Testimony of Major General Gary D. Speer, Acting Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, April 11, 2002

Testimony of Major General Gary D. Speer, Acting Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, April 11, 2002

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL GARY D. SPEER, UNITED STATES ARMY

ACTING COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 107TH CONGRESS

HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS

11 APRIL 2002

Mr. Chairman, Representative Menendez, and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you to discuss United States Southern Command’s role in assisting Colombia. The men and women of United States Southern Command deeply appreciate the hard work by the Members of this Subcoommittee and we thank you, and your colleagues in Congress, for your commitment and steadfast support.

I have served as the Acting Commander in Chief of United States Southern Command since October 1, 2001 when General Pace assumed the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the past ten months, I have traveled to Colombia eight times in the past ten months. I have met key leaders in Colombia and here in the United States, both military and civilian. I appreciateunderstand their challenges, and am convinced that the Colombian military is led by experienced and principled officers.

During the past twenty-five years, nations of our hemisphere have made substantial progress toward achieving peace through democratically elected governments, economic development, and the subordination of the military to civilian authority. However, some of our hemispheric neighbors are recoiling from the effects of political instability, faltering economic growth, and institutional weakness. High unemployment, endemic poverty, corruption, and crime combined with the effects of terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities challenge and threaten the legitimacy of many of these governments and consequently threatening U.S. hemispheric interests.

Again, I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an overview of the regional security environment, the threats to U.S. interests, the followed by a more detailed description of the pproblems facing Colombia and its Andean neighbors, and . I will also detail what we have done to date to address these threats and enhance security and stability, which are the underpinnings of economic growth and legitimate governance. Without security and stability, virtually all other programs of assistance remain in jeopardy.

Security Environment

During the past twenty-five years, nations of our hemisphere have made substantial progress toward achieving peace through democratically elected governments, economic development, and the subordination of the military to civilian authority. All countries, except for Cuba, have democratically elected governments. Without a clear or imminent external threat, Latin American and Caribbean nations essentially appear to be at peace with their neighbors.

Underlying this perception of tranquility are the multiple transnational threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and organized crime, all of which threaten the security and stability ofin the region. As a result, Ssome of our hemispheric neighbors are sufferingrecoiling from the effects of political instability, faltering economic growth, and institutional weakness. High unemployment, endemic poverty, corruption, and crime combined with the effects of terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities challenge and threaten the legitimacy of many of these governments and consequently threatening U.S. hemispheric interests. Without a clear or imminent external threat, Latin American and Caribbean nations essentially appear to be at peace with their neighbors. All countries, except for Cuba, have democratically elected governments. However, underlying this perception of tranquility are the multiple transnational threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and internal organized crime, all of which threaten the security and stability in the region. Governments are feeling the strain of weak economies, rampant corruption, ineffective judicial systems, and growing discontent of the people as democratic and economic reforms fall short of expectations.

Transnational threats in the region are increasingly linked as they share common infrastructure, transit patterns, corrupting means, and illicit mechanisms. These threats transcend borders and seriously affect the security interests of the United States.

Illegal Migration

Latin America and the Caribbean are major avenues for worldwide illegal migration. This migration creates economic and social imbalances that strain the effective rule of governments in the region. Illegal migration and human smuggling operations are linked to drugs and arms trafficking, corruption, organized crime, and the possibility for the movement of members of terrorist organizations.

According to the Census Bureau’s latest figures, more than eight million illegal immigrants reside in the United States; nearly two million of them are from the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates more than 300,000 illegal immigrants annually originate in, or transit through Central American countries destined for the United States. Also, many Chinese illegal immigrants destined for the U.S. transit through Suriname. Human trafficking is highly profitable and provides revenue of more than $1 billion annually to smuggling organizations within the region. Further, human trafficking provides the potential means of entry into the U.S. for criminals and terrorists.

Arms Trafficking

Although Latin America and the Caribbean spend less than any other region on legal arms purchases, illegal arms sales pose a significant threat to the stability of the region. Of particular concern is the rising trend in which Drug Trafficking Organizations exchange drugs for arms, which are then provided to terrorist organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia. Illegal arms originate from throughout the world and transit through the porous borders of Colombia’s neighbors. Arms traffickers use a variety of land, maritime, and air routes that often mirror drug and human trafficking networks.

Drug Trafficking

Illegal drugs inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of the United States and our hemispheric neighbors, and appropriately, have often been characterized as a weapon of mass destruction. According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy figures, Americans spent more than $64 billion on illegal drugs while drug abuse killed more than 19,000 Americans and accounted for $160 billion in expenses and lost revenue. The majority of cocaine and heroin entering the United States is produced in the Andean Region.

Drug trafficking persists as a corrosive threat to the democracy, stability, and prosperity of nations within the region, especially in the Andean Ridge, adversely affecting societies and economies as scarce resources are diverted to rehabilitation, interdiction, and crime prevention efforts. Drug trafficking generates violence, fosters crime, and corrupts public institutions. Increasingly, terrorist organizations support themselves through drug trafficking. This trend is particularly troubling in Colombia where we find clear connections between drug trafficking, guerrillas, and terrorist activities.

