Transcript of hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, April 24, 2002

PANEL ONE OF A HEARING OF THE SENATE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: FUTURE U.S. RELATIONS WITH COLOMBIA
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR CHRIS DODD (D-CT)
WITNESSES: MARC GROSSMAN, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; AND MAJOR GENERAL GARY D. SPEER, ACTING COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND


SEN. DODD: Good morning. The subcommittee will come to order. Senator Chafee is on his way and so we'll start with -- I'll make a short opening statement, and if he comes in before I complete, we'll move to Senator Chafee's opening statement, and any other colleagues who may arrive, and then we'll get to you, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Rodman and General as well, General Gary (sic), want to hear from you as well.
I just wanted to make note this morning that Senator Helms is in the hospital. Nothing -- it's serious, obviously, if he's in the hospital, but the possibility of some open-heart surgery. And I wouldn't want to begin a hearing here in this room this morning without expressing for myself, and I'm sure everyone else who knows Senator Helms and has worked with him over the years, our strong, fervent hope that he come out of this well, that he return as soon as possible to his duties. And he should know that all of us are thinking about him and is in our prayers and thoughts.

Jesse and I have had some real battles over the years on various things, but there's no finer gentleman that I've ever served with, and we have our disagreements, but never disagreeable. And so he has my fervent prayers and hopes that he'll be returning to us soon. It won't be the same around here; I have to have a good argument with him from time to time. So I wish he (sic) well, and Dot -- Dot should know we're all thinking of her as well.

Well, I thank everyone for coming this morning to this subcommittee hearing: U.S.-Colombian Policy: What's Next? For those of you who follow this at all, we had a hearing a few days ago on U.S.-Mexican relations. Today we deal with Colombia. And my hope is over the coming weeks we're going to deal with the other issues in the Americas that deserve, I think, our sort of review and attention.

A lot has happened in the region in the last number of years that point us in a direction that was not as optimistic as it was when we used to have hearings and talk about the fact that there was only one nation in the Americas that didn't have a democratically elected government. And today, while there are still strong democratic institutions in the region, there are mounting storm clouds on the horizon -- the economic difficulties in Argentina, the problems economically in Brazil, the obvious problems we saw recently in Venezuela, the difficulties in Colombia that we're talking about today and how that spills over into neighboring countries in the Andean regions.

There are trade agreements that are outstanding that need to be addressed, tremendous poverty still in Central America, the natural disasters that have devastated that part of the world, the historic and continuing relationship between the United States and Mexico.

I know a great deal of attention, obviously, is on the Middle East, and rightfully so; a great deal of attention, obviously, in the war against terrorism, and rightfully so, obviously. But in the midst of all of this, the United States, of course, has a continuing and important set of interests that need to be addressed and watched on a very continuing basis in the Americas.

And so I thought it would be worthwhile to have a set of hearings, in the midst of all of this, to go and see where are. And obviously, in the issue of Colombia, this is going to be one of the major debates in the Congress as to how we proceed from here, with a change of administrations coming shortly in Colombia, with the departure of President Pastrana, who cannot succeed himself in that country, who's done a remarkable job, in my view, as the president of the country, determined from the very beginning to try and bring peace to his nation, and has achieved a great deal. I should not consider -- his administration, because they didn't resolve ultimately all the issues, it should not be seen as not having succeeded. He has moved the ball forward, and any successor of his is going to have to pick up on those efforts and move forward with them.

And so I'll be very interested this morning in hearing from the administration and other witnesses as to where we go from here and what are the pitfalls, the kind of problems are faced. There are dozens and dozens of questions that I know we all ask ourselves, let alone ask each other about. And so I'm looking forward this morning to the testimony from the administration and others as to how we can work closely together here in formulating and framing a policy that will serve first and foremost the interests of our own country, but obviously as well Colombia and its neighbors in the region.

So today the committee will hold its second hearing in a series of hearings to assess the challenges to democracy in the Western Hemisphere and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in responding to those challenges. This morning, as I've said, we're going to focus on U.S.- Colombian policy. The hearing has been -- appropriate, I think -- titled "U.S.-Colombian Policy: What's Next?"

Colombia's democracy is in crisis. That's to state the obvious. And it didn't happen overnight. Colombia's civil society has been ripped apart for decades by having one of the most violent societies in Western Hemisphere, despite also having one of the longest records of democracy in the hemisphere. Historically, Colombian civil leaders, judges, politicians have put their lives in jeopardy simply by aspiring to positions of leadership and responsibility.

The introduction of illicit-drug cultivation and production has only heightened further this climate of violence in Colombia. Despite fears that must be pervasive in every Colombian's heart, tens of thousands of men and women have allowed and still allow their names to appear on electoral ballots in election after election. These are truly courageous people who deserve our respect and complete admiration for their willingness to stand up and to fight for democracy in their communities throughout Colombia.

Two years ago I supported U.S. efforts to become partners with the Pastrana administration's efforts to address Colombia's problem. I said at that time that I believed that it was critically important that we act expeditiously on the Plan Colombia assistance package because our credibility was at stake with respect to responding to a genuine crisis in our own hemisphere. We also needed to make good on our pledge to come to the aid of President Pastrana and the people of Colombia in their hour of crisis, a crisis that has profound implications for institutions of democracy in Colombia, throughout this hemisphere, and right here at home, as well.

No one I know claims that things have dramatically turned around in Colombia since the U.S. endorsed Plan Colombia and began providing significant resources to support its implementation. Narcotraffickers, in concert with right- and left-wing paramilitary organizations, continue to make large portions of the country ungovernable. Until recently, their activities were restricted to sparely populated rural areas of the nation, places where government order and services had never existed. Now, with the end of the FARC government peace process and in an effort to disrupt upcoming elections, the FARC is increasingly focused on urban areas, especially critical economic infrastructures in the nation.

Nor have these threats to Colombia's democracy remained within its borders. The ill effects are being felt by all of Colombia's neighbors -- Ecuador; Colombia, obviously; Peru; Bolivia; Venezuela; Panama and Brazil. Colombia's problems are having a profound impact on the stability and security of the entire region, yet there is little or no sustained regional support for Colombia's efforts to deal with the narcoterrorist threat. This is very difficult to understand and is deeply, deeply disappointing to this member of the United States Senate that we have not seen more interest and cooperation from the neighboring countries in the Andean region on this issue.

The Bush administration has decided that our current policy is too narrowly focused to counternarcotics cooperation, and is seeking to loosen restrictions on past and future assistance. What the administration has not done yet, in my view, is to clearly describe what our stake is in Colombia, what changes are needed to the current policy, and what we hope to achieve by making these changes. The administration needs to describe whether and how they will mobilize regional support for our policy. Nor has the administration, in my view, outlined the costs and benefits of our deeper involvement in this issue. I'm certainly open to considering changes to our existing policy, but I want to know with more specificity what those changes are and how they're going to make things better not only for Colombia and the region but also for United States interests.

I hope that in the course of this morning's proceedings that we will hear the administration's rationale for seeking the loosening of restrictions on past and future aid to Colombia, to examine the state of the ongoing conflict in that nation, assess the effectiveness of current counternarcotics programs, and scrutinize the human rights situation.

I mentioned earlier the kind of numbers and statistics over the last 15 years in Colombia, and I know I've cited these on many occasions. But I think they deserve being repeated over and over again to make the point. We've seen more than 200 bombs exploded in Colombian cities, including one recently against president -- presidential candidates. The archbishop of Cali was murdered. An entire democratic party was assassinated. Four-thousand people were wiped out in one political party as part of the violence in Colombia. A Colombian senator and her aide, Martha Daniels, were assassinated. Ingrid Betancourt has been kidnapped -- a candidate for the presidency of Colombia. Four presidential candidates have been executed, assassinated. Two-hundred judges and investigators have been killed, assassinated. One half of Colombia's supreme court was wiped out by terrorist activity. Twelve-hundred police officers, 151 journalists and 300,000 ordinary citizens have been displaced in the process. Forty candidates running for municipal office in the last election were either kidnapped or killed in Colombia, give you some idea of the magnitude of this problem that goes on in that nation. It is staggering -- the numbers -- when you think of it, what's occurred in just 15 years of violence in Colombia.

