|
The
Andean ridge countries, especially Colombia, are the focal point
of current U.S. security assistance in the Western Hemisphere. In
1999 four countries – Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru – accounted
for about 90 percent of the cost of U.S. military and police aid
and 50 percent of U.S. trainees.
Assistance
to these countries, the source of much heroin and virtually all
cocaine entering the United States, continues to multiply in 2000
and 2001. Colombia and its neighbors are now receiving the largest
aid package ever granted to Latin America,
a $1.3 billion measure introduced by the Clinton Administration
in January and signed into law on July 13.
The
package was passed in the form of an “emergency supplemental appropriation”
– a special measure that allows the administration to spend money
beyond what was originally budgeted. The supplemental introduces
$729.3 million in military and police assistance to the region during
2000 and 2001, added to existing programs roughly estimated to total
more than $500 million over those two years.
[1]
|
Military
and police assistance
|
Economic
and social assistance
|
Total
|
|
Budget
increases for U.S. counter-drug agencies’ activities in the
region
|
|
|
$223.5
million
|
|
Classified
intelligence program
|
|
|
$55.3
million
|
|
Aid
to Colombia
|
$642.3
million
|
$218
million
|
$860.3
million
|
|
Aid
to Peru
|
$32
million
|
0
|
$32
million
|
|
Aid
to Bolivia
|
$25
million
|
$85
million
|
$110
million
|
|
Aid
to Ecuador
|
$12
million
|
$8
million
|
$20
million
|
|
Aid
to other countries
|
$18
million
|
0
|
$18
million
|
|
Total
|
$729.3
million
|
$311
million
|
$1,319.1
million
|
By
far the largest part of the package is an $860 million outlay for
Colombia, about three-quarters of it for the security forces. In
fact, the aid is often referred to simply as “Plan Colombia,” borrowing
the name of the Colombian government plan that the package intends
to support. The Colombian “plan,” developed with heavy U.S. input,
aims to spend $7.5 billion in foreign and domestic funds to address
Colombia’s interlinked problems of narcotrafficking, civil war,
state neglect, economic crisis, and a weak rule of law.
[2]
This
new aid adds on to about $330 million in ongoing, previously planned
programs (chiefly funds in the State Department and Defense Department
counternarcotics budgets) for Colombia in 2000 and 2001, nearly
all of it police and military aid.
[3]
According
to the annual Foreign Military Training Report,
the United States planned to train 5,086 Colombian military and
police personnel in 2000, more than double the 2,476 trainees the
report cites for 1999. [4]
Among non-NATO countries, only South Korea will have more of
its personnel trained by the United States.
The
bulk of the military portion – $416.9 million – will fund the “push
into southern Colombia.” This Colombian Army operation will require
three newly created battalions to create secure conditions for police
anti-drug activities, including aerial fumigation, in the southern
departments of Putumayo and Caquetá, a coca-growing region dominated
by guerrillas and paramilitary groups. The “push” is scheduled to
begin in January 2001.
These
three battalions, each with about 900 members, are receiving helicopters,
logistical support, intelligence, training and other aid. They will
be headquartered at a base in Tres Esquinas, on the border between
Putumayo and Caquetá departments in southern Colombia. With previously
allocated U.S. funding, the first was assembled in April 1999, began
training a few months later, and has been based at Tres Esquinas
since December 1999. [5]
Once the aid package became law in July 2000, the second battalion
began receiving training from U.S. Special Forces at a Colombian
Army base in Larandia, Caquetá. The second battalion “graduated”
in December 2000, and the third is to be trained from January to
April 2001. [6]
Though
the counternarcotics-battalion strategy began in April 1999 – the
result of a December 1998 agreement between the Pentagon and Colombia’s
Defense Ministry– Congress did not have an opportunity to vote on
it until the 2000 aid package, when the strategy was well underway.
The first battalion’s training and non-lethal equipment were funded
through the Defense Department’s “section 1004”
counter-drug aid authority, which does not require reporting to
Congress. Later aid included a September 1999 drawdown of weapons
and parts, and a “no-cost lease” of U.S.-owned UH-1 helicopters
in November 1999. Neither transfer is subject to legislative approval
or debate, as the law merely requires that Congress be notified.
By the time Congress was asked to fund counternarcotics battalions,
the first unit was already fully trained and equipped.
The
aid package gives the battalions up to sixteen UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters
at a cost of $208 million. The units will also receive up to thirty
UH-1 Huey helicopters, a Vietnam-era aircraft upgraded to a more
powerful “Super Huey” configuration; the Colombian National Police
are to receive another twelve Super Hueys. The battalions will also
fly thirty-three older UH-1N Hueys; eighteen were granted in November
1999 and fifteen are to be delivered in January 2001.
[7]
The
aid package gives $115.6 million to the Colombian National Police
(CNP), previously the largest recipient of U.S. assistance. The
aid to the CNP supports a wide variety of items, from helicopter
upgrades and nine new spray aircraft to training and ammunition.
