Statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, under secretary of state for political affairs

Statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, under secretary of state for political affairs

Testimony of
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

October 6, 1999

U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss U.S. Government policy toward Colombia.

The U.S. Government is delighted to be working with President Pastrana. We have greatly improved and strengthened bilateral relations since he took office in August 1998. Difficult issues still exist in our bilateral relations, but with a reliable and committed partner like President Pastrana, the U.S. government has greatly enhanced its cooperation and engagement to address these issues.

Colombia is of vital interest to the United States. Although counternarcotics issues remain key in our policy towards Colombia, it is in our interest to support the Pastrana Administration and the peace process. Colombia is an important economic partner of the U.S., and is in fact our 5th largest export market in Latin America. Peace in Colombia would benefit not only Colombia, but would also enhance the stability of the region.

Our mutual interests are directly at stake in Colombia. Drug trafficking and abuse cause enormous social, health, and financial damage in the United States. The problems confronting Colombia directly affect communities not only within that nation, but in the workplaces, schoolyards, and city streets of communities throughout the United States. Over 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine is grown, processed, or transported through Colombia. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that up to 75 percent of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from Colombia -- although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the world's heroin. The U.S., therefore, has a vital interest in supporting the Colombian government's comprehensive strategy to halt the spread of illegal drugs, promote human rights, advance the peace process, and increase trade and investment.

Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-armed and ruthless guerrillas, paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking interests which are inextricably linked. Although the Government is not directly at risk, these threats are slowly eroding the authority of the central government and depriving it of the ability to govern in outlying areas. It is in these lawless areas, where the guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers flourish, that the narcotics industry is finding refuge. As a result, large swathes of Colombia are in danger of being narco-districts for the production, transportation, processing and marketing of these substances.

These links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and paramilitary movements are well documented. Profits from illegal activities, combined with a weakened economy and high unemployment, have enabled the FARC, in particular, to grow rapidly in terms of manpower. We estimate that the FARC now has 10,000-15,000 active members, the ELN around 5,000, and that there are an estimated 3- 5,000 paramilitary members. They all participate in this narcotics connection. Much of the recruiting success occurs in marginalized rural areas where the groups can offer salaries much higher than those paid by legitimate employers. Estimates of guerrilla income from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities, such as kidnapping and extortion, are unreliable, but clearly exceed $100 million a year, and could be far greater. Of this, we estimate some 30-40% comes directly from the drug trade. Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers, and paramilitary leaders have even publicly admitted their participation in the drug trade.

President Clinton and Secretary Albright have recently reiterated the high priority we place on helping Colombia's democracy, as it faces these interrelated challenges of narcotics, guerrillas, paramilitaries, and poverty. The U.S. is working closely with the Pastrana Administration to support his efforts to initiate a peace process, to broaden counternarcotics activities, to foster economic growth and development, and to protect internally displaced persons. We have expanded our assistance to Colombia to over $300 million in FY99, making Colombia the largest recipient of U.S. counternarcotics aid in the world.

PLAN COLOMBIA

The Government of Colombia (GOC) has developed a strategic approach to its national challenges. The "Plan Colombia - Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and Strengthening of the State" is a major step in the right direction. The Plan is an ambitious, but realistic, package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive Colombia's battered economy, to strengthen the democratic pillars of the society, to promote the peace process and to eliminate "sanctuaries" for narcotics producers and traffickers. The strategy combines existing GOC policies with new initiatives to forge an integrated approach to resolving Colombia's most pressing national challenges.

We consulted closely on the "building blocks," which make up the plan, with Colombian leaders and senior officials. But the plan was formulated, drafted and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. Without its Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp, it would not have the support and commitment of Colombia behind it needed for it to have a serious chance of success.

The USG shares the GOC's assessment that an integrated, comprehensive approach to Colombia's interlocking challenges holds the best promise of success. For example, counternarcotics efforts will be most effective when combined with rigorous GOC law enforcement/military cooperation, complementary alternative development programs and measures to assure human rights accountability. Similarly, promoting respect for the rule of law is just as essential for attracting foreign investors as it is for securing a durable peace agreement.

Plan Colombia covers five critical themes: economic policy; the judicial system; counternarcotics; democratization, human rights, and social development; and the peace process.

ECONOMIC POLICY

The Colombian economy, historically a strong performer, is in the midst of its worst recession since 1931 due to the emerging markets fallout, longstanding fiscal problems, and now mounting losses in the country's financial sector. The economy contracted 5.8 percent in the first quarter of 1999 and GDP is forecast to drop by 3-4 percent this year. Unemployment is currently at almost 20 percent. To deal with this downturn, the GOC is proposing reforms that will stabilize the banking sector and correct fiscal imbalances, promote trade and foreign investment, renew preferential trade agreements with the U.S., and target government assistance to those most hurt by the stabilization measures.

