Colombia Aid Package, by CIP's Adam Isacson and Lisa Haugaard of the Latin America Working Group, January 29, 2000

Colombia Aid Package, by CIP's Adam Isacson and Lisa Haugaard of the Latin America Working Group, January 29, 2000

January 29, 2000

To: Foreign Policy Aides
From: Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group; Adam Isacson, Center for International Policy
Re: Colombia Aid Package

The Clinton Administration has announced a two-year, $1.3 billion aid package for Colombia. While the Colombian government and people merit our assistance, this package as constituted is not the answer to Colombia's troubles–or our own serious concerns about drug abuse. Worse, the package may weaken a fragile peace process and draw the United States into a complicated and deep-rooted conflict that has little to do with drugs.

Colombia's military and police are already the world's third-largest recipients of U.S. assistance, with arms and training growing from about $65 million in 1996 to nearly $300 million in 1999. (For a detailed picture of current U.S. military and police aid to Colombia, visit www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm.) Until 1999, U.S. support had primarily gone to the Colombian police; this changed with a number of military-aid initiatives such as the creation of a new counternarcotics battalion within the Colombian Army. Though purportedly for counternarcotics only, the proposed aid will greatly increase the U.S. financial commitment to Colombia's army, and will bring the United States still closer to involvement in Colombia's intractable conflict.

Fighting between the Colombian military, leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries has escalated enormously since the mid-1990s, making the hemisphere's oldest conflict its bloodiest by far. The violence has forced about 1 million people from their homes in the past four years alone, creating a humanitarian crisis of global proportions. It is a conflict in which massacres and displacement are used as military tactics and civilian non-combatants account for at least two-thirds of casualties.

The United States should help Colombia with substantial diplomatic and financial support. However, we are concerned about the military portion of the proposed aid package for the following reasons:

1. Its effect on Colombia's peace process.

Colombia's president, Andrés Pastrana, has made the pursuit of a negotiated end to the conflict the centerpiece of his term in office so far. Though fraught with difficulty, talks with the FARC, Colombia's largest guerrilla group, have been proceeding for a year now, and the ELN guerrillas have also expressed an interest in negotiations.

The talks with the FARC are still in a fragile phase, and it is clear that both the guerrillas and the Colombian government are divided over whether to keep negotiating. Infusing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid risks weakening the process by radicalizing anti-peace elements on both sides. Militarists in the FARC will see the aid as a reason to keep fighting, while the aid will give comfort to hard-liners in Colombia's ruling circles who already resist any further concessions. The Clinton Administration's assertions that its package–which features up to $1 billion in aid to the Colombian military and police and $5 million for peace--is intended to support the peace process is frankly ludicrous.

Supporters of military aid sometimes argue that "gains on the battlefield will be reflected at the negotiating table." This ignores the nature of Colombia's "battlefield," in which civilian non-combatants are the main targets. If the United States introduces more weapons and trains more fighters to participate in this conflict, it risks intensifying the crossfire in which innocent civilians are already caught. The case of El Salvador is worth recalling–a peace accord was signed in 1992, twelve years and 70,000 deaths after the initial ratcheting up of U.S. aid.

2. Its effect on human rights.

Despite some positive steps taken by the Pastrana Administration to dismiss high-level officers involved in human rights abuses, concerns remain strong over the Colombian military's human rights record. Most center on the army's continuing connections to paramilitary violence. Paramilitaries were responsible for 78 percent of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in 1999, according to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, a respected human rights group. Guerrillas were linked with 20 percent – including numerous horrendous cases of kidnapping of civilians – and state forces with 2 percent.

