Statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, director, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy

Statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, director, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy

Statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey
Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

The Evolving Drug Threat in Colombia
And Other South American Source Zone Nations

October 6, 1999

Introduction

All of us in the Office of National Drug Control Policy thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify today about the evolving drug threat in Colombia and other South American source-zone nations. Chairman Helms, Senator Coverdell, distinguished members of the committee, your interest in all aspects of drug control policy and your commitment to bipartisan support of a comprehensive response to the nation's drug abuse problem are much appreciated. We welcome this opportunity to review the comprehensive initiatives that are being conducted in support of Goal 5 of the National Drug Control Strategy: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.

Emerging drug-control challenges in Colombia and the Andean Ridge threaten regional supply-reduction efforts and larger U.S. national security interests. Our collective efforts to implement the source-zone strategy laid out in the 1993 Presidential Decision Directive on "U.S. Policy on International Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere" have reduced global potential cocaine production by 29 percent over the past three years. It now appears that these important drug-control gains are eroding. CIA global crop estimates for this year (calendar year 1999) will likely show a large increase in cocaine production potential. The continued explosion of coca cultivation and continued opium poppy cultivation in Colombia undermine the U.S. source-zone strategy and Colombian democratic institutions. This increase will continue to promote cocaine addiction the world over. Colombia's ability to respond to this emerging drug threat is compromised by interlocking economic, political, and social problems. Meanwhile, U.S. Government efforts to negotiate long-term agreements, to replace expiring interim agreements with Ecuador and Aruba/Curacao, continue. The existing interim agreements allow the U.S. to operate Forward Operation Locations (FOL) to conduct essential multinational antidrug air operations following the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama.

Part I of this testimony provides an overview of current trends in cocaine and heroin cultivation, production, and trafficking with the "source zone" nations of South America -- Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. Part II addresses the current situation in Colombia. Part III summarizes U.S. Government drug-control programs in South America. Part IV presents U.S. challenges in Colombia and the source zone.

I -- Overview of Source Zone Trends

Cocaine

Coca, the raw material for cocaine, is grown in the South American countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Regional efforts to eradicate this crop have been quite successful in the past three years. Coca cultivation in Peru plummeted by 56 percent from 115,300 hectares in 1995 to 51,000 hectares in 1998. Potential cocaine production declined from 460 metric tons to 240 metric tons over the same period in Peru, while in Bolivia potential production declined from 255 metric tons in 1994 to 150 metric tons in 1998. These successes have been attributed to many factors, including: political will in both countries to confront the illegal drug trade, the regional air interdiction campaign that targeted drug-laden aircraft flying between coca-growing regions of Peru and processing laboratories in Colombia, control of precursor chemicals, diminished strength of insurgent forces in Peru, and alternative development programs. International drug control successes and shifting markets have forced change on the illicit cocaine industry in Latin America -- a large-scale shift in coca cultivation to Colombia.

The disruptions of the Colombian Cali drug trafficking organizations in 1995 and 1996 and the earlier dismantling of the Medellin cartel created greater opportunities for other trafficking organizations to develop their businesses. The days of highly integrated cartels with centralized control over production, shipment, distribution, and marketing functions are most likely gone, replaced by shifting, temporary agreements and coalitions among smaller, more specialized trafficking groups.

Heroin

Heroin is produced for the world market in nine countries in three regions of the world. Burma and Afghanistan are responsible for ninety percent of the world's opium production, which has almost doubled since 1986. An estimated 3,461 metric tons of opium was produced worldwide in 1998, a 16 percent decline in production between 1997 and 1998 due principally to drought and eradication in Southeast Asia. The Latin American component of this global production has historically accounted for 4 percent or less of worldwide totals.

While only a small portion of the world's heroin supply comes from Latin America, hemispheric production accounts for a disproportionate share of the heroin seized in the United States, according to the DEA Heroin Signature Program (HSP). HSP is based on federal seizures made at U.S. Ports of Entry and a long-standing program of undercover drug purchases on the streets of our major cities. It also includes random sampling for testing of all seizures made by the DEA, including distribution level seizures. Thus, the HSP covers testing at importation, distribution, and retail levels. For calendar year 1997, DEA reports indicate that Latin American heroin comprised 75 percent of the heroin seized or acquired in undercover buys in the United States. Law enforcement investigations, along with various indicator data reflect that the nation's largest heroin markets of New York, Boston, Newark, Baltimore, and Philadelphia are now dominated by the six tons of Colombian heroin produced each year. Mexico also produces about 6 metric tons of heroin per year, most of which is sent to the United States and consumed primarily in the western part of our country.