The Colombian Government has been working closely with the International Monetary Fund on an agreement to obtain resources needed to support the Government's tough economic adjustment. Over the next three years the IMF will provide $2.7 billion for balance of payments support, and other IFIs will provide $4.2 billion to Colombia. In a recent step, the Colombian Government announced it would abandon its exchange rate band, a step many economists had recommended, and float its currency.

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Colombia's weak and unresponsive judicial system has all too often prompted many Colombians to take the law into their own hands, with tragic results. The GOC proposes reforming the judicial sector to make it fair, accessible, independent and effective. Working with the Colombian legislative and judicial branches, the GOC proposes to strengthen the GOC's investigatory/prosecutorial capabilities, to undertake vigorous enforcement against corruption, and to increase training in human rights issues, thereby reducing levels of violence and strengthening the rule of law. Adoption of an accusatorial process in place of an interrogatory trial process will help in the reform of the Colombian judiciary and in ensuring more effective capabilities in Colombia in this critical area.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

To deal with counternarcotics issues, the GOC's strategy seeks to prosecute and incarcerate individuals and organizations associated with the drug trade, to dismantle trafficking organizations, to neutralize the drug trade's financial system, to introduce an effective air interdiction system, and to create a strong disincentive for drug crop production through eradication and law enforcement. In all of these objectives, the GOC intends to mesh its national initiatives with international efforts. The GOC envisions closer counternarcotics collaboration between its national police and select carefully vetted units of the Colombian military against heavily armed guerrillas and paramilitaries. The GOC also believes that breaking the nexus between Colombia's guerrilla groups and narcotraffickers, particularly in southern Colombia, is key to significant progress in its efforts to bring peace to the country, reduce narcotrafficking, and deny a major source of funding to guerrillas and paramilitaries.

The USG is involved with the government of Colombia on a wide range of programs in support of our counternarcotics strategy. The U.S. policy of aiding aggressive Colombian eradication efforts has largely controlled the coca crop in the Guaviare region and is beginning to make inroads in Caqueta. The gains made, however, have been more than offset by the explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo, and in Norte de Santander. Putumayo is an area that remains beyond the reach of the government's coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence and weak state authority have contributed to the dire situation in the Putumayo. The Government of Colombia plans to launch a comprehensive step-by-step effort there to counter the coca explosion, including eradication, interdiction, and alternative development over the next several years.

In the Pastrana Administration, the U.S. has a full and committed partner that shares our counternarcotics goals in Colombia and is dedicated to complete cooperation on the full range of counternarcotics efforts. The Colombian Army has greatly expanded cooperation with and support for the Colombian National Police, and has formed a brand new, fully vetted counternarcotics battalion, specifically designed to work directly with CNP on counternarcotics missions. The Colombian Air Force has increased air interdiction, combat air support and intelligence support to the counter-drug effort. We also believe the Colombian Marine Corps' riverine interdiction contribution, which has led to seizures along Colombia's extensive river system, merits positive attention. Cooperation with the Colombian military on counternarcotics operations has never been better.

The GOC has a large inventory of seized narco-trafficker farms and ranches which could be used to resettle coca farmers from remote areas where alternative crops would not be feasible due to land conditions. Legal and security issues have inhibited this. However, the GOC is reviewing the possibility of establishing a pilot program of transferring the land to coca growers with appropriate safeguards.

We have also strongly supported the efforts of the Pastrana Administration to advance the protection of human rights and to prosecute those who abuse them. Complicity by elements of Colombia's security forces with the right wing militia groups remains a serious problem, although the GOC has taken important steps in holding senior military and police officials accountable for participation in human rights violations. Since assuming office in August of 1998, President Pastrana has demonstrated his Government's commitment to protecting human rights by cashiering a number of senior and mid-level officers for complicity with paramilitary groups. Three generals have been dismissed; most recently Brigadier General Bravo for his failure to take measures to prevent right wing militia massacres that occurred in La Gabarra and Tibu in late August of 1999.

The GOC has also made reforms in its military courts. In 1997, the Constitutional Court directed the military judicial system to relinquish to the civilian judiciary the investigation and prosecution of grave human rights violations and other alleged crimes not directly related to acts of service. In the last two years, civilian courts have convicted 240 members of the armed forces and police of human rights violations.

The Pastrana Government has also begun a program to ensure the physical safety of human rights defenders. Much more remains to be done, but we believe the Pastrana Administration is sincere in its commitment to improving the human rights situation in Colombia.

U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided strictly in accordance with Section 568 of the FY99 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (the so-called Leahy Amendment) and Section 8130 of the FY99 Defense Appropriations Act. All military units of the Colombian security forces which receive counternarcotics assistance are carefully vetted by the Embassy and the Department of State. No USG assistance is provided to those military units for whom we have credible evidence of the commission of gross human rights violations, unless the GOC has taken adequate steps to bring those responsible to justice. There are strict procedures in place to verify that individuals and units proposed for USG assistance and training have not been involved in human rights abuses.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND SOCIAL REFORM

The GOC recognizes that it can regain the confidence of its citizens only by strengthening its democratic and social institutions, particularly those that assist Colombian victims of the country's violence and drug trade. Accordingly, the GOC is proposing measures to promote respect for human rights, to assist those displaced by civil strife, to implement alternative development programs, to combat corruption, to strengthen local governments and the role of civil society, and to provide sustainable development assistance to areas torn by conflict. The Government acknowledges the urgent need to improve physical security and protection for human rights workers and the NGOs to which they belong. Currently, the GOC has dedicated $5.6 million to provide physical protection to approximately 80 human rights activists and their offices. The Plan outlines measures to strengthen the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, as well as to establish a Permanent National Commission on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.