The military's percentage appears low but does not reflect state forces that routinely assisted paramilitary atrocities. "Cooperation between army units and paramilitaries remained commonplace," asserts Human Rights Watch's December 1999 report, Colombia: Human Rights Developments (available at www.hrw.org). "For instance, government investigators detailed direct collaboration between the Medellin-based Fourth Brigade and paramilitaries commanded by Carlos Castano. Repeatedly, paramilitaries killed those suspected of supporting guerrillas, then delivered the corpses to the army. In a process known as ‘legalization,' the army then claimed the dead as guerrillas killed in combat while paramilitaries received their pay in army weapons." The report went on to note that "The debate over percentages also leaves unaddressed continuing criminal activity by military intelligence, which government investigators linked to a string of high-profile killings and death threats, including the August murder of humorist Jaime Garzon." The report also notes the army's failure to control paramilitary violence: "Soldiers pursued guerrillas once an attack was reported. In contrast, although paramilitaries often announced plans to attack publicly and well in advance, authorities not only failed to act to stop killings, but rarely pursued paramilitary units even when they remained in the region after massacring noncombatants."

3. The growing overlap between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency.

Policymakers insist that all new military aid will be dedicated to the war on drugs. The drug war and Colombia's real war overlap significantly, however, increasing the risk that the United States will again be drawn the quagmire of another country's civil conflict. Counter-drug and counter-guerrilla efforts in Colombia resemble each other in three important ways:

Location. Years of drug fumigation without providing economic alternatives have pushed Colombian coca-growers deeper into guerrilla-controlled territory. U.S.-aided units on counternarcotics missions will end up fighting the FARC in the guerrillas' own strongholds, placing Washington at the center of Colombia's war effort. The base of the new U.S.-created counternarcotics battalion in Putumayo, near the Ecuadorian border, lies within a 100-mile radius of some of the Colombian Army's most notorious recent defeats at the hands of the FARC.

Training. U.S. military trainers offer their Colombian counterparts training in skills that can be applied easily to counter-guerrilla operations. Small unit tactics, light infantry skills, ambush techniques, marksmanship and other skills are equally applicable for counterinsurgency situations.

Intelligence. In March 1999, the United States loosened its guidelines for sharing intelligence about guerrilla activity with Colombian military units. In drug-producing areas, guerrilla-related intelligence may now be shared even if it has no counternarcotics content.

4. Its potential for quagmire.

The Colombian conflict has endured for over four decades. Colombian territory is vast--20 times the size of El Salvador and more than 3 times the size of Vietnam--and includes mountainous and jungle terrain ideal for guerrilla warfare. Any military strategy pursued in Colombia will certainly not be easy or quick.

5. Its blindness to the paramilitary role in drug trafficking.

The strategy behind the Colombia package assumes that attacking the guerrillas will cut down the drug trade, as guerrillas are connected to the drug trade, primarily by taxing coca growers in areas under their control. However, paramilitaries also tax the drug trade. Some paramilitary bands are said to be financed by drug traffickers, and the head of the paramilitaries, Carlos Castano, was identified by the DEA as a major trafficker. In a November 1999 interview in a major Colombian news magazine, Cambio, Carlos Castano said: "We finance ourselves with what the coca growers produce, I have to recognize this. I charge them a 60% tax on what they earn." The US strategy, aimed at the southern part of the country, does not address the paramilitary forces, whose strongholds are in the north. The strategy does not consider whether strengthening the military, which still has connections to paramilitary forces, will strengthen the paramilitaries as well.

6. Its continuation of a misguided policy.

If the United States really has $1 billion to spend on the anti-drug effort in Colombia, it should be part of a long-term effort to eliminate the reasons why Colombians choose to cultivate drugs in the first place. These reasons – state neglect of rural areas, a nonexistent rule of law, a lack of economic infrastructure and opportunity – not only explain the flourishing drug trade; they also account in part for the proliferation of armed groups in Colombia's countryside.

President Pastrana has indicated a strong interest in bringing state services and the rule of law to rural Colombia. But U.S. assistance so far has been overwhelmingly military in nature. While military and police aid to Colombia totaled almost $300 million in 1999 – plus $70 million for a crop-fumigation program – assistance for alternative development, judicial reform and human rights added up to less than $7 million. While the upcoming aid package promises more economic assistance in the aggregate, it carries a similar imbalance in favor of military assistance. The United States' all-stick-and-little-carrot anti-drug strategy in Colombia not only has human rights implications–it is also not effective. And it does nothing to affect the question of demand.

What Should Be Done?