Illegal drugs, often characterized as weapons of mass destruction, inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of the United States. According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy figures, Americans spent over $64B on illegal drugs in 2000 and drug abuse killed 19,102 Americans in 1999. The majority of cocaine entering the United States is produced in the Andean Ridge.

It is not only the drug producing countries that suffer. No country in this hemisphere in which drugs transit escapes the violence and corrupting influences of drug trafficking. Additionally, as traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit countries, transit nations are now becoming drug consumers as well.

Despite extensive eradication in the source zone and successful interdiction in the transit zone, supply continues to exceed demand. Partner nations are willing to work with us to counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. U.S. counterdrug assistance to security forces assists Colombia and other nations in the region develop more effective counterdrug capabilities. However, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations are beyond the capabilities of their thinly stretched resources. Drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations in reaction to counterdrug efforts. These small, efficient, and well-financed drug trafficking organizations rapidly change the place of production, transport routes, points of transshipment, and markets when eradication and interdiction programs achieve success. In fact, new estimates indicate a 16 percent increase in cultivation in Colombia (170,000 hectares), and no change in Peru (34,000 hectares) and Bolivia (20,000 hectares). One could have predicted at the outset of Plan Colombia that it would not be easy or quick to break the economy of the drug producers and traffickers in Colombia. We have much yet to do and a plan to accomplish it.

Terrorism

Southern Command recognized a viable terrorist threat in Latin America long before September 11. If not further exposed and removed, ththat threat potentially poses a serious threat to both our national security and that of our neighbors. We in Southern Command have monitored terrorist activities for years with such incidents as the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and Jewish-Argentine Cultural Center in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 attributed to Hizballah.

Recently, international terrorist groups have turned to some Latin American countries as safe havens from which they sustain worldwide operations. As an example, the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay serves as a base of support for Islamic Radical Groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Al Gama’at al-Islamiayya al Gama’at. These organizations generate revenue through illicit activities that include drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forged travel documents, and even software and music piracy.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) and the United Self Defense Group of Colombia (AUC) are all on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The FARC has been implicated in kidnappings and attacks against United States citizens and interests, to includeing the murder of three U.S. citizens in 1998. According to the Department of State’s most recent "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report, 86 percent of all terrorist acts against U.S. interests throughout the world in 2000 occurred in Latin America, predominately in Colombia.

According to the Department of State’s most recent human rights report, 44 percent of all terrorist acts against U.S. interests throughout the world occurred in Colombia and most were committed by the FARC.

Notwithstanding the Government of Colombia’s eleventh hour extension of the FARC’s "safe haven" on January 20 of this year, the FARC initiated a national terror campaign with more than eighty-five attacks since January 20 120 attacks against the nation’s infrastructure, security forces, and cities. These attacks ultimately prompted President Pastrana on February 20 to suspend the despeje or "safe haven", and initiate operations to occupy the area.

The recent bombing outside the U.S Embassy in Peru preceding President Bush’s visit is indicative that other domestic terrorist groups pose threats to the United States elsewhere in the hemisphere. These include, but are not limited to, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru and the Jama’at al Muslimeen (JAM) in Trinidad and Tobago.

Drug Trafficking

Illegal drugs inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of the United States and our hemispheric neighbors, and appropriately, have often been characterized as a weapon of mass destruction. According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy figures, Americans spendt more than $64 billion on illegal drugs while drug abuse killed more than 19,000 Americans and accounted for $160 billion in expenses and lost revenue. Most of the world’s cocaine and a significant portion of the The majority of cocaine and heroin entering the United States is produced in the Andean Region.

It is not only the drug producing countries that suffer. No country in this hemisphere throughin which drugs transit escapes the violence and corrupting influences of drug trafficking. Additionally, as traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit countries, transit nations are now becoming drug consumers as well.

Arms Trafficking

Illegal Migration

Latin America and the Caribbean are major avenues for worldwide illegal migration. This migration creates economic and social imbalances that strain the effective rule of governments in the region. Although not a problem directly tied to Colombia, illegal migration and human smuggling operations are linked to drugs and arms trafficking, corruption, organized crime, and the possibility for the movement of members of terrorist organizations.

According to the Census Bureau’s latest figures, more than eight million illegal immigrants reside in the United States; nearly two million of them are from the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The

United States Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates more than 300,000 illegal immigrants annually originate in, or transit through, Central American countries destined for the United States. Also, many Chinese illegal immigrants destined for the U.S. transit through Suriname, Ecuador and other countries in the hHemisphere. Human trafficking is highly profitable, and providing es revenue of more than $1 billion annually to smuggling organizations within the region. MoreoverFurther, human trafficking provides the potential means of entry into the U.S. for criminals and terrorists.

Colombia

No other region is suffering the destabilizing effects of transnational threats more than the Andean Ridge countries. In Colombia, the FARC, ELN, and AUC have created an environment of instability in which. tThe Ggovernment of Colombia, through its military and police forces, does not control portions of the country. In the areas where military and police that they are not present and do no’t have control, there is lack of a safe and secure environment, which undermines the ability to govern and permits terriorismterrorism and crime to florishflourish.

