Presentation
by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Wood, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, June 29, 2004
Presentation
by Ambassador William B. Wood
on
The
Peace Process with the AUC in Colombia
The
Woodrow Wilson International Center
June
28, 2004
Introduction
I
am delighted to be here at the Woodrow Wilson International Center
to discuss the vexed issue of the Colombian peace process with
the AUC.
Support for peace should be the easiest of decisions. But in Colombia
it is not. Indeed, in Colombia the idea of a peace process with
the paramilitaries is in many ways more controversial than similar
processes with such notable bad guys as the RUF in Sierra Leone,
the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or even, in some ways, the Taliban
in Afghanistan or the Baath Party and the Republican Guard in
Iraq. Some in Europe and the United States have been prone to
specify conditions for what is and is not an "acceptable"
peace. And the Colombians, by attempting to establish a legal
structure through what was once the "Alternative Sentencing
Bill" and is now called the "Bill for Justice and Compensation"
-- in advance of any agreement -- have gone through a similar
domestic debate. In most circumstances, the process is reversed:
the government strikes a deal and delivers a stark choice to the
world -- either support this peace or advocate continued conflict.
Right now the bill -- which enjoys the general support of the
U.S., the EU, and the UN -- is awaiting adoption in the next session
of Congress, which begins July 20. It was to have been adopted
this session but fell victim to other urgent matters -- reform
of the penal code, passage of a tough new anti-terrorism law,
and the first round of debate on a constitutional reform to allow
re-election of the president. It also fell victim, I believe,
to uncertainty about the future of the peace process itself, and
the desire of the Colombian Congress to adopt a bill that would
reinforce the chances for getting a good peace, without impeding
the chances for an acceptable one.
Does
this mean that the Government of Colombia should accept, and the
U.S. support, peace at any price? Obviously not. In the case of
Colombia, we should not consider support for any peace process
unless it offers a good chance of ending conflict with the faction
in question; reinforcing democracy, justice, and the rule of law;
reducing narcotics trafficking; and providing the foundation for
long-term peace, social equity, and development. I am convinced
that those are the goals of the Government of Colombia.
But,
after that, it gets murky. One interlocutor told me that he believed
that durable peace with the paramilitaries required that 100 paramilitaries
each go to jail for ten years. Or maybe a little less; he wasn't
sure. I agree with him; I am not sure either. But I am sure of
one thing: that we should defer to the democratic processes of
the country that is waging the war. Colombia knows the cost of
continued conflict and the benefits of future peace in a way that
those of us outside the conflict cannot. And the strength of Colombian
democracy gives the Colombian government the legitimacy to make
the decision. That is the basis for the U.S. position that national
reconciliation in Colombia is first and foremost up to the Colombians.
And our desire to assist where we can be of assistance.
With that sort of metaphysical introduction, let's look at where
we stand now.
Paramilitary
Peace Process
In
January, six months after the AUC had declared a cessation of
hostilities, President Uribe was so dissatisfied with the continued,
albeit reduced, level of violence against civilians and continued
narco-trafficking by the AUC that he launched a major initiative
to force them to the next stage of the process: verifiable concentration
of forces. He reached a controversial agreement in January, ratified
by the OAS on February 6, for the OAS to act as verifiers.
In
early April, the talks looked as though they were breaking down.
Carlos Castano -- historical leader of the AUC, drug trafficker
and terrorist, fugitive from U.S. justice, and the loudest voice
on the AUC side of the table for a negotiated peace -- had disappeared.
The leadership of the AUC increasingly was in the hands of long-term
narco-traffickers without even the veneer of a historical political
agenda. Peace Commissioner Restrepo had made a trip to Cordoba
Department, where the talks were being held, to reverse his previous
efforts to get an agreement that included all major AUC factions
and instead to simply see if any of the factions were willing
to sign on; he was not successful. The U.S. embassy was loudly
criticizing the paramilitaries for their open descent into unambiguous
narcoterrorism. "They have lost their disguise," was
our cry (although it was never much of a disguise).
