Country Snapshot

Population: 104,907,991 (July 2003 est.) Size, comparable to U.S.: slightly less than three times the size of Texas Per Capita GDP, not adjusted for PPP (year): (2002 est.): $6,598 Income, wealthiest 10% / poorest 10%: 57.6/1.2 (1998) Population earning less than $2 a day: 24.3% Ranking, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index: 64 out of 133 Defense Expenditure as a percentage of GDP: .5% (2001) Size of armed forces: 193,000 (2001) U.S. military personnel present: 28 (2003)

In 1996 the United States began a significant anti-drug assistance and training program for theMexican military that continues in 1999. “In 1997,” testified Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) chief Thomas Constantine, “the Government of Mexico, as a result of continuing incidents of corruption in the civilian law enforcement institutions, transferred much of the narcotics enforcement efforts to the Government of Mexico military."¹ Since 1997 the United States has provided equipment, training and aviation spare parts worth over $112 million, most of it to the Mexican military, for counternarcotics purposes.²

According to Defense Department official Brian Sheridan, “since 1996 the focus of Pentagon counter-drug efforts with the Mexican military has been the transfer of seventy-three UH-1H helicopters (plus parts and support equipment) and four C-26 observation aircraft, U.S. Special Forces training of Mexican Army elite counternarcotic special forces (GAFE), and a robust program to train Mexican UH-1H pilots and mechanics."³ Mexico also bought two Knox-class frigates through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in 1997; the United States has provided training for their operation.

Counternarcotics arms transfers

The effectiveness of these equipment transfers has been seriously questioned due to the condition in which items were transferred, the equipment’s usefulness to the Mexican government’s counternarcotics plans, and the timing of training for those who would operate the equipment.

In  March 1999 congressional testimony, Benjamin Nelson of the General Accounting office recounted the story of the transfers.

Last year we noted that while U.S.-provided assistance had enhanced the counternarcotics capabilities of Mexican law enforcement and military organizations, the effectiveness and usefulness of some assistance were limited. For example, two Knox-class frigates purchased by the government of Mexico lacked the equipment needed to ensure the safety of the crew, thus making the ships inoperative. We also reported that the 73 UH-1H helicopters provided to Mexico to improve the interdiction capability of Mexican army units were of little utility above 5,000 feet where significant drug-related activities and cultivation occur. In addition, we noted that four C-26 aircraft were provided to Mexico without the capability to perform intended surveillance missions and without planning for payment for the operation and maintenance of the aircraft.

Soon after the seventy-three helicopters were transferred through an emergency drawdown and the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, complaints were heard from Mexico that the Vietnam-era equipment was too old and broke down too frequently. In fact, the Mexican military grounded the entire fleet in March 1998 after the U.S. Army issued a warning about possible defects in the engines of all UH-1H helicopters.

As of mid-1999, the Mexican government chose to negotiate the return of fifty-two of the original seventy-three helicopters.⁵ In June 1999, the Mexican Embassy in Washington stated that “the government of the United States will contribute to the overhauling and setting into optimum conditions of 20 UH-1H helicopters, by allocating maintenance funds and transferring them through the FMS program. Mexico and the United States have started negotiations towards a cost-sharing agreement to finance the operation of the helicopter fleet."⁶ However, according to later press reports, even the twenty helicopters under agreement for refurbishment were returned.⁷ The total return of the helicopters is taking place after the United States has trained hundreds of Mexican military personnel in helicopter operations and maintenance.⁸

According to the GAO’s Nelson, who spoke in March 1999 about the four C-26 aircraft previously given to Mexico, the planes were "still not being used for counternarcotics operations."⁹ Furthermore, although the two Knox-class frigates were not usable when delivered, the United States provided training in their operation for Mexican naval personnel in 1997.¹⁰ The ships are now operational.

Through the State Department’s International Narcotics Control (INC) program, the United States supports the drug eradication efforts of the Mexican Attorney General's office (PGR) by providing twenty-seven U.S. government owned and maintained UH-1H helicopters. The program’s Congressional Presentation explains changes in U.S. support for the PGR’s aerial efforts.

The Aviation Support Subproject [of the INC program] once funded the maintenance for the entire PGR air fleet, including the USG [U.S. government]-owned aircraft (reaching $19 million by 1992), but under the GOM's [Government of Mexico's] policy of "Mexicanization," INL assistance has been focused on communications upgrades, specialized field support equipment, test equipment training, etc.¹¹

Training

U.S. programs trained over 1,000 Mexican military personnel in both 1997 and 1998. Most of this training was funded through the Defense Department’s “Section 1004” counternarcotics assistance authority. The Conference Committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for 1999 indicates that this high level of training continued in 1999, as it authorizes $12 million for counternarcotics training for Mexico.¹² This maintains a funding level for Pentagon counternarcotics training for Mexico of about $12 million for each of the past three years.¹³

A review of the courses taken by Mexican military personnel during 1998 reveals that many took aviation or helicopter-related courses. One hundred twenty-eight students took a course entitled "special formal training." A train-the-trainer course received 70 students, and intelligence-related courses about 60.¹⁴

Almost all U.S. training for Mexico takes place on U.S. soil. However, some U.S. training of Mexican military personnel does take place inside Mexico, mostly through Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). In 1998, seven training programs took place in Mexico, four in the port of Tuxpan, Veracruz, two in Mexico City and one in Acapulco. Nine MTTs were planned for 1999.¹⁵

The U.S.-sponsored training program for Mexico has gone through a number of incarnations. In 1997 and much of 1998 the United States trained many Mexican Special Forces units, known as Air-Mobile Special Forces Groups (GAFEs), with some counternarcotics responsibilities. GAFE members were trained on U.S. soil, almost entirely at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Benning, Georgia. According to Brian Sheridan, the deputy secretary of defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, training priorities shifted after the GAFE program concluded.

