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2004 narrative:

Drugs continue to be the priority in U.S. relations with Bolivia, the world’s third-largest producer of cocaine. Although U.S. counter-drug programs for the Andes are chiefly focused on Colombia, there is a sizeable counter-drug aid package for Bolivia as well. This stems from U.S. officials’ fear of a possible “balloon effect” – renewed coca cultivation in and increased cocaine trafficking through Bolivia as a result of eradication and interdiction in Colombia – as well as widespread opposition in Bolivia to forced coca eradication. The purpose of U.S. security assistance is thus twofold: “to prevent [Colombian] traffickers from simply relocating elsewhere”[1] and “to support continued aggressive and successful eradication programs despite cocalero and other opposition.”[2] Military training skyrocketed in 2003, making Bolivia the number-two Latin American recipient of U.S. military training. Bolivia’s refusal to sign an “Article 98 agreement” exempting U.S. personnel from International Criminal Court jurisdiction could reduce future military training, as it bars Bolivia from certain kinds of security assistance. 

Trends in the Security Relationship

Bolivia is the world’s third largest producer of cocaine, and is fast becoming an important transshipment zone for Peruvian cocaine products en route to Brazil and other Southern Cone countries.[3] As such, drugs continue to be the priority security issue in U.S.-Bolivia relations, and “Bolivia is heavily engaged in a major counternarcotics effort with significant support and partial funding from the United States.”[4]

However, drugs are no longer the only issue on the security agenda. Growing social turmoil in Bolivia has led U.S. officials to identify an emerging threat to U.S. security – populist leaders who are harnessing Bolivians’ frustration with unpopular drug, economic, and energy policies. As a result of these frustrations, massive demonstrations flared up on several occasions in 2003. In February of that year, 32 people died in a clash between police protesters and soldiers called in to restore order. Protests gained momentum in September and October, and were met with heavy repression that eventually led to the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003.

In testimony before Congress in March 2004, Southern Command (Southcom) Commander General James Hill said that the traditional drug threat in Bolivia was being “complemented by an emerging threat best described as radical populism, in which the democratic process is undermined to decrease rather than protect individual rights.”[5] He explained that coca growers opposed to the government’s forced manual eradication policy “have found leaders who have tapped into indigenous and other social tensions,” and warned that “if radicals continue to hijack the indigenous movement, we could find ourselves faced with a narco-state that supports the uncontrolled cultivation of coca.”[6]

The State Department is likewise worried about the potential impact the coca growers’ opposition to forced eradication could have on its drug control objectives. According to the 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the Bolivian government is “facing massive challenges because of a strong electoral showing by militant cocalero leader Evo Morales, who wants to stop coca eradication and alternative development projects. The next five years could bring significant reversals in Bolivia’s counternarcotics achievements if the new administration fails to consolidate previous GOB success.”[7] Counter-terrorism has become a concern of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which reported that it is now focusing on “strengthening the counterterrorism elements of our program.”[8]

Security Assistance

Recently, most U.S. security assistance to Bolivia has come as part of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which is administered by INL. Although overwhelmingly focused on Colombia, the ACI does provide much counter-drug aid to Bolivia, $91 million in both 2003 and 2004. INL provides funding and support for twenty-six counternarcotics programs in Bolivia, which fall into four areas: Narcotics Law Enforcement Interdiction/Eradication Operations; Alternative Development; Institution Building/Rule of Law; and Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction.[9] Security assistance (the first category) generally accounts for about half of INL’s Bolivia budget. In 2004, Bolivia is expected to receive nearly $10 million for eradication operations and $33.6 million for interdiction-related narcotics law enforcement.[10]

This assistance provides training, equipment, and other kinds of support for “special counternarcotic [police] forces and certain select units of the military.”[11] The aid is intended to “support continued aggressive and successful eradication programs despite cocalero and other opposition,” particularly in the “volatile” Chapare and Yungas regions where plantings are increasing.[12] This aid is also to step up interdiction efforts, in response to the increasing use of Bolivian territory as a cocaine transshipment zone. Officials expressed the opinion that “increased interdiction operations along Bolivia’s borders will head off an increasing influx of drug trafficking activity resulting from the implementation of Plan Colombia.”[13]

INL supports a variety of police and military interdiction and eradication units, which include:

• The Special Force for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking (FELCN), which is in charge of Bolivia's anti-drug efforts. In 2004, U.S. assistance supported “expanding personnel; upgrading existing physical infrastructure; and constructing new bases.”[14]
• The Rural Mobile Police Patrol Units (UMOPAR), which act as the FELCN’s rural unit, acting in drug producing and border areas.
• The Joint Task Force, an eradication unit whose conscripts come from all branches of the armed forces.
• The Ecological Police, which provide security for the Joint Task Force.
• The Unidad Operativo del Trópico (Operative Unit of the Tropics) is a police unit that was formed in 2003 to keep roads open in the Chapare region in central Bolivia (also known as the “Trópico” region of Cochabamba department). The U.S. Embassy provides food and transport for the unit.
• The air force’s Red Devils Task Force, which provides air transportation of police, heavy equipment, and fuel for drug control operations that take place beyond the reach of roads. Red Devil pilots fly 16 U.S.-owned and –maintained UH-1H helicopters as well as 6 light fixed wing aircraft. FY 2004 funding will be used to begin upgrading the helicopters, as spare parts for the older models are no longer readily available. (Conversion was originally supposed to begin in 2002 but was postponed due to insufficient funding.)[15]
• The air force’s Black Devils Task Force (BLDTF), which flies 3 U.S.-owned and –maintained C-130B aircraft in support of counternarcotics and eradication missions.
• The navy’s Blue Devils Task Force, which are riverine units that “interdict drug and precursor chemical trafficking and to provide intelligence and logistical support to other counternarcotics units.”[16] INL helped develop, equip and train the Blue Devils. In 2004 INL was scheduled to complete a full overhaul of the Blue Devils’ fleet, replace some antiquated equipment, and help to increase personnel salaries.[17]
• The army’s Green Devils Task Force, which provides ground transportation for police personnel, fuel and commodities.
• The 9^th army division, headquartered in Ibuelo, was formed in 1999 to prevent coca replanting in the Chapare, although its mission continues to evolve and now includes clearing the roads of protesters’ blockades. It also has camps in Cristal Mayu, Chimore, and Ichoa (a facility formerly used by the Expeditionary Task Force described below).
  

