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December 15, 2004

Paramilitary Talks (6): Extradition and the U.S. role

It isn’t easy to characterize the U.S. approach so far to the Colombian government’s talks with the AUC. “Ambivalent,” perhaps. The United States has been the talks’ biggest foreign detractor at the same time that it has been its biggest foreign financial supporter.

The government of Álvaro Uribe is prodding Washington to offer the talks more political support and more funding. (Curiously, the OAS verification mission, MAPP-OEA, is playing a similar cheerleading / lobbying role; mission chief Sergio Caramagna was here in Washington last week making a sales pitch to key members of Congress, and he admonished the United States and Europe to do more in an interview Monday with the Associated Press.) The U.S. response, however, has been unclear – at least in part because the Bush administration’s position still appears to be evolving.

“Support for peace should be the easiest of decisions. But in Colombia it is not,” U.S. Ambassador William Wood said in June. Instead, Washington is adopting a tricky position of modest support and strong criticism, of moving toward helping to demobilize paramilitary fighters while simultaneously seeking to extradite their leaders on drug charges.

The U.S. government officially supports the peace talks, or at least the idea of negotiations as a cheap, peaceful way to eliminate the paramilitaries as a factor of instability and narcotrafficking. Washington’s shows of support, though, have been relatively small and tentative. In May 2003 Alex Lee, then the head of the embassy’s political section, met with an AUC emissary to discuss the talks. That year, a February 2004 letter from the State Department (PDF format) indicates, USAID spent $150,000 in Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) funds on “a needs assessment study and to pay for consultants from two USAID contractors (International Organization for Migration and Creative Associates) to advise the Colombian government as they design demobilization/reintegration programs.”

This sort of logistical support has continued in 2004. Caramagna’s MAPP-OEA mission got several hundred thousand dollars from USAID to help establish itself. “The government just provided $1 million [to the OAS] for further preparation and development,” Ambassador Wood said in June. “But long-term funding is unclear.” Like the European Union, the United States has indicated that the overall process will be easier to support once Colombia’s congress approves a “legal framework”: a law determining what happens to demobilized paramilitaries accused of serious abuses, dismantling paramilitarism, and compensating victims. Small amounts of U.S. funds have gone to non-governmental organizations advising the drafting of such “justice and compensation” legislation, including the yet-to-be-introduced bill drafted by Sen. Rafael Pardo and a multi-party group of congresspeople (discussed in an earlier posting).

Overall, though, the U.S. contributions to the AUC process have been small, though its outlays exceed those of other donors – Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Bahamas – whose support has mostly (perhaps entirely) gone to the OAS mission.

In fact, the U.S. government’s expressions of skepticism have attracted much more attention. Officials speaking off the record will readily admit strong concerns about issues like the paramilitaries’ narcotization and economic power, the possibility of impunity for rights abusers, and the security vacuum that demobilizations could leave behind. For his part, Ambassador Wood took on a markedly more critical tone during early and mid-2004. A few examples:

• February 2004: “It is clear that the paramilitaries have not completely met the commitments of the cease-fire,” Wood told the daily El Tiempo.
• June 2004: “I’m not sure the self-defense groups have a political goal or that they have a political agenda. They have only one program: narco-terror. And only one agenda: destruction. … We are skeptical about the peace process,” Wood told the newsweekly Cambio.
• July 2004: After calling three paramilitary leaders’ address before the congress a “scandal,” Wood told the Cartagena daily El Universal that the Congress was not an appropriate forum to host the AUC leaders. “We’re willing to give them a forum, if they want it. It’s called a courtroom.”
• July 2004: Referring to the “launch” of negotiations in the Santa Fe de Ralito demilitarized zone, which no U.S. official attended, Wood said, “It doesn’t look to me like a transition in favor of peace as much as one in favor of narcotrafficking.”
• July 2004: “We believe that Dr. Restrepo [government peace negotiator Luis Carlos Restrepo] has done a magnificent job, but this all depends on the compliance of the evildoers.”