II -- Colombia: A Crisis Situation

The changing face of drug trafficking

The drug trade in Colombia has changed significantly over the past few years. Coca cultivation has increased dramatically in response to regional airbridge interdiction efforts that curtailed the flow of coca products from Peru to Colombia. The cocaine trafficking industry fragmented following the arrests of the Cali drug kingpins in the mid-1990s and is now characterized by smaller groups specializing in limited segments of the drug trade. These groups are more difficult to detect; dismantling any one of them has less impact on the overall trade. A strategic decision by Colombian drug organizations to enter the heroin production/trafficking business has resulted in the proliferation of Colombian heroin within the United States.

Virtually all of the drug-crop cultivation in Colombia is in remote, underdeveloped regions outside the government's control and often under the control of heavily armed guerrilla or paramilitary forces. This makes eradication and interdiction enormously dangerous to security forces. Moreover, without greater protection by the Police and Army in the countryside, the government cannot deliver adequate alternative development programs to provide licit income to growers who abandon coca or poppy cultivation.

As opposed to the situation ten years ago when small airplanes were the preferred method of transporting drugs out of Colombia, the majority of drugs today leave Colombia via maritime means, either in containerized cargo or by fast boat. Transport via small plane is still the preferred method for moving drugs within Colombia, from production sites to distribution points. Riverine transport of precursor chemicals into processing regions and of finished drugs coming out has also increased substantially.

Exploding cocaine production

U.S. Government crop experts from the Department of Agriculture, Drug Enforcement Administration and Director of Central Intelligence's Crime and Narcotics Center believe Colombian cocaine production may be poised for a dramatic increase in 1999.

Higher yielding coca is being cultivated in Colombia. This has yet to be reflected in annual estimates of potential cocaine production because of the two-year maturation time for the higher yielding variety of coca (erythroxylum coca var coca) to become fully productive. Much of the increase in cultivation in Putumayo and western Caqueta -- where the higher yielding variety of coca is most likely being grown -- took place in 1996-97 and those fields are only now becoming fully productive. However, new but preliminary information indicates some new fields may have become productive sooner, and that lab processing efficiencies have likely improved. That means that potential Colombian cocaine production for 1999 would reach at least 250 metric tons even if there were no increase in coca hectarage. Adding the production from the coca planted in 1999 will lead to an even higher potential cocaine production figure.

Colombian penetration of U.S. heroin market

Colombian drug organizations made a strategic decision at the beginning of this decade to expand into opium cultivation and heroin production and trafficking. As a result, net opium cultivation in Colombia went from zero to more than 6,000 hectares by 1995, and has remained essentially stable since. Opium cultivation is concentrated in the Huila-Tolima area and has a potential yield of six metric tons a year. Unlike Asia, where there is a distinct growing season, cultivation is year round, resulting in multiple crops. Colombian heroin trafficking is reportedly controlled by relatively autonomous groups that developed their own smuggling systems. The predominant mode of transportation is commercial air, with human courier mules swallowing balloons filled with heroin, hiding it in body cavities, or concealing it in their luggage.

The nexus between drugs and Colombia's civil conflict

Insurgent and paramilitary organizations are profiting from the drug trade and using drug revenues to finance operations against the democratic government. The growth of drug cultivation, production, and trafficking has added to the war chests of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups, which protect and/or control various aspects of the drug industry. Colombian defense experts have estimated that the two major insurgent groups (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) gain 50 percent or more of their revenues from their involvement in drug trafficking. Estimates vary widely on the amount of money that the FARC and ELN earn annually from the drug trade -from a low of $100 million to a high of $500 million. What is clear is that their revenues from the drug trade equal or exceed their other major income sources - kidnapping, extortion, and bank robberies. The FARC, which controls or influences much of southern Colombia, earns revenues by providing protection for or directly participating in activities related to coca cultivation, drug processing facilities, and clandestine airstrips. The FARC also "taxes" the campesinos and drug traffickers at each stage of drug cultivation, production, and transport in areas under their control. The FARC, through attacks on military and Colombian National Police (CNP) logistical bases and outposts, have negatively affected the GOC's aerial eradication efforts. CNP and U.S.-owned aircraft conducting eradication missions were hit by ground fire in guerrilla-controlled areas 48 times last year.

