Madeleine Albright, secretary of state, op-ed, The New York Times, August 10, 1999

Madeleine Albright, secretary of state, op-ed, The New York Times, August 10, 1999

Colombia's Struggles, And How We Can Help

(New York Times 08/10/99 Madeleine Albright op-ed piece) (930)

(The following article is in the public domain; no reprint restrictions.)

(NOTE: Madeleine K. Albright is the U.S. Secretary of State.)

The death of five American and two Colombian soldiers in a plane crash during a counter-narcotics mission in Colombia last month put the spotlight on our stake in South America's most troubled country.

Colombian drug traffickers produce more than 80 percent of the world's cocaine and a rising proportion of the heroin that reaches our shores. Two guerrilla organizations -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, known as FARC, and National Liberation Army, or E.L.N. -- are at war with the Government and control a significant amount of territory.

The guerrillas are opposed by right-wing paramilitary groups that, like the guerrillas, regularly abuse human rights. Both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries use the drug trade to finance their operations. Efforts by Colombia's President, Andres Pastrana, to negotiate peace have stalled. Crime is rampant. And the nation's economy, long a regional star, is in the midst of its worst recession since the 1930's.

Colombia's problems extend beyond its borders and have implications for regional security and stability. To turn the tide, President Pastrana must wage a comprehensive effort. And he needs -- and deserves -- international support that focuses on more than drug interdiction and eradication.

As President Pastrana understands, the goals of peace, law, prosperity and respect for human rights are not separate from one another, but rather reinforcing of each other. Progress toward one will make the others easier to achieve.

There are, for example, many dimensions to the pursuit of peace. After 38 years of struggle, it should be clear that a decisive military outcome is unlikely. President Pastrana was right to initiate talks; the question is whether he can muster a combination of pressure and incentives that will cause the guerrillas to respond.

The peace efforts must be guided by Colombians themselves. President Pastrana has taken courageous risks in this quest, and it is up to him to decide what carrots and sticks are needed. But the United States and other friends of Colombia must be ready to help. President Clinton has already pledged our support in a letter to President Pastrana on July 20.

Efforts to stop the drug trade are linked to the quest for peace because of rebel and paramilitary involvement in drug trafficking. And, as we have seen in Bolivia and Peru, success in battling drugs requires a medley of strategies, including eradication, interdiction, crop substitution, economic development and criminal justice reform.

Here, too, the Colombian Government must take the lead, but others must do their share. The United States has been a strong supporter of Colombia's anti-narcotics effort, which is appropriate because our demand for drugs is a major cause of the problem.

The Colombian National Police are spraying and seizing impressive amounts of cocaine and heroin. But coca production is soaring, drug organizations are well armed and financed, and Colombia's judicial system is plagued by corruption, inadequate resources and a backlog of 3.5 million cases. Success will not come quickly, but progress is possible if the Government has international support.

The protection of human rights is similarly intertwined with the other goals. Most victims of Colombia's conflict have been civilians. In its most recent offensive, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia indiscriminately attacked villagers and deployed child soldiers as young as 9.

The guerrilla group still refuses to account for three American missionaries kidnapped from Panama in 1993, and in March its forces murdered three Americans who were working with local indigenous groups. In addition, paramilitary groups have recently stepped up attacks on human rights workers and political activists.

In the past, the Colombian military has squandered support by failing to prevent human rights abuses, by both its own forces and paramilitary groups. The United States has strict procedures in place in Colombia, as elsewhere, to verify that individuals and units receiving American assistance and training have not been involved in human rights abuses, and that those responsible for past abuses are brought to justice.

Under President Pastrana, the military has dramatically improved its record, but we continue to press for further progress, especially to insure that any remaining ties between military commanders and paramilitaries are broken.

Colombia's economic problems are linked to low commodity prices and high deficits, but they are also the result of crime and conflict. Conversely, economic development and the creation of legitimate jobs are the best ways to keep citizens from flouting the law and supporting radical movements.

So any nation interested in helping Colombia fight drugs or achieve peace will have an interest in helping it recover economically. The United States has been working with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other partners to insure that needed assistance is available.

Today, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering will be in Bogota to meet with President Pastrana and convey United States support for Colombia's efforts to move forward on all of these fronts. He will go to Caracas, Venezuela, as well, as part of our effort to secure strong regional backing for policies to achieve peace, establish law and build prosperity.

Colombia's people are engaged in a vital test of democracy, a test they must pass for themselves. But they should know that we understand the many dimensions and long-term nature of the problems they face, and that we will do all we can to help them.

As of March 13, 2000, this document is also available at http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/alb12.htm