In January 2001, INL also created and supported a now defunct force, known as the Expeditionary Task Force (ETF), whose mission was to secure eradication efforts from opposition, particularly by keeping the roads free of blockades. Although commanded by military officers, the ETF was not considered part of the Bolivian police or military. Its members were paid directly by the U.S. Embassy, which also provided food, uniforms, transportation, and training. Criticized by human rights groups for being “an abusive irregular army whose existence violates Bolivian law,”[18] the ETF was disbanded on July 31, 2002 in the wake of allegations of excessive force and human rights abuses, including murder and torture.

INL also supports the Garras School, which is the principal training center for the FELCN, UMOPAR, and other counter-drug units, chiefly police. The school also provides counter-drug training to police and military officers from other nations, including Panama, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador.

For 2005, INL requested $91 million for its Bolivia programs, to continue ongoing interdiction, eradication, and alternative development efforts, with an emphasis on “support and maintenance of a network of interdiction bases; a national secure communications grid; and additional personnel to control coca production, enhance interdiction efforts and provide intelligence support for the growing number and increased complexity of operations and investigations.”[19]

Future U.S. military aid to Bolivia could be subject to withholding on human rights grounds. In January 2004, Congress passed foreign aid appropriations legislation that conditioned the availability of FY2004 funds for the Bolivian military and police on a determination by the Secretary of State that these forces “are respecting human rights and cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of alleged violations of human rights.”[20] Congress also required the Secretary of State to submit a report that would substantiate such a determination. The determination and report submitted to Congress by the State Department in April 2004 was criticized sharply by human rights groups, and is unlikely to satisfy members of Congress concerned about impunity for security personnel credibly alleged to have committed violations. Some form of human rights conditionality is likely to be repeated in the next U.S. foreign aid spending bill, and could affect the levels of U.S. military aid that are actually delivered to the Bolivian military and police.

Military and Police Training[21]

Military training skyrocketed in 2003, making Bolivia the number-two Latin American recipient of U.S. military training that year. The number of Bolivian personnel receiving U.S. training has almost quadrupled since 2000, from 531 to 2,045 in 2003. Funding for 94 percent of trainees in 2003 came from counter-drug accounts.

Almost all of the 2003 training – 81 percent -- was paid for by the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Of the 1,655 Bolivians receiving FMF training, 1,650 participated in a three-month course on “Civic Action” at Fort Bragg, home to U.S. army special forces. No description of the course is provided, but the Foreign Military Training Report indicates that this training was for international narcotics control efforts. Participating students came from various military police battalions and well as civilian police units (FECLN and UMOPAR).

Most of the remaining students who took courses in 2003 were trained through the Pentagon’s “Section 1004” counter-drug account. In all, 263 members of the Bolivian military’s Red Devils, Black Devils, and Blue Devils task forces received training through this account, mostly in helicopter, aircraft, and patrol boat maintenance and operation. “Section 1004” also sponsored three Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in Bolivia, including one for the “Fuerza Conjunta Contra el Terrorismo” (Joint Counter-Terrorism Force).

Other accounts paid for the U.S. training of just over 100 additional Bolivian personnel. “Section 506” emergency counter-narcotics drawdowns provided training for 8 members of the Black Devils Task Force; 35 Bolivians were beneficiaries of exchange training; and the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program trained 69 students. According to the FMTR, IMET funds provide “professional military education (PME) and NCO [non-commissioned officer] training to enhance the professionalism of Bolivia's armed forces.”

Members of counter-drug units within Bolivia’s civilian police receive U.S. military training. The FMTR does not specify how many police attended the “Civic Action” course at Fort Bragg (of a total of 1,650 police and military who took the course). In 2001, nearly 200 UMOPAR agents participated in a MTT on riverine operations with U.S. Navy SEALs.

Bolivia’s refusal to ratify an “Article 98 agreement” with the U.S. government could reduce future military training. The legislature’s failure to approve the agreement, in which Bolivia would pledge not to seek the prosecution of U.S. citizens in the International Criminal Court, will bar Bolivia from receiving IMET and FMF assistance. Regardless of whether or not Bolivia signs an Article 98 agreement, Bolivia can still receive training funded out of the much larger INC and Section 1004 anti-drug accounts.

Training Exercises

Bolivian personnel participate in several of the U.S. Southern Command’s regular multilateral training exercises, among them Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarian, Fuerzas Unidas Peacekeeping, New Horizons, UNITAS, and United Counterdrug. According to Southcom, in 2003 Bolivia participated in the annual UNITAS naval exercise and hosted a New Horizons exercise.[22]

Equipment Transfers and Purchases

In 2005, Bolivia was expected to receive about $3 million worth of FMF aid “to assist the Bolivian army, military police and security units to support the democratically elected Bolivian government against threats of violence and to fund counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations.”[23] If unresolved, the Article 98 issue could prevent that aid from being delivered.

Bolivia is not one of the region’s major weapons customers; Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) have consistently added up to roughly $10 million in each of the past few years.

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