CIP
position on resolution before U.S. House of Representatives, March 6,
2002
Some
notes on the proposed resolution, from the Center for International Policy.
(Feel free to cite any information here.)
Though the language
is much improved over earlier drafts, CIP is quite concerned about the
vague recommendation on page 5 that the President "without undue
delay" submit legislation to provide additional anti-terror and anti-drug
aid to Colombia. We agree with the Bush administration's decision last
week (see Washington
Post article) that it is too early to embark on a major policy change.
The situation is
so serious, and the FARC's offensive so shocking, that perhaps some U.S.
aid might be in order. But in today's debate, it is important to make
clear that new aid would only help - or even make a difference - if two
very hard-to-meet conditions are satisfied:
- Condition 1:
Colombia must decisively break all links with paramilitaries, and launch
a serious effort to combat them as well.
- The Colombian
Commission of Jurists and other human rights NGOs credit Colombia's
security forces with less than 5 percent of all non-combatant killings.
The paramilitaries, however, commit over 75 percent, and the State Department
human rights report issued Monday indicates that "members of the
security forces sometimes illegally collaborated with paramilitary forces"
last year. U.S. and Colombian NGOs continue to document a disturbing
pattern of military-paramilitary collaboration, as well as a failure
to investigate or prosecute military officers charged with such collaboration.
- On a trip to Colombia during the second half of February, the Center
for International Policy heard numerous testimonies from elected officials,
local leaders and ombudsmen, and human rights defenders about a continuing
- or even increasing - pattern of military-paramilitary collaboration,
especially in the provinces of Cauca and Nariño, where the AUC
first gained a foothold in mid-2001.
- At current levels of military-paramilitary cooperation, we fear
that U.S. "counter-terrorism" assistance on a national level
may benefit units and officers who collaborate with the paramilitaries.
- Condition 2:
Colombia must dramatically increase its own contribution to both the
war and peace effort. Counter-insurgency
aid - particularly to a country the size of Colombia (40 million people,
53 times the size of El Salvador) - is doomed to failure if the local
leadership does not share our commitment to the fight. Colombia is simply
too big, and its defense needs are too great, for U.S. aid alone to
make a difference.
- By most
estimates, the army would need to at least triple in size in order to
take on the FARC effectively. (Currently, the Army has about 130,000
members, but only 40,000 of them can be deployed into battle. The rest
are at desk jobs or tied down to guarding static infrastructure like
pipelines and power lines.) The United States cannot fill this need
alone, and would be foolish to try.
- There are strong reasons to doubt Colombia's current commitment to
make the sacrifices necessary for a real war effort.
- The
law excludes high school graduates, meaning all but the poor, from
serving in combat units.
- The World
Bank's figures show that Colombians pay only 10.1 percent of GDP
in taxes - half the U.S. figure and lower than most of Latin America
(during World War II, the U.S. figure was more than 40 percent).
Colombia's National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF)
reports that Colombia spends only 1.97 percent of GDP on defense
- lower than most of Latin America - despite having been at war
for decades. This level of contribution makes a serious war effort
impossible.
- Worse, much
of the funds that are raised are lost to corruption. (Transparency
International's "corruption perceptions index" ranks Colombia
50th on a list of 91 countries.)
- It is doubtful
that U.S. funds and personnel could or should make up the difference.
The need goes beyond more defense spending, too: Colombia's long-running
war is deeply rooted in historical social and economic causes that must
also be addressed if any peace is to stick. The United States and Colombia's
leadership must also commit to a dramatic expansion in provision of
basic services to the Colombian people, especially in long-neglected
rural areas. Most U.S. aid should be non-military.
Our fear, however,
is that Colombia will satisfy neither of these conditions, and in fact
will choose a cheaper, possibly quicker course of action: giving free
rein to the paramilitaries. If this happens, we may see a level of
violence and human rights abuse on a scale the hemisphere has not seen
for decades.
There are strong
reasons to fear that Colombia may indeed be turning to the paramilitaries
as its main anti-guerrilla strategy.
- The
AUC had about 4,000 members in 1998; today it has nearly 15,000 and
its leaders, riding a wave of increased drug profits and donations from
wealthy Colombians, are pledging to double the group's size in the coming
year.
- Paramilitaries'
approval ratings have been rising in opinion polls (though still far
from a majority), as their media-savvy leaders have instructed their
fighters to avoid headline-grabbing massacres in favor of selective
killings.
- Meanwhile, the
candidate leading polls for the May presidential elections, hard-liner
Alvaro Uribe, rarely criticizes the paramilitaries and in fact is promising
to arm 1 million Colombian civilians if elected. The Center for International
Policy has heard several reports of paramilitaries gathering residents
of villages and neighborhoods under AUC control and instructing them
to vote for Uribe.
The paramilitary
option clearly looks tempting to many Colombians. It may promise victory
over the guerrillas - but only after a bloodbath of shocking proportions.
And the peace it would bring would be very short.
What the United States
does will depend on what the Colombians do. If Colombia embarks on a good-faith
war effort and takes on all armed groups, right and left, then U.S. support
could make a difference. If, however, Colombia unleashes the paramilitaries,
the United States should not offer a cent.
We must wait and
see what Colombia intends to do before considering any new aid packages.
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