The largest single police-aid item is a grant of two new UH-60 Blackhawk
helicopters, valued at $26 million. Other police forces, such as
the Judicial Police and Customs Police, will get an additional $7.5
million. [8]
The
CNP, particularly its 2,300-man counternarcotics unit, will continue
to get at least $80 million each year in assistance through regular
channels like the State Department's International Narcotics Control
(INC) program.
[9] This aid funds the police unit's illicit crop eradication,
interdiction, investigations and other counter-drug activities.
U.S.-funded
planes and helicopters spray glyphosate on coca and opium poppy
fields in several areas of the country. A U.S.-supported CNP Air
Service, with over sixty helicopters and airplanes, focuses on poppy
eradication, while Dyncorp, a private U.S. contractor, concentrates
on coca fumigation.
A key
goal of the new aid package is improving the Colombian military’s
intelligence-gathering ability. A focal point is a police-military
Joint Intelligence Center (COJIC), founded with $4.9 million in
U.S. funding, at Tres Esquinas. The facility seeks to increase the
amount of information available to the military about drug and other
activity in southern Colombia, and to increase sharing of this information
between branches of the Colombian armed forces that do not have
a tradition of close cooperation.
[10]
Some
funding in the aid package will benefit U.S. intelligence agencies
working in Colombia. $30 million in Defense Department funds will
buy a new Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) aircraft similar to
the signal-detecting plane that crashed in July 1999 near the border
of Nariño and Putumayo departments.
[11]
Another
$55.3 million funds a classified intelligence program, about which
this study can offer little information. U.S. Southern
Command Chief Gen. Charles Wilhelm (since retired) told a congressional
committee in March 2000, that the classified program is under the
Defense Department’s budget “really for management” reasons. “It
is focused on the activities of two of our agencies and intelligence
community.” [12]
$102.3
million in the 2000-2001 supplemental will fund the Colombian armed
forces' air, river, and ground drug-interdiction operations, military
human rights training, and military justice reforms. Air interdiction
assistance includes upgrades to Colombian Air Force OV-10 and A-37
aircraft, radar upgrades, and improvements to airfields at Tres
Esquinas, Marandúa, Larandia, and Apiay.
[13] Along with the Defense Department’s “section 1033” riverine
counter-drug program, the aid package is funding outboard motors,
ammunition and other assistance to new “riverine combat elements,”
small units within the Colombian Navy’s new Riverine Brigade, based
at Puerto Leguízamo, Putumayo.
[14]
The
aid package includes $13 million to build a new Ground-Based Radar
(GBR) facility at Tres Esquinas to monitor potential aerial drug
smuggling. Three ground-based radars (GBRs) already exist in the
southern Amazon basin area at Leticia, Amazonas department; Marandúa,
Vichada department; and San José del Guaviare, Guaviare department.
Two other radar sites, part of the U.S. Air Force’s Caribbean Basin
Radar Network, are located at Ríohacha in the northern department
of La Guajira, and on the island of San Andrés in the Caribbean
near Nicaragua. [15]
The
battalion strategy and the focus on Colombia’s army represent a
major change in the direction of U.S. aid to Colombia. Before 1999,
Colombia’s National Police received the vast majority of U.S. assistance.
Years of aerial herbicide fumigation of coca (the plant used to
produce cocaine), however, caused cultivation of the crop to move
to the south, in particular to the department of Putumayo along
Colombia’s border with Ecuador. U.S. and Colombian officials consider
Putumayo, a stronghold of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FARC) guerrillas, to be too dangerous for the police-centered strategy
followed throughout the 1990s. The State Department’s March 2000
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report indicated
that spray aircraft did not venture more than twenty miles into
the department. [16]
“Our
programs have been designed to focus heavily and increase the capacities
of the Colombia National Police,” Undersecretary of State Thomas
Pickering explained in November 2000. “But given the military threat
that exists on the ground to their operations, also to find ways
to increase the capacities of the Colombian Armed Forces.”
[17]
The
objective of the new Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions,
explains an October 2000 White House report, is to “establish the
security conditions needed” to implement counter-drug programs such
as fumigation and alternative development in Putumayo.
[18] It is reasonable to expect that “establishing security
conditions” will involve the first major armed confrontations between
the new U.S.-aided military units and the FARC guerrillas.
Administration
officials have sought to ease concerns that the “push into southern
Colombia” will inadvertently involve the United States in Colombia’s
civil conflict. “As a matter of administration policy, we will not
support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts,” the October White
House report reads. [19]
In several congressional hearing statements during the spring
of 2000, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict Brian Sheridan asserted that the Pentagon
would not “cross the line” into an anti-guerrilla mission.
