Program description / Law | JCET and other deployments | Other sites

Program description

Law

Special Forces units of the U.S. military are very active in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are present in nearly every country in the hemisphere, taking part in counternarcotics operations, training missions, and other activities. Special Operations Forces (SOF, or "Special Forces") are specialized military units designed to confront a wide variety of situations ranging from peacetime threats to open warfare. They are most frequently employed in three settings, as the Secretary of Defense’s 1998 Report to the President and Congress explains: In "crises and conflicts below the threshold of war, such as terrorism, insurgency, and sabotage"; In major conflicts, where they serve as "force multipliers … increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.S. military effort"; and In "situations requiring regional orientation and cultural and political sensitivity, including military-to-military contacts and noncombatant missions like humanitarian assistance, security assistance, and peacekeeping operations."1 Over 46,000 active-duty and reserve personnel are members of SOF units, which include Army Green Berets, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, psychological operations and civil affairs units; Navy Sea-Air-Land forces (SEALs) and special boat units; and Air Force special operations squadrons.2 Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), based at Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station in Puerto Rico, is the Special Forces component of the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), the regional military command for Latin America. SOCSOUTH coordinates most Special Forces activity in Latin America and the Caribbean. The assistant secretary of defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) is responsible for special operations policymaking and resource allocation.3 Special Forces have a separate program and budget, known as "Major Force Program 11 (MFP 11)," to fund their activities. Special Forces’ main duties include counterproliferation, counterterrorism, reconnaissance, direct action (small-scale strikes), psychological operations (influencing public opinion), civil affairs (relations between military forces and civilian authorities), foreign internal defense (organizing, training, advising and assisting host-nation military and paramilitary forces), and "unconventional" warfare (military or paramilitary operations in enemy-held territory in support of forces resisting a standing government). SOF also take part in what the Secretary of Defense’s 1998 Report to the President and Congress calls "collateral activities," in which they "share responsibility with other forces, as directed by the geographic combatant commanders" such as the head of Southcom. Four of these collateral activities take place with some frequency in Latin America and the Caribbean: Humanitarian Assistance. Limited assistance "to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters." Security Assistance. "Provide training assistance in support of legislated programs which provide U.S. defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services." Humanitarian Demining Operations. "Reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants posed by mines and other explosive devices by training host nation personnel in their recognition, identification, marking, and safe destruction. Provide instruction in program management, medical, and mine awareness activities." Counterdrug Activities. "Train host nation counterdrug forces to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs."4 Included in many of these roles is the subsidiary task of maintaining military-to-military contact. By training with foreign military forces and interacting with foreign military leaders, explains Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Henry Shelton (formerly of the U.S. Special Operations Command), SOF "establish special enduring relationships with their host nation military counterparts." This is valuable, Shelton contends, because "[i]n many parts of the world, the military is often the most cohesive institution and wields significant power and thus can influence the outcome of events during a crisis and affairs of the government."5 Training with foreign security forces accounts for a great deal of Special Forces activity in Latin America and the Caribbean. Special Forces teams deploy over 100 times each year for joint training in nearly every country in the hemisphere. The vast majority of these SOF training deployments fall into two categories: Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and counternarcotics training. JCET Special Forces deploy to Latin America and the Caribbean dozens of times each year under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. JCET involves sending small SOF teams overseas to work with, or to train with, foreign militaries. The average JCET group is comprised of 10 to 40 troops, though groups can include as many as 100. After operating in 101 countries worldwide in 1997 and about 95 countries in 1998, the JCET program has declined somewhat, with deployments to 62 countries in 1999. JCET deployments are usually funded through Major Force Program 11, the SOF operating budget. The law (section 2011 of Title 10, U.S. Code, enacted in 1991) dictates that if the Defense Department’s operational funds are to be used for Special Forces training with friendly foreign militaries, the primary purpose must be to train the U.S. personnel involved. The JCET program, according to Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon, "is not designed to train the forces of other countries. It's designed to train our special forces in how forces of other countries operate."6 In a later briefing, Bacon explained: It's to give them an opportunity to learn about the geography, topography of other nations, and to build up relationships with the military in other nations in case they're called upon to do hostage rescue operations or evacuations of American citizens or peacekeeping work or help training with forces of other nations.7 Of course, since training of foreign troops and military-to-military contact are secondary benefits of JCETs, they often resemble security assistance activities funded through the foreign assistance process (such as the IMET program). This is particularly the case, for example, when Special Forces are training in foreign internal defense (FID), a frequent JCET topic. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO) of the U.S. Congress, "foreign internal defense involves organizing, training, advising, and assisting host country militaries to protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."8 Since training is a major part of the FID mission, a primary purpose of such JCETs is to train the U.S. Special Forces in how to train other militaries. These JCETs, then, may be difficult to distinguish from traditional security assistance. Counternarcotics Counter-drug missions account for much SOF activity in Latin America and the Caribbean today. Army Special Forces, according to a Southern Command publication, are well represented on "an interconnecting network of military teams" that provide "intelligence, planning and training to countries actively engaged in countering cocaine cartels."9 Special Forces’ counternarcotics mission involves extensive contact with the region’s militaries and police, much of it through training. Special Forces teams deploy frequently to Latin America to train foreign units in counternarcotics, often through joint training activities that can resemble JCETs. When the subject matter is drug-related, training the U.S. personnel need not be the activity’s primary purpose. Special Forces counternarcotics training missions are funded under Section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, which allows Defense Department personnel to offer counternarcotics training to other countries’ security forces. As these missions are not funded through the Special Forces’ own operating budget, the law requiring that the primary purpose be to train the U.S. personnel (section 2011 U.S.C.) does not apply. Oversight of Special Forces training Ambassadors and the Special Operations Command approve each JCET and counter-drug training mission; the civilian Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict was added to the approval process by a change in the law in 1999. The commander in chief of Southcom and U.S. ambassadors make most decisions about where training deployments are to take place. When the deployment is a JCET, the Special Forces units themselves normally determine what is to be taught. The Defense Department provides the State Department with a monthly projection of all JCETs it expects to carry out. Though the law required the Defense Department in 1999 to supply Congress with two different reports documenting past JCETs, the exact extent of Special Forces training activity in Latin America and the Caribbean remains unknown. As the tables below indicate, there is significant conflict between Defense Department source documents. Even the Congress’s General Accounting Office (GAO) has been unable to get an exact count of recent JCETs. "For fiscal years 1997 and 1998," a July 1999 report from the agency states, "GAO was not able to determine how many JCETs occurred."10 "Inaccuracies in reporting have arisen," the report explains, "because of confusion in the field regarding how to define a JCET, how to pay for and report costs incurred by host countries, and how to interpret the legislative requirement to report JCETs’ relationship to counternarcotics and counterterrorism."11 The Special Operations Command told GAO that "data were inaccurate because no one person managed the reporting process and because field personnel lacked guidance on how to report JCETs."12 Human rights and SOF training Revelations in the media of JCET activity in Colombia and Indonesia – where, for human rights reasons, many armed forces units are prohibited from receiving training through standard security assistance channels – were a source of controversy in 1998. Observers voiced concern that JCETs could be used to circumvent the Leahy Amendment, a provision in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act which prevents foreign military units from receiving assistance if their members face credible allegations of human rights abuse and are not being brought to justice. Starting in 1999, a similar Leahy Amendment has been added to Defense Department appropriations legislation. According to the new provision, JCETs cannot take place with foreign security units whose members face credible allegations of gross human rights violations unless "necessary corrective steps" are taken. Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC Brian Sheridan told the congressional appropriations committees in April 2000 that "no JCET took place after October 17, 1998 without a Department of State human rights review."13