The violence in Colombia remains a significant threat to the region as the combination and links amongbetween guerrillas, terrorists, drug-traffickers, and illegal self-defense forces have severely stressed the government’s ability to exercise sovereignty and maintain security. TWe have seen movements by the FARC and other illegal groups cross into neighboring countries at will. In addition, neighboring countries remain transshipment points for arms and drugs entering and exiting Colombia.

Colombia is critically important to the United States. With over 40 million people, it is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere, and it is an important trading partner, notably especially for resources such as oil oil. More importantly, it is the linchpin of the Andean Region; as such, it is critical for the United States that Colombia re-establish a safe and secure environment within its borders and survive as an effective democracy. Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador are certainly at risk to some degree based on what happens in Colombia.

The current political and security situation in Colombia is at a critical juncture. Notwithstanding the Government of Colombia’s eleventh hour extension of the despeje,, the FARC’s "safe haven," on January 20 of this year, the FARC initiated a countrywide terror campaign with more than 120 attacks against the nation’s infrastructure and cities. These attacks ultimately prompted President Pastrana on February 20, to eliminate the despeje on February 20,, and initiate operations to occupy the area. From a military perspective, it President Pastrana’s decision to eliminate the FARC’s safe haven, after the FARC initiated its intensive terrorist campaign, was the right move from a military perspective. Simply put, the FARC is nothing less than a terrorist organization that conducts violent terrorist attacks to undermine the security and stability of Colombia, funded by its involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation, production and trafficking, as well as kidnapping, and extortion. The FARC was useding the ddespeje as a sanctuaryn area to support their drug trafficking operations, launch terrorist attacks, and recruit and train their forces. Simply put, the FARC is a terrorist organization that conducts violent terrorist attacks to undermine the security and stability of Colombia, f inanced by its involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation, production and transportation, as well as by kidnapping, and extortion.

TAlthough the Colombian military immediatelyaggressively initiated operations to reoccupy the dd espeje, they focusinged on occupying population centers with deliberate operations to prevent and avoiding civilian casualties. This strategy avertoided the significant displacement of the population. In response, tThe FARC has avoided confronting the military and has broken down into small elements, retreated into the jungle and rural areas, and concentrated their its actions on terrorist attacks against the country’s iinfrastructure.

While the March 10 Congressional elections were executed relatively problem-free, tThe weeks leading to the upcoming Presidential elections on May 265th will be particularly fragile critical as the Colombian Military dedicates significant resources to ensure the security of the electelectoral processions. Recently, the United States Government has received increased numbers of requests for support from the Government of Colombia.

U.S. Southern Command’s Support to Plan Colombia

We continue to execute the Department of Defense’s counterdrug support to Plan Colombia, ColombiaPresident Pastrana’s long-term national security plan. Colombia is just beginning the second year of this six-year plan. The initial phase of operations focused in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments of Southern Colombia where approximately half of Colombia’s coca cultivation takes place. In implementing U.S. Support to Plan Colombia initiated by the the FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental, Southern Command has been responsible for training and equipping a Counter Narcotics Brigade, riverine units, fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters, training pilots and crews, infrastructure upgrades, and providing counterdrug intelligence support. is responsible for military training and support missions as well as providing continual support to the Department of State’s military-related programs. We are beginning the second year of our support to this six-year plan. Operations have focused in Southern Colombia, particularly in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments where approximately half of Colombia’s coca cultivation takes place. We are seeing positive results from our support.

Professionalism of the Colombian Military

We have witnessed a steady improvement in the professionalism and respect for human rights by the Colombian military, accompanied by increased effectiveness in counterdrug operations. Our legal assistance projects in Colombia, which include developing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) school as well as legal and human rights reform, continue on track. We have worked closely with the Colombian military to establish and build a Military Penal Justice Corps. The initial JAG school courses began in February 2002 for 60 judge advocates and clerks in temporary facilities. The Department of State recently approved the construction of a permanent JAG facility and we expect completion in July 2003.

Counter Narcotics Brigade

The United States trained Counter Narcotics Brigade (CN Brigade) headquarters and its three battalions are now fully trained and equipped. United States trainers performed staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops. The brigade headquarters and the second battalion of the brigade completed training and began operations in December 2000; we completed training of the third battalion last May. We continue to provide sustainment training to the CN Brigade.

We appreciate the support of the United States Congress in providing us the necessary resources to effectively train and equip the CN Brigade.

The CN Brigade is, the best-trained and equipped unit in the Colombian Army. It, has made impressive results during drug interdiction operations by destroying coca processing labs, providing security to eradication operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf in Southern Colombia. Since operations began in December 2000, over 890 drug labs have been destroyed and 119 people detained for judicial processing. The CN Brigade has also provided the ground security forto the spraying of 59,000 hectares of coca in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions. The government of Colombia’s success in spraying effort in Putumayo last year would not have been possible without the CN Brigade’s aggressive ground support to spray aircraft. If the government had not suspended spraying operations for over eight months in 2001, gains against cultivation in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions could have been even greater.