I
know that many are concerned that this aid package represents
a step “over the line,” an encroachment into the realm of counterinsurgency
in the name of counternarcotics. It is not. The Department has
not, and will not, cross that line. While I do not have the time
to elaborate on all of the restrictions, constraints, and reviews
that are involved in the approval of the deployment of US military
personnel on counter-drug missions, in Colombia and elsewhere,
it suffices to say that it is comprehensive.
[20]
Armed
groups’ resistance to the U.S.-funded strategy is nonetheless likely,
and Colombia’s FARC guerrillas have already declared U.S. trainers
to be “military targets.” In November 2000, U.S. and Colombian officials
decided to delay the launch of the “push into southern Colombia”
from December 2000 to January 2001, contributing to concerns that
security conditions in Putumayo were worse than planners had anticipated.
“The presence of the armed units of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries
is going to make it more difficult to start more than a few pilot
projects,” warned Undersecretary of State Pickering in November.
[21]
Critics
like House International Relations Committee Chairman Rep. Benjamin
Gilman (R-New York) warn that the U.S.-funded battalions may fail
in the face of guerrilla resistance.
As
recent events in the heavy coca-growing Putomayo (sic) area in
the south of Colombia show, it is evident that the Colombian army
is incapable of controlling any of this guerilla and coca-infested
territory now, or anytime soon. Certainly, three new U.S. trained
counter-narcotics battalions of the Colombian army alone, will
not change this major imbalance on the battlefield. … [O]ne can
easily predict that either the start of army-supported eradication
operations there will continue to be interminably delayed, or
that these operations will be reduced in scope to only small “show
case” interdiction or manual eradication operations (with no real
aerial eradication against the industrial-size coca plots).
[22]
Benchmarks,
planning, and clarity about goals
Several
members of Congress have questioned what they perceive as a lack
of clear, measurable objectives for the new assistance to Colombia
and its neighbors. Solid benchmarks for determining the program’s
success remain elusive. “Nothing in the materials I have seen describes
the Administration's goals with any specificity, what they expect
to achieve in what period of time, at what cost,” Sen. Patrick Leahy
(D-Vermont) said in February 2000.
[23] By October, the White House could still only report that
“specific, quantifiable objectives are currently being negotiated
with the Government of Colombia. The administration will keep the
Congress informed as to the outcome of these discussions.”
[24]
According
to the GAO, the Colombian government bears much blame for the lack
of clarity about goals.
In
early 2000, State [Department] officials began asking the Colombian
government for plans showing, step-by-step, how Colombian agencies
would combat illicit crop cultivation in southern Colombia, institute
alternative means of making a livelihood, and strengthen the Colombian
government’s presence in the area. However, according to State
officials, Colombia’s product, provided in June 2000, essentially
restated Plan Colombia’s broad goals without detailing how Colombia
would achieve them. In response, a U.S. interagency task force
went to Colombia in July 2000 to help the Colombians prepare the
required implementation plan. In September 2000, the Colombian
government provided their action plan, which addressed some of
the earlier concerns.
[25]
Human
rights conditions and Leahy Law implementation
The
supplemental conditioned military assistance on the Colombian armed
forces’ human rights performance, though the conditions were weakened
by an escape clause.
Once
the bill became law (July 13, 2000), and again at the beginning
of fiscal year 2001 (October 1, 2000), new aid could not be “obligated”
(released to be spent) until the Secretary of State certified to
Congress that the following conditions were met:
- The
President of Colombia has issued a written order requiring trials
in civilian courts for all Colombian Armed Forces personnel who
face credible allegations of gross human rights violations;
- The
Commander-General of Colombia's armed forces is promptly suspending
from duty all military personnel who face credible allegations
of gross human rights violations or of assisting paramilitary
groups;
- Colombia's
armed forces are cooperating fully with civilian authorities'
investigations and prosecutions of military personnel who face
credible allegations of gross human rights violations;
- The
Colombian government is vigorously prosecuting paramilitary leaders
and members, and any Colombian military personnel who aid or abet
paramilitary groups, in civilian courts;
- The
Colombian government has adopted a strategy to eliminate all coca
and poppy production by the year 2005. This strategy must include
alternative development programs, manual eradication, aerial spraying
of herbicides, “tested, environmentally safe” mycoherbicides (fungi
that attack drug crops), and the destruction of narcotics-production
laboratories; and
- Colombia's
armed forces are developing and deploying a Judge Advocate General
Corps in their field units to investigate misconduct among military
personnel.
The
supplemental allows these conditions to be skipped entirely if the
President determines that the “national security interest” demands
it. This waiver authority was exercised for all but the first condition
in an August 23, 2000 presidential determination, and a similar
decision appears likely as this publication goes to press in December
2000. [26] Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Washington Office on
Latin America have an analysis on the Colombian government’s progress
on meeting the human rights conditionality.
This
analysis is available on the Washington Office on Latin America
web site at: http://www.wola.org/colombia_adv_certification_jointstatement.html
These
human rights conditions are in addition to the “Leahy Law,” existing
legislation that suspends assistance to foreign military units whose
members have committed gross human rights violations with impunity.