(At any rate/Anyway ?), those numbers, as I say, I've repeated them often, but I think for those who may not be -- or maybe what's occurred in Colombia in recent years give you some idea the magnitude of civil unrest and civil violence in the nation. But (at any rate/anyway ?) I welcome the witnesses here this morning. I thank them immensely for their willingness to be here and to participate in this important hearing and before turning to them, we've been joined by my colleague from Rhode Island, the ranking member of this subcommittee and someone who cares deeply about the region.

And Senator Chafee, any opening comments you may have.

SEN. LINCOLN CHAFEE (R-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Sorry for my tardiness.

My own thoughts on Colombia are that it's important that we keep a sense of how the public, themselves, in Colombia feeling about the violence. And it's, of course, been four decades; on and on it goes. And I think as it first started, perhaps it was a movement against -- I think what one of the insurgents called "the rancid oligarchy." But my sense now is that that has changed, and the public opinion's opposed to the insurgents, both right-wing and left-wing. And I think that's important for our experience, as how much United States is going to get involved and the experience we've had -- some good, not so -- some not so good in Southeast Asia and Somalia and some other places around the world.

And my cousin is married to a Colombian, and he -- my cousin's husband Guillermo (sp) writes to me occasionally. And just got a letter last night saying that as he wrote the thoughts to me, a car bomb exploded. And as the chairman mentioned, all the violence throughout the country -- this particular bomb was in his parents' home town. And as he said, "My parents, who are in their 80s, have walled themselves in their own home for fear of the wave of bombings." It's just an -- a situation that cries out for civilized countries to come to their aid. And I think that we do have a role to play, and the key is whether the citizens, themselves, in Colombia want our intervention or not and whether we can -- even the short term or the long term -- bring some kind of stability to that good country.

SEN. DODD: Very good. Excellent statement. And if you'd like to -- we'll make that letter part of the record unless there are parts of it you'd live included in the record and we do that.

SEN. CHAFEE: Yes. I would like to make it part of the record. I'll amend parts of it.

SEN. DODD: Thank you. (Inaudible.) (Laughter.)

SEN CHAFEE: I don't think the public will be interested in some of the personal -- (laughter).

SEN. DODD: But then again, they might be. You never know -- (inaudible.)

Well, thank you.

Marc, we appreciate your being here. And I don't know how you want to proceed. You mentioned to me you wanted to make a statement -- a broader statement and then supporting statements from your two colleagues, and if that's the way you'd like to proceed, then we'll do that. And let me -- and I'll make this by -- this apply to all of your witnesses, but any data, materials, maps, supporting material you'd like to have as part of this permanent record will be included in the record.

And so I am going to put a clock on here, but I don't want you to feel required to live by this -- just to give you some sense. And let's make it -- why don't we make it eight minutes or so here, and if you need longer time, obviously take it -- but to give some sense of what the time is like. Thank you for being here.

MR. GROSSMAN: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me first of all join you, and I am sure all of us on the panel here, in also wishing Senator Helms the very best. We were surprised and shocked to hear about his entry into the hospital this morning, and we join you very much in saying, especially in this room at this time, that we hope he'll be back with us soon.

I also want to thank you very much for allowing us to put a longer statement, maybe some maps and charts in the record. That would help us very much. I also want to thank you and Senator Chafee both for your opening statements. I appreciate what you say. We have a hard job to do. There are very hard questions here, that as you say, we ask ourselves and you ask yourselves. And I hope that this hearing and this conversation will help you understand a little bit better where we have come out, and also move this process forward.

And, Senator Chafee, I agree with you also very much that this is a time when civilized countries really need to come to the aid of Colombia, and I think that was very well said.

Senator, if I could get this down to one sentence, one bullet, it is that Colombia matters to the United States. You both made that point I think extremely well. I also want to say that Colombia has been a key partner in our effort to try to help Colombia as they deal with these issues of narcotrafficking, underdevelopment, human rights abuses and terrorism.

I also want to say that many members of this committee and the subcommittee have traveled to Colombia. And we very much appreciate that effort that people make to travel. And for those who were considering travel, I hope that they will go, because the United States Senate and the United States Congress has a big impact in making your points in Colombia as well.

If I also might just start out, if I could, senator, by paying tribute to the tremendous men and women who represent the United States of America in Colombia. They do a great job. They have great leadership under Ambassador Ann Patterson. And all of the people who are there, civilian or military, I think deserve our support for a very difficult job that they undertake.

I also can't pass up the opportunity, senator, if you'd allow me, to just make a pitch for the Andean Trade Preferences Act, and hope that the Senate will find a way to renew it soon --

SEN. DODD: I hope so too. I think it's outrageous we've taken so long to get to it.

MR. GROSSMAN: Senator, you sent me a letter, in which you asked us to try to deal directly with what's going on in Colombia and what kind of changes we seek in the law. And on March the 21st the administration asked the Congress for new authorities. We believe that the terrorists and the narcotics threat in Colombia are linked -- they are intertwined. As President Bush and President Pastrana spoke last week when they were together, we need a strategy now about how to change the focus from counternarcotics to include counterterrorism.

If I could just deal with this upfront, as clearly as I possibly can, here's what these new authorities would allow us to do. First, we want to address the problem of terrorism in Colombia as vigorously as we are currently addressing narcotics. And, secondly, we want to help the government of Colombia address the heightened terrorist risk that has resulted from the end of the demilitarized zone.

If I could also be as clear and as upfront as I possibly can, here are the things we won't do, we are not seeking: First, we will not stop our human rights vetting of Colombian military units receiving U.S. assistance. We are committed to abiding by the Leahy Amendment. Second, we will not exceed the 400-person cap on U.S. military personnel providing training in Colombia, nor the 400-person cap on U.S. civilian contractors. We are committed to the Byrd Amendment. Third, we will not do away with the requirement in the Foreign Operations Act that the secretary of State certified on Colombian armed forces human rights records before we provide assistance to the armed forces. And, finally, we do not intend -- we will not bypass regular reprogramming requirements.

What we seek is a flexibility that will enable Colombia to use U.S.-provided helicopters and counter-drug brigade from Plan Colombia to fight terrorism. We would also be in a position, as General Speer will talk about, to provide more information to the Colombians.

Let me also be clear that as Colombians use these helicopters and this equipment, if this authority is granted, they would continue to be subject to existing Leahy restrictions. And, as I said to you before, we look very much forward to talking with you about this and debating this proposition with you.

Senator Dodd, in your introduction, you sort of contrasted where we were perhaps some years ago and where we are today in the hemisphere. And I think that we all have got to work hard to preserve this hemispheric consensus in favor of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, open markets and social progress.

I thought one of the great events of last year was the Quebec Summit, where democratically-elected heads of state and government came together and said that the goals of the hemisphere are democracy, security and prosperity. And my question is what good are these principles if they are trampled in Colombia. Colombia's democracy is under assault. And, Senator Dodd, you gave statistics that are right in line with mine -- in fact, better than mine. Colombian democracy is under assault from three terrorist groups -- from the FARC, from the AUC, from the ELN. The FARC and the AUC are involved in every single facet of narcotics trafficking, including cultivation, processing and transportation. And the income they derive from this narcotics trafficking, which we estimate to be almost $300 million a year, has been a key to their expansion. As you said, senator, they attack democracy by attacking candidates, by attacking leaders, by attacking representatives of Colombian democracy.

But they also attack Colombian democracy by bombing key infrastructure -- by bombing for example the Cano Limon oil pipeline, which cost the government of Colombia almost $500 million in lost revenue. Terrorist attacks resulted in over 3,000 Colombians killed in 2001, and another 2,856 were kidnapped. And, as you say, the FARC and the ELN and the AUC also threaten regional stability.

Those groups also threaten American interests. Since 1992, the FARC and the ELN have kidnapped 51 U.S. citizens, and murdered 10. And of course there are American victims of Colombia's violence on our streets, because Colombia supplies 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States, and is a significant source of heroin as well.

