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Program description

The State Department’s International Narcotics Control (INC) program funds and supports two dozen distinct counternarcotics programs in Bolivia. The INC program groups these efforts into four areas: Narcotics Law Enforcement and Eradication; Alternative Development and Economic Incentives; Rule of Law and Administration of Justice; and Program Development and Support.¹ With nearly one-half of its 1999 budget devoted to alternative development, judicial reform and domestic demand reduction, the INC program provides a fuller mix of military-police and economic aid in Bolivia than it does in most other countries, notably Colombia.

The first category, narcotics law enforcement, encompasses all assistance to Bolivia’s police and armed forces. The category is made up of four subprojects: ground operations, air operations, riverine operations, and field support and infrastructure.

The INC program assists several Bolivian police units. Foremost among them is the Special Force for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (FELCN), a police unit given leadership of Bolivia's anti-drug efforts. U.S. government personnel provide the FELCN with advice and training. U.S. goals for the unit, according to the INC program's 2000 Congressional Presentation, include helping it "to develop an operational-level planning capability," improving its command and control over the Rural Mobile Police Patrol Units (UMOPAR) and the three military task forces it supervises, and increasing coordination with counternarcotics agencies elsewhere in the Andean region.²

The FELCN was completely reorganized in February 1996 "from a combined military/police organization to a primarily police based organization." An active duty police officer, instead of a retired senior military officer, serves as the unit's director general. According to past Congressional Presentations, U.S. advisors are helping the director general to reorient the FELCN toward "more traditional investigative functions."³

The Rural Mobile Police Patrol Units (UMOPAR) are the FELCN’s uniformed interdiction force. UMOPAR detachments are active in the Chapare, Trinidad and Yungas coca-growing regions of northern Bolivia.⁴ The UMOPAR and Ecological Police, which carry out manual eradication of coca, receive U.S. training and equipment. The INC Congressional Presentation regards communications equipment as especially “critical” since these police forces “face violent ambushes and attacks from coca growers.”⁵

Other police units receiving assistance include the urban narcotics police, which performs investigations, Special Prosecutors of Controlled Substances assigned to police units, other investigative and intelligence gathering units, and canine units. The INC program also supports two police schools, the International Anti-Narcotics Training Center and the International Waterways Law Enforcement Training School.⁶  

The three Bolivian military counternarcotics task forces that receive aid under the INC program are the army's Green Devils Task Force (GDTF), the air force's Red Devils Task Force (RDTF), and the navy's Blue Devils Task Force (BDTF). All are charged with providing transport and logistics support to the police, and are ostensibly under police command. The FELCN, the police unit leading Bolivian counternarcotics efforts, is nonetheless still struggling to assert full command over Bolivia's counternarcotics forces; the General Accounting Office (GAO) noted in March 1998 that "coordination between the counternarcotics police and military units continues to be a problem."⁷

The army's Green Devil Task Force transports police personnel, fuel and commodities. The 2000 INC Congressional Presentation notes a need to continue replacement of the task force’s and the police’s “rapidly aging vehicle fleet,” whose condition is exacerbated by difficult terrain.⁸

In April 1998, a joint military-police task force was sent to the Chapare coca-growing region to deal with rioting in response to stepped-up eradication efforts. With U.S. assistance, this joint force was converted into an “eradication/security” unit. The force, which includes 2,000 army personnel, provides protection for the UMOPAR units eliminating coca on the ground in the Chapare.

The air force’s Red Devils task force provides air transportation for eradication and counternarcotics law-enforcement operations that take place beyond the reach of roads. Counternarcotics missions are the Red Devils’ only responsibility.⁹

Red Devil pilots fly U.S.-owned aircraft maintained in Bolivia through the interregional aviation program of the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Most of these aircraft, which are flown by Bolivian pilots, are located in Santa Cruz, Chimore, Trinidad and La Paz.¹⁰ U.S.-owned UH-1H “Huey” helicopters, according to the INC program’s 2000 Congressional Presentation, “enable the government to project authority over vast areas where drug traffickers previously operated with impunity.”¹¹ The U.S.-owned UH-1H helicopter fleet was reduced from twenty-two to sixteen in November 1997. 