The 1999 edition of Just the Facts reported that Colombia’s
National Police, Air Force, Navy and Marines were cleared to receive
assistance under the Leahy Law, as were five Army brigades and the
new counter-narcotics battalions. In September 2000, the State Department
confirmed reports that assistance to two of these Army brigades
– the 12th, based in Florencia, Caquetá Department, and the 24th,
based in Santa Ana, just outside Puerto Asís, Putumayo –had been
suspended in compliance with the Leahy Law.
[27]
The
U.S. military presence and the “troop cap”
Funds
in the supplemental may not be used to assign U.S. military personnel
or civilian contractors to Colombia if their assignment would cause
more than 500 troops or 300 contractors to be present in Colombia
at one time. This “troop cap” does not apply to other funds, such
as the Defense Department’s budget or regular anti-drug aid programs
in Colombia. The cap may be exceeded for ninety days if U.S. military
personnel are involved in hostilities, or if their imminent involvement
in hostilities “is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”
[28]
The
cap owes largely to concerns about “force protection” – guaranteeing
the safety of U.S. personnel in the rather hostile environment of
southern Colombia – as well as concerns about the policy implications
of U.S. proximity to Colombia’s conflict.
U.S.
military personnel are in Colombia and other Andean countries carrying
out training, intelligence-gathering, and technical assistance missions.
In 1999, the Southern Command’s Gen. Wilhelm told a congressional
committee, “On our average peak, monthly troop strength in Colombia
was only 209.” [29] This
number is probably higher in late 2000 and early 2001, due to the
ongoing effort to train counternarcotics battalions and to implement
other initiatives foreseen in the aid package.
U.S.
officials state that strict guidelines are in place to shield U.S.
military personnel from Colombia’s violence. “We have expressly
forbidden all of our trainers to engage in or to locate themselves
with Colombian military or other security force units conducting
field operations,” Gen. Wilhelm said in March 2000. Wilhelm added
that the base in Larandia, Caquetá, where most counter-narcotics
battalion training is taking place, “has never once been attacked
by the FARC or other insurgent groups.”
[30]
Contractors
In
fact, the U.S. military presence may not increase sharply along
with the aid package, as civilian contractors working for private
U.S. corporations are carrying out a good deal of the U.S.-funded
cooperation with Colombia’s security forces. In addition to the
Dyncorp spray-plane pilots and mechanics discussed above, contractors
are training Colombian personnel, helping to reform Colombia’s military,
and even flying the helicopters that will transport the counter-narcotics
battalions. The extent of this “outsourcing” – including names of
corporations involved and the range of roles they play – is not
clear, as the law does not require the State and Defense Departments
to make information public on this relatively new phenomenon.
The
Dyncorp contract pilots, one of the most visible examples of this
trend, fly approximately twenty-three State Department-owned helicopters
and airplanes. Including pilots, mechanics, and support staff, Dyncorp
maintains forty-four permanent and sixty-five rotating temporary
staff in Colombia. [31]
The General Accounting Office (GAO) of the U.S. Congress reports
that direct costs of supporting Dyncorp activities in Colombia rose
from about $6.6 million in 1996 to $36.8 million in 1999.
[32] The spray pilots fly over territory where FARC guerrillas
occasionally fire on the planes with small arms. Three contract
pilots have died in two aircraft accidents: a 1997 crash blamed
on pilot error and a 1998 accident in which the cause remains uncertain.
[33]
Another
often-cited example is a multi-year contract with Military Professional
Resources International (MPRI), a Virginia-based company staffed
mainly by retired U.S. military officers. The Defense Department
has hired MPRI to conduct a thorough review of the Colombian military,
offering comprehensive recommendations for making it a more effective
institution. Gen. Wilhelm explained the MPRI contract to the House
Armed Services Committee.
We
have engaged the services of Military Professional Resources,
Incorporated (MPRI). Hand-picked and highly experienced, MPRI
analysts will assess Colombia's security force requirements beyond
the counter-drug battalions and their supporting organizations.
The contract that [Assistant Defense Secretary Brian] Sheridan's
people have developed and negotiated with MPRI tasks them to develop
an operating concept for the armed forces, candidate force structures
to implement that concept and the doctrines required to train
and equip the forces.
[34]
“The
MPRI contract cost $3 million,” added the Pentagon’s Brian Sheridan
at the same hearing, explaining the decision to hire a contractor.
What
are we doing with MPRI that Southern Command or someone else can't
do? In theory, nothing. If Gen. Wilhelm had unlimited manpower,
he would be able to send 15 people permanently to work at the
Colombian Ministry of Defense to help them organize a new structure,
he'd be able to send 6-man teams down on a temporary basis to
help them focus on certain problem areas and he'd help them reform
the Colombian military. But when you look at the reality of the
staffing that U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has, we don't have
the manpower to do this.