In addition, Further, indications are that the Colombian military’s concerted interdiction efforts combined with aerial spraying are is having an effect on the narcotraffickers. Cocaine labs are being established pushed ffurther away from the Putumayo and Caqueta cultivation areas; in fact, large scale, industrial sized labs were discovered in the former dDespeje. With the training and capabilities of the CN Brigade, n Most importantly, the FARC now avoids head-on engagements against the Colombian military in Putumayo and Caqueta Departments because of the training and capabilities of the CN Brigade.. No longer does the FARC own the military initiative in Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, but, and it is no longer strategically effective for them to attack Colombian bases and forces in the field. avoids head-on engagements against the Colombian military. This increased security in the coca growing areas affordsmeans a better environment for interdiction efforts by the first CN Brigade and the Colombian National Police.

Based on the success of the first CN Brigade, the Administration is supporting Colombia’s request to train and equip a second CN Brigade in FY03 for employment elsewhere within the country. The formation of a second CN Brigade would include training, equipping and infrastructure support. We must support the Colombians in their effort to broaden the counter narcotics fight by forming the second CN Brigade, which will enable them to further pursue those HCL labs which have left the Putumayo and Caqueta departments and attack the other main coca growing areas to the east of the Andean Ridge.

Using the first CN Brigade as a baseline, we will profit from our lessons learning in order to train, equip and provide infrastructure for the second CN Brigade. The second CN Brigade will be made up of four battalions of approximately 1,700 troops. U.S. Special Operations Forces Detachment Alphas made up of approximately 60 personnel per deployment will train one battalion per quarter. If resourced, the second CN Brigade Staff will be trained during the first quarter. All of this training will continue to emphasize professionalism and human rights requirements. Estimated training cost is about $12 million. The State Department will provide weapons, ammunition, communications and sustainment equipment. The estimated cost for equipment and sustainment is approximately $18 million. Infrastructure requirements and cost will be determined once training and operational sites are identified.

Helicopters

Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to the first CN Brigade using 33 UH-1Ns withand a combination of Colombian and Department of State contracted and Colombian pilots. The UH1N aircraft are based in Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are forward deployed to Larandia for operations. Last year, the UH-1Ns flew over 10,000 flight hours in direct support of Joint Task Force South CN operations, moving over 26,700 soldiers and 261 tons522,000 lbs of cargo. The current operational focus remains providing air mobility support for Joint Task Force South counterdrug eradication missions in Colombia.

Our training and logistics programs are on track to provide greatly enhanced air mobility capability to the Colombian Army.

All fourteen UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the Colombian military werehave been delivered by December 2001. The first 6 of the 25 Plan Colombia Huey II aircraft arrived in March 2002. Based onUnder the current delivery schedule, we expect the remaining 19 Huey II helicopters to be delivered by the end of September 2002.

Department of Defense training programs specifically designed to fulfill the requirement for trained Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs, and maintenance personnel for to crew and maintain the Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters are currently underway and progressing well in Colombia and in the United States.. In addition to training pilots, crew chiefs, and maintenance personnel will also be trained.

This has been a real success story: Colombian Air Force Instructor Pilots under the quality control of an U.S. Army Technical Assistance Field Team are training Colombian Army pilots in the Blackhawk transition and the Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) courses. The night vision training, advanced or readiness level progression training, and the Huey II transition are is being executed through a DOD contract in Colombia. Crew cChiefs are being trained in Spanish, both in the United States and Colombia. The various special aviation and avionics maintenance training is conducted in Army schools in the United States. The Plan Colombia Blackhawk pilot and crew training will be complete in July. The first IERW course is in progress and Huey II transition will commence this month with a projected completion of Colombian Army pilots and crews for the 25 Huey IIs by mid 2004late 2003xxxxx. The long pole in the aviation training is the CONUS specialized maintenance training, which will last through 20034 due to the extensive technical courses and the limited throughput possible. As such, contractor logistics support will be required throughout this entire period.

Our training and logistics programs are on track to provide greatly enhanced air mobility capabilit y to the Colombian Army. We must continue to follow through with support toward the end goal of full operation of this capability.

Riverine Capability

For much of Colombia, the rivers are the highways. Consequently, the Consequently, a critical element of our support to Colombia has been the training of the Colombian Riverine units Through the funding provided under Section 1033 authority, the Department of Defense has been able to resource and train to an ever expanding capability in to assist in their the Colombian Mariness as they attempt to control the vast amount of waterways throughout Colombia. The main objective of creating this capability has been to interdict the pre-cursor chemicals used in cocaine production that have traditionally been moved along Colombia’s rivers. It is estimatedAn estimated that 60 to 70 percent of these pre-cursors reach the coca growing areas byvia the rivers. The Colombian Marines have had some success in this endeavor, while demonstrating the capability to tran sport the first CN Brigade to riverside labs and also protecting river convoys carrying building materials to Tres Esquinas. Colombia’s The overall goal ofor thisour training, equipping, and infrastructure plan is to create 53 riverine combat elements. TheyColombia currently hashave 30 riverine combat elements comprising five riverine battalions. This is a, and we feell it is crucial initiative towards overall security in the countrysideto continue our efforts toward our stated goal.

rivers are the only means of transportation and commercial communication. As a result, an integral part of our support to Colombia has been the training and equipping of the Colombian Riverine forces. The goal of the Riverine Forces is to permit the Colombian government to exercise sovereignty throughout the vast regions where other governmental entities are otherwise absent. Colombia’s plan is to establish controls at critical river junctures along its borders and throughout the heartland of the country. The plan includes establishment of 58 riverine combat elements, with support structures, at these critical river nodes. The operational objective of the Riverine Forces is to establish control over the riverine transportation network and interdict illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals used in the production of cocaine.