On April 27, President Uribe issued an ultimatum to the paramilitaries,
which may have been a pivotal event. Its key elements were: (1)
a first-ever accusation that the supposedly patriotic paramilitaries
were targeting President Uribe for assassination, a true statement,
(2) a statement that the peace process could not advance in the
face of continued violations of the cessation of hostilities,
drug trafficking, and other paramilitary violence, (3) a call
for the paramilitaries to accept a concentration zone with clear
rules, under OAS verification, (4) a threat that, otherwise, the
government would continue to fight until they were annihilated,
and (5) a confirmation that extradition was not a subject for
negotiation. Although the U.S. had no hand in drafting this statement,
we strongly supported it, most directly during Under Secretary
Grossman's visit in early May.
Less than two weeks after that statement, AUC leadership advised
the government that they were prepared to sign the draft peace
agreement. Key elements of the agreement were:
The
ten most senior AUC leaders, with their bodyguards, about 400
persons in all, would concentrate in an area of 142 square miles
(less than 12 miles by 12 miles) for six months, extendable upon
agreement by the parties.
Concentration
of leaders was an explicit first step toward development of a
timetable for concentration of all paramilitary forces.
Once
concentrated, paramilitary personnel would enter and leave the
zone only with express permission of the government and only for
activities related to the peace process. (There continues to be
discussion about how many paramilitaries can be allowed out of
the zone at any one time.)
The
paramilitaries inside the zone would not undertake illicit activities,
recruit, pressure, or threaten the local population or visitors,
train, or order or coordinate illegal actions. (This is crucial:
concentrated paramilitary leaders will retain responsibility for
the actions of their forces.)
Arrest
warrants would be suspended for paramilitaries within the zone,
but national law would continue in full force there and the government
could take law enforcement action in response to any infraction.
(So the government can respond to any infraction by the leaders,
or their cadre.)
The
OAS would verify compliance, including by receiving an inventory
of all communications equipment, arms, and ammunition held by
the paramilitaries in the zone. (The communications equipment
is important because it is the basis for the continuing responsibility
of the leaders for their cadre.)
The
military and police would establish a security perimeter around
the zone. The 11th Army Brigade already has made its initial deployments.
(The government had not been able to station troops in this area
for more than a decade.)
On
June 15, the government promulgated decrees 91 and 92, creating
the zone of concentration and formally beginning the process of
negotiation toward a final peace agreement with the paramilitaries.
That same day, the paramilitaries and the government announced
that concentration would take place on July 1. This is two weeks
later than the original date for concentration and skepticism
regarding paramilitary compliance remains high.
The
U.S. welcomed the beginning of peace negotiations on June 16,
emphasizing the contribution that a credible peace process could
make toward ending the violence, the importance that the process
in no way prejudice the extradition of Colombians indicted in
the U.S., and the need to bring gross violators of human rights
and major drug traffickers to trial. In Colombia, the embassy
has emphasized steadily in its public statements that the agreement
is only as good as paramilitary compliance makes it. AUC leaders
have requested the presence of the U.S. at the negotiating table.
We have made clear that we would not even consider such a step.
ELN
Peace Process
As the peace process with the paramilitaries was taking its most
recent steps, on May 30 President Fox offered Mexican "facilitation"
for a peace process with the ELN, one of the oldest, but now the
weakest Colombian illegal armed group. Recent press accounts have
noted that the ELN seemed to have only three options: (1) to lose
on the battlefield, (2) to be absorbed by the FARC, which has
a totally different approach and to which the ELN has lost both
territory and stature, or (3) to negotiate with the government.
European repudiation of the ELN following the kidnapping last
fall of European and Israeli eco-tourists may have influenced
the ELN to move toward peace talks. The successful negotiations
by the government that achieved their safe release -- without
damaging concessions -- may have indicated that, unlike the FARC,
the ELN could be dealt with and would comply with its commitments.
President Uribe has called for "prudence" in developing
an ELN process, not least to limit the ability of the paramilitaries
and the ELN to play two separate processes against each other.