A society under brutal attack

In Colombia, the melding of guerrilla movements, or in some cases, paramilitary groups, and international drug trafficking organizations has created an unprecedented threat to the rule of law, democratic institutions, and the very fabric of society. More than 35,000 Colombians have been killed over the past decade in Latin America's longest-running internal conflict. There are an estimated 20,000 guerrillas threatening democratic governance and the viability of the State. In recent years, paramilitary organizations have evolved from their origins as self-defense organizations that sprang up in the absence of effective law enforcement and the rule of law. Today, they are competing with insurgent organizations and government forces for personnel and control of territory. They are also implicated in an increasing number of politically motivated killings and other gross violations of human rights. In addition to the involvement in the drug industry by guerrilla and paramilitary groups, the acceleration of the deadly spiral of violence in Colombia can be attributed to the 1980s boom in the cocaine industry and the extensive investments in all aspects of Colombia's economy by fabulously wealthy drug traffickers who were seeking to reinvest their fortunes, expand drug cultivation and production, and legitimize their social standing.'

Colombia's ability to respond to the exploding drug threat is hindered by interlocking economic, political, social, and security challenges. The national economy is shrinking for the first time in three decades -- GDP shrank by more than 5 percent in the first six months of 1999. Unemployment exceeds 20 percent. The criminal justice system's inability to ensure that justice will be done has resulted in a loss of the public's confidence. The populace, especially in the rural areas, is turning to the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers for sources of employment and income. Guerrilla recruits are reportedly paid more than twice as much as Army conscripts. Colombians are emigrating in increasing numbers to the United States, Costa Rica, and Spain among other places. Over half a million Colombians have left for good in 1998-1999.

Colombian security forces are presently incapable of conducting counterdrug operations in the Putumayo and experience great difficulty in conducting operations in the Caqueta growing regions, the source of two-thirds of Colombia's coca, because of the dangers posed by the guerrillas. Narco-guerrillas have achieved dominance of these regions because of serious shortfalls in training, force structure, leadership, intelligence, mobility, communications in the Armed Forces and Police, lack of government presence and services in rural areas, and the extreme geography of many of those areas. The series of tactical battlefield defeats suffered by the Armed Forces in recent years lead them to undertake some fundamental reforms. The Armed Forces and Police have had few encouraging successes against the FARC in 1999.

The Colombian Army, with U.S. assistance, is creating a special Counternarcotics Battalion that will work in support of or in coordination with the CNP in their efforts to move counterdrug operations into the Putumayo region. The members of this unit have been carefully selected, fully vetted, and are being trained and equipped with U.S. support. The GoC has also reinvested in the base at Tres Esquinas in southern Colombia to provide a center of counterdrug operations in the heart of the coca-growing region. Colombia's Joint Task Force - South is located there. Tres Esquinas will also soon be the site of the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center, which will bring together the counterdrug intelligence efforts of all the Colombian military forces and the CNP. Once the runway extension at Tres Esquinas has been completed to handle more types of aircraft, the Colombian Air Force will be able to station additional aircraft there as required in support of police and military counterdrug operations.

Such inter-service cooperation is absolutely key to creating the security conditions and force structure that will make it possible for Colombia's drug eradication, alternative development and law enforcement counterdrug programs to be successful. The 2,500 people who comprise the CNP's Anti- Narcotics Division nationwide are courageous, professional, and dedicated, but they are no match for some 20,000 FARC and ELN guerrillas, 6,000 paramilitary members, and hundreds of violent drug criminals operating in much of Colombia. Tres Esquinas will also serve as a point of departure for counterdrug operations, air interdiction of trafficker flights, and riverine patrolling. Unless the GOC can contest guerrilla and paramilitary dominance in drug-producing regions, cultivation and production will continue to expand, and the outlaw movements will continue to strengthen as a result of the enormous amounts of money generated by the drug trade.