To date five riverine battalions, composed of thirty riverine combat elements, have been deployed and are operating throughout Colombia. These riverine combat elements have successfully supported the operations of the first CN brigade in destroying riverside labs and by providing convoy security for building material used to construct the Tres Esquinas airbase. Furthermore, these riverine units have established the first continuous presence of the Colombian government in areas previously abandoned to control of narco-terrorists organizations. Continued support to complete the fielding of the remaining riverine combat elements and establishment of a self-sustaining training capability are high priorities in our strategy for the future.

Engineer Projects

Extensive projects are underway in Larandia to support the CN Brigade and associated helicopters. They include helicopter pads, a fueling system, maintenance hangar and storage warehouse, operations building, control tower, and an ammo storage facility with arm/disarm pads. The first helicopterport projects will be completed later this year, with the overall construction complete in 2003. Other projects at Larandia include additional barracks for both counter narcotics and Aaviation brigade personnel, a counter narcotics brigade headquarters facility, and a supply warehouse. These support projects will be complete later this year also. Extensive projects are underway in Larandia to support the CN Brigade and associated helicopters. Many of these facilities will be completed later this year. At Tres Esquinas (a forward operating site in Southern Colombia), construction was recently completed on the riverine facilities, an A-37 ramp, and taxiway. The remaining projects at Tres Esquinas (runway extension and Schweitzer hanger) are in progress with completions also scheduled for later this year. (CHECK WITH J3)The riverine base at El Encanto (forward base in Southern Colombia) and the riverine maintenance facility at Nueva Antioquia are complete. However, tThe airfield runway improvements at Marandua remain unfounded; this airfield will be critical to supporting operations in Eastern Colombia. The military base and improvement projects, which we have funded and overseen, have effectively enabled the Colombian military to expand its influence over the coca growing areas of Putumayo and Caqueta. We must follow these successes with further planned airfield upgrades and infrastructure to support the second CN Brigade.

Additionally, we continue to improve our infrastructure at the Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Manta, Ecuador. Last year, operations at the FOL ceased for six months while we made runway improvements. The current construction for living quarters and maintenance facilities will be completed in June 2002. The infrastructure upgrades for the FOL at Curacao are in progress, but Aruba remains unfunded. The Manta FOLS are is critical to our source zone counterdrug operations and provides coverage in the transit zone eastern Pacific where we have seen the greatest increase in drug smuggling activity. The infrastructure upgrades for the FOL at Curacao are in progress, but Aruba remains unfunded.

Professionalism and Human Rights

We have witnessed a steady improvement in the professionalism and respect for human rights and the rule of law by the Colombian military, accompanied by increased effectiveness in counterdrug operations. The increase in professionalism starts with the continued professional military education, and the confidence gained by technical proficiency, through training and resources available for operations.

Our legal assistance projects in Colombia, which include developing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) school as well as legal and human rights reform, continue on track. We have worked closely with the Colombian military to establish and build a Military Penal Justice Corps. The initial JAG school courses began in February 2002 for 60 judge advocates and clerks in temporary facilities. The Department of State recently approved funding for the construction of a permanent JAG facility, and we expect completion in July 2003.

Human Rights

In the area of human rights, United States Southern Command and human rights international organizations have has supported Colombian efforts to extend human rights training throughout its ranks. Additionally, we sponsor opportunities for the continued exchange of information on human rights issues, such as: . We a recently held a Human Rights Seminar with 60 Colombian media and international representatives,, which was lauded for its part in bridging an existing with the Colombian military. We also began conducting bimonthly hHuman rRights roundtables involving representatives from svarious sectors everal levels of Colombian society, incorporating human rights in every training initiative, and . Moreover, we have begun to sponsor advanced education programs. This summer, twenty students from the Armed Forces, National Police, Ministry of Defense, and Commanding General's office will receive specialty degrees in International Humanitarian Law.

I am convinced the military leadership in Colombia is firmly committed to human rights and is taking action ton any reports of wrongdoing. They have suspended officers and noncommissioned officers for acts of wrongdoing and have stepped up their operations against illegal defense forces.

In fact, in a short period of time, the Colombian military has emerged as one of the most respected and trusted organizations in Colombian society. FewerLess than three percent of complaints of human rights abuses last year were attributed to the Colombian Security Forces, down from a high of 60 percent just a few years ago. There have been zero allegations of human rights abuses against the U.S. trained counter narcotics drug brigade.

However, there is more work to be done throughout the Colombian military and we have shown in the first counter narcotics brigade that our training has made a difference. We would expect a second counter narcotics brigade to follow this human rights record.