Mr. Chairman, you talked about President Pastrana's efforts and President Pastrana's great goal in Plan Colombia. He launched Plan Colombia in 1999, a $7.5 billion effort. And we believe the government of Colombia is well on its way to funding its commitment under Plan Colombia, having spent $2.6 billion for Plan Colombia projects, and another $426 million on social services and institutional development that are related to Plan Colombia. And with the strong support of the Congress since July 2000, the United States has provided Colombia with $1.7 billion in support for that plan to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism, strengthen democracy, strengthen Colombia's institutions, strengthen our effort on human rights, foster development, and mitigate the impact of violence on Colombian citizens.

We get asked a lot, you know, Does anybody give -- have we made any progress in this area? And in my statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, I have given you 11 specific examples -- sorry -- I have tried to give you 11 specific examples of where we have made progress. For example, we have delivered to the Colombian national police eight of the 11 helicopters to be provided under Plan Colombia. And the Colombian military has now received 35 of the 54 helicopters that it is programmed to receive under the plan.

The government of Colombia -- another example -- has extradited 23 Colombian nationals to the United States in 2001, which is an unprecedented level of cooperation.

SEN. DODD: You might just as a matter of comparison --

MR. GROSSMAN: I'm sorry, sir?

SEN. DODD: You might just as a matter of comparison -- President Pastrana mentioned that the other day.

MR. GROSSMAN: Right.

SEN. DODD: I forget the number he cited, but prior to his assumption to office, I think the number was --

MR. GROSSMAN: It's tiny. We have actually gotten a chart here. It's pretty graphic. And one of the reasons that we have been involved with them on such a great level -- and also their commitment to dealing with the drug problem. And I'd say I think that's quite a telling chart.

Also, we have trained, equipped and deployed the Colombian army's counternarcotics brigade, which has destroyed 818 base laboratories and 21 hydrochloride laboratories, and provided security for our aerial eradication. And most people believe this is the best trained unit in the Colombian military. We have sprayed a record number of hectares against drugs. We have funded a program that has provided protection to 1,676 Colombians whose lives were threatened, including human rights workers, labor activists and journalists. We have got an early-warning system going so that the government of Colombia hears about a potential attack from the FARC or the ELN or the AUC -- they have got a chance to go in and stop it. And that's been used 106 times over the past year. And we have also provided assistance to almost 300,000 Colombians who have been made internally displaced by this violence.

So we think in a lot of categories -- and, as I say, for the record I've given you 11 of them -- where we have really made progress since September of last year, when we started to spend money on Plan Colombia.

Alternative development. I think it's worth spending a moment here, Mr. Chairman, even though perhaps we are not the great experts in alternative development, that this remains a key part of U.S. interests and a key part of our overall effort in Plan Colombia. As you know, and everybody else who has looked at this program knows, that promoting alternative development in Colombia is not easy. The security situation makes it more difficult. The challenges of alternative development in the area in which we are working make it more difficult. And here I pay tribute to our people in Colombia and in AID who are changing the way we do alternative development. And, again, in my statement for the record I have tried to provide some details in the new way we intend to make this issue a success for the United States and for Colombia as well.

Human rights. It has got to be said -- and I want to say it as clearly as I possibly can -- that human rights concerns remain or must be a central element in our Colombia policy. When I was last in Colombia in February, I had a chance to tell President Pastrana and his senior leadership that human rights remains for us absolutely key to all of our efforts. I had the chance to say exactly the same thing to all of the presidential candidates. Army Commander General Shinseki was there a few weeks ago -- gave the same message -- and I know General Speer does as well.

We think that this human rights message that we are giving to the Colombians, and very much to the Colombian military, is having a difference. A couple of statistics. The Colombian military captured 590 paramilitary people last year, and killed 92 in combat -- eight military personnel, including two colonels, a lieutenant colonel, were charged in civilian courts with collaborating with paramilitaries, or with committing gross human rights violations in the year 2001. And a senior Colombian naval officer's career has been effectively ended because of allegations that he collaborated with the paramilitaries. So we think our message is having some effect.

Still, it's clear that too many Colombians suffer human rights abuses, and this is an area we need to continue to focus our attention on. Our view is the best way to ensure that Colombia continues to make progress in human rights is through continued U.S. engagement. One of the most interesting meetings I had, senators, when I was in Colombia in February was with a group of human rights groups. And to a person all of them said that the most important thing that we could do in Colombia was professionalize the military -- train the military so that they would have a fair and honest chance of being secure. I was really struck by this, and one of the things I think we can be most proud of is the way that vetted unit of ours operates in the field.

As I say, we have asked for new authorities. We believe those new authorities will help both President Pastrana, his successor and the United States. President Pastrana asked for help just after the 20th of February when he ended the zone. And inside our regulations and our laws, we try to provide as much help as possible. But it was in consulting with the Congress, both in the House and in the Senate, that we heard back one very important thing: people said don't stretch the definition of counternarcotics. Don't blame games with the law. So we came up and said, Fair enough -- that's a fair point, we want to stay within the law. But here's now an opportunity to test, to talk and to debate whether we want to move from just a counternarcotics mission to a counterterrorist mission. So one of the reasons that we are here, one of the reasons that we have made this proposition is that in our consultations after the 20th of February people urged us if we needed something different to come up, talk about it honestly, and ask for it straightforwardly. The new authorities recognize that terrorist and narcotics problems together threaten Colombia's security and prosperity and democracy.

Two other quick points, senator, and then I'll stop. First, the peace process. I think you've very rightly said that President Pastrana shouldn't look back on his time as a failure, because he was not able to make peace with the FARC and the ELN. We support his peace efforts, and we continue to do so. And to the extent that he can move forward on some peace process with the ELN, we will continue to support that as well.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chafee, your support will be crucial in the days ahead as we discuss our proposal for new and supplemental funding for our assistance to Colombia, as well as our '03 budget request. And as you said in your opening statement, senator, we want to work together with you to make sure that the United States has the best policy possible for Colombia, so that Colombians are not denied what we all want, which is this prosperity and security and democracy, which ought to be the consensus in this hemisphere.

So I thank you very much, sir. That was an overview. And I hope my colleagues would not abuse your time, and make the points that they want in a useful way.

SEN. DODD: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. And we are now going to hear from Peter Rodman, who is the assistant secretary for international affairs in the Department of Defense. And, Mr. Secretary, we thank you for being with us this morning.

MR. RODMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank the chairman and the Senator Chafee and the subcommittee for your courtesy to us. I too want to associate myself with the good wishes for Senator Helms.

You have my prepared statement, so I just want to speak briefly to highlight a couple of points, if I may.

We have had in the past few years a bipartisan consensus in support of Plan Colombia. And I am sure that has a lot to do with its effectiveness. We believe it has been a success. It has achieved many of its objectives. And I think our hope is in coming before you to help nurture a similar bipartisan consensus in support of the modifications in policy that we are proposing.

Plan Colombia, as Marc said -- again, I want to wholeheartedly endorse his statement of what the stakes are. Colombia is a friend, it's a democracy -- it is a country we have a huge stake in for a number of reasons. This is a friendly government that is under pressure from extremists of both left and right. We believe we have the ability to help it, and that that's something that the United States really has to do. And in fact the failure -- if Colombia fails in this present effort -- this is a disaster for the hemisphere.

The new approach that we are proposing is not a wholesale new policy; it is not a vastly expanded commitment. To some extent it is a request for some new flexibility which would in our view allow us the more effective use of many of the things we are already doing to support the Colombians, particularly in the military field.

The reason for coming before you with some new ideas is a number of things have changed in the recent period. First of all, I might mention that there may be a new understanding that we have of the nexus between narcotics and terrorism with respect to the FARC -- perhaps more awareness of this than we had in earlier periods -- and of course our sensitivity to terrorism at this moment needs no explanation.

The second major development is President Pastrana's closure of the safe haven. As Marc said, we supported him while he was conducting and committed to the diplomacy. And we also should support him now that he has come to this very fateful decision that the diplomacy wasn't working; that he had to take on the FARC. This is a very difficult and consequential decision that he has made -- a courageous decision in which in our view he needs to be supported.