The GAFE training program was completed by October 1, 1998, and DoD [the Defense Department] refocused its training efforts (in consultation with Mexico) towards more technical skills training to assist in maintaining the UH-1H fleet. In February 1999, Mexico announced its new counternarcotics strategy, and DoD is working with the Mexican military to provide counter-drug training to the new and developing Mexican counternarcotic amphibious units, the Mexican Marines and the Mexican Navy’s interdiction forces."¹⁶

The shift in U.S. training seems to reflect the Mexican military’s priorities and directions. According to the INCSR, “The role of the Mexican military in counternarcotics continued to expand in 1998. The Secretaries of Defense and the Navy publicly acknowledged that counternarcotics issues are now the primary mission of their respective services."¹⁷ The report adds that “the [Mexican] Army and Navy were engaged in a cooperative effort to seal off Mexico’s large, isolated coastal areas from use by narcotraffickers. The Army took steps to create and equip a special amphibious force to operate in areas and supplement the efforts of the Mexican Navy."¹⁸

The State Department’s February 1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) notes that the U.S. Coast Guard also conducts “coincidental operations” with the Mexican Navy in the Gulf of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific. During these operations, “Coast Guard and Mexican Naval units operate simultaneously, and exchange on-scene information, which may assist in the interdiction of drug traffickers."¹⁹

Mexico is the only Latin American country outside the “Area of Operation” of the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), and does not participate in Southcom’s regular multilateral military exercises. A U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Working Group for Military Affairs was established in 1995 to address issues of mutual interest. The group’s fourth meeting took place in February 1999.

Other Arms Transfers

The Mexican government has announced that it plans to spend $400 to $500 million over the next three years to purchase equipment for counternarcotics, such as planes, ships, and radar.²⁰ This may explain the projected increase, from $21 million in 1998 to $91 million in 1999, in expected Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) deliveries to Mexico. In 1998 the United States licensed for potential sale to Mexico military-related items valued at $182,327,876. The vast majority of this sum, over $140 million, is described as “agreements, manufacturing and technical assistance."²¹

Mexico spent $2,722,000 on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases from the United States in 1998, most of it for spare aircraft parts.²² The 1999 Defense Appropriations law (P.L. 105-262) authorized the transfer by sale of two ships to Mexico, an auxiliary repair dock and a Knox class frigate. Section 1018 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes the sale to Mexico through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program of the "Newport" class tank landing ship Newport and the "Knox" class frigate Whipple.

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Sources:

¹ "Statement by: Thomas A. Constantine, Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Department of Justice Before the: Senate Drug Caucus" (Washington: February 24, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct022499.htm>.

² United States, General Accounting Office, Drug Control, Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities, Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, document number GAO/T-NSIAD-99-98 (Washington: March 4, 1999): 3 <http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns99098t.txt>, Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format <http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns99098t.txt.pdf>.

³ United States, Department of Defense, Brian E. Sheridan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, April 27, 1999.

⁴ Drug Control, Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities 12.

⁵ The fleet was reduced to 72 after one crashed.

⁶ Government of Mexico, "Mexico to keep 20 UH-1H helicopters in its counter-narcotics military fleet," Embassy of Mexico press release, BOL-99-65, June 6, 1999.

⁷ See, for instance, Molly Moore, "Mexico Sends 'Junk' Choppers Back to U.S." Washington Post, October 6, 1999.

⁸ Based on data compiled from United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 (Washington: 1999).

⁹ General Accounting Office, Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities 3.

¹⁰ United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges, GAO/NSIAD-98-154 (Washington: June 1998): 21-22.

¹¹ United States, Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: March, 1999): 41 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/fy2000_budget/latin_america.html>.

¹² United States, National Defense Authorization Act, Conference Committee Report 105-736 (Washington: September 22, 1998).

¹³ Letter from Robert J. Newberry, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support to Representative James P. McGovern, December 12, 1997.

United States, National Defense Authorization Act, Conference Committee Report 105-736 (Washington:  September 22, 1998).

¹⁴ Department of State and Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities.

¹⁵ Department of State and Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities.

¹⁶ United States, Department of Defense, Brian E. Sheridan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, April 27, 1999.

¹⁷ United States, Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998 (Washington: February 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/major/Mexico.html>.

¹⁸ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998.

¹⁹ Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998.

²⁰ General Accounting Office, Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Activities 12.

²¹ United States, Department of State, U.S. Arms Exports: Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 98 (Washington: July 1999): 67.

²² United States, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, FY 1998, Defense Articles (Including Excess) and Services (Including Training) Furnished Foreign Countries and International Organizations Under the Foreign Military Sales Provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, Chapter 2 (Washington: July, 1999): 171.