Further, President Pastrana’s decision on February 23 to suspend the FARC’s "safe haven" and reoccupy the area was the right move from a military perspective. The FARC was using the "safe haven" as an area to support their drug trafficking operations, launch terrorist attacks, and recruit and train their forces. The Colombian military has aggressively initiated operations to occupy the area. We have also received increased requests of support from the Government of Colombia.

This is a success story that often gets overlooked. The Government of Colombian military should publicizeneeds to tell the story about what the military isthey are doing and take credit for the accomplishments they have attained. This progress reflects a strong and principled leadership and the genuine desire of the Colombian military to honor and promote democratic principles in their country.

Current Initiatives

Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 Andean Counterdrug Initiative

The Department of State’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative is designed to sustain and expand programs funded by the FY 20002 emergency supplemental. It addresses potential production, processing, and distribution spillover due to successful Plan Colombia execution. Since the beginning of 2001, we have been working with the Department of State to help develop, prioritize, and validate requirements for partner nation militaries. In each case, although still counterdrug focused, we are seeking to sustain the military contacts focused on professionalization of the armed forces and the specific challenges and security needs within available resources.

AIn FY 2002, approximately $100 million of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative will be allocated to support the Colombian military. This funding will be used to sustain the capabilities initiated under the FY 2000 supplemental appropriation, particularly in the areas of training and aviation support for the first CN Brigade, riverine programs, and the Colombia military legal reform program. Additionally, the Department of State’s FY 2003 request includes funding to continue sustainment of the existing CN Brigade and funding for the training and equipping of a second CD Brigade.

Second Counter Narcotics Brigade

Based on the success of the first CN Brigade, the AdministrationU.S. government is supporting Colombia’s request to train and equip a second CN Brigade in FY 2003 for employment elsewhere within the country. The existing CN Brigade has been successful in forcing the drug traffickers to move their operationsHCL labs outside of the Putumayo and Caqueta departments. A second CD Brigade will enable the Colombians to pursue those HCL labs and attack the other main coca growing areas to the east of the Andean Ridge or elsewhere in the country.

Using the first CN Brigade as a baseline, we will profit from our experience in to training and equipequipping the second CN Brigade. The second CN Brigade will be made up of approximately 1,700 troops. If approved, using U.S. Special Operations Forces, we could t will train one battalion per quarter, commencing with . If resourced, the second CN Brigade Staff will be trained during the first quarter. This training will continue to emphasize professionalism and human rights requirements. The equipment will include weapons, ammunition, and communications equi pment. The cost for training and equipping the second CN Brigade will be approximately $30 millionM(J-3/J-5 provide). Additionally, the Department of State’s FY 2003 request includes funding to continue sustainment training of the existing CN Brigade.

(NEED TO CONFIRM WITH J5 ON FUNDING FOR SECONFY 2003 Infrastructure Security Strategy

In addition to counterdrug assistance, the Administration has proposed to Congress $98 million, for FY 2003, to help Colombia to enhance the training and equipping of units to protect the Caño Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, one of the most vulnerable elements of their economic infrastructure. The FARC and ELN are active in carrying out attacks against Colombia’s energy infrastructure. Attacks on the Caño Limon-Covenas pipeline cost the Government of Colombia more than $40 million per month in revenues when the pipeline is not operational. During the past yearDuring 2001, the pipeline was offline for more than 266 days. In addition, the amount of oil spilled during these attacks is eleven timeseleven times greater than the horrific Exxon Valdez spill, creating significant environmental damage several years ago.

The Administration has included $6 million in the FY 2002 Supplemental to begin the training. The first unit to be trained for this program will be training will initially be given to the Arauca-based and recently human rights vetted, Arauca-based Colombian Army 18th Brigade. Subsequent units to be trained for infrastructure security include Follow-on training will be provided for the 5th Mobile Brigade, designated Colombian National Police units, and Colombian Marines. The Colombian units will also be equipped with weapons and ammunition, vehicles, night vision devices, and communications equipment, as well as a helicopter tactical lift capability for a company-sized quick reaction force.

If approved, this training will assist the Colombians to exertreclaim effective sovereignty dominance in the Arauca Department, where these attacks primarily occur. Through a comprehensive strategy of reconnaissance and surveillance, offensive and quick reaction operations, the Colombian military will be better able to mitigate the debilitating economic and financial effects of constant attacks on critical infrastructure.

Challenges

Despite extensive eradication in the source zone and successful interdiction in the transit zone, cocaine supply continues to exceed demand. Although Colombia and other partner nations are willing to work with us to counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations are beyond the capabilities of their thinly stretched security forces.

United States counterdrug assistance to security forces helps Colombia and other nations in the region develop more effective counterdrug capabilities; however, drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations in reaction to counterdrug efforts. These small, efficient, and well-financed drug trafficking organizations will rapidly change the place of production, transport routes, points of transshipment, and markets when eradication or interdiction programs achieve success.