The third factor I would mention is what we see as the improved performance of the Colombian military. Again, as Marc referred to not only their human rights performance -- we think their military effectiveness, their professionalism in that respect as well is evident in the last year or so. We think this is in part -- considerable part -- the product of the training and support that we have been providing. And it is this improvement in performance that encourages us to believe that additional support, and with the flexibility in the forum that we are discussing here, will indeed make a difference, and may perhaps tip the balance more decisively in favor of this friendly democracy.

So, in sum, it's a pivotal moment in Colombia, and that makes this hearing especially timely and especially important. And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. DODD: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General Speer, we thank you for your presence here this morning. General Speer is the acting commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command, located in Miami, Florida. And we appreciate your presence and your comments.

GEN. SPEER: Mr. Chairman, Senator Chafee, thank you both for the opportunity to represent United States Southern Command about this important issue as we talk about Colombia. But I'd like to first of all thank all the members of the committee, this committee certainly, for your unwavering support to United States Southern Command as we go about our business in executing the mission throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. And certainly, at this point in time, thank you all for your support of the men and women in uniform deployed around the world in the global war on terrorism and other military activities.

This committee certainly is aware of the growing importance and significance of Latin America and the Caribbean to the United States. And, Mr. Chairman, you highlighted very well the progress over the past quarter-century in the transformation to a hemisphere of democratic nations.

I'd like to give credit to the men and women of the U.S. military over that 25-year period, because I think that, to a certain degree, it's been the military presence in the mil groups, working day in, day out, with their host nation counterparts, the joint exercises and combined training, and the professional military education opportunities for foreign officers and non-commissioned officers to come to the United States and study professional military education, all of which provided U.S. military as a role model for the conduct of the military in democratic society, with respect for the rule of law, human rights and subordination to civil authority.

And this is something that we have to continue, because you rightly highlighted the challenges that we face throughout the hemisphere, the challenges of instability and corruption that stem from arms and drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration. In the backdrop of terrorism, certainly no place is more at risk than Colombia in terms of violence as a (milestone?). And as you pointed out, Colombia certainly is the linchpin for the Andean region, with potential spillover effects, not only of the violence but also of the other ill effects of corruption.

A lot has changed in Colombia since your last visit, February of 2001. At that point in time, Plan Colombia operationally was only in the second month of implementation. Now, after 15 months, Secretary Grossman highlighted the progress that we've seen, for example, with the counternarcotics brigade. It focused on the south, which that was the focus for phase one of Plan Colombia. And it's important to remember, of the six-year plan, we're only at the 15-month mark in terms of Colombia's execution of Plan Colombia.

Certainly 20 February marked a significant milestone in the landscape in Colombia with the elimination of despeje and setting aside the peace process. The Colombian military performed very well in the military reoccupation of the despeje.

Their military operations were very deliberate -- deliberate in the context that they focused their efforts on securing the five major population centers and went about their business in a way to minimize the chances for collateral civilian casualties. And they executed that very well. And it took longer than we would have liked to have seen from a military perspective, but they did it very effectively. And I only heard of three collateral casualties as a result of that entire operation, attributed to both the FARC and the military through the reoccupation.

The fact is, the military in Colombia has demonstrated tremendous progress over the past few years -- progress tactically, progress operationally, and also, Mr. Chairman, progress in human rights. The real problem in Colombia is not just about drugs, though. It's the problem of security.

You described the situation in terms of the violence that persists throughout the country. And until the government of Colombia can re-establish a safe and secure environment, using all of its security forces, the police and the military to do so, the other aspects of governance cannot take hold -- the judicial reform, the alternative development and all the other things that are necessary.

The challenge in Colombia today for the military -- as we look at the sit rep every morning, I see a number of bombings, kidnappings or civilian casualties through a variety of activities, not only the FARC but the ELN and the illegal paramilitaries. So the military challenge, on a day-to-day basis, is to try to protect critical infrastructure throughout the country. And the Colombian military leadership has identified over 18,000 specific sites that they deem as critical infrastructure that requires protection.

Additionally, they have to provide protection to the major population centers, because that's where the FARC is taking the terror campaign at the present time. In addition, they continue their support to counterdrug operations and they continue to provide support to the CNP in overall law enforcement operations in terms of providing security to allow the police to do law enforcement actions, as well as continuing to combat the FARC, the ELN and the illegal paramilitaries; in their spare time, also to try to set the conditions to preserve the electoral process for the 26th of May and the presidential election, a monumental task. They've demonstrated great progress, but the fact of the matter is they lack the resources in terms of manpower, mobility and equipment, to re-establish a safe and secure environment throughout Colombia.

And, again, Mr. Chairman, Senator, thank you for your support for SOUTHCOMM. And certainly we look forward to your continuing support as we try to address these challenges. Thank you very much.

SEN. DODD: Thank you very much, General. And let me underscore the points you made about the competency of our military personnel in the region. One of my -- my older brother Tom was an American ambassador in Uruguay and Costa Rica and would often comment to me how impressed he was with the officers associated with the embassy and others in terms of their knowledge of the language, the culture, their relationships they built within the community. He was always deeply impressed with the level of competency and knowledge. And it's something we hear about often. So we thank you as well for your efforts.

What I'll do is I'll keep a clock on ourselves up here, not that senators have a reputation for talking too much. So why don't you put it on for 10 minutes apiece here so we can complete some thoughts here with all of you.

I was going to include in the record, by the way, a report from Human Rights Watch, "Colombia Terror from All Sides" -- you may have seen this -- and include it in the record. But it points out here the terror from the FARC and the AUC. We have a tendency -- we talk about the FARC, obviously, because of their major involvement, historic, going back 40 years.

It's beginning to appear, though, that both of these organizations are achieving sort of an equilibrium in terms of balance of forces. It appears still the AUC doesn't have quite as many people in their ranks. They're growing. You're talking about, according to this report, anyway, some 11,000 people, as opposed to 17,000 in the FARC; still 11,000 in the AUC. And then you go down and look at the kidnappings and assassinations and it's -- if you switch the names, it'd be hard to distinguish the level of violence that goes on from both of these organizations.

I agree with the statement made by Senator Chafee earlier. There may have been a time when the FARC represented some social aspirations within the country. But when you hear and see the activity that goes on, even the case recently of a father who had been kidnapped and a son, a young boy, dying, and even the appeal of a Fidel Castro in a letter to the FARC to allow this father to see his dying son and denied -- in fact, they then executed the father; the boy died and the father died as well -- you begin to get some sense of what we're dealing with here.

And as you see with the AUC here -- in fact, the language of both organizations, their statements, it's pretty much similar in terms of what they do. So as we talk about this, it's going to be important, I hope, as well to keep in mind here that while the attention is on FARC, to a large extent, while we're dealing with ELN, that many of us are going to raise questions about this AUC issue. This is a growing concern.

I understand, in some ways, when people are frightened to death, literally, that they will grasp and hold on to elements that they think are going to provide some security for them. In the face of 3,700 kidnappings last year alone in the country, then you get some appreciation of what people are apt to lurch to in their desperation. But it's deeply concerning to me, and I know to many of us up here, this growing paramilitary activity doesn't seem to be abating at all here, and I'd like to have your comment on that.

Let me ask, if I can, some questions related to this. And let me begin by U.S. policy objectives, Secretary Grossman. We've all heard, and you've articulated it again this morning here, the objectives of U.S. policy in Colombia -- and I'm not quoting these exactly -- but to strengthen democracy, reduce drug production and trafficking, deal with counterterrorism, reduce the violence, promote human rights and the rule of law; sort of, I think, in one sentence all those issues, and the armed conflict, obviously.

It's a difficult question, but if you had to prioritize those goals, how would you do so? What would be your -- because that's a large order just laid out there, but there's some sense of priority how we address these questions. One leads to the other in some instances. So I wonder if you might give us some sense of priority for the administration's standpoint on those issues.

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir, let me try to do that. If I might, Senator Dodd, take up your invitation, though, to speak a little bit about this AUC-FARC business in the beginning of your comments.