[35]
Critics
worry that, as they are not official representatives of the U.S.
government in Colombia, the contractors are less accountable than
uniformed military personnel. As a result, there is concern that
contract personnel may come to fill roles that go beyond the narrow
counter-drug mission, and that since contractor casualties would
be less controversial, they may perform tasks and operate in zones
that would be off-limits to regular government or military officials.
These concerns are necessarily based on speculation, however, because
of the lack of transparency surrounding the contractors’ activities.
Problems
with the delivery of assistance
Though
it has been active at Tres Esquinas since December 1999, the first
Colombian Army counternarcotics battalion has been limited for over
a year by a lack of trained pilots to fly the eighteen UH-1N Huey
helicopters it received in late 1999. In early 2000, a U.S. contractor
was training twenty-four civilian contract pilots and twenty-eight
Colombian Army co-pilots; the plan was to have the aircraft ready
for use by May 2000. [36]
The
GAO reports, however, that the State Department “had not included
the funds necessary to procure, refurbish, and support” the Hueys
in its budget, and was forced to await congressional approval of
the “Plan Colombia” aid package, which did not occur until July.
“Because of the lack of funds,” the GAO states, “17 of the 24 contractor
pilots trained to fly the 18 UH-1Ns were laid off beginning in May
2000. In August 2000, State reprogrammed $2.2 million from the U.S.
counternarcotics program for Mexico to rehire and retrain additional
personnel.” [37] As
of October 2000, the White House reported, “There are currently
47 Colombian Army officers in various stages of pilot training in
the United States and Colombia,” but the first battalion was still
restricted to operations on land for lack of pilots.
[38]
The
next battalions are also expected to “go on-line” well in advance
of their helicopters. While the second battalion finished training
in December 2000 and the third is to be ready in April 2001, the
units will be limited to the older Hueys until at least the middle
of 2001, when the first Blackhawks and “Super Hueys” are to begin
arriving. [39] In fact,
U.S. officials had originally predicted that the first Blackhawks
would not begin arriving until the end of 2002; faced with stiff
congressional criticism, however, they announced a revised delivery
schedule in October 2000.
[40]
Spillover
Colombia’s
neighbors and other observers are concerned that the “push into
southern Colombia” may send violence, refugees and drug cultivation
across Colombia’s porous borders into Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru
and Venezuela. The U.S. aid package included $180 million for Colombia’s
neighbors, mainly Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Of this amount, just
over half – $93 million – will fund alternative-development programs
to wean coca-growers away from the drug trade. The rest is military
and police assistance.
[41]
Undersecretary
of State Pickering acknowledged the spillover risk in November,
indicating that post-2000 aid increases will focus more on the entire
region, not just Colombia.
It
is clear that as we increase our efforts in Colombia, there will
be a tendency to find new areas, either in Colombia or outside of
Colombia, in which to move the cultivation and production of cocaine
and heroin, wherever it is appropriate. And so we are now thinking
very clearly of a regional program … as a centerpiece of next year's
effort to support the Andean region.
[42]
The
supplemental roughly doubles existing programs for Ecuador by contributing
$20 million: $12 million for drug interdiction and $8 million for
alternative development programs. The $12 million for Ecuador’s
security forces will be spent as follows, according to a July 2000
State Department report.
The
Department plans to use $12 million to create and improve border
checkpoints along the Colombian border, and to improve communications,
mobility, interoperability and intelligence collection and information
sharing among the police and military units in the northern border
regions. Additionally, funding will improve port security and
inspection facilities along the coast.
[43]
According
to the annual Foreign Military Training Report, the United States
trained 681 Ecuadorian military and police personnel in 1999.
[44] U.S. Special Forces (SOF) units deployed
to Ecuador on training missions at least sixteen times in 1999,
almost always for counter-drug training.
[45] Another twelve SOF counter-drug training deployments were
foreseen for 2000. [46]
Ecuador
also hosts a counter-drug “Forward Operating Location” (FOL)
at Manta, on the Pacific coast about 200 miles south of the Colombian
border. Under this arrangement, U.S. aircraft on detection and monitoring
missions have access to airport facilities. Small numbers of military,
DEA, Coast Guard and Customs personnel are stationed at the FOL
to support the U.S. aircraft and to coordinate communications and
intelligence. The supplemental provides $61.3 million for the Manta
facility, which will be used largely for paving, hangars, and maintenance
facilities. [47]
The
supplemental roughly doubles existing programs for Bolivia as well,
contributing $110 million: $25 million for drug interdiction and
$85 million for alternative development programs. The $25 million
for Bolivia’s security forces will support President Hugo Banzer’s
ongoing military coca-eradication campaign in the Chapare, a jungle
region in eastern Bolivia, according to a July 2000 State Department
report.
The
Department plans to use $25 million to support interdiction and
eradication efforts in the Chapare and Yungas coca growing regions.
