Main INC Mexico Page

The 1999 Congressional Presentation for the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) lists six objectives for narcotics control efforts in Mexico:

1. Prevent use of Mexican territory and territorial waters by international drug trafficking organizations to move cocaine, other illicit drugs, and precursor chemicals to the U.S.;
2. Dismantle drug mafias and disrupt trafficking;
3. Promote administration of justice and legal reform;
4. Reduce and ultimately eliminate illicit drug crop production and methamphetamine trafficking;
5. Control money laundering, including the vigorous seizure and forfeiture of trafficker assets; and
6. Reduce demand for illicit drugs as well as promote community mobilization against drug trafficking and abuse in Mexico.¹

In 1996, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City raised counternarcotics to its list of top-level policy priorities, alongside business and trade, and increased counternarcotics assistance accordingly. A U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group was established that year to guide both countries' counternarcotics cooperation. The Contact Group developed a comprehensive bi-national drug strategy, which was issued in February 1998.

The United States has provided varying levels of counternarcotics law-enforcement assistance to Mexico since 1973. Between 1993 and 1995, the Mexican government declined U.S. anti-drug aid in an effort to fund its own counternarcotics activities. The 1994-95 peso crisis, combined with a large increase in the trafficking of drugs through Mexican territory, forced Mexico to reverse this policy and resume accepting U.S. assistance.²

According to its 1999 Congressional Presentation, the International Narcotics Control (INC) program in Mexico "draws heavily on the support of other USG [U.S. Government] agencies, particularly the Department of Justice."³ It focuses in particular on the strengthening of law-enforcement and judicial institutions.This largely means improving investigative capabilities while offering training in law-enforcement and drug-interdiction methods.

The chief civilian beneficiaries of INC aid to Mexico are:

1. The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR).
2. The Special Prosecutor for Crimes Against Health (FEADS), within the PGR. This office was created to replace the Mexican National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD) after the INCD's director, Gen. Jesus Gutiérrez Rebollo, was arrested and charged with maintaining links to drug traffickers. According to the INCSR, personnel assigned to this office must pass "a rigorous suitability examination."⁴
   Two special units within the FEADS receive significant amounts of assistance:
   
   • The Organized Crime Unit, a 300-member force which conducts "investigations and prosecutions aimed at criminal organizations, including drug trafficking activities"; and
   • Bilateral Task Forces, charged with "investigating and dismantling the most significant drug-trafficking organizations along the U.S.-Mexican border." These task forces, established by a 1996 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Mexico, have a combined strength of 70 members.⁵
     
3. The PGR's Division of Air Services, which provides aviation support for over 160 aircraft, including 27 U.S.-owned UH-1H helicopters, used in the PGR's operations.
4. The Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), a joint civilian/military interdiction program that began in 1990 as "a cooperative U.S.-Mexican air interdiction program aimed at stopping cocaine shipments from South America into Mexico, but has since expanded to include ground and maritime components." Mexican Air Force intercept aircraft are integrated into the NBRF. ⁶
5. The national legal training academy (INACIPE).
6. The counternarcotics planning center (CENDRO).
7. The Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP).
8. Personnel from the treasury ministry (Hacienda).

The INC program has provided these units with equipment and training, and developed "an extensive project to upgrade data processing and communications systems for drug enforcement elements of the PGR." Training and technical assistance ranges "from highly-technical investigative techniques down to new approaches to administration and personnel system management."⁷

The INC program provides field support funding to the Northern Border Response Force. "While the GOM has assumed most of the program's support costs," the 1999 Congressional Presentation states, "INL will continue to provide periodic assistance, particularly with specialized equipment and pilot activities to further enhance the GOM's [Government of Mexico's] interdiction capabilities, in addition to logistical, communications, computer and other support."⁸

Until the early 1990s, the INC Air Support Subproject funded the maintenance of the entire PGR Division of Air Services, including U.S.-owned aircraft. The Mexican government's "Mexicanization" policy has reduced this assistance to communications upgrades, specialized field support equipment, test equipment, and training. INC assistance may fund maintenance of sensor equipment aboard Mexican Citation tracker aircraft; this equipment can only be repaired by cleared U.S. personnel.⁹

The INC program has provided only limited support to the Mexican military in the past, such as aerial surveillance equipment to detect drug cultivations. While no military aid through the INC program is foreseen this year, the personnel of the Narcotics Affairs Station at the U.S. Embassy, which carries out the INC program in Mexico, will help deliver military aid from other U.S. assistance programs.¹⁰

These programs include:

• Drawdowns;
• Grants and sales of excess defense articles;
• Foreign military sales (FMS) and direct commercial sales (DCS);
• Training through the International Military Training and Education (IMET) program; and
• Training and equipment provided through accounts authorized by section 1004 of the 1991 defense authorization law and section 1031 of the 1997 defense authorization law.

Observers have expressed some concern about the "end use" of equipment and training transferred to Mexico through INC and other programs. Much of this concern was inspired by the misuse of U.S.-provided counternarcotics helicopters to transport troops during the 1994 Chiapas uprising.¹¹In March 1998 testimony, the General Accounting Office (GAO) indicated that"oversight and accountability of counternarcotics assistance continues to be a problem. We [The GAO] found that embassy records on UH-1H helicopter usage for the civilian law enforcement agencies were incomplete. Additionally, we found that the U.S. military's ability to provide adequate oversight is limited by the end-use monitoring agreement signed by the governments of the United States and Mexico."¹²

A 1996 GAO report notes that "the Mexican government ... has objected to direct oversight of U.S.-provided assistance and, in some instances, has refused to accept assistance that was contingent upon signing such an agreement." "According to U.S. officials," the report goes on, "the U.S. Embassy relies heavily on biweekly reports that the Mexican government submits. Unless they request specific operational records, U.S. personnel have little knowledge of whether helicopters are being properly used for counternarcotics activities."¹³

Sources:

¹ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1998): 47.

²United States, General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: Status of U.S. International Narcotics Activities," Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, document number GAO/T-NSIAD-98-116, Washington, March 12, 1998: 3 <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=waisback.access.gpo.gov&filename=ns98116t.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>. Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=waisback.access.gpo.gov&filename=ns98116t.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>.

Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 48.

³ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 48.

⁴ United States, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington, March 1998, March 2, 1998 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/index.html>.

⁵ General Accounting Office, "Status of Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico," 9.

General Accounting Office, "Status of U.S. International Narcotics Activities" 8.

United States, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Report to Congress: Volume I, Washington, September 15, 1997: 16 <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/enforce/rpttocong/rpttoc.html>, Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/enforce/rpttocong/report.pdf>.

⁶ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 49-50.

⁷ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 49.

Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1998.

⁸ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 49-50.

⁹ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 50.

¹⁰ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1996): 37.

¹¹ General Accounting Office. "Status of U.S. International Narcotics Activities" 10-11.

¹²General Accounting Office. "Status of U.S. International Narcotics Activities" 11.

¹³ General Accounting Office. "Observations on Counternarcotics Activities in Mexico" 5-6.