Plan Colombia and Beyond

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July 08, 2005

Two cheers for the Senate

The annual foreign-aid budget bill (H.R. 3057) continues to move through Congress, a bit ahead of schedule this year. The House passed its version of the bill on June 28, and gave the Bush Administration exactly what it wanted where Colombia is concerned, despite the best efforts of the policy’s many opponents.

Now it’s the Senate’s turn. Sometime in July, that body is likely to debate its version of the bill. Before they left for the July 4 break, the Senate Appropriations Committee drafted its text, whose Colombia provisions are unlikely to change much when the full Senate considers the bill.

As usual, the Colombia provisions in the Senate’s version are significantly better than those that come out of the House of Representatives. While of course they’re far from the strategy that we think would work, they at least do a much better job of reflecting the challenging reality faced by U.S. aid programs in Colombia.

Two elements in the Senate text are especially noteworthy: a slight improvement in the balance between military and economic aid, and an excellent set of conditions that must be met before any U.S. funds go to support paramilitary demobilizations.

Aid amounts: toward a better balance

While aid to Colombia flows through several different accounts in the foreign aid and defense budgets, the biggest single source of aid is the “Andean Counterdrug Initiative.” Overseen by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control, the “ACI” provides both military and non-military aid to Colombia and six of its neighbors. It pays for fumigation and alternative development, helicopter maintenance and aid to the displaced, patrol boats and aid to the OAS verification mission. In fact, the ACI supplies Colombia with almost all the non-military aid that it gets, most of it passed directly to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Since Plan Colombia began, U.S. aid to Colombia has been heavily weighted in favor of Colombia’s security forces. For every dollar in economic and social aid to Colombia, the United States has given four dollars to Colombia’s armed forces and police. Improving this balance would require a change to the amounts of military and non-military aid in the ACI.

The Senate bill makes an effort to do this. For the first time, it puts a “ceiling” on the amount of ACI aid that can go to Colombia’s military: “not more than $278,450,000 shall be made available for assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces and National Police.” That is over $53 million less than what the Bush Administration’s ACI aid request for 2006 (PDF format) had anticipated giving to the Colombian security forces.

The bill also raises a “floor” for economic aid that first appeared (thanks to the Senate) in the 2005 bill. It specifies that “not less than $149,757,000 shall be made available for alternative development/institution building in Colombia, which shall be apportioned directly to the United States Agency for International Development.” This is $24 million higher than the similar “floor” for USAID assistance to Colombia in the 2005 foreign aid bill.

A bit more ACI non-military assistance – for “rule of law” programs – does not go through USAID, and is in addition to this “floor.” If the Senate language passes, then, non-military aid to Colombia in 2006 could total $177.15 million, $25 million more than the Bush Administration’s request.

If this ceiling-and-floor language were to pass, it would not bring an earth-shaking change in aid amounts. Considering expected 2006 funding from all aid programs, it would merely shift the overall ratio of military to economic aid from 80-20 to 75-25. Nonetheless, it would be a big step in the right direction after five years of mostly-military anti-drug programs that have failed to affect drug supplies in the United States. Most significantly, it would get some badly needed funding to worthy, resource-starved efforts to expand rural development aid to new areas, to help displaced people, and to help Colombia’s civilian institutions improve their ability to govern.

In the House of Representatives, Democrats on the Appropriations Committee, led by Rep. Sam Farr (D-California), sought to improve the balance between military and economic aid in the ACI. Their effort was shut down by the unyielding opposition of the committee’s Republican leadership. Since the House bill includes no ceiling-and-floor language whatsoever, the aid ratios will no doubt be a subject of much debate later this year, when a House-Senate Conference Committee meets to resolve the differences between both chambers’ versions of the bill.

Military and police aid

Economic and social aid

Conditions on aid for demobilization and reintegration

Two weeks ago, Colombia’s Congress passed a so-called “Justice and Peace” law giving very lenient treatment to demobilizing paramilitary leaders (something an editorial in Monday’s New York Times called a “capitulation” to the AUC). Widespread criticism of this law had made significant U.S. funding for the AUC demobilization process much less likely, despite the Uribe government’s appeal for aid and Ambassador William Wood’s inexplicable support for the “Justice and Peace” law.

