Colombia-related
questions about the 2002 supplemental appropriations request, April 8,
2002
The administration's
supplemental appropriations request raises the following questions about
our policy toward Colombia and foreign military assistance in general.
All page numbers and sections here refer to the OMB document found at
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/pdf/5usattack.pdf.
I. Colombia
A. Changing the
mission of our aid
The provisions on
page 64 and the top of page 42 would allow all State Department and Defense
Department counter-drug aid to Colombia - past, present and future - to
be used for any threats to Colombia's security, whether or not drug-related.
The language refers to Colombia's "unified campaign against narcotics
trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security."
The language specifies
that two legal safeguards would remain in place: the Leahy Law (which
prohibits aid to military units credibly alleged to include human rights
abusers) and the Byrd Amendment (which sets a maximum presence in Colombia
of 400 U.S. military and 400 U.S. civilian contractors). The language
does not include the additional human rights conditions on U.S. aid to
Colombia found in section 567 of the 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act (H.R. 2506).
- If we expand the
criteria for use of our aid, we will greatly expand the number of potential
targets for the units we support and the assets and intelligence we
provide. The original plan was to use these assets - mainly, 75 helicopters
and a 2,300-man army brigade - for anti-drug efforts in a small part
of southern Colombia. With this expanded mission, will these assets
be stretched too thin to make any real difference against Colombia's
40,000 insurgents and paramilitaries?
- If we do find
current levels of U.S. aid are barely making a dent - as is likely -
will there be pressure in future years for substantial aid increases?
How far are we willing to go?
- Broadening the
mission of U.S. assistance means allowing U.S. aid to be used all over
the country, possibly including many areas where the military is frequently
alleged to be colluding with paramilitaries. U.S. personnel are checking
the names of recipient-unit members against a database of known violators,
in an effort to comply with the "Leahy Law" human rights protections.
Is this enough to guarantee that our aid will not inadvertently help
the paramilitaries in these zones? What other safeguards are in place?
- By most estimates,
Colombia would have to increase the size and capabilities of its security
forces dramatically in order to bring a significant weakening of insurgents
and paramilitaries. However, Colombia's contributions to its own military
are low even by Latin American standards, and recruits with high school
graduates are legally exempted from serving in combat units. If Colombia
does not substantially increase its contribution, can our aid make much
difference? Are we prepared to go it alone if necessary?
B. Foreign Military
Financing:
The provision on
page 84 would provide Colombia with $6 million in FMF assistance to begin
training military units to protect the Caño Limón - Coveñas
pipeline in northeastern Colombia. FARC and ELN guerrillas attacked the
pipeline -whose oil belongs to a joint venture involving U.S.-based Occidental
Petroleum - 170 times in 2001.
The administration's
2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations request includes another $98 million
in FMF for pipeline protection. This aid includes helicopters, training
and equipment for Colombia's 18th Brigade, based in Arauca department
on the Venezuelan border, and a new 5th Mobile Brigade. The $6 million
in the supplemental merely seeks to "jump-start" this larger
aid program.
- The real debate
about the pipeline proposal will take place during consideration of
this supplemental, not the Foreign Operations bill, which will be considered
later.
- The proposal raises
questions about whether the additional assistance, which will include
$60 million for helicopters, will be able to bring an end to guerrilla
attacks on the 400-mile-long pipeline. The guerrillas may adapt and
begin to concentrate their attacks beyond the 18th Brigade's jurisdiction
(about the first 75 miles of the pipeline). If this happens, will Congress
be asked to provide still more FMF for pipeline protection?
- U.S. Ambassador
Anne Patterson told Colombia's El Tiempo newspaper that "There
are more than 300 infrastructure sites that are strategic for the United
States in Colombia." What is the rationale for favoring Caño
Limón?
- The 18th Brigade
does not have a record of collaborating with paramilitaries during the
seven years it has existed, mainly because paramilitaries have not been
present in Arauca until very recently. Beginning in December 2001, however,
the AUC's "Eastern Plains Bloc" has moved north from Casanare
department and begun systematically killing people in two towns about
100 miles to the southeast of the pipeline, Tame and Cravo Norte. It
is worth keeping an eye on the 18th Brigade's response, if any, to the
paramilitary offensive in Arauca.
- The phrase "notwithstanding
any other provision of law" would seem to lift all safeguards on
this aid, including human rights protections like the Leahy Law (section
556 of the 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and section 8093
of the 2002 Department of Defense Appropriations Act). Is this the case?
C. Anti-Terrorism
Assistance:
The provision on
page 86 would give $25 million in State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) to Colombian military and police anti-kidnapping (GAULA) units.
Colombia accounts for more than half of the world's kidnappings, with
3,041 in 2001 mostly by guerrilla groups.
- Though many GAULA
units perform admirably, we must ensure that this aid is not misused.
The latest State Department human rights report notes, "In April
then-Prosecutor General Alfonso Gomez Mendez announced a formal investigation
of extensive illegal wiretapping by the Medellin GAULA (a combined police
and army antikidnapping unit). Investigators working on the October
2000 disappearance of ASFADDES workers Angel Quintero and Claudia Patricia
Monsalve uncovered evidence that the GAULA tapped 2,500 telephone lines
without proper authorization, including those of ASFADDES and other
human rights organizations. … Prosecutors are investigating the
April 4 murder of police officer Carlos Ceballos Gomez, who testified
in the case."
- The phrase "notwithstanding
any other provision of law" would seem to lift all safeguards on
this aid, including human rights protections like the Leahy Law (section
556 of the 2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and section 8093
of the 2002 Department of Defense Appropriations Act). Is this the case?
D. International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement:
The provision on
page 63 would add $114 million to the 2002 budget of the State Department's
International Narcotics Control aid program, which already totals about
$840 million this year.
This includes $4
million in new funding for Colombia's police, to "harden" police
stations in rural towns. The FARC guerrillas regularly attack police outposts
by launching crude gas-canister bombs; the guerrillas' campaign to clear
out the police has left about 200 of Colombia's 1,050 municipalities (counties)
with no police presence.
- "Hardening"
the police stations may help maintain police presence, though surrounding
homes and businesses in towns under attack would remain vulnerable to
the guerrillas' inaccurate, indiscriminate weapons.
II. Military aid
through the Pentagon budget:
As noted recently
in the Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10900-2002Apr7.html),
the provisions at the bottom of page 39 and the bottom of page 41 would
allow the Defense Department to provide $130 million in defense articles,
services and training "in furtherance of the global war on terrorism,
on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine."
- At least since
passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195, beginning
with 22 USC 2151), Congress has determined that military aid be managed
by the State Department and funded through the Foreign Operations appropriation.
(The main exception has been Section 1004 of the 1991 National Defense
Authorization Act [P.L. 101-510], which allows the Pentagon to provide
military aid for counter-narcotics.) Allowing the Defense Department
to provide "defense articles, services and training" to other
countries through its own budget would call into question this long-standing
arrangement. Why does the terrorist threat require that aid be given
outside the framework of the Foreign Assistance Act? Why do we have
a Foreign Assistance Act if so much aid is being delivered under another
authority?
- Programs like
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education
and Training (IMET) already exist to grant defense articles, services
and training to other countries. These programs are directed by the
State Department and overseen by both houses' Foreign Operations Appropriations
subcommittees. It is not clear why the administration's request excludes
the State Department and the subcommittees. Is minimizing oversight
a motive?
- The phrase "notwithstanding
any other provision of law" would seem to lift all safeguards on
this aid, including human rights protections like the Leahy Law (section
8093 of the 2002 Department of Defense Appropriations Act). Is this
the case?