Nevertheless, on June 2 the government made an extraordinary gesture:
it released for one day convicted ELN leader Franciso Galan to
meet with Vice President Santos and Peace Commissioner Restrepo,
and to deliver its position in the national congress, at a meeting
on anti-personnel mines. Although the ELN response, calling for
a bilateral cessation of hostilities (the equivalent of renunciation
of government authority) and immediate release of all so-called
political prisoners was not acceptable, the process continues.
On June 16, Mexico named experienced diplomat and former ambassador
to Colombia Andres Valencia as facilitator; on June 18 he met
with Peace Commissioner Restrepo for the first time and shortly
thereafter with Mr. Galan in an extended get-acquainted session.
On June 24, the ELN Central Council named Galan as their official
negotiator, indicating continued interest in the process. I met
with Ambassador Valencia last week. I assured him that the U.S.
has long supported a process with the ELN, provided it met president
Uribe's pre-condition for all such talks -- declaration of a unilateral
ceasefire -- and was a serious process. We will have to see how
it unfolds.
FARC
Peace Process
In the interest of completeness, a few words about the peace process
-- or the lack of one -- with the FARC. The FARC has made numerous
overtures through the UN, the Church, and other intermediaries.
With the UN, they were seeking simply an initial meeting, but
the preparatory talks foundered over the nature of the event:
the UN wanted a serious discussion on neutral ground; the FARC
wanted a media event involving either concession by the government
of secure territory inside Colombia for the talks, or recognition
of FARC status in some form by a foreign host government. The
talks broke down. More to the point, the FARC have never come
close to accepting the unavoidable pre-condition of the government
for a peace process: a unilateral declaration of a cessation of
hostilities, to include an end to narco-trafficking.
I
have held two final topics for last, because they are meant to
apply not to any specific peace process, but to any process with
any of Colombia's terrorist groups: the legal structure for peace
under the draft Law of Justice and Compensation, and the organizational
preparations made by the Colombian government to implement demobilization
and reinsertion of armed groups.
Law
of Justice and Compensation
The
draft Law of Justice and Compensation has evolved substantially
since it was first introduced last fall. In essence, it provides
a legal structure in the event that an illegal armed group declares
a unilateral cessation of hostilities, signs a final peace agreement,
and provides the government with a list of its members to be considered
for benefits under the law. If, at any stage, an individual ex-combatant
fails to fulfill his obligations under the law, he immediately
loses the benefits and becomes subject to full law enforcement
action. The steps in the current draft are as follows:
The
ex-combatant promises to meet the requirements levied by a new
"Tribunal for Truth, Justice, and Compensation" regarding
assisting victims, paying compensation, and cooperating in further
peace-making. In particular, he must assist the prosecutors and
the Tribunal in examining his case, and disclose his economic
assets.
The
Prosecutor General reviews the ex-combatant's record, condenses
all charges into one case, and sends its recommendations for a
normal sentence to the Tribunal. The Tribunal reaches a verdict
and sets the sentence; at that point the individual has been formally
convicted and sentenced according to the usual Colombian norms.
Then
the Tribunal sends the case to the president, with its recommendation
that the ex-combatant be given or denied benefits; i.e., an alternative
sentence. If the recommendation is denial, the individual receives
the full sentence and the President (really the Ministry of Justice
and Interior, which is responsible for the prison system) determines
where he will serve it.
If
the recommendation is to grant benefits under the law, the president
makes a final decision in favor or against benefits for the individual,
and returns the case to the Tribunal. Again, if he decides against
benefits, he determines where the sentence will be served.
If
the president decides in favor of benefits for this individual,
the Tribunal sets the "alternative sentence," between
five and ten years of prison, and imposes obligations for compensation
and peace-making actions. Again, the president determines where
the sentence will be served.
After
serving his sentence and fulfilling all other obligations, the
beneficiary is placed under supervised parole for ten years (or
five years if he had received the minimum alternative sentence
of five years).
If,
at the end of that period, the individual has fulfilled every
obligation, he is a free man.
A
couple of comments. First, this is a law meant for the leaders
and most violent members of these organizations. Only those found
personally responsible for major violent crimes or narco-trafficking
would pass under it. Most members of IAGs would probably be found
to be guilty only of so-called political crimes, which would be
amnestied.