The Administration is fully supportive of President Pastrana's desire to end Colombia's civil conflict through negotiations for a peace agreement with guerrilla groups. Unfortunately, this peace initiative has yet to yield many positive results. Negotiations scheduled to begin July 7 were postponed by the FARC who then launched a nationwide offensive on July 8 from the so called DMZ, again making a mockery of their commitment to negotiated peace. FARC, ELN, and paramilitary forces continue committing acts of violence against the government and the civilian population, including widespread kidnapping. Three American citizens, representatives (of a non-governmental organization working for the rights of indigenous peoples, were among the victims of the violence, having been murdered by the FARC in March 1999. Violence, including mass kidnappings from a church and on airline flights, continues at a level that undermines democracy and the rule of law. Rural violence has spurred campesino families to flee to urban areas already strained due to high unemployment. There are now more than one million internally displaced people in Colombia.

Deteriorating Regional Situation

Colombia is now clearly the new center of gravity for the cocaine industry. Negative trends also appear to be emerging elsewhere in the region, in some cases perhaps as a consequence and spillover from Colombia's troubles.

In Peru, the drug control situation is deteriorating. Traffickers have adjusted routes and methods to reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement and interdiction operations. Peruvian coca prices have been rising since March 1998, making alternative development and eradication more difficult. Some farmers are returning to abandoned fields and the central growing areas are rejuvenating. Clearly, rebounding cultivation in Peru would be a setback to U.S. interests.

In Bolivia, continued reductions in cultivation are expected but there is cause for long-term concern. The cocaine industry is still intact and coca prices remain high. Coca growers have instigated many acts of violence. Progress continues to depend on the will of the Banzer Administration to incur considerable political risk to achieve long-term coca reductions and on the availability of sufficient alternative development funds to provide coca farmers with licit income options.

The withdrawal of U.S. counterdrug operations forces from Panama by December 3 1, 1999 will challenge our ability to maintain adequate levels of support to the hemispheric drug control effort. The Departments of Defense and State must establish a new structure to support forward-based, source zone, counterdrug operations to replace access to Panama facilities. USG efforts to establish Forward Operating Locations for counterdrug air interdiction operations are complicated by the lack to date of U.S. congressional support to secure the required Overseas Military Construction budget and authority. We also still lack long-term access agreements with the Governments of the Netherlands (for Aruba and Curacao) and Ecuador (for Manta).

Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary units have found sanctuary in Panama's Darien Province and cross the Colombia-Panama border nearly at will. Guerrillas also rely on supply sources in Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru. An insurgency that once was mostly an internal Colombian problem is now fueled by enormous drug wealth and is gaining regional security significance.

III -- The U.S. Source Zone Strategy

The imperative for supply reduction

The rule of law, human rights, and democratic institutions are threatened by drug trafficking and consumption. International supply reduction programs not only reduce the volume of illegal drugs reaching our shores; they also attack international criminal organizations, strengthen democratic institutions, and honor our international drug-control commitments. The U.S. supply-reduction strategy seeks to:

(1) eliminate illegal drug cultivation and production;

(2) destroy drug-trafficking organizations;

(3) interdict drug shipments;

(4) encourage international cooperation; and

(5) safeguard democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law.

A source zone focus

The United States continues to focus priority international drug-control efforts on source countries. International drug-trafficking organizations and their production and trafficking infrastructures are most concentrated, detectable, and vulnerable to effective law enforcement action in source countries. In addition, the Cultivation of coca and opium poppy - - and the production of cocaine and heroin are labor intensive. For these reasons, cultivation and processing are relatively easier to disrupt than other downstream aspects of the trade. The international drug control strategy seeks to bolster source country resources, capabilities, and political will to reduce cultivation, attack production, interdict drug shipments, and disrupt and dismantle trafficking organizations, including their command and control structure and financial underpinnings.

The international context in which we operate

The era in which hemispheric anti-drug efforts were characterized by bilateral initiatives between the United States and selected Latin American and Caribbean nations is gradually giving way to growing multilateral initiatives. The 34 democratic nations in the Americas and the Santiago Summit of the Americas have recognized that the lines demarcating source, transit, and consuming nations have become blurred as drug abuse and drug-production become a shared problem. The growing trend toward greater cooperation in the Western Hemisphere has created unprecedented drug-control opportunities.