While statements like these have made headlines in Colombia, they pale in comparison to the best-known expression of U.S. skepticism about the AUC talks: the U.S. Justice Department’s requests to extradite paramilitary leaders on narcotrafficking charges. “Our position has been that we’re not involved in negotiations. We’re not involved either in dropping any charges or other legal action that we might want to take against individuals,” State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said in September. It is now a cliché in the Colombian press to refer to the extradition requests as a “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the negotiations.

To the best of our knowledge, ten AUC leaders are wanted to stand trial in the United States. Most, though not all, of these leaders are currently in the Ralito demilitarized zone negotiating with the Colombian government. Those in the zone do not face any danger of arrest as long as the talks continue. Those outside the zone are powerful fugitives whose arrests are unlikely. Several of those listed here are among the wave of notorious narcotraffickers who have only recently put on paramilitary uniforms in an effort to win amnesty.

1. Salvatore Mancuso, the top AUC leader, was one of the first to face an extradition request, a September 2002 indictment on charges of shipping at least seventeen tons of cocaine to the United States. On November 24^th, Colombia’s Supreme Court gave final approval for his eventual extradition, should talks end and Colombia arrest him.
2. Juan Carlos Sierra, a lower-ranking chieftain nicknamed “El Tuso,” was also named in the September 2002 indictment. In an effort to prod the talks during a low point in late September 2004, the Colombian government declared that Sierra, who was present in Ralito, would be arrested and extradited. He has since been a fugitive.
3. Vicente Castaño, “El Profe,” is a longtime narcotrafficker allegedly implicated in the April 2004 attack on, and subsequent disappearance of, his brother and longtime AUC leader Carlos Castaño.
4. Diego Fernando Murillo, nicknamed “Don Berna” or “Adolfo Paz,” is the AUC’s very powerful “inspector-general” and head of several blocs.
5. Víctor Manuel Mejía Múnera, nicknamed “El Mellizo” (“The Twin”) but known in Ralito as “Pablo Arauca,” is the head of the AUC’s “Avengers of Arauca” bloc.
6. Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, or “Jorge 40,” runs the AUC’s Northern Bloc and is based in the port of Barranquilla.
7. Ramiro Vanoy Murillo, or “Cuco,” heads the Antioquia-based Mineros Bloc.
8. Francisco Javier Zuluaga Lindo, known as “Gordo Lindo” in the drug underworld but in Ralito as “Comandante Gabriel Galindo,” is the political chief of Don Berna’s Pacific Bloc.
9. Guillermo Pérez Alzate, or “Pablo Sevillano,” heads the Liberators of the South Bloc, based in the Pacific port city of Tumaco, Nariño.
10. Hernán Giraldo Serna, based in the Caribbean port city of Santa Marta, is wanted for ordering the murder of two DEA agents.

In the extremely slim chance that he is still alive, Carlos Castaño would of course be an eleventh paramilitary leader facing extradition.

While seeking to bring the AUC’s top leadership into U.S. courtrooms, the Bush administration wants to give a different treatment to rank-and-file paramilitaries, expressing some interest in funding their demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR). The State Department indicated in February that “in its FY 2005 Budget Request, USAID asks for $3.25 million of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account for ‘Peace Initiatives’ in Colombia, which could be used in support of the AUC peace process.”

Most of that $3.25 million is likely to go to DDR, though it will cover only a tiny sliver of the Colombian government’s expected total cost. According to Ambassador Wood, “Estimates have placed the cost of the whole demobilization process at about $8,500 per head.” Multiply that by 20,000 paramilitaries and you get $170 million, or 52 times the USAID obligation.

It’s hard to imagine the U.S. contribution increasing much in the near term, for at least two important reasons. First are the conditions the Bush administration appears to have set for itself, which the State Department indicated in February.