Funding will also support border control and inspection facilities
on the Paraguayan/Argentinean/Brazilian borders; improved checkpoints
in the Chapare; intelligence collection; training for helicopter
pilots and C-130 pilots and mechanics; spare parts for C-130 aircraft,
helicopters and riverine boats; vehicles; training for police
and controlled substance prosecutors; and justice sector reforms.
[48]
The
United States planned in 2000 to use funds in the Defense Department’s
“section 1004” counter-drug budget to build three base camps for
Bolivian Army coca-eradication forces in the Chapare. (Section 1004(b)(4)
of the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act allows the Pentagon
to use its counter-drug budget for “the establishment and operation
of bases of operations or training facilities.”) At a cost of $6.4
million, the Southern Command planned to build a brigade headquarters
and three 520-man facilities at Chimore, Fonadal and Ichoa. The
sites, according to a Southern Command document, would have allowed
the Bolivian Army to “maintain a presence and prevent narco-traffickers
from taking over once the strong government presence departs” following
the Chapare eradication campaign.
[49]
Bolivia
was convulsed in late September and early October by massive protests
of Chapare peasants affected by the eradication campaign. One of
the protestors’ main demands was that Bolivia abandon its plan to
establish the three new barracks. The Bolivian government agreed
to this demand, leaving the U.S. construction funds unspent. It
is currently unclear how these funds will be used; improvements
to existing facilities are a likely alternative.
According
to the annual Foreign Military Training Report, the United States
trained 2,152 Bolivian military and police personnel in 1999.
[50] This study was able to identify nineteen Special Forces
training deployments to Bolivia in 1999, between the JCET program
and counter-drug training.
[51]
The
supplemental provides $32 million to purchase up to five KMAX helicopters
for Peru’s National Police (PNP). The aircraft, the State Department
reports, will replace Peru’s “operationally expensive and unreliable
Russian MI-17 helicopters.” The aid will train pilots and mechanics
and provide four years’ spare parts and logistical and technical
support. [52]
The
Southern Command’s 2000 “Posture Statement” cites “steady progress”
in the United States’ riverine counter-drug aid program for Peru’s
Navy and Police, made possible by the Defense Department’s “section
1033” budget authorization.
With
U.S. Assistance, the Peruvians have established the Joint Peru
Riverine Training Center near Iquitos in the Amazon region. …
During the past year four of 12 planned Riverine Interdiction
Units (RIU) have been fielded and pressed into service. With currently
approved funding we will assist Peru to expand its riverine capabilities
by providing them twelve 25-foot patrol boats, six 40-foot patrol
craft, spare parts, night vision devices and essential items of
individual equipment.
[53]
According
to the annual Foreign Military Training Report, the United States
trained 983 Peruvian military and police personnel in 1999.
[54] Peru hosted one U.S. Special Forces Joint Combined Exchange
Training (JCET) deployment in 1999. According to the annual Foreign
Military Training Report, however, the Special Forces conducted
no counter-drug training in Peru in 1999. The report foresees two
Special Forces counter-drug deployments and one Marine Corps riverine
training deployment in 2000.
[55]
Concerns
over the now-departed Fujimori government’s anti-democratic behavior
were reflected in Section 530 of the 2001 Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act (H.R. 5526, Public
Law 106-429). This measure requires the Secretary of State to issue
a report every 90 days during 2001 determining “whether the Government
of Peru has made substantial progress in creating the conditions
for free and fair elections, and in respecting human rights, the
rule of law, the independence and constitutional role of the judiciary
and national congress, and freedom of expression and independent
media.” If the report finds that substantial progress has not been
made, section 530 prohibits further assistance to Peru’s central
government. [56]
The
supplemental for Colombia and its neighbors includes smaller amounts
for other countries in the region. Brazil will get $3.5 million
to upgrade intelligence collection in its Amazon basin, to support
construction of a Brazilian radar network (known as SIVAM), and
to provide small boats for riverine drug interdiction. Through a
transfer via the U.S. defense budget, Brazil is also receiving several
ships, including four frigates. Panama will receive $4 million to
create a 25-member Technical Judicial Police (PTJ) task force, to
support the National Maritime Service’s patrol boats, and to support
border control programs. $3.5 million will help Venezuela’s Technical
Judicial Police (PTJ) and National Guard carry out ground and port
interdiction, and will support judicial reform, drug policy coordination
and domestic drug demand-reduction programs.
[57]
Since
June 1999, the government of President Hugo Chávez has consistently
denied U.S. requests to allow counter-drug aircraft to enter Venezuelan
airspace for intelligence missions or pursuit of suspected drug
traffickers. “Since May 27, 1999,” the Southern Command’s Gen. Wilhelm
told a Senate caucus in February 2000, “the Government of Venezuela
has denied 34 of 37 U.S. requests for overflight in pursuit of suspect
aircraft.” [58]
The
supplemental approved in July 2000 provides enhanced funding only
for 2000 and 2001. In mid-2001, as Colombia’s counternarcotics battalions
receive their helicopters and carry out their “push to the south,”
Congress will consider an aid request from the new Bush administration
to support programs in the Andes during 2002. Since most initiatives
from the previous aid package will barely be underway, this request
will probably be aimed more at maintaining current efforts than
at beginning new ones – though aid to Colombia’s neighbors is likely
to rise significantly.
