Foreign Policy Brief, House International Relations Committee Democratic Office, October 7, 1999

Foreign Policy Brief, House International Relations Committee Democratic Office, October 7, 1999

Colombia Needs Comprehensive Aid, Not Just Interdiction and Eradication

Colombia's difficulties require a comprehensive solution. The country needs to rebuild its economy, improve the armed forces' human rights record, control the paramilitaries, provide alternative development and, above all else, keep working hard on the peace process. Without peace, the drug trade will not stop -- and that is what we in the U.S. are most concerned about.

Overview

Last year, in response to increasing drug production in Colombia and in support of the new Pastrana Government's commitment to reducing the drug flow and reaching a peace agreement to end the civil war, the U.S. significantly raised assistance levels to Colombia. The $287 million provided in fiscal year 1999 made Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world, behind only Israel and Egypt.

This year, the political and economic situation in Colombia has deteriorated. Peace talks between the Government and the largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have stalled; a worsening economy is compounded by a lack of investor confidence; and the country's long-standing democracy is threatened. The line between the drug war and the 40 year-old civil war is narrowing. The war provides cover for the drug trade and the drug traffickers in turn finance the war. Which means, most poignantly for the United States, Colombian drug production is up.

However drug eradication and interdiction must not be the sole focus of international support. In the long term, to stop the flow of narcotics, Colombia must achieve peace. And the U.S., in full partnership with Colombia and the international community, must be aggressive in providing help in that effort.

President Pastrana last week unveiled a broad strategy for addressing the increasingly worrisome problems facing the country. In a meeting with the House International Relations Committee, hosted by myself and Chairman Gilman, Pastrana called for bipartisan Congressional support for his government's action plan. The U.S. and other international donors will be asked to fund $3.5 billion of the $7 billion total investment envisioned under the plan.

Three Guiding Points on Which Most Agree

There is no military solution to the situation in Colombia. The civil war between government forces and various rebel guerrilla armies, has continued now for nearly 40 years. In this decade, the war has been complicated and fueled by two developments: the entry into the killing fields of right-wing paramilitaries; and the direct and indirect participation of the paramilitaries and left-wing guerrillas in the drug trade – from which both derive substantial sums of money to fund the violence and warfare. The war cannot and will not be won by any side – the government, the guerrillas, or the paramilitaries. Instead, a political solution, that takes into account decades of neglect for the countryside on the part of Colombia's central government, must be found.

A negotiated settlement must be the goal. The Pastrana government in Colombia is fully committed to the peace process. The guerrillas have failed so far to show a similar dedication to ending the war; but the Colombian government is confident that the FARC guerrillas will realize that they are now in the best possible position in which to come to the negotiating table. Last month, the FARC agreed to resume discussions. The international community must be prepared to assist efforts to achieve peace.

Things may get worse before they get better. Colombia's economy, which has experienced a negative growth rate for the first time in 70 years, may still be bottoming out, though many analysts say that the worst is over. Still, fiscal austerity measures must be implemented before Colombia can collect on promised IMF economic support. The production of coca, used to make cocaine, is up 126% over the past three years and may still be on the rise. Eradication through spraying has failed to stem the flow of cocaine out of Colombia, and until comprehensive programs of alternative development and economic investment can be implemented, an increase in drug production may continue.

Most troublesome of all, the cycle of violence persists. An average of nearly 10 political killings occur each day (more than 30,000 over the past 10 years), kidnapping has increased, and up to 1.5 million Colombians have been internally displaced. Many of those who can are choosing to leave the country. The violence gets more complicated too as links appear to grow between the military and the paramilitaries. Colombian and international human rights groups report increasing human rights abuses on the part of the paramilitaries (who commit an estimated 75% of the political killings), and increased collusion between the military and the paramilitaries.

The Framework for a Solution: Help for Colombia in Response to All its Needs

The Colombian Government's newly unveiled Plan Colombia: A Plan for Peace, Prosperity and the Strengthening of the State focuses on 1) the peace process; 2) the economy; 3) military reform; 4) judiciary and human rights; 5) counter narcotics; 6) alternative development; and, 7) social development.