We have made it clear to the Government of Colombia that our overall support for the peace process is conditioned upon a clear timetable for demobilization, legal accountability for those AUC members who have committed gross human rights violations, and a continuing commitment to illegal drug eradication and interdiction in AUC areas. In addition, the government should control any zones in which armed militants are concentrated for the purposes of demobilization and disarmament.

Some of those requirements have been met: a demobilization timetable does exist for the 3,000 paramilitaries expected to hand in their weapons by the end of the year (though it requires a lot to be done in a very short period), and herbicide fumigation certainly takes place in AUC areas. But no legal framework is yet in place to guarantee accountability for rights violators, and the government’s ability to control zones where paramilitaries are demobilizing is very much in question. While the United States and Europe have been pushing hard for a legal framework, this remains stalled in Colombia’s congress, and probably won’t be taken up again until the next legislative session begins in February.

Second, though the executive branch is free to fudge its own conditions for increased support, the U.S. Congress – which is not enthusiastic about supporting the AUC talks – has added some strong, though non-binding, requirements of its own. The House-Senate Conference Committee that drew up a compromise version of the 2005 foreign aid bill had some strong words and some stringent conditions in the narrative report that accompanied the bill, approved in November.

The managers [the Conference Committee members] believe that the costs of demobilizing illegal armed groups should be borne by the Colombian Government, not the United States. The managers are concerned that the demobilization process is being undertaken without adequate safeguards to ensure the dismantling of such FTOs [Foreign Terrorist Organizations], to deter members of such groups from resuming illegal activities, or to prosecute and punish those involved in drug trafficking and human rights violations.The managers do not believe the Administration should request funds in fiscal year 2006 for the demobilization / reintegration of members of such FTOs unless it is for limited activities that are determined by the Justice Department to be consistent with United States anti-terrorism laws.

The committee urges that any DDR aid be contingent on the following conditions:

(1) The FTO is respecting a ceasefire and the cessation of illegal activities; (2) the Government of Colombia has not adopted any law or policy inconsistent with its obligations under the United States-Colombian treaty on extradition, and has committed to the United States that it will continue to extradite Colombian citizens to the United States, including members of such illegal armed groups, in accordance with that treaty; (3) the Colombian legal framework governing the demobilization of such groups provides for prosecution and punishment, in proportion to the crimes committed, of those responsible for gross violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law, and drug trafficking, for reparations to victims, and for the monitoring of demobilized individuals; (4) the Government of Colombia is implementing a policy of effectively dismantling such groups, including the seizure of financial and property assets; and (5) the Government of Colombia is taking actions to enable the return of stolen assets, including real property, to their original owners.

The committee also urges that future assistance to the OAS mission meet a set of conditions:

The managers request that, prior to the provision of additional funds to the OAS for this purpose, the Secretary of State report to the Committees that the OAS Mission is strictly adhering to its verification role, FTOs are concentrated in zones for demobilization, the legal framework governing the demobilization conforms with (3) above, and the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights is providing advice to the OAS Mission.

Since this is narrative report language, not legislation, the Bush administration can ignore these conditions without breaking the law – and it might, since several of these conditions, especially the requirement for a legal framework, are unlikely to be met soon. But to do so would be to run counter to the strongly expressed preferences of both houses’ appropriations committees – which means that a great deal of negotiation will be required to free up even the planned $3.25 million for demobilization.

As we’ve indicated in earlier postings, CIP supports conditions along these lines. However, the phrase “punishment in proportion to the crimes committed” is too vague. If the standard of “proportional punishment” were to be rigidly applied, all AUC leaders would have to go to jail for life, which they won’t do willingly. Instead, a maximum sentence of ten years is contemplated in both the Colombian government’s and Sen. Pardo’s proposed laws. Left-of-center Sen. Piedad Córdoba introduced an alternative bill on December 6 calling for up to twenty years in jail – a tougher penalty but still hardly a proportional punishment for mass murder. It is unclear whether even Sen. Córdoba’s bill meets the standard set in the Conference Committee’s report.