As indicated in Thursday’s New York Times, the Senate version of the foreign aid bill includes a lengthy section with a list of very specific, common-sense conditions that Colombia’s process must meet in order to merit U.S. support. No similar conditions appear in the House of Representatives’ version.

Aimed at preventing U.S. aid for a bad process, the conditions – meant to apply to any future demobilization of guerrillas as well as the current paramilitary process – probe some of the glaring weaknesses in the “Justice and Peace” law.

The Senate language states that funds for demobilizations may only pay for “limited activities,” and only then after the State Department certifies that the following conditions have been met

The Senate conditions (Section 6110 of H.R. 3057) 1. The Colombian government has not adopted any law or policy that inhibits extraditions of “members and former members” of Colombian terrorist organizations. This condition is unlikely to be met, even though U.S. prosecutors have sought to extradite several AUC leaders. A week ago, President Uribe told the Voice of America that “in some cases, extraditions will have to be suspended.” 2. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations “provides for effective investigation, prosecution and punishment, in proportion to the crimes committed, of gross violations of humanitarian law and drug trafficking.” This condition is unlikely to be met, unless a few years of house arrest in rural haciendas is considered a punishment “in proportion” to crimes like ordering massacres, disappearances and displacement. Meanwhile, many crimes will go unprosecuted because of a sixty-day limit for prosecutors to initiate cases. 3. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations conditions sentence reductions “on a full and truthful confession” of each demobilizing individual’s “involvement in criminal activity; full disclosure of his knowledge of the FTO’s structure, financing sources, and illegal assets; and turnover of the totality of his illegal assets.” This condition is unlikely to be met. While some Colombian legislators had sought to put this “full disclosure” mechanism in the “Justice and Peace” law, their efforts were blocked. Colombian Interior Minister Sabas Pretelt said, incredibly, that to require such “full disclosure” would have made the law into a “snitch law” risking bloodshed and endangering informants’ security. This is an odd argument to hear from a government that has set up a network of tens of thousands of civilian informants to help fight its war. 4. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations requires that, in order to get reduced sentences, each demobilizing commander ceases “illegal activity by the troops under his command” and turns over all of his group’s illegal assets. This condition is unlikely to be met. As we argue elsewhere, the “Justice and Peace” law leaves a high probability that paramilitary groups may continue to exist in another, powerful form – something akin to mafias – and to continue their illegal activity. 5. Colombia’s “legal framework” for demobilizations provides for revocation of sentence reductions if demobilizing individuals “are subsequently found to have withheld illegal assets, lied to the authorities about their criminal activities in the group, rejoined the same or another FTO, or engaged in new illegal activities.” This condition is unlikely to be met. The “Justice and Peace” law allows paramilitaries to confess later to crimes they had neglected to admit earlier. 6. “An inter-agency working group consisting of representatives from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Departments of State and Defense” must consult with a wide variety of experts and authorities and report to Congress that: a. The group that is demobilizing “is not violating any ceasefire and has ceased illegal activities, including narco-trafficking, extortion, and violations of international humanitarian law.” b. The group’s “criminal and financial structure is being destroyed” and the group, “or any part thereof, is not regrouping to continue illegal activities.” c. The Colombian government “is conducting effective investigations and prosecutions” of the group’s commanders for crimes, including human rights and international humanitarian law violations, “and, when appropriate, extraditing them to the United States. d. The Colombian government “is aggressively implementing an effective procedure to locate and confiscate illegal assets, held directly or through third parties.” e. The Colombian government is enforcing ceasefires by barring ceasefire violators from receiving reduced sentences or other demobilization benefits. The “working group” is likely to be unable to say that these five things are happening, because the “Justice and Peace” law does not give the Colombian government effective tools to make them happen. Letter (e) alone will be impossible to certify if paramilitary leader Diego Murillo (“Don Berna”) benefits from lighter sentences – as is likely – even though he was arrested in late May for ordering the murder of a provincial legislator.