There are no easy answers in Colombia and there is no magic package. The drug trade, both on the production and consumption end, is a market-driven phenomenon that is complex and hard to address. The guerrilla forces in Colombia are brutal and a negotiated settlement is not just around the corner.

In our view, however, a positive Colombia package would center on the following. Please note that although we comment on the administration package's coverage of these issues, it is difficult to evaluate the package's full contents until more detailed plans are provided.

1. Aid to strengthen Colombian government investigations into human rights violations and drug trafficking.

While impunity for severe human rights abuses is the norm in Colombia, there are effective Colombian government institutions that could benefit from U.S. resources. U.S. could expand existing judicial efforts and fund technical training for judges and local justice initiatives, as well as witness protection programs and protection programs for judges and investigators under threat. The U.S. should provide assistance to improve police investigations into human rights abuses and drug trafficking and improve controls against money laundering. Substantial assistance appears to be included in the administration's Colombia package for the justice system, and if it addresses the issues above, it should be supported.

2. Peace initiatives.

The United States should fund civil society peace initiatives, which range from local community roundtables, consensus-building community development projects, local mediation programs and church-led programs of dialogue to anti-kidnapping campaigns. The administration's package contains $5 million for peace. This a good step but seems an inadequate quantity given the scope of the rest of the assistance, and its message is undercut by the primarily military nature of the package.

3. Human rights.

The U.S. should fund governmental and nongovernmental human rights activities, especially human rights education to develop greater consensus on human rights norms and the need to respect international humanitarian law (including respect for civilians during wartime). The administration's package includes mention of human rights funding but the details should be sought.

Far more important than funds for human rights programs, however, will be the United States' own vigorous diplomacy to urge the Colombian government to improve the justice system, protect human rights advocates and sever the links between the military and paramilitary forces. Any good that human rights funding could do will be undercut if this large military package is accompanied by a tendency to tone down pressure on our Colombian military partners.

4. Alternative development and other economic assistance.

The United States should fund alternative development programs for small coca and poppy growers to encourage them to switch to legal crops. This should go beyond mere crop substitution to comprehensive rural development that provides a real market incentive for small farmers attracted to the lucrative drug trade. Before this package was announced, the United States had allocated funding only for a small program for the poppy growing area. The U.S. should make a sizeable multi-year commitment to fund programs for small coca growers in the areas where it is funding fumigation programs. The $145 million included in the administration's package sounds like a sizeable step in the right direction. However, some reports indicate only $115 million of this is dedicated to Colombia, with the rest going toward surrounding countries. Also, the administration remains reluctant to start funding alternative development programs in areas not firmly under Colombian government control–a completely untenable position if these programs are to be used as incentives for the bulk of small coca growers.

The United States should provide other kinds of economic assistance as well, including for rural development in conflict areas in projects that promote community consensus.

5. Relief for the displaced.

Colombian government and nongovernmental programs are unable to address the needs of Colombia's enormous and growing displaced population (308,000 people were displaced in 1998, 1.5 million since 1985). The United States should contribute substantially to emergency relief and especially longer-term resettlement assistance for Colombia's displaced. The amount dedicated to date, $2 million, is far from adequate. The administration's announcement is not clear on the amount that will be provided nor on the kinds of relief that it will entail. Disturbingly, the administration's discussion of a "push into Southern Colombia" foresees that U.S.-funded operations will cause additional displacement.

All of these programs must be accompanied by strong U.S. diplomatic support for a peace process in Colombia, along with efforts to encourage the Pastrana Administration to strengthen its human rights policy and improve the justice system.

Finally, at the same time as the United States is considering a package of assistance to Colombia, it should consider expanded funding for U.S. drug treatment and prevention programs and programs for youth at risk in order to limit demand at home. While aid to Andean militaries skyrockets, many Americans seeking treatment programs are not served. If the real issue behind the Colombia package is addressing the problem of drugs, home is where the answer lies.

Contact for more information:

Lisa Haugaard, Latin America Working Group, 202-546-7010
Adam Isacson, Center for International Policy, 202-232-3317