One of the most serious problems in Colombia, which perhaps does not receive adequate attention, is the plight of its internally displaced persons (IDPs). The scope of the problem is enormous. The vicious conflict between paramilitaries and guerrillas is largely responsible for the forced displacement of Colombians. As many as 300,000 persons, mostly women and children, were driven from their homes in 1998 by rural violence. NGOs report that Colombia has the fourth largest population of displaced persons in the world. The USG has provided $2 million in assistance to the internally displaced through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

PEACE PROCESS

Colombia's internal conflict, the longest running in the hemisphere, has its roots in the civil strife of the 1950s, and has developed over a nearly 40 year period. The conflict continues to claim the lives of thousands every year and complicates efforts to stem drug trafficking. Resolving this conflict will take time, commitment, and persistence not only by the Government of Colombia and the Colombian people, but by members of the international community committed to helping Colombians bring peace and national reconciliation to Colombia.

President Pastrana has made bringing an end to Colombia's civil strife through a peace agreement with the various insurgent groups a central goal of his Administration. Pastrana believes, and the United States Government agrees, that ending the civil conflict and eliminating all of that conflict's harmful side effects is central to solving Colombia's multifaceted problems. A peace agreement would stabilize the nation, help Colombia's economy to recover and allow for further improvement in the protection of human rights. A successful peace process would also restore Colombian government authority and control in the coca-growing region.

"Peace at any price" is fool's gold. We applaud the Colombian Government's determination to press the guerrillas to cease their practices of kidnapping, forced recruitment of children, and attacks against the civilian population. We have made clear to all parties that the peace process must support and not interfere with counternarcotics cooperation, and that any agreement must permit continued expansion of all aspects of this cooperation.

AMCIT ISSUES

The return of David Mankins, Mark Rich and Richard Tenenoff, missionaries from the New Tribes Mission (NTM) organization, who were kidnapped on January 31, 1993, remains a high priority for the U.S. Government. We hold the FARC responsible for this kidnapping and we call again on the FARC to provide a full accounting of the whereabouts and the status of these missionaries.

We repeat our demand that the FARC turn over to the proper authorities those responsible for the brutal and senseless March 4 murder of three U.S. citizen indigenous rights activists. We have demanded a complete investigation by legitimate law enforcement entities. In particular, the investigation needs to identify all those responsible for the murder of the three U.S. activists. We have insisted that the Government of Venezuela and the Government of Colombia identify and prosecute those individuals responsible for this heinous crime. Both governments have been receptive to our requests and are pursuing efforts to bring those responsible to justice.

Regarding State Department contacts with the FARC, let me remind you that we initiated those contacts at the request of the Pastrana government in order to promote a peace process we all support, and to press directly the FARC for an accounting of three NTM missionaries. After the tragic killings of the three Americans we immediately suspended those contacts, and they remain suspended today.

USG ASSISTANCE

During my recent trip to Colombia, President Pastrana requested USG collaboration in Colombia's effort to further refine a comprehensive strategy to address the inter-related problems that confront Colombia. In response to that request, we worked closely with the GOC as it formulated its comprehensive strategy. The GOC graciously shared a draft of their strategy, which we reviewed to ascertain how the USG can best help President Pastrana and the Colombian people implement the strategy.

The GOC will fund the bulk of the $7.5 billion strategy, but seeks supplementary support of up to $3.5 billion from the international community. The U.S. Government has already been helpful in addressing Colombia's needs. We are reviewing within the Administration Colombia's plan now in order to determine whether and in what additional ways U.S. support is justified. We are discussing how we can use existing authorities and funds to support counternarcotics operations. We are ready to work with the Colombians to assess their strategy and the optimum ways in which the U.S. can assist in the GOC's efforts to resolve its systemic national problems, many of which adversely impact upon U.S. citizens and businesses. We are also considering how to engage the IFIs, the European Union and other potential donors.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, the Administration has been pleased by the bipartisan support from both houses that share our concern for Colombia's future and our recognition that this is a key moment in which to contribute to a positive course of events. Recent letters from the Administration to the leadership and other key congressmen have ratified that sense of bipartisan commitment so badly needed if we are to deal with the problems, which Colombia poses for us and our people. Concerted action now could help over time to stem the illicit narcotics flow to the United States. Action now can contribute to a peaceful resolution of a half-century of conflict. Action now could return Colombia to its rightful historical place as one of the hemisphere's strongest democracies.

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As of March 13, 2000, this document is also available at http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/pick06.htm