Plans
for the more distant future are less clear. According to the White
House’s October report on its objectives in Colombia, the plan “will
extend to cover the entire country over a six-year period.”
[59] Gen. Wilhelm, the Southern Command chief, discussed this
six-year plan for Colombia aid a bit more specifically at a House
committee hearing: “The first two years are to the south, the second
two years are to the east toward the Meta and Guaviare provinces,
and the years five and six move to the north to Santander and the
other provinces where the drugs are grown.”
[60]
In
the end, there are too many variables and uncertainties – not least
among them a change of power in the U.S. executive – to predict
where U.S. assistance to the Andean countries is headed over the
next few years. Engagement with the region’s militaries, however,
is virtually certain to remain very close. For the foreseeable future,
the Andes are likely to continue accounting for more than nine out
of every ten dollars of U.S. security assistance to the hemisphere.
Sources:
[1] For aid amounts, see:
Title III, Division B, Military Construction Appropriations bill,
2001, H.R. 4425, Public Law 106-246, Washington, DC, July 13, 2000
< http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.4425.ENR:>.
House-Senate Conference Committee report 106-710, Washington, DC,
June 29, 2000 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp106:FLD010:@1(hr710)>.
United States, Department of State, “Report to Congress,” Washington,
DC, July 27, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/080102.htm>.
United States, The White House, “Proposal for U.S. Assistance to Plan
Colombia,” Washington, DC, February 3, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/aidprop4.htm>.
United States, The White House, “Report On U.S. Policy And Strategy
Regarding Counter-drug Assistance To Colombia And Neighboring Countries,”
Washington, DC, October 26, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/102601.htm>.
[2]
Government of Colombia, “Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity,
and the Strengthening of the State,” Bogotá, Colombia, October 1999
<http://www.presidencia.gov.co/webpresi/plancolo/index.htm>.
[3]
The White House, February 3, 2000.
[4]
United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, “Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal
years 1999 and 2000, Volume I,” Washington, DC, March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
[5]
For descriptions of the battalion-based strategy, see:
The White House, October 26, 2000.
Statement Of Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Usnited States House Of Representatives,
Committee On Government Reform, Subcommittee On Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Washington, DC, October 12, 2000
<http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/011/lef401.htm>.
Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), “Aid to ‘Plan Colombia:’ The Time
for U.S. Assistance is Now,” Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, May 3, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/050302.htm>.
United States Southern Command, “Posture Statement Of General Charles
E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps Commander In Chief, United
States Southern Command,” delivered before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, DC, March 23, 2000 <http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00-03-23wilhelm.htm>.
General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, “Emergency Supplemental Request for Assistance to Plan Colombia
and Related Counter-Narcotics Programs,” Statement before the House
Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Washington, DC, February
29, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/022903.htm>.
General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, “US Counter-drug Assistance for Colombia and the Andean Region,”
Statement before the Senate International Narcotics Control Caucus
and Finance Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade, Washington,
DC, February 22, 2000 <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/testimony/022200/index.html>.
General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps, Commander-In-Chief,
United States Southern Command, Statement before the House Committee
on Government Reform, Subcommittee On Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
And Human Resources, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000 <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/aid15.htm>.
General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, “Colombian and Andean Region Counter-drug Efforts: The Road
Ahead,” Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Washington, DC, February 15, 2000 <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/mccaf15.htm>.
The White House, February 3, 2000.
United States, Department of Defense, “Colombia Supplemental,” Washington,
DC, January 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/aidprop3.htm>.
[6]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
Sheridan, October 12, 2000.
[7]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, Statement before the Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Government Reform, Washington, DC, October 12, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/101202.htm>.
[8]
Military Construction Appropriations bill.
House-Senate Conference Committee report 106-710.
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
The White House, February 3, 2000.
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[9]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[10]
United States Southern Command, March 23, 2000.
Wilhelm, February 15, 2000.
General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps, Commander
in Chief, United States Southern Command, Statement before the Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control, September 21, 1999 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/00092104.htm>.
[11]
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
Transcript of Hearing, Washington, DC, March 23, 2000 <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has083000.000/has083000_0f.htm>.
United States Senate, Committee Report 106-290, Washington, DC, May
11, 2000 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp106:FLD010:@1(sr290)>.
[12]
Committee on Armed Services, March 23, 2000.
[13]
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
[14]
United States Southern Command, March 23, 2000.