Although in the past few years the Colombian military has emerged as a much more capable and professional force, they lack the resources, manpower, and mobility, to reestablish a safe and secure environment throughout the country. With Colombia’s narco terrorists increasingly supporting themselves through drug trafficking, it is increasingprogressivelly more difficult for the security forces to sustainestablish a secure n enenvironment that allows protects U.S. national security interests; for democratic institutions to fully function, permits and; for political, economic, and social reforms to take hold,. and reduces It also limits Colombia’s ability to ; and to prohibitreduce the s destabilizing spillover into neighboring countries.

In addition to combating the FARC and its current terror campaign, the Colombian Military must contend on a daily basis with the conventional and terrorist attacks by the ELN and AUC, as well as the drug trafficking organizations. This requires not only the continuous conduct of military and counterdrug operations, but the protection of population centers, critical infrastructure to include electrical towers and power gridplants, communication towers and facilities, the oil pipelines, dams, roads and bridges. Also, for any type of elections to take place, the Colombian military must devote significant resources and manpower to protect candidates and polling stationssecure the Presidential election process.

Way Ahead

Although we have seen great progress through the military portion of the first year of Plan Colombia, the Colombian military still lacks the wherewithal to create a safe and secure environment in Colombia. As mentioned previously, fundamental security and stability are necessary for the Ggovernment of Colombia to remain a viable, legitimate government and for other supporting programs to succeed. The extent of support and the conditions under which we are willing to provide it is a necessary next step in determining what we can do.

U.S. Our support to the Colombian military is currently restricted to support for counterdrug operations. We are restricted in providing counterrorism support with our counterdrug-funded assets. WWe are further limitedhampered by restrictions on sharing non-counterdrug information withto the Colombians. The Colombians are also limited in their use of U.S. provided counterdrug-funded equipment, such as the Plan Colombia helicopters. If enacted, t The Administration’s FY 2002 supplemental request to expand our authorities in Colombia will if enacted will provide some relief by lifting these restriction for future United States funded equipment, assets, and programs for Colombia.

We support reinstating the Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia and Peru as an effective means to interdict the flow of drugs, arms and contraband. In the past, this program was very successful in breaking down a critical network of conveyance for the drug traffickers. Further more, we know that arms traffickers smuggle weapons to the FARC byvia the airways. By incorporating the recommendations of the Beers and Busby reports, we can safely resume U.S. support to the air bridge denial operations and reinforce our commitment to partner nations.

As we look to the future, we need to ensure that our efforts are focused on fighting terrorism throughout this hemisphere and on preserving and stabilizing Colombia’s democracy. The problem in Colombia is not just about drugsT hese efforts require that we move beyond a counterdrug-focused strategy. In my judgment, a Policy reviews, athe ’s

.-provi ded,the United States mayshould consider

Foreign Military Financing

Security Assistance Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is an important element of the U.S. national security strategy that fosters and supports cooperative security arrangements. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program has been essential to the effort of professional military education and professionalization of the militaries of the region. We appreciate the continued congressional support of this valuable program.

Although military expenditures in the region are the lowest in the world, Latin American and Caribbean militaries do have legitimate defense sustainment and modernization requirements. WAs we needincorporate the assistance of partner nations in both regional cooperation and in protecting their own borders against fighting terrorism and other terrorism and other transnational threats. ; Foreign Military Financing (FMF), F MF is the primarya critically important source of equipment and training for resource strapped countries. AdditionallyMost importantly, much of the U.S. provided military equipment and capability throughout the region requires funding for sustainment and would benefit from modernization.

Against these requirements, Latin America and the Caribbean received less than one-tenth of one0.1 percent of the annual worldwide FMF program, which although an increase over previouslast years, was just $8.7 million. This allocation is not sufficient to cover the sustainment of the aircraft and other equipment previously provided to our regional partners, much less even address the prospect of modernization or new initiatives. In light of the security cooperation requirements that exist, the United States has not provided substantive security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade,; and this is a region of vital significance to the United States in terms of demographics, trade, natural resources, and proximity.

There may be a perception that the FY 2000 Plan Colombia Emergency Supplemental and the FY 2002 Andean Counterdrug Initiative and the FY2002 Andean Counterdrug Initiative fully satisfies the requirements for Colombia and neighbor militaries. While these programs are essential, especially for Colombia, theyre are not concentrated on military assistance, and the assistance provided is counterdrug related.

It Lack of FMF fundingalso limits our ability to influence the direction and scope of regional military modernization and enlist the full cooperation of partner nations. LikewiseFurther, it limits the capabilities of the militaries within the region to assume a more active role in security cooperation against transnational threats, disaster response, and peacekeeping. Other country source?

We continue to work with the Department of State in support of the FMF program.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Our global war on terrorism continues to reinforce the critical role that a comprehensive ISR posture plays in any operational environment, whether home-based or abroad. Secretary Rumsfeld noted in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review that: "We cannot and will not know precisely where and when America’s interests will be threatened..." His observation is particularly applicable to the Southern Command area of responsibility, where threats take many forms and are often ambiguous. These threats present a range of intelligence challenges – from tracking terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations of the Andean Ridge in Colombia to monitoring international criminal and terrorist activities throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

The restrictions placed on the use of certain collection assets exacerbate the constraints inherent to the limited availability of intelligence resources in our area of responsibility. Today, mostany of the intelligence assets allocated to Southern Command are funded from counterdrug appropriations. Therefore, the employment of these scarce assets is further restricted to supporting only counterdrug operations or force protection of those involved with counterdrug activities. AlsoFurther, our access agreements on the Forward Operating Locations of Manta, Ecuador, Aruba and Curacao, and Comalapa, El Salvador restrict operations from the FOLs to counterdrug only.