All of these areas must be addressed simultaneously, and deserve U.S. and international support. Support for the peace process should include, where appropriate, technical assistance in facilitating negotiations; help in the formation of international working groups, such as a "Friends of Colombia," or other observer or monitoring groups. Military reform assistance must concentrate on training in human rights and professionalization, as well as help in making military courts more effective. Support for judicial reform and administration of justice is badly needed to address corruption in the courts and a massive backlog of pending cases, and should not be short-changed. Increased funding for human rights and humanitarian assistance should include aid for the displaced, and training and financial assistance for Colombian human rights groups, the attorney-general's office and NGOs in order to strengthen investigations, reporting, and prosecution. Additionally, campaigns that promote peace and condemn kidnapping and violence, which draw broad-based support, should be fortified.

Crucial to promoting peace and reducing drug flows is a comprehensive alternative development plan that would include crop substitution, infrastructure and market development, and extension of trade preferences, including an expansion of the Andean Trade Preference Act. The Colombian Government has recognized that economic and social development, including a decentralization of power and resources, is needed for peace to have a chance and to reduce the cycle of violence and drug trafficking. The U.S. should support efforts towards promoting social and economic equality in Colombia. Lastly, in their battle against increasingly strong and well-protected narcotics traffickers, the Colombian police and military may need an increase in outside assistance.

The Clinton administration proposes increased assistance to the Colombian military in the form of equipment and training for counter-narcotics battalions that would operate in support of the Colombian National Police. Indeed, last month President Clinton used his authority under section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act to provide immediate counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. This package includes $75 million in funding for the three countries, $60 million of which will go to Colombia. The CNP will get $10 million and the Colombian military will get $50 million. Equipment provided will include helicopters (UH-1N's for the military's counter-narcotics battalion), machine guns, ammunition, and night-vision goggles. The package will also include training to maintain the helicopters.

U.S. assistance for the Colombian military, as distinct from the Colombian National Police, raises concerns because of the military's poor human rights record. The Administration is trying to address this issue by creating a counter-narcotics battalion whose members have been vetted for human rights abuses. While this is a good start (and is a requirement under current U.S. law), the U.S. should also continue to insist that the Colombian military sever all ties to the paramilitary organizations and that senior Colombian military officers who are guilty of human rights abuses be removed from service.

While arguments can be made to provide assistance to the Colombian military in its efforts to reform and professionalize the armed forces as well as to eradicate drugs, this support must be conditioned on adherence to human rights, and – equally important – it should back-up the peace process, not replace it.

Economic assistance for Plan Colombia will be provided not only by the United States, but also through multi-lateral institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank and the IMF. The European Union and Japan and others will also be asked to contribute. Congress must look at the situation in Colombia with a regional perspective, ensuring that counterdrug support seeks to reach a comprehensive regional solution, rather than aiming to stop the flow in one country, only to have it resurface elsewhere.

The State Department, White House, Pentagon and others in the Administration are conferring on the size and scope of a probable request to Congress for supplemental aid to Colombia. The timing of such a request is still unknown, and likely will depend upon consideration of other spending issues (Kosovo, Wye River Agreement, UN Arrears). Estimates on the size of the package range from $500 million to $1.8 billion over three years. At least a third, and up to two-thirds, of the proposed funds would go to support to the military. A Republican Congressman who recently traveled to Colombia spelled out publicly during his visit the difficulty he thought Congress could have in passing such a package for the country, given that only "five-10" Democrats can be expected to support military assistance, whereas "15-20" Republicans may vote against any aid package, meaning trouble with only a five-seat majority. Most Democrats will find it difficult to support heavy military assistance; whereas many Republicans who have chastised the Administration for being slow and stingy in sending helicopters down to Colombia will only half-heartedly and in not much more than an after-thought manner, support funds for crucial parts of the package, such as alternative development.

Military hardware is expensive; but so is viable alternative development that will encourage and allow coca growers to give up their lucrative cash crop. Without real reform of the judiciary and the military; without substantial investment in all aspects of alternative development; and without long-term social and economic development – peace will be elusive and drugs will be abundant.

Finally, we must focus on demand as well. The drug flow into the U.S. from Colombia and other countries can really only be stopped through a decrease in demand in the U.S. Leading drug policy experts agree that international drug control is only one of six prescriptions for reducing drug usage – the others are education, prevention, treatment, research, and law enforcement. At the same time we are helping Colombia – and therefore ourselves – to reduce the supply of drugs, we must also aggressively promote and fund successful drug education, prevention and treatment programs in the United States.

As of March 22, 2000, this document is also available online at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/democrats/briefs/fpbColombia1.htm