The counterdrug institutions required for successful hemispheric cooperation are beginning to be established. Many of the requisite multi-national mechanisms and processes are also in place or under development. The anti-drug action agenda signed during the 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas is being implemented. All members of the Organization of American States endorsed the 1995 Buenos Aires Communiqu6 on Money Laundering and the 1996 Hemispheric Anti-Drug Strategy. The hemisphere's thirty-four democratically elected heads of states agreed during the 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile to a Hemispheric Alliance Against Drugs. All nations agreed to broaden drug prevention efforts; cooperate in data collection and analysis, prosecutions, and extradition; establish or strengthen anti- money laundering units; and prevent the illicit diversion of chemical precursors. The centerpiece of the agreement is a commitment to create a multilateral evaluation mechanism (MEM) -- essentially, a hemispheric system of performance measurement. OAS/CICAD has moved rapidly since the Santiago Summit. In a series of two consultative meetings and six Intergovernmental Working Group Meetings, chaired by Canada's Jean Fournier and Chile's Pablo Lagos, the basic outlines of the evaluation system were negotiated. The system is divided into five main categories for evaluation: 1) National Plans and Strategies; 2) Prevention and Treatment; 3) Reduction of Drug Production; 4) Law Enforcement Measures; and 5) Cost of the Drug Problem. The MEM will be inaugurated during the twenty-sixth regular session of CICAD in Montevideo, Uruguay (October 5-8, 1999). Further discussions will be held on qualifications of experts for the evaluation group, the development of an evaluators' operations manual, and the question of financing. The week following the Uruguay meeting, the MEM will start its work. The results of the first evaluation round (using an abbreviated system) will be presented at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, Canada in May 2001. Based on guidance of Presidents, CICAD will revise MEM and prepare for full evaluation in year 2001.

The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act

Last year 1998, Congress enacted the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (WHDEA) which authorized $2.7 billion for use by drug control agencies in illicit drug supply reduction activities. The WHDEA included $565 million in new authority for source country and regional programs and over $2.1 billion in new authority for the improvement of U.S. transit zone interdiction capabilities. In ONDCP's view, the priorities outlined in the WHDEA generally did not best support the National Drug Control Strategy. Some provisions of the Act required investments that exceeded well-articulated agency contingency funding plans. To support the VTHDEA, Congress appropriated $844 million in an FY 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for counterdrug activities. Ironically, Congress now seems to be on a path which would fail to fully fund the FY 2000 budget request of the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which is the entity responsible for many of the programs mandated in the WHDEA.

IV -- U.S. Challenges in Colombia and the Source Zone

Provide adequate and responsive counterdrug support to the Government of Colombia

The United States has committed to work with the Government of Colombia to develop a comprehensive response to the enormously increased threats. We are determined to help reestablish the rule of law and allow the development of legitimate economic alternatives to the drug trade. Such support will be limited to counterdrug training, administration of justice, resources, equipment, intelligence, and regional political support operations, as U.S. policy is absolutely to not intervene militarily in Colombia's internal struggle.

The Government of Colombia has responded to its broad array of challenges with a new version of its national strategy, "Plan Colombia," which President Pastrana discussed with President Clinton and several members of Congress during his visit to the U.S. in late September. We believe that this comprehensive, integrated strategy provides a framework that will allow Colombia to find a way to: increase its capabilities to conduct counterdrug operations in the Putumayo, Caqueta, and poppy growing areas; improve infrastructure supporting eradication, interdiction, chemical control, and other Colombian counterdrug operations; strengthen the Colombian Joint Task Force-South and its military-police Joint Intelligence Center at Tres Esquinas; increase operational tempo of counterdrug maritime and riverine missions; help develop an effective criminal investigation, prosecution and incarceration capability; improve the economy and provide alternative economic development; and continue efforts to negotiate an end to the FARC/ELN and paramilitary violence. We believe at ONDCP that the key to ending Colombia's crisis is to eliminate drug production and trafficking and the money it provides for outlaws and terrorists. At the same time, we realize that drug production is linked to other endemic challenges in Colombia. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering is leading an interagency effort to assist the GoC to refine and operationalize its broad national strategy. This process will ensure that the U.S. Government is in the proper position to make well-grounded decisions about the nature and level of our ongoing support to Colombia.

