Reporting to Congress and the public on U.S. military training has improved somewhat over the past year or two, yielding more detailed information about training of Latin America’s security forces. What we have learned as a result, however, has given rise to serious concerns about the direction of U.S. military training in the hemisphere.

The United States trains each year with every military in the hemisphere except Cuba’s. While reporting has been far from exact, last year we were able to estimate that the United States trained at least 10,000 Latin American security personnel in 1998. Our estimate for 1999 is between 13,000 and 15,000.* If the March 2000 Foreign Military Training Report is accurate, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for nearly 40 percent of all training provided to non-NATO countries in 1999 (14,872 out of 38,031 trainees). [1]

We cannot conclude from these figures, however, that training for Latin America increased by 30 to 50 percent in one year – it is impossible to make any generalizations about training trends because comprehensive information has only been available to the public for the past two years. In 1999, the first year it was required by law, the Foreign Military Training Report (the most comprehensive source document) was generally unreliable, as its presentation made it impossible to produce accurate totals of trainees in each recipient country.

Whatever the actual count, the improved reporting showed us that the United States offers far more military training than we had assumed. The scope and volume of these activities have led us to ask some fundamental questions.

Does training get ahead of policy? As training can be inexpensive and ubiquitous, it can take place “below the radar” of key policymakers. There is reason to question whether training can end up building relationships or launching strategies without diplomats’ or appropriators’ full knowledge or explicit approval.

Colombia offers a possible illustration. More than half of Colombia’s share of the 2000-2001 aid package funds a strategy based on the training and equipping of three new counternarcotics battalions within the Colombian Army. Most observers failed to notice, however, that this strategy was already in place more than a year before Congress began to consider the aid package. By the time Congress had an opportunity to approve funds for the new battalions, one was already trained and lacked only the “lift capability” (helicopters) to execute the strategy for which it was created. This was possible because the first new battalion was trained using Defense Department counter-drug funds that receive little scrutiny from Congress. Congress eventually had to be brought into the debate, however, if only because foreign aid appropriators’ approval was needed to grant helicopters and other costly equipment.

What does training leave in its wake? About one third of all training for Latin American security forces in 1999 was funded through State and Defense Department counter-drug budgets and programs. Yet the drug war rapidly shifts focus throughout the hemisphere – in recent years we have seen the emphasis of U.S. counter-drug efforts migrate between and within the “transit zone” (the Caribbean, the Mexican mainland, and then Mexican coastal waters) and the “source zone” (from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia). Shortly after counter-drug programs get underway in one zone, it seems, the focus of eradication or interdiction begins to move elsewhere.

After the counter-drug effort shifts away from an area, it leaves behind military forces with often-sophisticated skills acquired from U.S. training programs. These skills are frequently considered “transferable,” meaning that they are useful for more than just counter-drug missions. Intelligence capabilities, for example, have many uses, as do helicopter repair and light infantry skills. After the drug war moves on to another region, what do recipient-nation militaries do with their new abilities, equipment, law enforcement roles and domestic prestige?

With training comes a share of responsibility. A common view among U.S. military strategists and policymakers is that “engagement” with foreign militaries – of which training is a component – is always beneficial. “All international education and training, as well as engagement activities, play a role in shaping the strategic environment to prevent conflict and promote regional stability,” reads the March 2000 Foreign Military Training Report. [2]

We nonetheless question the wisdom of dramatically increasing the efficiency and capability of military institutions in countries a) without longstanding democratic traditions; b) dealing simultaneously with narcotrafficking and insurgency; or c) with little civilian control over their armed forces. Unfettered U.S. military training – in most cases combined with very little aid for economic development or civilian institution-building – increases local armed forces’ skills, effectiveness and domestic prestige while doing little for the rest of the state or civil society. An unintended result of training could be to upset delicate civil-military balances of power in many of the region’s struggling democracies. Building up armed forces in these situations can have negative effects not just on human rights, but also on democratic stability, civil-military relations, and security relations between states.

Many in the U.S. security community fail to understand the concerns of civilian critics who have objected to the U.S. Army School of the Americas because many of its graduates returned to commit human rights abuses. To the school’s critics, the U.S. Army responds that foreign troops were not taught to commit human rights violations. That may be true, although former training materials certainly lead one to question that defense. What the SOA definitely did, though, was make Latin American militaries more effective at a time when that effectiveness was being used against civilians.