First, one of the things that I hope everyone will do -- and I have worked very hard to train myself to do this -- is when we talk about terrorism in Colombia, to always talk about the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, to always use all three. I think that's a very important thing to do for American officials. I also think it sends the right signal to Colombians.

The second point I wanted to make is that I appreciate your mentioning the Human Rights Watch report. We've worked very closely with Human Rights Watch. We appreciate the information that they give us. We appreciate the fact that they also recognize that we've got to be engaged in Colombia. So we work very, very closely with them.

The third point that I would make is that one of the things that this administration did, which I think is absolutely right, was to put the AUC on the foreign terrorist list. And, in fact, if you'll remember, Secretary Powell was in Lima, Peru on the 11th of September. He was on his way to Colombia, where he hoped to be on the 12th. And on the 10th, we notified the Congress that we wanted to put the AUC on the foreign terrorist list. I think that was a very good decision. It has helped us a lot and absolutely shows where we stand on the AUC.

I think, as you do, we are all worried about the increasing numbers in the AUC and the FARC. And as you say, it shows us that getting at security is absolutely key, because, as you say, people will hold on to anything when their lives and their families and their prosperity is under attack.

It leads me to your second question. You listed exactly all of our objectives. Colombia matters to the United States. If you want to pin me down, what I would say is we've got to start with security, because security is the beginning that leads us to all the other things. I can't accomplish my goals in alternative development unless there's security.

As you very well pointed out, how can people have a real democracy when politicians and judges and mayors and governors are kidnapped and murdered? How can you really have prosperity when people are afraid to invest in Colombia, when an American company can't make an investment work on a pipeline? So I would put security at the base of this.

But, Senator, what you said was exactly right. These things are linked. I think the days are gone when you could kind of work on security Monday and Tuesday and democracy and human rights on Wednesday and Thursday and your economy on Friday and Saturday. These things are all together. And one of the things that attracts me about supporting Plan Colombia is the fact that it's multifaceted. It's not just about one thing or the other.

So I'll try to answer your question. I think you've got to get at the security question. But I don't answer it by leaving all the other things aside. Exactly as you said, they're related.

SEN. DODD: Let's focus on the security issue, then. And General Speer, let me draw you into this one as well, and the burden-sharing issue. And, again, Senator Chafee, I think, rightfully pointed out in his brief comments about to what extent can we -- we obviously know what the Colombian people are going through; the senator commenting on family members, 80-year-old people barricading themselves, basically, in their homes. And the details we've cited already cite statistically what's going on in the country.

Plan Colombia, of course, we talked about not only our commitment, which I think we've fulfilled, the financial commitments and so forth. Part of that included, of course, $4 billion over three years to be spent by the Colombians. Now, obviously their economy is suffering, and I realize they're under a lot of pressure.

I want you to -- they haven't met that goal, but I want to get some sense from you, in the midst of all of this, some expression in your analysis of where the commitment is in Colombia to address this, rather than hopefully not relying exclusively on sort of the U.S. coming in on this question.

And secondly, related to that -- and I want you to address this, General, if you can -- I'm still troubled by the fact that the Colombian legislature -- I'm told, anyway -- has not effectively dealt with the issue of conscription in the country. Do you still have a prohibition against college bound or university bound, I think the rules are, students from being conscripted into the armed forces? We've seen the problems in our country when this occurs. And obviously here, if you're talking about a nation under siege from the FARC, the AUC, the ELN, and you're excluding the elites from having to bear the burdens, then you contribute, it seems to me, to some of that dismembering of the social fabric of a country, when they see people not being treated relatively equally in this regard.

I wonder if that's going to change, what affect it's having on the -- on the ability to build the kind of support for institutions in Colombia to respond to this -- the military, the public community, rather than lurching to the AUC as a more viable and credible organization to protect their security.

Is -- my question again -- is not the absence of some of these things occurring from an institutional standpoint in fact contributing to the very point I tried to make earlier about the success of the AUC and its growing numbers and support by the civilian population? And what are we doing to try and reverse that trend so that the ranks of the AUC don't become enlarged in the coming weeks and months?

GEN. SPEER: Thank you, Senator. I guess let me go to the bottom line up front, which is even the Colombian military leadership looks to the illegal paramilitaries, the AUC, as the greater long-term threat, as they look at the challenges of dealing with the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, because of what you just talked about. It -- they have increased in numbers and for all the reasons you just described, because there are at least some people in Colombia that look to the AUC as doing something. Of course, the AUC is not concerned about the rule of law in their application of how they deal with people.

The other thing that is important to remember, though, is that the illegal paramilitaries, the AUC is also involved in the drug trade, as is the FARC and the ELN. So, in all three cases, the FARC, ELN and AUC are self-financed through drugs, extortion and kidnaping.

Now, you highlighted -- in my discussions with the Colombian military, in terms of the leadership, frankly, if they could do it, they would love for the government of Colombia to finance their total military budget and all of their demands. They really would prefer not to have to go elsewhere or ask for outside assistance. I mean, they view as a Colombian problem. And I'm giving you the military frame of reference. They view it as their responsibility, their problem, and they would hope that their country could finance all of their needs. That's not the case.

Now, the other aspect, in terms of dealing with legislation, you highlighted a problem, and that is their law in terms of not only who may be drafted and where they may serve once they're in the military, but the other aspect is the term of service. And again, this is something that we've discussed with our counterparts, and our counterparts are working within their legislative framework to try to -- try to get a change to the law.

SEN. DODD: This has been issue, though, now for several years.

GEN. SPEER: Yes sir.

SEN. DODD: And again, it's a Colombian decision, but it just seems to me as we're looking at this and how it's getting deeper involved here now -- we're going to change the law in terms of how military equipment is used, and I appreciate Secretary Grossman going down and telling me the things we're not going to do differently here, in the vetting of the human rights, the military, and so forth -- those four points you made -- but I've got this eery feeling you're going to be back here at this table next year and saying, look, it hasn't gotten better, and it may in fact have gotten worse. And so I want to get some sense from you too, where is this going, and if the financial commitments, for the obvious reasons in some cases not being met by Colombians, they're not dealing with some of these very issues, and instead of talking about 11,000 people in the AUC I'm back here next year and human rights is saying, no, those numbers now are 18,000 people.

You know, where are we going with this? I don't have too much difficulty in supporting the request you're making this year. I haven't made a firm decision on that yet, but I -- I can understand that request. So, I -- that isn't my problem this year. I'm trying to look down and saying "Where is this taking us?"

And so I'm going to get to in a minute the regional questions, but before I get to regional issues, I don't have the sense yet -- I don't have any doubt about President Pastrana's commitment. I don't have any doubt, based on the numbers I've seen here, obviously, what the people are going through. But I -- I don't have that sense yet, that there is this determined effort by the structures, Colombian structures -- the military, the political structures -- that they've come to terms with this yet. And one of the glaring pieces of evidence is they don't seem to understand yet that you -- how do I make a case of dumping U.S. dollars and equipment into a region here when you can't get college-aged kids to serve in the military, to take on the AUC and the FARC. How do I make that case? And if they won't do it in the midst of this, when do you do it? You know, that's my point, I guess. And you're making the same point. I mean, you're not disagreeing with me, but --

GEN. SPEER: No sir --

SEN. DODD: I want to take this opportunity to say to you what I hope they're getting down there, because it's awfully for Senator Chafee and I to keep coming back here despite all of these horrible statistics that we read about. And obviously, the impact here, where 50,000 people die in America every year in drug related deaths, and obviously a connection in all of this.

So, let me turn to my colleague from Rhode Island and come back to this.

SEN. LINCOLN CHAFEE (R-RI): I guess along the same lines -- thank you, Mr. Chairman -- if we are going to add -- have increased flexibility in our relations with Colombia, what is the general plan to be successful? Just looking over the border, for whatever Fujimori's faults might have been, they did have some success in Peru with their insurgents and with their narcotics issues. Is that -- is there anything to be learned from what occurred in Peru? Secretary Grossman, your boss is an advocate of the Powell Doctrine -- come in with overwhelming force to be successful. What is the general outline in order to be successful in this effort? What's it going to take? I guess I'll start with Secretary Grossman.