(A third obstacle to increased U.S. aid for DDR was a Justice Department interpretation of Section 803 of the PATRIOT Act. The interpretation left open the possibility that DDR aid to ex-AUC members might be construed as giving “material support” to terrorists. According to communications with congressional staff, though, an agreement with the Justice Department has recently been reached, thus removing that obstacle.)

The Bush administration’s approach has so far been two-pronged: offer a small amount of support for the AUC’s rank-and-file – thus showing that Washington supports the process – while taking a very hard line against their leaders. Can this two-pronged approach work? The answer depends on how the extradition issue plays out.

The Justice Department – which exists to enforce U.S. law and doesn’t care about peace processes – is not going to withdraw its extradition requests. Ultimately, the Colombian and U.S. governments will each have to make a decision. The Colombian government must decide whether or not it will honor the U.S. extradition requests for AUC leaders (or whether it will only honor some, perhaps handing over those who became paramilitaries only recently in a bid to win amnesty). If it does not – if paramilitary leaders receive assurances that they will not be extradited after negotiations conclude – the U.S. government would then have to decide whether rejection of the extradition requests will damage U.S. relations with Colombia.

If a final peace accord can be reached with the AUC (or the FARC, for that matter, as several guerrilla leaders also face extradition), it is very likely that Bogotá would promise not to extradite and Washington would not make a big issue of it. (Governments change, however, and unless Colombia’s constitution is amended to protect paramilitary leaders permanently – which is unlikely – one of President Uribe’s successors could someday choose to honor the extradition requests.)

While the “don’t extradite, don’t complain” result is by far the likeliest, the extradition issue, while it remains unresolved, gives the Colombian government significant leverage in the talks. The Colombian and U.S. governments would do well to hold this card close to their chests as long as possible, using the threat of extradition as a means to extract the greatest possible concessions from the paramilitaries, particularly with regard to reparations and the dismantling of the AUC’s support networks. The threat of extradition can also keep paramilitary leaders at the negotiating table: if they break off the talks, they risk finding themselves on a plane to Miami.

Colombian government negotiators would do well, then, to make no concessions on this issue early in the talks. Government negotiator Luis Carlos Restrepo did some damage already by hinting, in taped negotiation sessions leaked by Mancuso, that President Uribe could use “discretionality” on extradition.

Using extradition as a negotiating tool is a double-edged sword, however: pushing too hard could torpedo the talks. Paramilitary leaders have made no secret that extradition is of paramount importance to them. Salvatore Mancuso told an interviewer earlier this month that unless an understanding on extraditions is reached, “The demobilizations will not advance, because it is easier for me to go back, gather the few remaining troops that haven’t demobilized, run off to the jungle and die there, either of old age or when the law kills me, than it is to finish the negotiations here only to be taken away to jail in the United States.”

For the time being, the extradition requests will remain the most visible element of Washington’s policy toward the paramilitary peace talks. However, if Colombia manages to pass a “legal framework” law governing demobilization, dismantling and reparations – thus satisfying a key administration and congressional pre-condition – we can probably expect U.S. support to become more visible.

We probably cannot expect U.S. aid for demobilizing the paramilitaries’ rank-and-file to reach high levels, though. Congressional appropriators have made clear that they expect Colombia to pay for it, and only a few million dollars would be available between now and 2006 unless the administration includes more money for DDR in a supplemental budget request for 2005 (and we’ve heard no indications that this will happen).

This “wait and see” attitude is understandable, and we support it. Until basic conditions are met – a real cease-fire, the exclusion of narcotraffickers from the talks, a strategy in place of improvisation, a plan to fill the “security vacuum,” and a legal framework for justice, reparations and dismantling – the U.S. government would be wise to continue its current policy of modest aid and “skeptical support.”

Posted by isacson at December 15, 2004 09:58 AM

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Posted by: jcg at December 16, 2004 01:38 PM

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