Prevent a reversal of counterdrug gains in Bolivia and Peru

We face the very real possibility of reversal of the dramatic reductions made against the coca industry in Peru. We have seen indications that trafficking organizations are adjusting to the disruptions we've achieved since 1995. Certainly, the increased number of multi-ton seizures in commercial maritime conveyances suggests that this mode of trafficking may be more important than before.

Restructure the theater interdiction architecture: establishing forward operating locations

Over the past decade, the majority of Department of Defense support to the cocaine source country effort was provided from U.S. military facilities in Panama. Over two thousand counterdrug flights per year originated from Howard Air Force Base. This vital facility supported -- operationally and logistically -- interagency detection, monitoring, and tracking operations from the Customs Service, Defense Department, Coast Guard, CIA, and DEA conducted by P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, P-3 Counterdrug Upgrade (CDU) aircraft, E-3 AWACs, E-2 early warning aircraft, F-16 fighters, C-550 Citation trackers, and various other aircraft. The U.S. military presence in Panama also supported transit zone interdiction operations, provided facilities for pier-side boarding and destructive searches, supported training in small boat operations and maintenance, and provided jungle operations training for small counterdrug units. The counterdrug capabilities resident in Panama provided significant support to the efforts of the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and our many regional partners.

As a result of the closure of Howard Air Force Base on May 1, 1999 -- as part of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Panama required to be completed by December 31, 1999 -- the Departments of Defense and State are working to establish Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Manta, Ecuador and Aruba/The Netherlands Antilles (Curacao). Temporary interim agreements have been reached with Ecuador and The Netherlands. Negotiations are underway for long-term agreements that will allow significant infrastructure improvements to facilitate around-the-clock operations at both locations.

The timely replacement of Howard Air Force Base's counterdrug capabilities is dependent upon a number of key steps that are already either in progress or under coordination. The restoration of full air and sea interdiction coverage will require significant Overseas Military Construction, especially in Ecuador, to improve FOL facilities. Additional legislative authority will be required to obligate FOL upgrade funds. Budget estimates for the establishment of FOLs may be revised after detailed site surveys are completed. The interim agreements with Ecuador and Aruba/Curacao are scheduled to expire within one year's time. Long-term agreements are still being negotiated.

A concerted U.S. government effort is required over the next eighteen months to ensure that we maintain full support to the National Drug Control Strategy as we reestablish our regional counterdrug support infrastructure. This interagency effort must include: long-term agreements with host nations, overseas military construction authority and budgets, and commitment from interagency force providers to maintain an uninterrupted level of effort. The Secretaries of State and Defense have indicated full commitment to ensuring that the necessary steps are taken to bring the FOLs to full operational status. We now need to ensure that all of the other affected elements of the U.S. Government are similarly prepared to support this FOL plan. We cannot afford a long-term degradation of detection and monitoring capabilities over the Andean Ridge, Caribbean and Eastern Pacific trafficking routes.

CONCLUSION

Experience teaches that countries that enjoy political, economic, and social stability derived from effective democratic institutions are most capable of mounting coherent policies to reduce drug cultivation, production, trafficking and money laundering. U.S. international counterdrug assistance must continue to be carefully coordinated by our Ambassadors to ensure that drug-policy objectives support U.S. foreign policy goals of promoting democracy and protecting human rights. In many instances, such U.S. assistance must take the form of building military social and political institutions that further democratic governance while confronting the drug trade.

The recent operational loss of a U.S. Army reconnaissance aircraft in Colombia -- and the death of five U.S. Army crew members and two Colombian Air Force riders -- is a reminder of the real dangers inherent in confronting criminal international drug organizations. The men and women in the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, Customs Service and DEA risk their lives for our national security. We appreciate their efforts. In August 1994 we also mourned the loss of five DEA special agents who were killed in a plane crash during a reconnaissance mission near Santa Lucia, Peru.

Chairman Helms, Senator Coverdell, we thank you, the rest of the Committee, and the Congress as a whole for the bipartisan support you have provided our drug-control efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Your support has been essential to the progress we achieved over the past three years in reducing coca cultivation and cocaine production in Bolivia and Peru. With your continued support we can stand by courageous and dedicated Colombians who at great personal risk share our commitment to confronting criminal drug organizations and the devastation they cause to the international community.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

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As of March 13, 2000, this document is also available at http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/mcaf06.htm