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, thank you very much, Senator. First, if I could say that we believe, as Peter testified, we believe that one of the reasons we feel we can be successful is the success we've had in the past. This counter-narcotics brigade that we have trained and equipped is the best military unit in the -- in Colombia. And we think that if we can get another counter-narcotics brigade, if we can train another brigade to protect the pipeline so that money could flow again to Colombians, that we could have some success. And it's because we've been successful that we believe that we can be increasingly successful.

Yes, of course there are lessons to be learned in Peru. One of the most important one, as I think our colleagues from AID would say, is it was in Peru that we've had some success also in alternative development. And the combination of moving people away from coca to something else was actually quite successful in Peru.

You refer, sir, to the Powell Doctrine -- and, of course, he's testifying someplace else in the Senate, so I'd let him speak for himself -- but I think it's very clear, and I hope I could take the opportunity to say that not one of us here is talking about U.S. troops in a combat role. We're talking about U.S. troops and U.S. forces training and equipping Colombians to do this work. And I think that goes back to the point the chairman just made, which is to say that Colombians have to more. The Colombians have to change their laws. Colombians need to take the brunt of this. But I think, as we've all tried to testify, we ought to be there to help them.

If I could just make one other point -- it's too soon to tell, perhaps, but I think that 9/11 has had a big impact on Colombians. One of the big differences between my visit there last August and a visit I made there in February was a real clear focus on this terrorism question. And the Colombians would have to speak for themselves, but I don't think President Pastrana would have come to, as Peter said, the courageous decision that he did on the 20th of February to clear out the zone had it not been for 9/11. And I hope, to both of you, that that will bring more focus for Colombians on Colombia's problem.

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you. General Speer, any additional comments on an outline of success in the region as we go forward, and make a commitment here, as Secretary Grossman said, the key word is security, and in order to achieve that amend our legislation to have increased flexibility?

GEN. SPEER: Senator, I think it's important to just review where we are today in terms of what we are allowed to do. First of all, in terms of published U.S. government policy, our work and contact with the Colombian military is predominantly focused on counter-drug support. So, that's a limited aspect of our interaction in training and equipping the Colombian military. The issue is -- it's not just about drugs, it's about security in a broader spectrum. The reality is today, and I use the FARC as the example, I can't distinguish between the FARC when the FARC is acting as a narco-trafficker and the FARC as a terrorist or the FARC as an insurgent. Those distinctions that may have existed at one time are really blurred, certainly at the tactical level. And the real problem is we've got to get at the security issue, or Colombians have to get at the security issue. So that -- that really is what changing the authorities is all about.

SEN. CHAFEE: You served in the region, I know, in your background quite a bit, and are there lessons to be learned from Peru? And as I said, for all his fault, President Fujimori seemed to have a plan that worked fairly well in this area. Are there lessons to be learned from that -- the interdiction of the fly-in zones? I'm not intimately familiar with what he -- what was his plan, but at least he pushed it out of Peru into Colombia to some extent, unfortunately.

SEN. DODD: That's part of the problem, I think.

SEN. CHAFEE: Part of the problem.

GEN. SPEER: Well, certainly the counter-drug aspect in Peru did just that. The air bridge denial program, from a regional perspective, was a very effective program over a period of years. And that helped to close out the air bridge that existed previously in terms of Peru to Colombia. And that is what force the, shall we say the cultivation in one country and the base being changed into the actual cocaine in another country. So, it forced the drug traffickers to consolidate, if you will, and eliminate that movement.

But the other thing -- I mean, fundamentally, if you look back at what President Fujimori and the government of Peru did is they resourced their security forces to deal with the security threat, and consequently they did.

Now, on the other side of the coin, if you want to talk about human rights performance, they're -- at least during that time, I'm not sure that the Peruvian security forces were -- had to adhere to any human rights vetting. So, there were some tactics used that we don't want to see applied elsewhere.

SEN. CHAFEE: Okay. I'll switch the subjects a little bit and talk about the upcoming elections. Mr. Secretary, how is -- what are the dynamics, and the same way we talked about the lurching to the right and increased support for the AUC, and now you look at the elections in France, what's happening there -- what are the dynamics in Colombia as we come forward to their elections? Is there a rightward swing to a candidate? I know Arube (sp) is generally considered the law and order candidate? Is he -- I don't know how accurate the polls are, but is he the frontrunner at this point?

MR. GROSSMAN: I don't know. I certainly wouldn't be involved in predicting Colombian elections from here, but it is certainly true that all the polls, Senator, show the people are interested in security, and people are moving to the right, no question about it.

One of the things that General Speer and I did, along with a number of other people when we visited Colombia in February, was we had a chance to meet each of the three leading presidential candidates. And really, our message to them was the same, which is to say that the United States is interested in Colombia. You've got to be interested in doing your part in this. And then, especially -- and with all three candidates, we made a very big point of this linkage, how important it was for the United States on democracy and on human rights. So, as much as people are concerned about their security, if you're going to be elected the president of Colombia, you have to understand how much the United States is interested in security that is being maintained and protected along with human rights and democracy.

We'll see how people vote, but we found that all three candidates were interested in a good relationship with the United States, were interested in Colombia doing more for itself, recognized that they had a big challenge, and I think would generally go forward with Plan Colombia.

SEN. CHAFEE: You don't foresee any surprises on the horizon?

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, I think one of those three people is going to be the president of Colombia. (Laughter.)

SEN. DODD: That's why we pay you the big bucks for that kind of analysis.

MR. GROSSMAN: Sure. That's right.

SEN. CHAFEE: Secretary Rodman.

MR. RODMAN: May I add a point? I have the same assessment that all of the leading candidates are in favor of prosecuting the war, a harder line, if you will. And I think, first of all, a lot of it is a reflection of the collapse of the peace diplomacy. But, the second point I would emphasize is this may well be a society that is -- it is now -- that is now coming to terms with the necessity to take on this -- this campaign and to commit resources to it. I think before, while there was a peace diplomacy, I think there were a lot of hopes invested in it, and perhaps that was an excuse for not making this a larger military commitment or a commitment of resources. Now it seems that the society as a whole has tested, you know, that option and found it wanting. And it may well be that you get -- whoever is the next president will follow President Pastrana in this -- in this stronger line. I think it's a sea change in Colombian politics in the direction that we want, if what we're looking for is a greater commitment on their part.

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. DODD: Thank you very much. And before just turning to our colleague from Wisconsin has joined us -- and we thank you, Senator Feingold for being here -- I just wanted to underscore that point that Senator Chafee just made, and I hope in addition to other things that this hearing would serve as a -- as a basis of sending a message to the candidates here -- we're going to be electing new candidates here in May, and a new president will emerge in Colombia in the next month or so -- we're going to be voting on a package that will be good for a year or so, and I hope that these candidates understand that it's going to be very, very important to continue the efforts that President Pastrana has made and others have made in the country. And I'm not suggesting they're going to have to have an exact duplicate plan, but deviating from that particular effort would certainly be not -- not welcomed.

And I just want to raise the issue once more, because I -- I'll quote our on department -- State Department's designation of the AUC, on September 10th of last year it said, "The AUC has carried out numerous acts of terrorism, including the massacre of hundreds of civilians, the forced displaced from entire villages, the kidnaping of political figures, and the forced recognition of AUC demands. The AUC has committed at least a thousand killings, over a hundred massacres in 2001, and at least 50 percent of all political killings." And according to the some reports here, Human Rights Watch, the 11,000 people who are part of the AUC is a 560 percent increase since 1996. And the question obviously that comes is why? Is that -- why the numbers? If security is the issue and their ranks are swelling, that is a reflection on people's lack of confidence, in my view anyway, of the governmental structures, principally the ability of the military. And I -- do you agree with that conclusion, first of all, Mr. Secretary?

MR. GROSSMAN: I do.

SEN. DODD: And then -- so, if we're looking here a year from now and these numbers continue to rise and instead of 11,000 we're talking numbers that are moving up, then we've got to question whether or not the president policy we're following here is really working very effectively.