We contend that with training comes a share of responsibility for how the skills transferred are subsequently used. By improving Latin American militaries’ effectiveness and transferring on them a tacit U.S. “seal of approval,” the United States is in some sense responsible for what they do. We may train foreign troops to gather intelligence to catch drug traffickers, but if those same skills are later used to spy on political figures, it must lead us to question the long-term impact of training.

Policymakers and citizens must recognize the responsibility that goes along with training 13,000 police and military personnel each year in a historically volatile region. A more serious approach to training and its consequences would require greater scrutiny and monitoring of all engagement activities, more questioning of training programs’ objectives and methods, and more limits and standards governing the transfer of skills and the selection of recipient countries.

Foreign Military Training Report

The annual Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR) represents an enormous leap toward better congressional and public oversight and understanding of military training. While the report has great potential, it is still not as helpful as it should be. Congress should encourage the State and Defense Departments to make adjustments in the presentation of the 2001 report.

In 1998, Congress first required a comprehensive Foreign Military Training Report listing all U.S. trainees worldwide, incorporating programs in both the Defense and State Department budgets. In 1999, Congress added this requirement to the Foreign Assistance Act, making it a permanent annual requirement. The law also instructed the executive to make it available on-line, and it can be obtained at the State Department’s website at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html.

We criticized the first report, covering 1998, as a “data dump” only useful to those willing to spend hours mining the document for information (a task that would challenge the scarce resources available for legislative oversight). The 1999 report, released in March 2000, was much improved, providing information by funding category, with country totals and (often seriously incomplete) course descriptions.

The FMTR still suffers from several basic problems that keep it from being an effective oversight tool.

A) The most serious problem with the 1999 FMTR was the classification of much information made public in the previous year’s report. The classified volumes of this year’s report include important information about the foreign military units trained, the U.S. trainers, the location of the training and the dates of the training. Hiding the trainees’ units prevents all without classified access from monitoring implementation of the “Leahy Law” human rights restrictions, while omitting U.S. trainers and locations made it impossible to determine which U.S. institutions provide the most instruction and how much training takes place overseas.

The most commonly heard argument for classifying these sections was “force protection”: releasing the information might jeopardize U.S. instructors. While it is a plausible argument for certain aspects of future training, in the case of already-completed training it is difficult to imagine why information about the unit trained, the U.S. instructors’ units or the location of training should be withheld on security grounds.

Some of the most important data learned from the March 1999 FMTR were based on what is now classified information. For example, the 1999 report showed us that only 10 percent of Latin Americans’ training took place at the School of the Americas, 50 percent was taking place outside of the United States, and vetted individuals from Colombian Army brigades banned from receiving unit-level assistance were being trained.

B) A significant percentage of the course descriptions in the FMTR are so vague as to be utterly useless. This is how the FMTR describes the top six courses taken by Latin American students in 1999, accounting for about 70% of all training given.

1.        JCET (3,606 students) “An event primarily designed to benefit U.S. SOF METL/JMETL training.”

2.        CDTS (2,924 students) “Provide counternarcotic (CD) training to enhance HN operational CD capabilities – or to conduct counter-drug related training of foreign military law enforcement personnel.”

3.        Ldrship Pgm Dis.Resp. (697 students) “Course no longer offered. Contact Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron for expired course descriptions.”

4.        MTT Comcerc Ctrl, Infras Dev (660 students) “This program assists nations in developing Maritime Commerce Control programs through the intergration of the Waterways Management Strategy Concept….” (a detailed description continues)

5.        3432 – USMC Riv. Deployments (389 students) Not listed.

6.        MTT Miscellaneous Opns (322 students) Not listed.

C) For some funding categories, the report appears to be counting students taught; for others, it appears to be counting courses offered. One student may take various courses, but only one country’s chart in the FMTR bears a footnote indicating that this happened. The country summaries in the first half of the report provide a total number of students trained. However, the individual course listings in the second half of the report often yield different sums. In the case of International Military Education and Training (IMET), for example, there is a discrepancy of about 2,000 students in 1999 – a difference of more than 50 percent. These discrepancies make it impossible to solidly identify trends or perform year-to-year comparisons.

