Plan Colombia and Beyond

The issue is that the Colombian Air Force has been contemplating this purchase since at least the mid-1990s, if not earlier, so this is far from being an exclusively Uribe-era prospect.

I'd tend to disagree with the argument (made here and by the two previously mentioned congressmen) that these planes wouldn't be useful in counterinsurgency operations.

Right now, as could be seen on TV (Channel 9) in the recent live debate, the Colombian military has very little light-attack air support. Not to mention the fact that these planes could also be used to shoot down drug flights.

In other words, at least for now I'm inclined to believe in the arguments put forth by the Colombian Defense Ministry and by the FAC Commander.

The numbers of available, aging aircraft are very meager and to simply put off replacing them indefinitely is an irresponsible act. This issue has been delayed long enough already.

As for the deal of cost...yes, they are expensive, that's clear enough. And obviously budgetary priorities could be different (and for what it's worth, the number of new airplanes could be scaled down to 20 or 18, for example), but then again it's very hard to find the proper balance when Colombia has to take care of multiple problems at the same time....some people always critize Colombia for receiving U.S. aid, and now that Colombia's going to make a purchase on its own there's more criticism on the way.

Apparently there's no way for Colombia to avoid controversy.

Let's see... The Colombian MOD says the planes are not for deterring the MiG's and you note that "It is not clear how turboprop planes would serve as a deterrent against MiGs..." You seem to be in agreement with the Colombian Ministry of Defense.

I don't think there's a single military analyst who would say that these turboprop planes would stand a chance against Russian MiG's. Yet, you (and others) still claim they want the planes because of Venezuela's arms purchases. Why?

Is it possible that the Colombian government is telling the truth and really wants the planes to support combat against the FARC?

It's probably a bit of both. The air force would no doubt use the planes against the guerrillas. Despite what official statements say, though, there is no doubt that the Colombian Air Force - whose doctrine, however rigidly, includes the need to balance against even hypothetical threats from neighbors - views Venezuela's proposed buildup with concern. For the FAC, Venezuela lends an added sense of urgency to what is otherwise a non-urgent purchase of counterinsurgency aircraft.

By the way, if the planes are that crucially important for fighting the FARC, you'd expect Southcom or the Bush administration to be trying to find a way to help Colombia defray the cost - or even transferring some used aircraft. ($234 million, if spread over two years, would increase the U.S. military/police aid outlay perhaps 20 percent.) But that hasn't happened.

I'm not so sure...the U.S. is already spending considerable sums of money by aiding Colombia and, among many other things, transferring helos and other equipment, plus it has also donated some used aircraft in the past ( like the OV-10 Broncos and the A-37, I believe)...so some might believe that's already enough help in that area. Perhaps it is, perhaps it isn't. There can be internal policy disagreements about the matter in the U.S., for what it's worth.

Yet another aspect of the truth seems to be that even these donated airplanes have been of limited use, as they already have years of wear behind them (Vietnam anyone?) and some have had to be heavily refurbished in the U.S. at a very slow pace (specifically talking about the OV-10s here). Meanwhile, very few airplanes are currently available in Colombia.

That kind of help is good as a "stop gap" measure, but only new airframes would be able to adequately fulfill the light attack requirements of the FAC (without having to be flown back to the U.S. for long periods of time, like the OV-10s again).

Of course, as to the specific importance of those requirements...military experts would have to discuss the matter (and I'm sure several have done/are doing so).

I don't mean to be a cynic or a MOTO... but right is right.

These aircraft would be very useful in counterinsurgency ops; that's what they were DESIGNED for.

And of course they are of no utility against a Fulcrum. They're slow, prop driven, and armed for CAS missions.

One suspects that the real bone of contention here is not the sticker price, nor the need that Colombia might have... but from whom they are buying the planes.

I'm studiously avoiding a discussion of which planes are best for counterinsurgency. I ask that we keep an eye on the big picture here and consider all of the other things that Colombia needs but can't afford. Just one example from the posting I put up today: conservative estimates of the cost of demobilizing all AUC members give a price tag of $170 million. Merely going without 2/3 of these planes would free up the money needed for that. And there are a host of other needs that go unmet (massive displaced population, for instance), though they seem far more urgent than another piece of hardware to defeat a guerrilla group that, according to Gen. Castellanos, is already unable to go on the offensive, "in an evident state of retreat, and in the social and political realm is weak and without support."

Well, if we look at things from that point of view, then it's absolutely true that the money could be better spent elsewhere on the subjects that you've mentioned....and following what I posted above, I wouldn't be against reducing the number of airplanes to be acquired by a 1/3 or 1/4, for example.

Still, I believe that the numbers you've cited are underestimating the size of the other problems involved. In other words, I'd think that both the AUC's demobilization (or "reinsertion") and taking adequate care of the displaced are going to be far more expensive affairs, requiring not only financial aid but human resources well above an extra $240 million. Not to mention that properly addressing such issues would imply a fundamental change in the Colombian government's policies, which I don't see happening in the near term, sadly.

There are many conflicting priorities and feelings at work...I guess you could sum things up by saying that Colombia has to take care of too many complex tasks at the same time, even with the amount of aid that it currently receives. Certainly a lot more money is needed for peaceful and social purposes, and I do mean "a lot", but the war must also be funded simultaneously, at least for the forseeable future.

Because the thing is, even if I can certainly agree that the number of new airplanes could very well be reduced in order to save some money and use it for those previously mentioned purposes (which even then would still remain underfounded unless some big changes are implemented)....

....I can't help but notice that the airplanes, whether they are 10 or 15 or 24, are still going to be needed, because another thing is that I respectfully disagree with General Castellano's assessment, at least as far as the guerrilla's overall capabilities go.

They might not be willing to go on the offensive and some of their fronts might be heavily hit, but I'm sure that, once and if the government's military pressure eases up (due to simple exhaustion and/or lack of financial resources due to a reduction of foreign aid, for example), they'll get reorganized relatively quickly. One can't underestimate the FARC, unfortunately, given their past history.

Buying new airplanes from whom? How about the planes that radar near the oil fields. Maybe if the US company, Harden, from Texas and G.W.Bush affiliated (who will own 100 percent of the oil profits it exports out of Colombia) would give up what rightly belongs to Colombian citiznes (oil) and because of Uribes restructing of Colombia's state oil company Ecopetrol Colombia is losing out on its own oil. Colombia could generate revenue to buy airplanes to combat the FARC and distribute some out for displaced persons and demobilization. Uribe, I think should join Chavez and kept oil nationalized and not sell out. Rising oil prices is not a bad idea.

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