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, I'll tell you, Senator, that one of the reasons that we want to do more with the military and not less is for precisely this reason. If what we have learned since September of 2000, that if we can train a counter-narcotics brigade with the wonderful men and women of our uniformed services, and it turns out to be -- excuse me -- the best unit in the Colombian military, then we ought to do another. And then, if we can do the same and do some training so that they can protect the pipeline, we ought to do that too.

And so the question that we all have to debate here as you look at our budget request is, you know, are we prepared to spend that extra money? Are we prepared to do extra? And we believe that the more of these units we can train, the better security there will be, and on top of that, the better human rights performance there will be. There has not been one credible, proved allegation of a human rights abuse for this counter-narcotics brigade that has been trained by the United States of America, and we're very proud of that.

So, if you ask me, I'd do more vetting, I'd do more units, for precisely the reason that we ought to -- people ought to be confident about their own military.

SEN. DODD: I want to come back to that theme in a minute, but let me get to my colleague from Wisconsin. Senator Feingold.

SEN. RUSS FEINGOLD (D-WI): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and for your leadership on these issues. And I'm sorry I wasn't here earlier, but I'm glad to just have a chance to ask a couple of questions.

Mr. Grossman, you know of my interest on the fumigation program. And I'd ask you do you believe that fumigation in the absence of credible well managed alternative development projects is really all policy that makes sense? And I ask this because some people have concluded that there is no alternative development strategy that will convince economically rational coca growers to stop growing it. And I don't know whether that's accurate, but if it is it leads me to wonder what we really hope to gain through the fumigation program.

MR. GROSSMAN: Senator, let me say in my view, and perhaps there are people -- there are people who are certainly much more expert than I am -- is that you can't have alternative development alone and you can't have fumigation alone. So if your proposition to me is, Wouldn't it be wrong to have a fumigation program without an alternative development program, absolutely.

But I would also say in reverse, sir, that if someone proposed to me that we have a great alternative development program without fumigation, I would say that that's not going to work either. There has to be some hammer here, if I could use a non-diplomatic term, to keep people focused on what it is they are supposed to do.

As I tried not very well to say in my statement, we recognized some months ago that the alternative development program that we were pursuing wasn't producing the kind of results that we want. And I give great credit to people here at AID, and in our mission in Colombia, for changing the way that they are thinking about alternative development. And they are now focused better on communities. They are focused on alternative -- not just development, but alternative jobs. And I think, very wisely, they have expanded the geography of alternative development. We were looking just at Putumayo. But the studies that we had done, both by the GAO and work that we did, showed that you have to expand your geography. And if you can employ somebody outside of the county, and they will move there for a job, it's something that they ought to do.

And so I believe that with this new focus on alternative development we are going to be doing a better job in there, we will have a plan. And, combined with spring we will have a serious anti- narcotic effort.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I appreciate that answer. And let me just follow up a little more specifically. Under an amendment that I offered to the Foreign Ops bill last year, the State Department must certify that community development programs are in place in all fumigation areas by mid-July, and the certification is required for the fumigation program to continue.

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I am aware that there's been some concern about the provision. But I think it's essential, and I think your comments tend to support that, if we are to implement an effective and humane fumigation program in Colombia. In the absence of alternative development opportunities, evidence suggests to me that farmers will simply replant their coca crops in other regions, perhaps causing more instability, and of course more environmental damage over the longer term. So my question then is to ask for a status report on community development programs. Will they be in place as required before having fumigation begin again in July?

MR. GROSSMAN: The experts tell me that the answer to that question is yes, and that based on all the available data and the work that AID has done, we will be able to certify that to you, as the law requires.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I thank you, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. DODD: Thank you. Senator Chafee, do you have any more questions?

SEN. CHAFEE: No, thank you.

SEN. DODD: Let me ask you a couple of other issues, if I can. And let me just pick up on what Senator Feingold has raised about the counternarcotics effort. One of my concerns is if we go now we are going to start utilizing this equipment not only in the counternarcotics area but obviously in dealing with the anti- insurgency efforts. The obvious issue that comes up in my mind is we are sitting around a year from now, and we are having these reports on the eradication efforts. And given the resources that are committed, there will be a diminution of those resources obviously in the counternarcotics field. Although you can say it overlaps, that we are coming back and we are watching -- because more of these resources are being committed to dealing with the insurgency efforts, although again I accept the notion there is some overlap here -- that we could be looking at a situation where the counternarcotics efforts are beginning to slip and fail and fall behind. How do you address that question?

MR. GROSSMAN: Let me start. Our proposition is that we can do both of these things, and that --

SEN. DODD: With the present level of resources?

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir. And that is why we have asked for additional funds in '03 to train a second counternarcotics brigade. It is why also we have asked in '03 funds for the $98 million to train and equip a unit to look after the pipeline, to infrastructure. And it is also why in the emergency supplemental that is here now we have asked for $35 million -- $25 million in anti-kidnapping assistance, $6 million to begin work on the pipeline, and $4 million to help police sort of really build police stations that they can be secure in. So we think that that level of funding is the right level of funding. That's why we have asked for it. And we believe we can do these -- we can operate these missions, and do them successfully.

SEN. DODD: There's been a -- President Pastrana the other day when he was here, I asked him about the success of the talks with ELN. And his report was that they are going fairly well, and that in fact, that he was even hopeful that before he left office there may actually be some resolution of those talks -- successful resolution with the ELN. One of the factors is of course that they are being -- these talks are being conducted in Cuba.

MR. GROSSMAN: Right.

SEN. DODD: And I asked him very directly whether or not in this particular case Castro was being of any help in this matter. And he said he was. How do you answer that question?

MR. GROSSMAN: We supported President Pastrana in his efforts with the ELN. They have not asked us for anything in that regard. Near as I can tell, that it's the right report, that they seem to be making some progress. You know, obviously I think I'd like to have it in another venue, but that's really not for me to choose. And if they can get this job done and bring peace and have some reasonable agreement with the ELN, I think we would support that.

SEN. DODD: I presume our interest section is giving you some reports on how they are going, and --

MR. GROSSMAN: Actually, sir, we get them mostly from the Colombians, through Ann Patterson. I think they come to Cuba, they use it as a facility; but our reporting and our interaction with that peace process to the Colombians is done through Bogota.

SEN. DODD: Well, let's assume for a second that President Pastrana is right; in fact, in this particular case, despite our obvious differences with Castro on a whole host of issues --

MR. GROSSMAN: Right.

SEN. DODD: -- that in this particular case, whatever motivations may be, it is being constructive and working fairly well. Would we object to having a role for Fidel Castro in dealing with any political resolution dealing with the FARC?

MR. GROSSMAN: With the FARC --

SEN. DODD: The Colombians seeking the assistance of the Cuban government in coming to some political resolution in addition to the other steps they're taking with the FARC. How do we -- what would our view be on that?

MR. GROSSMAN: Our view on this is that we would support President Pastrana. I mean, he is the president of Colombia and he is pursuing a peace process. And if he came to us and said, This is how we would do this, we have been quite open about that. We would support --

SEN. DODD: So we would not object to that?

MR. GROSSMAN: We would support President Pastrana.

SEN. DODD: Yeah. You're being clever here in wording here. (Laughter.)

MR. GROSSMAN: That's right. You said that's why I get paid all this money. (Laughter.)

SEN. DODD: I think I'm hearing what I want to hear. But I hope I'm -- (laughter) --

MR. GROSSMAN: I hope so.

SEN. DODD: Well, have we told the -- well, have we given the -- is there any -- the ELN obviously is on a terrorist list.

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir.

SEN. DODD: Have we laid out some conditions on which they come off that list, if in fact these negotiations are successful?

MR. GROSSMAN: Luckily the list of what it would take to get off the terrorist list is a public list. And anyone who has asked us, whether it's been President Pastrana or other governments, what would it take, we say here it is -- here's the law -- here's the standard by which we judge whether people are on or off that list. And when the ELN or any other terrorist group in the world moves away from that list, we are prepared to consider it. The law is designed to require us to meet certain criteria. They meet the criteria -- when they stop meeting the criteria, we would be prepared to consider it. I think we are a long way from that, given what they are doing on the pipeline and the kidnapping and their dealing with drugs. But in the theoretical, there's the list.