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is governed by section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code ("Unified combatant command for special operations forces"). Section 167 was added as part of the 1986 "Goldwater-Nichols" legislation which restructured the Department of Defense. USSOCOM is responsible for developing strategy, doctrine and tactics, directing the expenditure of funds, training assigned forces, and ensuring special forces' combat readiness. Special operations activities, according to section 167, include: Direct action; Strategic reconnaissance; Unconventional warfare; Foreign internal defense; Civil affairs; Psychological operations; Counterterrorism; Humanitarian assistance; Theater search and rescue; and Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Section 2011 of Title 10 governs special operations forces' training with foreign militaries. It allows the commander of USSOCOM to pay expenses associated with: Training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly foreign country; Deploying special operations forces for that training; and The friendly foreign country's incremental expenses incurred as a result of the training. ["'Incremental expenses' means the reasonable and proper cost of the goods and services that are consumed by a developing country as a direct result of that country’s participation in a bilateral or multilateral military exercise with the United States." These may include rations, fuel, training ammunition and transportation. Incremental expenses do not include pay, allowances, and other normal costs.] The law dictates that the primary purpose of this cooperative training must be to train the U.S. special forces. Every April 1, the Secretary of Defense must submit a report to Congress discussing special forces' training with foreign forces. The report must specify: All countries in which that training was conducted; The type of training conducted, including whether the training was related to counter-narcotics or counter-terrorism activities, the duration of the training, the number of members of the armed forces involved, and expenses paid in connection with the training; The extent of foreign military forces’ participation, including the number and service affiliation of foreign military personnel involved, and the host nation’s "physical and financial contribution" to the training effort; and The training’s relationship to other overseas training programs conducted by the armed forces, such as: Military exercise programs sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Military exercise programs sponsored by a combatant command; and Military training activities sponsored by a military department (including deployments for training, short duration exercises, and other similar unit training events). Click to read the text of section 167 of Title 10, U.S. Code. (From U.S. House of Representatives Internet Law Library) Click to read the text of section 2011 of Title 10, U.S. Code. (From U.S. House of Representatives Internet Law Library)

JCET, counter-drug, and other Special Forces deployments

(JCETs are funded through the SOF budget, and cover a wide variety of topics.
Counter-drug deployments are funded through accounts authorized by section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act.)

Important note: Examining these Special Forces deployment charts may initially be a bit confusing. The complexity of this chart confirms the General Accounting Office's recent conclusion that record-keeping on Special Operations Forces training programs is very inadequate. The chart provides data from one of three official sources of information. The only source accessible for FY 2000 - FY 2003 was the Foreign Military Training Report (which accounts for only a portion of the JCET deployments in the region) while the annual report on Special Forces training required by Section 2011 of Title X, U.S. Code was classified and U.S. Southern Command provided no description of Special Forces activity (as was acquired for FY 1997-FY 1999).

2004: [²⁴]

2003:²³

2002:²²