The Red Devils also use C-130 cargo planes provided and supported by the United States. These aircraft transport police, heavy equipment, and fuel for counternarcotics operations. The INC Congressional Presentation notes that “only the C-130 aircraft can transport the helicopter fuel blivets necessary for long-range operations in remote areas.”¹² 

The INC program has helped the Bolivian Navy to develop, equip and train four task groups, the "Blue Devils," which are located in the Amazon basin cities of Trinidad, Puerto Villaroel, Riberalta, and Guayaramerin. The Blue Devils provide logistical support to the police, and monitor and interdict riverine traffic in drugs and precursor chemicals. In December 1997, the unit was granted law enforcement authority by the Bolivian government, which means its members have the power to arrest suspects and make seizures.¹³

The June 1997 Senate Appropriations Committee report was quite critical of U.S. support for the Blue Devils, alleging that the unit had not performed well:

[T]he Committee notes the continued support of the blue devil task force, a Bolivian Navy river interdiction unit, which has consumed $20,000,000 in United States funds with few returns. In 56 operations in 1996, the blue devils enjoyed limited success. There are no indications that outcome-based performance standards are used to judge the effectiveness of the program or justify its cost. The Committee strongly urges the Department of State to seriously review the costs associated with the blue devil task force and recommends a general phaseout of the program unless significant eradication or interdiction goals are met.¹⁴

The 1999 INC Congressional Presentation defended the decision to continue support for the Blue Devils, citing the recent decision to grant them law enforcement authority. "The BDTF," it adds, "has the capacity to conduct its own training, maintain standards of performance and carry out its mission with minimal USG [U.S. government] advisory assistance."¹⁵ “Substantial retraining has been necessary to prepare members of the organization to carry out their new responsibilities,” notes the 1998 INCSR. “However, the Blue Devil Intelligence Operations Unit has already produced impressive results.”¹⁶

The INC program’s support and infrastructure subprogram pays for the administrative and operating expenses of Bolivian counternarcotics agencies that do not fall within the other subprograms. It also covers many personnel and overhead costs for four field offices of the U.S. embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), which provide logistical support for counternarcotics activities.¹⁷

The original 1999 appropriation for the INC program in Bolivia was $40 million. In non-binding report language, the House Appropriations Committee directed the State Department to spend $5 million of this amount to “enhance” existing alternative development programs in Bolivia’s Chapare and Yungas regions, and $3 million to increase Bolivia’s air, riverine and coca-eradication efforts.

With an October 1998 “Western Hemisphere drug elimination” emergency supplemental appropriation, Congress voted an extra $14 million for the Bolivia INC program in 1999. The INC program dedicated $5 million of the extra funds to alternative development programs, and $9 million to Bolivian air, riverine and eradication operations.

Much of the $9 million will support the new military-police force providing security for eradication activities in the Chapare region. “The supplemental funds will enable us to fly more helicopter hours and supply more of the equipment necessary to support such a unit,” INL bureau chief Rand Beers told a House subcommittee.¹⁸ The additional funds will also be used to replace or upgrade UH-1H helicopters.

Budget

(Thousands of U.S. dollars)

These footnotes are reproduced from the original Congressional Presentation documents:

^a In FY96, USAID administered $15 mil of ESF Counternarcotics funds for Bolivia. FY97 amount does not include $950,000 to be transferred to INL from another USG agency.
1/ Narcotics Law Enforcement totals for FY97, 98, and 99 include INL and Military Counternarcotics funding.
2/ FY 97 amount does not include $1,000,000 transferred to INL from another USG agency.
3/ In FY 97, $2,000,000 in Anticrime funds were provided for AOJ programs. Similar amount is planned for FY 98.
4/ Indicated amounts are provided to USAID for administration.
5/ In FY 98, $2,000,000 in Anticrime funds were provided for AOJ programs. Amounts for FYs 99 and 00 are from country program INC funds.
6/ Includes $5 million for AD and $9 million for law enforcement support for FY 99.

Other sites

• Mid-1998 "State Department backgrounder", one page of which describes how the Bolivia INC program will spend $23 million originally destined for Blackhawk helicopters for Colombia.
  • Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format, 7KB
• U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia. "Seis Helicopteros De Los Estados Unidos Serán Retirados." Press release, November 4, 1997.

Sources:

¹ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1999): 14 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/fy2000_budget/latin_america.html>.

² Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 15.

³ United States, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington, March 1998, March 2, 1998 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/index.html>.

United States, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Washington, March 1997, October 1997 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1996_narc_report/index.html>.

⁴ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1998.

⁵ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 15.

⁶ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 14.

⁷ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1998): 21.

⁸ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 15.

⁹ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 21.

United States, Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, End-Use Monitoring Report, 1995 (Washington: Department of State, February 1997): 70-4.

¹⁰ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 80.

¹¹ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation 15.

¹² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998, (Washington: Department of State: March 1999): <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/major/Bolivia.html>.

¹³ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1998.

¹⁴ United States, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Committee Report 105-35 (Washington: U.S. Senate, June 24, 1997.) <ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/cp105/sr035.txt> Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_reports&docid=f:sr035.105.pdf>.

¹⁵ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 21.

¹⁶ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1999.

¹⁷ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 21.

¹⁸ Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, testimony before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 3, 1999  <http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990303_beers_hirc.html>.

¹⁹ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1996): 15.

²⁰ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Congressional Presentation 13-16.

²¹ Department of State, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation 21.

²² United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 1999): 18.

²³ United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: March 2000): 25