While the Bush Administration 2006 aid request asked Congress for very little funding to support paramilitary demobilizations, the Senate conditions could stop even that small trickle from flowing.

One significant thing to note about these conditions: human rights and the “balance between justice and peace” is not a main concern. The importance of proportional punishment appears in the second condition only. Most of the conditions have to do with dismantling paramilitaries, and keeping them from continuing to exist as powerful mafia / death squads after they “demobilize.” This focus on dismantlement is right on the mark, because there is strong reason to believe that the current process is likely to leave the paramilitaries’ structures intact.

Since the House has no such conditions in its version of the bill, will the conditions survive the House-Senate Conference Committee that will reconcile differences in the two chambers’ bills? Last year, a more basic set of four conditions appeared in the Senate’s bill, but the Conference Committee stripped them out, moving them to its narrative report on the bill, which is non-binding. (See the texts of the various versions of last year’s bill on this page, which I admit is a bit difficult to read.)

This year, though, the Senate conditions are unlikely to disappear. Their specificity and extensiveness indicates that some serious bipartisan thought went into them, and the Senate won’t just lie down in the face of House opposition – if there is any. If anything, the conditions may be pared down a bit, but they will still likely be strong enough either to encourage Colombia’s government to do more to dismantle paramilitarism, or to keep U.S. aid from flowing at all.

At some point, though, several House Republicans (especially Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee) will fight for a pet project that the Senate’s language would make impossible to fund. This group wants to help the Colombian government to employ hundreds (or even thousands) of demobilized rank-and-file guerrillas and paramilitaries as manual coca-eradicators, flying throughout the country on U.S.-donated DC-3 aircraft to cut down coca and poppy plants.

(My view about this proposal: it’s far more humane than fumigation, and it does provide at least a short-term income stream for former combatants. But it must meet three conditions in order to be worthwhile. (1) Those who participate must be rigorously investigated, including full confession requirements, to ensure that major narcotraffickers or war criminals aren’t being hired as coca-cutters. (2) Any abuses or human-rights violations committed in conjunction with eradication activities must be promptly punished – if they are not, the U.S. must pull the plug on funding. (3) All farmers whose crops are eradicated must immediately receive significant assistance in meeting short-term food needs and moving to legal crops or employment. If conditions are safe enough for manual eradication, they’re safe enough for infrastructure-building, education, healthcare, agricultural assistance and marketing support. If these three conditions are met, then hiring former combatants as manual eradicators could work. If they are not, the result will be marauding gangs of thugs who abuse campesinos while destroying their livelihoods and leaving nothing behind, thus pushing them into the arms of the guerrillas and paramilitaries.)

A few other good things in the Senate bill

Several other provisions in the Senate bill, making smaller contributions, do not appear in the House bill.

