to these tasks, then a military
government will replace Zardari. The United
States would profess opposition to the installation
of a military government, but such an outcome
would not affect US national security interests.
Other myths should also be understood before
decisions are made about increasing the US military
presence in Afghanistan. Too many people believe
that the "surge" in Iraq in 2007 was
a strategic victory.
No, it was a short-term tactical success,
but it created no strategic advantage because
of Iraq's inability to capitalize on the increased
US presence to stabilize and strengthen its
government. Similarly, a "surge" in
Afghanistan would have no impact on the corruption
and abuses of the government of President Hamid
Karzai.
Most agree that the Afghan election in August
exposed the fraudulence and corruption of the
Karzai government. Yes, but it also exposed
the inability of US and international forces
to allow the Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Tajiks to
go out and cast their ballots.
President Obama faces difficult decisions
if he is to avoid making Afghanistan his own
personal briar patch. He is getting too much
advice from domestic advisers and from military
professionals who occupy important positions
in the White House and even in Kabul.
Obama needs to widen the arc of the debate
and he should have started with the commission
of a National Intelligence Estimate. Intelligence
estimates have been compromised by the corrupt
product CIA prepared for the Bush administration
in the run-up to the Iraq war, but the Obama
administration should familiarize itself with
the excellent intelligence estimates prepared
during the Vietnam War.
A series of estimates in the 1960s and early
1970s warned the Johnson and Nixon administrations
that the South Vietnamese government was corrupt,
that it would not be a strategic ally in the
war against the North, and that the strategic
bombing campaign would fail.
As philosopher George Santayana's wrote: "Those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it."
Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the
Center for International Policy and adjunct
professor of government at Johns Hopkins University,
is The Public Record’s National Security
and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years
with the CIA, the National War College, and
the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of
Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.
Copyright 2009 The Public
Record