Second,
the payment of compensation under the law should not be confused
with restoration of stolen or wrongfully acquired property. Compensation
is in addition to restoration of illegally acquired property.
So the former combatant faces both confiscation of illegal assets
and compensation for illegal actions paid from possibly legal
assets: two blows to the pocketbook.
Third,
no promises regarding extradition are made or implied in any part
of the law.
Finally,
as I said earlier, the law is still in draft form and, now, not
one but both terrorist organizations involved in peace talks will
be reacting to it at the negotiating table. The government, and
Peace Commissioner Restrepo in particular, have been very, very
firm regarding jail time, compensation, and extradition, in spite
of intense pressure from the paramilitaries. The ELN is likely
to adhere to much the same line. The U.S., the Europeans, and
the UN have all said that they can generally support the draft
as it now stands. We will continue to support a tough line with
terrorists.
Demobilization
and Reinsertion
The
government's plans for demobilization and reinsertion are also
meant to apply to all groups entering a peace process. But there
clearly will be operational differences if only because of the
difference in size between the few thousand ELN members and the
much larger AUC paramilitaries.
In
general, the process is under the control of, first, the Peace
Commissioner during the negotiations, second, the Ministry of
Defense during the concentration and demobilization phase (which
includes identification by the National Civil Registry and judicial
interrogation by the Prosecutor General), and third the Ministry
of Justice and Interior during the reinsertion phase, with the
assistance of a number of other governmental and non-governmental
social entities to help with health, education, and placement.
The OAS has accompanied the Peace Commissioner at all recent negotiating
sessions -- not as a mediator but as an adviser to the government
-- and is responsible for verification of all operational phases.
The Medellin-based demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara,
which you will hear about later, has reached the final stages
of reinsertion and has many practical experiences to share. But
the government's national effort has not yet passed the initial
negotiation stage with any group. As I indicated, it was only
on June 15 that the government formally ended the pre-negotiation
phase with the paramilitary AUC group and began final negotiations.
The negotiation phase with the AUC paramilitaries has been difficult.
Reports are that the disappearance of Carlos Castano was related
to his willingness, in contrast to the other AUC negotiators,
to accept government demands, and that he was a source of internal
dissension and insecurity among AUC leaders. Reports are also
that Dr. Restrepo has taken a very tough line, through shouting
matches and threats to leave the table; President Uribe's high
popularity and the growing possibility of re-election give Restrepo
a strong negotiating base.
Negotiations are taking place only within the limits of the April
27 declaration and the draft Law of Justice and Compensation,
although the paramilitaries regularly attempt to sidestep both.
As a result, the discussions have operationally related to two
chief subjects: modalities for the concentration of the leaders,
and the subsequent concentration and demobilization of their forces.
Regarding the modalities, there already have been heated disputes
regarding, for example, access by the paramilitaries to media
and other outsiders. Regarding concentration of the rank-and-file,
the first goal is to establish a calendar for concentration and
demobilization. The government's goal -- a hopeful one -- is to
concentrate up to 4,000 paramilitaries by year's end.
The concentration and demobilization phases are modeled after
the government's experience with some 4,000 deserters from all
the terrorist groups. Each former combatant would be identified,
not least to enable a check of criminal records for past crimes
(not an easy task, for instance, for paramilitaries carried off
as child soldiers years ago). The Defense Ministry would debrief
for intelligence about the organization and operation of the paramilitaries
(the deserter program has been an important source of such information).
The Prosecutor General would interview the former combatant for
information relating to possible prosecution, application of the
law of Justice and Compensation, and general legal issues. Following
satisfactory interviews, the ex-combatant would sign a pledge
to permanently separate himself from the organization and its
activities, acknowledging that any failure to cooperate would
leave him open for full action of law enforcement. That would
constitute formal demobilization.
