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| White
House Office of National Drug Control Policy discussion paper: Western
Hemisphere counterdrug program enhancements, July 13, 1999 EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF NATIONAL The
purpose of this letter is to share with you the enclosed discussion paper
which proposes that the Administration develop counterdrug program enhancements
above the President's budget request. These program enhancements would
meet emerging drug control challenges in Colombia arid the Andean Ridge
and establish the forward-based counterdrug facilities needed to replace
access to Howard Air Force Base, Panama. Emerging
drug control challenges in Colombia and the Andean Ridge threaten regional
supply reduction efforts and larger U.S. security interests. Our collective
efforts to implement the President's counterdrug strategy have reduced
the global potential production of cocaine by 29 percent over the last
three years. It now appears that these international drug control gains
are eroding. CIA global crop estimates for CY 1999 will show a large increase
in cocaine production potential, eliminating most, if not all of the gains
of the last two years. The continued explosion of coca cultivation and
increases in opium poppy cultivation in Colombia undermine the U.S. source
zone strategy and Colombian democratic institutions, and will continue
to promote cocaine addiction the world over. Colombia's ability to respond
to this emerging drug threat is compromised by interlocking economic,
political, and social problems. Meanwhile, U.S. government efforts to
establish Forward Operating Locations to support counterdrug operations
have been hamstrung by the lack of adequate Congressional support and
the lack of long-term access agreements with our regional partners. Key
members of Congress are actively pursuing an FY 2000 Emergency Counterdrug
Supplemental very similar to last year's legislation. Unfortunately, preliminary
drafts of the Congressional effort indicate that the targeted Congressional
spending would not provide the correct mix of assets to respond to the
emerging challenges identified above. The
initiative framed in the enclosed document will meet emerging requirements,
build upon the success achieved in international drug control this decade,
and extend the supply disruption in the cocaine industry into the coming
decade. I request your support on the critical issue to ensure that adequate
resources are committed to this effort. I appreciate your continued leadership
and support of our international drug control efforts. Sincerely,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF NATIONAL Discussion
Paper Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Program Enhancements I.
Purpose. To propose program enhancements above the President's
budget request to meet newly emerging drug control threats in the Western
Hemisphere. II.
Background. A.
U.S. International Drug Control Policy -- Western Hemisphere Successes.
U.S.
interagency implementation of the PDD-14 directed source country
strategy has achieved tactical success over the last three years and is
worth continued national support. According to CIA estimates, U.S. supported
drug control programs have reduced cocaine global potential production
by 29 percent since 1995. Coca cultivation in Peru, once the source of
over half of the world's coca leaf, has been reduced by 56 percent since
1995. Over the last two years, the Banzer Administration in Bolivia has,
turned around its drug control effort and achieved a 22 percent reduction
in coca cultivation. Interdiction and intelligence flights operating from
Howard, AFB in Panama played a key role in these successes. B.
Emerging Challenges - Growing Drug Crisis in the Andean Ridge.
Illicit
drug trafficker operations in the cocaine source zone have adapted to
previously successful law enforcement and interdiction programs. The international
drug control gains that we have achieved over the last three years are
now eroding. Traffickers have established new routes to evade the regional
interdiction effort and are expanding cultivation and production. CIA
global crop estimates for CY 1999 will show a large increase in cocaine
production potential, eliminating most if not all of the gains of last
two years. Continued
explosion of coca cultivation and increases in opium poppy cultivation
in Colombia undermine the U.S. source zone Strategy and Colombian democratic
institutions. Colombia now dominates global cocaine cultivation, production,
and trafficking. Colombian coca cultivation has doubled in two years from
50,000 hectares in 1995 to 100,000 hectares in 1998. CIA will report continued
rapid expansion in Colombia coca potential production next January. Over
the last decade, Colombia heroin poppy cultivation baa expanded from almost
no growth to over 6,000 hectares, producing enough high purity heroin
to meet over half of U.S. demand. Virtually all of the new cultivation
is occurring in area controlled by guerrilla or paramilitary groups, contributing
to the erosion of democratic institutions and ascendancy of extremism
and violence. Colombian
security forces are nor capable of conducting effective counternarcotics
operations in the Putumayo and Caqueta growing regions, source of two-third,
of Colombian coca, due to guerilla control of the area. Intelligence assessments
have identified numerous deficiencies in training, force structure, leadership,
intelligence, mobility, and communications which must be corrected if
the GOC is to mount credible CD operations. Unless the Government of Colombia
succeeds in establishing a security presence in the coca growing regions,
Colombian coca cultivation will continue to expand and the guerrilla movement
will continue to strengthen. Colombia's
ability to respond to the emerging drug threat is compromised by interlocking
economic, political, and social problems. The government remains wedded
to a faltering peace process. The negotiations scheduled to begin July
7 were postponed by the guerrillas, who then launched a nationwide offensive
on July 3, raising anew questions of their commitment to establishing
a lasting peace. Meanwhile, the guerillas continue committing acts of
violence against the government and the civilian population, including
widespread kidnapping. Violence continues at a level that undermines democracy
and the rule of law. There are now more displaced people in Colombia than
in Kosovo at the height of the recent conflict. Colombia's economy is
suffering through its first recession in more than 25 yeas. GDP shrink
by more than five percent in the first six months of the calendar year.