D) The report’s coming-year training projections are wholly unreliable, as entire programs appear to be left out. For example, either the Special Forces’ JCET program – about a third of overall training in 1999 – will disappear completely in 2000, or the entire category is missing from 2000 estimates.

Congress should encourage the State and Defense Departments to improve the FMTR in the following ways.

• Declassify information about foreign units trained, location of training and U.S. trainers’ units.

• Provide accurate course descriptions.

• Distinguish between the number of courses given and the number of students trained.

• Report estimates for coming-year training that include all categories reported.

The Leahy Law

The Leahy Law, which prohibits aid or training to foreign military units credibly charged with violating human rights with impunity, is being applied inconsistently. The definition of “unit” is vague within the law, resulting in an almost absurd degree of variation in its implementation. In Colombia, as a result, we are told “the unit to be trained is the unit that is vetted for past human rights abuses.” For upcoming training events, then, individual soldiers are defined as “units” to be vetted. This allows the U.S. military to train individuals not accused of human rights violations, even if their squad, battalion, brigade or other unit does stand accused. This interpretation greatly reduces the Leahy Law incentive for the Colombian military to purge its ranks of human rights violators.

In Mexico, the U.S. embassy interprets “unit” to mean the smallest military grouping involved at the time of the incident. For example, if a squad is out patrolling when a violation occurs, assistance would be restricted to that squad.

The administration should clarify its interpretation of the Leahy Law in a way that is consistent with the spirit of the law, which was to deny assistance to human rights violators and encourage governments to prosecute those who commit violations.

Defense Department counternarcotics training

The Defense Department’s “section 1004” authority allows the Pentagon to use its own counter-drug budget to train Latin American militaries and police forces. Section 1004 is now one of the main sources of funding for training the region’s security forces; it authorizes dozens of Special Forces training deployments and funded training of the Colombian Army’s first counternarcotics battalion. Nearly all training in this budget category benefits Latin American personnel.

Section 1004 is perhaps the least transparent part of the military training budget for Latin America. Until 2001, there was no reporting requirement for this training (other than limited counts in the 2000 FMTR), and unlike IMET or International Narcotics Control, it is not managed by the State Department.

Section 1004 is not a permanent authority. It expired, and was renewed, in 1995 and 1999. The current authorization expires in 2002. For the program to continue, it will need to be reauthorized by Congress in the Defense Authorization bill. Almost all other standard training programs are authorized and appropriated along with regular foreign aid. The Defense Department should not offer counternarcotics training outside the foreign aid process, which is significantly more transparent. Therefore, Section 1004(b)(5) should not be reauthorized, and Pentagon counternarcotics training should be included along with almost all other foreign military training in the foreign aid legislation.

After-training tracking

It is difficult to assess the impact of training because the careers of those trained are not followed systematically. This process of following career placement is sometimes referred to as “after-training tracking.” Without after-training tracking, for instance, one cannot know if trainees from a tainted military body, trained by the United States under the above-mentioned interpretation of “unit,” return to the same abusive body afterward. While this would be interpreted as legal, it is important to know if it is happening, because training could be making bad brigades more efficient and contributing to human rights problems. Tracking could also determine whether individuals trained for counter-drug purposes actually go on to perform counter-drug activities. This information could help allay concerns about U.S. counternarcotics training being used to support counterinsurgency activities.

This year’s National Security Assistance Act requires tracking for individuals taking International Military Education and Training (IMET) funded courses. This is a step in the right direction, but should be expanded to include those trained under other funding authorities.

Human rights training

In a positive step, the U.S. military is increasingly emphasizing basic human rights training. However, we have lingering concerns. A recurring problem over the past few decades in Latin America has been that legitimate political and civil-society actors are defined as military targets when internal conflicts arise. This was a problem in Central America in the 1980’s and it is happening again in Colombia.   We are not convinced that this essential problem is adequately covered in U.S. human rights training programs. 

The military’s human rights training programs should address the role of legitimate civilian actors in a functioning democracy, making clear that holding opinions in opposition to those of the military or the state should not make one the equivalent of armed opposition. Human rights training, of course, is only part of the picture – a military that guarantees impunity for abusive officers is likely to be abusive no matter how advanced its human rights curriculum may be.