[15]
Walter B. Slocombe, undersecretary of defense for policy, United
States Department of Defense, letter in response to congressional
inquiry, April 1, 1999.
Military Construction Appropriations bill.
House-Senate Conference Committee report 106-710.
The White House, February 3, 2000.
[16]
United States, Department of State, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Washington, DC, March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1999_narc_report/samer99_part3.html>.
[17]
United States, Department of State, “On-The-Record Briefing: Under
Secretary Pickering on His Recent Trip to Colombia,” Washington, D.C.,
November 27, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/112701.htm>.
[18]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[20]
Sheridan, October 12, 2000.
Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, Statement before the United States House
of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC, September 21, 2000 <http://www.house.gov/international_relations/wh/colombia/sheridan.htm>.
Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, Statement before the United States Senate
Committee On Armed Services, Washington, DC, April 4, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/040402.htm>.
Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, DC, March 23, 2000 <http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/00-03-23sheridan.htm>.
Brian E. Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict, Statement before the House Committee on
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing
And Related Agencies, Washington, DC, February 29, 2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/022904.htm>.
[21]
Department of State, November 27, 2000.
[22]
Rep. Benjamin Gilman, letter to Gen. Barry McCaffrey, director,
White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, November 14, 2000
<http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/111401.htm>.
[23]
Sen. Patrick Leahy, Statement before hearing of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, February 24,
2000 <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/022401.htm>.
[24]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[25]
General Accounting Office, October 17, 2000.
[26]
The White House, “Memorandum Of Justification in Connection With
the Waivers Under Section 3201(A)(4) of the Emergency Supplemental
Act, as Enacted in the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001,”
Washington, DC, August 23, 2000 <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/8/23/7.text.1>.
[27]
William Brownfield, deputy assistant secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, on-the-record briefing, Washington, DC, September
29, 2000.
[28]
Military Construction Appropriations bill, 2001.
[29]
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
March 23, 2000.
[31]
United States, State Department, Inspector-General, “Report of
Audit: Review Of INL-Administered Programs In Colombia,” Report number
00-CI-021, Washington, DC, July 2000 <http://oig.state.gov/pdf/00ci021.pdf>.
[32]
United States, General Accounting Office, “Drug Control: U.S.
Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, Report
number NSIAD-01-26, Washington, DC, October 17, 2000 <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?rptno=GAO-01-26>.
[33]
State Department, Inspector-General, July 2000.
[34]
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
March 23, 2000.
[36]
General Accounting Office, October 17, 2000
[38]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[40]
Beers, October 12, 2000.
[41]
Military Construction Appropriations bill.
House-Senate Conference Committee report 106-710.
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
The White House, February 3, 2000.
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[42]
Department of State, November 27, 2000.
[43]
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
[44]
United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, “Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal
years 1999 and 2000, Volume I,” Washington, DC, March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
[45]
United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, “Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal
years 1999 and 2000, Volume I,” Washington, DC, March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
United
States, Defense Department, State Department, "Foreign Military
Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal Years
1998 and 1999: A Report To Congress," Washington, March 1999:
3-4.
[46]
United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, “Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal
years 1999 and 2000, Volume I,” Washington, DC, March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
[47]
United States Southern Command, "Information on Forward Operating
Location Manta (Eloy Alfaro Int'l Airport)," Document obtained
November 2000.
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[48]
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
[49]
United States Southern Command, “Bolivian Army Base Camp Construction
Information Paper,” January 19, 2000, Document obtained November 2000.
[50]
United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, “Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal
years 1999 and 2000, Volume I,” Washington, DC, March 1, 2000 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
[51]
United States, Defense Department, "Report on Training of
Special Operations Forces for the Period Ending September 30, 1999,"
Washington, April 1, 2000.
United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal
Years 1999 and 2000: A Report to Congress (Washington: March 2000)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
United States, Defense Department, State Department, "Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal
Years 1998 and 1999: A Report To Congress," Washington, DC, March
1999: 1, 11.
[52]
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
[53]
United States Southern Command, March 23, 2000.
[54]
United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign
Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal
Years 1999 and 2000: A Report to Congress (Washington: March 2000)
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
[55]
United States, Defense Department, "Report on Training of
Special Operations Forces for the Period Ending September 30, 1999,"
Washington, April 1, 2000.
United
States, Department of Defense, Department of State, “Foreign Military
Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years
1999 and 2000: A Report to Congress” (Washington: March 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>.
[56]
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2001, H.R. 4811, Public Law 106-429, Washington, DC, November
6, 2000 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.4811.ENR:>.
[57]
Department of State, July 27, 2000.
[58]
General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps, Commander-In-Chief,
United States Southern Command, Statement before the Senate Caucus
on International Narcotics Control and the Senate Finance Committee,
Subcommittee on International Trade, Washington, DC, 22 February 2000
<http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/022207.htm>.
[59]
The White House, October 26, 2000.
[60]
United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
March 23, 2000.
Colombia (2001 narrative)
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