With unemployment rates at 20 percent, the populace is turning to the
guerrilla, parami1itaries and narcotraffickers for paying jobs. Meanwhile,
capital flight and brain drain accelerate. In
Peru, the drug control situation is deteriorating. The period of disruption
in the Peruvian cocaine industry appears to be ending. Traffickers have
adjusted routes and methods to reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement
and interdiction operation Peruvian coca prices have been rising since
March 1998, making alternative development and eradication more difficult.
Farmers are returning to abandoned fields and the central growing areas
are rejuvenating. Clearly, rebounding cultivation in Peru would be a setback
to U.S. interests. In
Bolivia, continued reductions in cultivation are expected but there is
cause for long-term concern. The cocaine industry is still intact and
prices remain high. Coca growers have instigated many acts of violence.
Progress continues to depend on the will of the Banzer Administration
to incur considerable political risk to achieve long-term coca reductions
and on the availability of sufficient alternative, development funds to
provide coca farmers with licit income alternatives. The
withdrawal of U.S. counterdrug operations forces from Panama by December
31, 1999 will challenge our ability to maintain adequate levels of support
to the hemispheric drug control effort. DoD ant DOS must establish a new
structure to support forward, source zone, counterdrug operations to replace
access to Panama facilities. USG efforts to establish Forward Operating
Locations are complicated by (1) the lack of adequate Congressional support
to secure the required Overseas Military Construction budget and authority,
and (2) the lack of long-term access agreements with the Governments of
The Netherlands and Ecuador. III.
Discussion. A.
Meeting the New Challenges Meeting
these emerging drug control challenges will require program enhancements
above the President's budget request. Over the last several months, the
interagency has assessed the rapid changes taking puce in international
trafficking organization's structure and operating methods and identified
required changes in U.S. operational concepts and program support. Program
enhancements would accomplish the following:
B.
Proposed program enhancements. The following program recommendations,
reflecting preliminary interagency thinking, would help meet the emerging
challenges:
D.
The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act - A flawed Strategic Framework.
Congress
recently has been most supportive of enhanced international drug control
spending; unfortunately many of its initiatives have not been well targeted
to meet emerging threats. In 1998, Congress developed the Western Hemisphere
Drug Elimination Act (WHDEA), which authorized $2.7 billion for use by
drug control agencies in illicit drug supply reduction activities. The
WHDEA included $56.5 million in new authority for source country and regional
programs and over $2.1 billion in new authority for the improvement of
U.S. transit zone interdiction capabilities. Many
of the programs supported by Congress in the WHDEA fail to provide the
needed resources to meet the challenges outlined above. The priorities
of the WHDEA generally do not support the United States National Drug
Control Strategy. The authority in the Act exceeds documented interagency
requirements, is not matched to the threat, and does not support agreed
upon interagency operational concepts. The authority is also very narrowly
constructed, in effect micromanaging Executive Branch operations, and
limiting the ability of agencies to adapt programs to rapidly evolving
changes in the international treat and operational concepts. Due to budget
spending caps. Agencies and Departments would be forced to reduce support
to higher priority programs to provide adequate outyear funding for new
capital equipment. Also, Congress does not seem willing to adjust spending
caps or agency base budgets to provide for outyear costs in the regular
appropriations process. Last
year, Congress drafted a $942 million Emergency Supplemental to begin
funding the priorities of the WHDEA, including a total of $844 million
for counterdrug activities. Negotiations with the Administration improved
the Supplemental sufficiently to win the President's support. This year,
key members of Congress have developed a draft, $930 million Supplemental
which follows the same flawed spending guidance found in the WHDEA. Crafting
an Administration Supplemental would produce a better set of programs
that are more responsive to emerging challenges. IV.
Conclusion The
programs outlined above meet the new challenges presented by the illicit
drug trafficking industry in the Western Hemisphere. This proposed draft
Administration Emergency Supplemental or budget amendment fully reflects
the interagency counterdrug vision contained in the National Drug Control
Stategy and PDD-14 and responds to the emerging threats in Colombia
and the Andean region. Support for this initiative would build on the
success achieved in international drug control strategy this decade and
extend the supply disruption in the cocaine industry into the coming decade.
Sent
to: The
Vice President Secretary
Albright NSC
Adviser Sandy Berger |
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