Finally, entry into the reinsertion program and preparation for
reinsertion. This phase is supposed to last for no more than a
year for each "reinsertado," except in the case of child
soldiers. In all cases, it is expected that the national Institute
for Family Welfare, the Ministries of Health and Education, the
national Training Institute, and a number of others would work
to prepare the ex-combatant for return to normal life in body
and mind. In cases where ex-combatants want to return to farms
or other places they formally worked, they normally would be allowed
to go. In other cases, they would be prepared for some sort of
regular work. They would receive a stipend during this period,
in exchange for cooperation and work that did not interfere with
the other tasks of this phase.
Estimates have placed the cost of the whole demobilization process
at about $8,500 per head, or more than $42 million for 5,000 "reinsertados."
The government is still defining the specific elements of the
program, so the precise numbers are not yet available. They may
even be affected by the negotiations themselves, so we may not
be able to know the costs in complete detail for a while longer.
Although
the cash-strapped government will pay the lion's share of the
cost of concentration and demobilization, they need help on the
more "humanitarian" reinsertion side: they are requesting
that the international community contribute up to $5,700 per "reinsertado."
We are studying the policy, budgetary, and legal implications
of U.S. assistance. One thing is clear: the cost of reinsertion
for each ex-combatant would be substantially lower than the costs
of his continued illegal activity plus the cost of confronting
and defeating him militarily. Not to mention the continued suffering
by the population and the armed forces that would entail. A good
peace is also a good deal.
The OAS verification mission has also faced financial difficulties.
The U.S. provided several hundred thousand dollars to help OAS
mission head Sergio Caramagna launch his office. The government
just provided $1 million for further preparation and development.
But long-term funding is unclear. Until that is pinned down, Caramagna,
who is working almost alone, says he is unable to write contracts
with the experts he needs to do the actual work. In addition,
Caramagna says that he has critical needs for vehicles and communication
gear: in all such operations, mobility and communications compensate
for not having sufficient personnel to be in all places at all
times. Sweden appears to have offered to send an expert to work
in Caramagna's office, who will also come with some equipment.
The U.S. recently reached a decision that continued assistance
to the OAS effort is legally possible for us if there are no changes
in the program. But, since the program is still in development,
there will be changes; so we are working to broaden that decision.
Bottom
Line
Thank you for your attention to what has been a very long and
probably too-detailed presentation. In closing, I would like to
leave you with some concluding thoughts:
This
is hard. Finding a balance between peace and justice necessarily
implies that neither goal will be served perfectly, so judgment
is a key factor. The draft Law of Justice and Compensation has
been toughened substantially since its introduction precisely
because voices inside and outside Colombia didn't think the first
draft got it exactly right. That debate will continue inside and
outside Colombia.
This
is uncertain. The paramilitaries are composed of many different
kinds of people: Child soldiers who never had a chance to know
better. Campesinos who may have been caught up in a struggle they
did not understand or may have felt that their safety and the
safety of their families required that they ally with one armed
side or another. Thugs and psychopaths looking for a way to realize
their desire to prey on society. Leaders who range from those
who once may have had an ideology but slipped into narco-trafficking
and abuse over the years, to the hardest-core, most cynical, most
cruel drug lords on the face of the earth, hoping to use the so-called
political aspects of the movement to disguise and shield their
real activities. And leaders-to-be waiting for their time when
they can order the depredations, and reap the profits. By the
way, the other illegal armed groups share this horribly mixed
profile. In no plausible scenario will all of these persons participate
in good faith in any meaningful peace process. But to be able
to pull 1000, or 5000, or, optimistically, 10,000 fighters off
the battlefield, in the country with the largest, and longest-lived
terrorist movement in the world, is a goal worth working for.
Finally,
this is a necessary part of our policy, both as a part of our
partnership with the Uribe Administration and as part of our unrelenting
war on terrorism and narco-trafficking. Just as we support alternative
development to undermine the economic and social structure that
has contributed to the growth of narco-terrorism, we must also
support a "pull" strategy to complement our forceful
"push" strategy to destroy the political and military
structure of the illegal armed groups. And we have to get it right.
Thank
you again for your attention. And thanks again to the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for hosting this important discussion,
so directly relevant to the well-being of our citizens, as they
live their daily lives in American cities, suburbs, and towns.
As of
June 29, 2004, this document was also available online at http://wwics.si.edu/events/docs/ACF227.doc