U.S. Bases: The Past		The Future
Overview  Southern Command Headquarters Fort Clayton Fort Sherman and the Jungle Operations Training Center Fort Kobbe	Rodman Naval Station Galeta Island Firing Ranges Howard Air Force Base The proposed "Multilateral Counternarcotics Center"	Forward Operating Locations Soto Cano, Honduras Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Counter-Drug Radar Sites

U.S. defense planners had hoped that Howard Air Force Base, which ceased operations in May 1999, would be the centerpiece of a post-1999 U.S. military presence in Panama, either through a renegotiation of the Canal accords or through the establishment of a “Multilateral Counternarcotics Center (MCC).”

Efforts to maintain a U.S. presence began in January 1993, when the National Security Council instructed the Secretary of State to be prepared to negotiate future base rights.  During a September 1995 visit to Washington, Panamanian President Ernesto Pérez Balladares agreed to begin exploratory talks on the issue. These talks never got underway, however, once U.S. officials made clear that Washington would not pay rent for future use of the Panama bases.

In discussions with U.S. officials at the June 1996 OAS General Assembly, Pérez Balladares advanced the idea of using parts of the former bases as a “Multilateral Counternarcotics Center,” from which personnel from the United States and other countries would coordinate counter-drug activities. In May 1999 testimony to a House subcommittee, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Peter Romero described how the United States envisioned the MCC:

The MCC would have been a civilian institution with two main functions. An information directorate would coordinate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information regarding drug trafficking and related crimes. A training institute would provide training in counternarcotics law enforcement. U.S. military personnel would have provided unique support to an MCC through specialized skills such as pilots, aircraft mechanics, and those who operate radar and communications equipment. To support this effort, the U.S. military would have had continued access to Ft. Kobbe, adjacent to Howard Air Force Base, and use of pier facilities at Rodman Naval Station. Approximately 2,500 U.S. personnel would have been stationed at the MCC.¹

U.S. and Panamanian diplomats began informal conversations on the MCC in September 1996; these talks entered a formal negotiation phase in July 1997. In December 1997 President Pérez Balladares announced that a draft agreement on the MCC had been reached, though in fact -- according to Romero -- “certain provisions relating to privileges and immunities remained to be worked out.”²

In fact, remaining differences between Panama and the United States were large. Panama was unwilling to commit to a U.S. presence for at least twelve years or to provide various “quality of life” guarantees for U.S. personnel. In particular, Panama resisted Washington’s request that U.S. troops at the MCC be allowed to carry out other missions having nothing to do with counternarcotics but closely resembling activities already carried out at the bases. Romero enumerated these other missions:

[T]raining, regional logistics (that is, support to other U.S. military training exercises in South America and other U.S. operations, including support for U.S. embassies and consulates), search and rescue activities, and other related missions as required. We insisted on these other activities because we could not otherwise justify the cost of maintaining the base itself and the personnel, equipment, and resources necessary to do the counternarcotics task.³

Faced with opposition among its political base, the Pérez Balladares government backed away from the MCC accord during the first few months of 1998. Occupied by an August 1998 referendum on a constitutional amendment that would have allowed the president to run for re-election, the Panamanian government avoided efforts to revive the MCC talks. 

On September 24, 1998, just over three weeks after Pérez Balladares lost the constitutional referendum, the United States and Panama issued a joint statement ending the MCC negotiations. “In essence,” testified Romero, “our needs for a cost-effective presence -- by which we mean one that permitted a full range of missions at Howard -- could not be reconciled with Panama's political requirements.”⁴

Sources:

¹ Peter F. Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Statement before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,” Washington, DC, May 4, 1999 <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990504_romero_panama.html>.

² Romero.

³ Romero.

⁴ Romero.