• Human rights certification: the Senate and House bills both repeat the five human-rights conditions on military aid that have appeared in the law for years. The Senate, however, adds a sixth condition: that “the Colombian Armed Forces are respecting the legal, cultural, and territorial rights of Colombia’s indigenous communities.” The Senate bill would also require the State Department to consult with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia before certifying.
• Earmarks: The Senate bill would require that a minimum of $8 million be devoted to judicial-reform programs in Colombia. At least $10 million would go “to the United States Agency for International Development for organizations and programs to protect human rights.” At least $2 million would “be made available through nongovernmental organizations for programs to protect biodiversity and indigenous reserves in Colombia.”
• Fumigation certification: The Senate bill renews language, which has been in each bill since 2003, holding up all but 20 percent of funding for herbicides until the State Department certifies that aerial fumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of guidelines for health, environment, compensation for those unjustly sprayed, and availability of alternative development. The fumigation conditions do not appear in the House bill.
• Fumigation in national parks: The Senate bill specifies that “funds appropriated by this Act may be used for aerial fumigation in Colombia’s national parks or reserves only if the Secretary of State determines that it is in accordance with Colombian laws and that there are no effective alternatives to reduce drug cultivation in these areas.” This is a weak provision, unlikely to stop an eventual restarting of fumigation in parks. But even this doesn’t appear in the House bill.
• Bolivia conditions: The Senate bill renews language, which first appeared in the 2004 bill, establishing human-rights conditions on military aid to Bolivia. Before this aid can be delivered, the Secretary of State must certify “that the Bolivian military is respecting human rights, and civilian judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting, with the military’s cooperation, military personnel who have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.”
• Report language: The Senate Appropriations Committee’s non-binding narrative report includes several interesting provisions with regard to Colombia:
  • Fumigation: “The Committee is increasingly concerned ... that the aerial eradication program is falling far short of predictions and that coca cultivation is shifting to new locations. Since the start of Plan Colombia, over 525,000 hectares of coca crops have been sprayed, yet coca cultivation has decreased by only 7 percent. Last year alone, 136,555 hectares were sprayed, but the total area under cultivation, estimated by the State Department at 114,000 hectares, remained essentially unchanged from the previous year. There is no indication that the quantity of cocaine entering the United States has decreased. … The Committee directs the Secretary of State, in consultation with the EPA and appropriate Colombian authorities, to submit a report not later than 180 days after enactment of the Act, with the following information: the results of a GIS analysis of the proximity of small, shallow water bodies to coca and poppy fields and of tests to determine the toxicity of the spray mixture to Colombian amphibians; and, an assessment of potential impacts of the spray program on threatened species, including in Colombia’s national parks.”
  • Afro-Colombians: “The Committee is aware that Afro-Colombians face many difficult problems, including poverty and discrimination. The Committee recommends assistance to address the economic and social needs of Afro-Colombians, particularly IDPs in the Choco region, through the Afro-Latino Development Alliance.”

   

  Why the Senate's bill is better

Why is the Senate’s Colombia language consistently so much better than the House’s? One key reason is that the senior Democrat on the subcommittee that writes the foreign aid bill – a position that offers heavy input into what goes into the bill’s draft – is Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont. Leahy and his staff know Colombia and closely follow what happens there, and have made a priority of ensuring that the policy includes some economic assistance and human-rights safeguards.

That’s not to say House members (mainly the Democrats, though there are some Republicans) aren’t equally committed to human rights and more economic aid to Colombia. But they have been shut down by a much more ideologically driven Republican leadership, which limits debate and strongly discourages dissent within the Republican party. No doubt acting on orders from the party leadership – Speaker Dennis Hastert is a major supporter of Plan Colombia and has traveled to Colombia many times – the chairman of the House subcommittee that drafts the foreign aid bill, Arizona Republican Jim Kolbe, allowed no changes at all to the Bush Administration’s aid request. The Senate – for now at least – doesn’t face similar rigidity from the Republican majority on this issue. And where aid to the paramilitaries is concerned, there seems to be a basic consensus that the process is rotten.

The next step for the foreign aid bill is approval in the full Senate (a debate on Colombia is not anticipated). Then representatives of both the House and Senate will form a “Conference Committee” to resolve differences between the two versions. There could be some intense debate and bargaining in the Conference Committee on the bill’s Colombia provisions, given the sharp differences outlined here. Let’s hope that the Senate stands firm.

Postscript

Meanwhile, a human-rights certification decision could be coming from the State Department at any moment. It’s long overdue – the failure to be able to certify has held up 12.5 percent of aid from 2004. The arrests in the Cajamarca case last week indicate that the Colombian military is reluctantly throwing a few bones to give the illusion of progress against impunity. (Other investigations and prosecutions, however – such as the February 2005 massacre in San José de Apartadó, the 1997 massacre in Mapiripán, and the August 2004 massacre of three union leaders in Arauca – have made little or no progress.) A large group of mostly Democratic Senators has sent a letter to Secretary of State Rice asking her not to certify yet; I hope to post that letter and list of signers to our site later today. Stay tuned.

Posted by isacson at July 8, 2005 12:40 PM

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