. ; limiting and at times confusing our ability to assist the Colombians battle terrorists and guerillas.

Our ability to assistexecute effectiveinfluence operations in Colombia is also further llimitedhampered by restrictions on sharing data. We are prohibited from providing intelligence that may be construed as counterinsurgency related. For the operator, it is very difficult to distinguish between the FARC as a drug trafficking organization and the FARC as a terrorist organization with our partner nations. We need to streamline sharing procedures that are currently used for time sensitive intelligence information to allow the Colombians to act as threats emerge. . Like other unified commands, we are developing information-sharing networks that will allow us to combat asymmetric and other specific threats in our region more effectively. The South American Net, the Caribbean Information Sharing Network, and the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System are all prime examples of initiatives that enable us to share certain types of information expeditiously; but we must do more.

and the FARC as a insurgenctinsurgent organization. In my opinion, we have tried to impose artificial boundriesboundaries where one no longer ne exists.

Way Ahead

Although we have seen great progress through the military portion of Plan Colombia, the Colombian Military still lacks the resources to create a safe and secure environment in Colombia. As mentioned previously, fundamental security and stability are necessary for the government of Colombia to remain a viable, legitimate government and for other supporting programs to succeed. The extent of support and the conditions under which we are willing to provide it is a necessary next step in determining what we can do.

Our support to the Colombian military is currently restricted to support for counter drug operations. We are restricted in providing counterrorism support with our counterdrug funded assets. We are further hampered by restrictions on sharing non-counterdrug information to the Colombians. The Colombians are also limited in their use of U.S. provided counterdrug-funded equipment, such as the Plan Cololmbia helicopters.

As we look to the future, we need to ensure that our efforts are focused on fighting terrorism throughout this hemisphere and expanding our efforts to preserve and stabilize Colombia’s democracy. These efforts require that we move beyond a counterdrug-focused strategy. Policy reviews, additional assistance for infrastructure security and combating terrorism, intelligence sharing, and increased security assistance are examples of expanded support for the Government of Colombia that should be considered. The Administration’s Infrastructure Security Strategy allows us to step beyond our counterdrug assistance and I fully support its execution.

Conclusion

In summary, the United States Southern Command remains committed to providing the assistance needed by Colombia and other partner nations in the region within Congressional authority. We continue to execute operations and activities to enhance the region’s militaries, advance democracy, promote regional security, support hemispheric cooperation, foster economic opportunities, promote peace, sustain freedom, and encourage prosperity. AdditionallyFurther, we will continue to prioritize these activities in areas that offer the greatest leverage for protecting and advancing United States regional and global interests.

We recognize the dangerous nature of hostile activities that threaten the stability, security, and economic development within these countries. We clearly recognize the existence of a terrorist threat within our hemisphere as profits from illicit drug trafficking fuel terrorist activity that can ultimately have national security implications for the United States and the hemisphere. United States Southern Command will continue to seek every opportunity to resource, plan, and combat terrorism and other transnational threats within the region to ensure our national security and win this war .

While SouthCom’s Southern Command’s priority since September 11 has been on the planning and coordination necessary to execute the global war on terrorism, everything we are doing in Colombia and in the region supports that end.we continue to dedicate significant efforts and resources to Colombia and its neighbors. Our efforts in Colombia are not only to fight drugs but also to save democracy in that country and promote security and stability in the Andean Region.

Although in the past few years the Colombian military has emerged as a much more capable and professional force, they lack the resources, manpower, airlift and mobility, to reestablish a safe and secure environment throughout the country. To win this war, we must provide Colombia with more than counterdrug assistance. We must provide Colombians with the assistance necessary to establish a safe and secure environment within their own borders.

Your continued support will help to ensure the stability of Colombia and safeguard U.S. national security interests throughout the Latin America and the Caribbean against the transnational threats that concern us all. Thank you for providing me this opportunity to discuss these issues with you today. Andean Region. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

- Without security and stability, virtually all other programs of assistance remain in jeopardy.

- Recently, the United States Government has received increased numbers of requests for support from the Government of Colombia.

- We appreciate the support of the United States Congress in providing us the necessary resources to effectively train and equip the CN Brigade.

Latin American and Caribbean countries are of growing strategic importance to the United States. We recognize the insidious nature of hostile activities that threaten the stability, security and economic development within these countries. We clearly recognize the existence of a terrorist threat within our hemisphere as profits from illicit drug trafficking fuel terrorist activity that can ultimately have national security implications for the United States. United States Southern Command will continue to seek every opportunity to resource, plan, and combat terrorism within the region to ensure for our national security and win this war.

Your continued support to provide resources to Colombia and its neighboring countries will ensure that this region remains stabile. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

As of April 12, 2020, this document was also available online at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/spee0411.htm