SEN. DODD: Let me go back to the regional issue again with you.

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, sir.

SEN. DODD: And I -- when I made the comments I did at the opening at this hearing in my disappointment in the lack of support -- first of all, let me address the issue of Venezuela in the connection. I asked President Pastrana when he was here as well whether or not the events that unfolded in Venezuela and how they were handled help or hurt the situation. He felt they had hurt the situation. We don't seem to be getting the kind of commitment and support in some of these neighboring countries, who are providing I think $5 million in assistance to Ecuador, if my memory serves me well as part of the proposed budget request. There may be additional levels of support in the area of $35 million for -- or 30 million for Ecuador I guess is what it is -- that's been committed. We are obviously -- had President Bush visit President Toledo in Peru, lending his presence to strengthen the government there. Bolivia has had some difficulties. Obviously there's changes occurring in Brazil. Obviously the problems in Venezuela sort of surrounding this particular issue. What is your assessment of the regional support of this particular effort? And do you share my concern that if this is sort of a bilateral Colombian- U.S. deal with no one else doing much except being spectators in the region, that we are going to have a more difficult time resolving this issue in the long term? And if you draw that same conclusion that I have, what steps are we taking to try and build some regional support for Plan Colombia, including the participation beyond just rhetorical commitments from these neighboring nations to share in the burden that the present situation poses in Colombia?

MR. GROSSMAN: Senator, I agree with you. If this is a bilateral U.S.-Colombia deal, it won't work. And I think we ought to be clear about that, and I hope all the people who are behind me and listening to this broadcast, listening to this hearing, understand that.

I'd say a couple of things. One is that we I think have taken some steps to try to show our interest in the region. When I joined -- when I took my job, there were two great criticisms of what we were doing on Plan Colombia. Criticism number one was that it was too focused on the military; and criticism number two, it was too focused on Colombia and not on the region. And when President Bush took a look at this, his proposition to you all was that we have the Andean Regional Initiative, which is better balanced between military and non-military, and is much better balanced in terms of the money between Colombia and some of the surrounding states, including Ecuador. And although, senator, I'd have to -- maybe you would allow me to respond in writing -- I think the numbers on Ecuador are actually higher. I think we have $20 million to Ecuador this year --

SEN. DODD: I'm glad to hear that. I would suggest they be higher. They deserve --

MR. GROSSMAN: Yes, and I think k--

SEN. DODD: That's the supplemental request?

MR. GROSSMAN: That's correct. And in the ARI request for '03 I think the number is higher as well. But I will get that to you, because I don't want to --

SEN. DODD: I'm glad you mentioned Ecuador, because they have been a great ally and supporter in these --

MR. GROSSMAN: Absolutely right. So we have tried to show the way by changing our support for Plan Colombia from just support for Plan Colombia to support for the Andean Regional Initiative. But we need to do more. And, exactly as you say, we need to make sure that the other countries in the region are not spectators. I had a chance a few weeks ago to go to Brazil, and one of the things we did in a long list of consultations with the Brazilians -- I came back and back and back again to the need for them to support Colombia. So in all of our conversations with Latin Americans, and with Europeans as well, we need to just continue to push ahead and recognize that Colombia is not just an American problem -- it is really a worldwide problem.

SEN. DODD: Yes. I mentioned Ecuador specifically -- and they have been very, very helpful. And of course the base in Ecuador, which has allowed us to have these overflights and views that have been critically supportive I think in terms of our ability to deal with the eradication efforts. And yet we also -- I also know that on the eastern border of Ecuador, the border with Colombia, it is an open frontier, and I gather there's a lot of back and forth -- in fact, it's almost a safe harbor in a sense -- this is true also in Brazil, I am told -- and that's -- so as I say it's more than just a kind of help -- it's a real problem here that people are actually in these -- in the FARC particularly, and maybe in the other groups as well -- are able to have sort of free access to these neighboring countries, and not the level of support yet we need to deal with those issues. And there's some concern obviously in these governments that if they become too difficult on these questions then the problems that Colombia is facing are going to spill over into their areas. So it's a serious issue that needs addressing.

Lastly, let me raise one specific question with you dealing with the counterterrorism and counter-insurgency support -- an issue about whether or not this will fall outside the caps. And I want to have you, Secretary Rodman, as well as General Speer comment on this. The administration has not requested a waiver of use of these personnel caps in the FY '02 emergency supplemental. And the question is: Do you believe the cap limitations apply to the additional programs that you are proposing to support in Colombia, such as the protection of infrastructure, antiterrorism programs, counter-insurgency support, which arguably fall outside the scope of the definition contained in existing law? And the further question is: Will you support legislative language that makes it clear in statute that the existing caps apply to these additional activities as well?

MR. GROSSMAN: I can just be -- as easy as it can -- we do not intend to exceed the caps. We want the Byrd Amendment to -- we support the Byrd Amendment. I wouldn't give you advice about how to legislate or not legislate. All I can tell you is the 400 military, 400 civilian are caps that we want to live with.

SEN. DODD: So you would not object to legislative language that made that clear if someone were to propose that?

MR. GROSSMAN: Well, in our -- again, I'm not --

SEN. DODD: We are going to run the language by you -- I am not going to spring it on you. But you understand the thrust of what I am asking?

MR. GROSSMAN: I do. But since we are saying that the Byrd Amendment as it exists continues to be the law, I mean in our view it will be the law.

SEN. DODD: Staff tells me here the Plan Colombia is defined here, and that's why we raise the very specific question. Plan Colombia means the plan of the government of Colombia instituted by the administration of President Pastrana to combat drug production and trafficking, foster peace, increase the rule of law, improve human rights, expand economic development, and institute justice reform. We are going to expand the definition to include other activities. And I just want to make sure that as we expand that list here that we are not going to have someone coming back and saying, Well, that statement I gave you about the caps persists -- except that we have now moved into a whole new area and it doesn't apply there.

MR. GROSSMAN: No. The reason I tried in my testimony to be clear in the four or five commitments that I gave you was that's the administration position. Those are the commitments we give you.

SEN. DODD: Well, all right. And Secretary Rodman, do you agree with that?

MR. RODMAN: I concur in that.

SEN. DODD: And General Speer?

GEN. SPEER: Sir, with what the administration has recommended in terms of the way ahead, the second CD brigade, the infrastructure security force, which involves the 15th Brigade and the 18th Brigade, and continuing this sustaining training for the original Counter Drug Brigade, as well as the riverine force and support to the C-130 fleet and other Air Force programs, all of that can be executed within the cap.

SEN. DODD: Okay. We are going to -- there's always going to be draft language here -- and we want you look at it. I mean, I want to make sure we're not -- no one is trying to play games with each other here, so you understand it -- so we are clear on it.

We've got about two minutes left on a vote here, my colleagues, so we may leave the record open for some additional questions, but I appreciate your testimony here this morning. We didn't cover every issue obviously, but I'm very appreciative of your response to the questions we've raised. And we look forward to a close and important working relationship with you as we go forward here with these proposals.

MR. GROSSMAN: We thank you, and we're glad to come back any time.

SEN. DODD: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, secretary, general, we appreciate it.

The committee will stand in recess. And when we come back we'll pick up the second panel.

(RECESS)

SEN. DODD: (Sounds gavel.) The committee will come to order. I apologize for the delay. We had a vote on the floor of the Senate, and getting back here. I want to thank our next panel for their patience in waiting to be heard. I hope in some way that just hearing the first panel is some assistance to you and allows you to even modify some of the comments you may have made, in light of some of the statements having been made by the administration regarding Colombia policy, U.S.-Colombian policy: What's next?
We are pleased to welcome to the committee today Mr. Mark Schneider, the senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, located here in Washington, D.C. Mark is, I should say for the record, is a very dear and long-standing friend of mine. We have worked together over many, many years on numerous issues -- a former volunteer, and most recently the director of the Peace Corps, an organization near and dear to my heart, as a former volunteer in the Dominican Republic. High school students ask me when was I a Peace Corps volunteer -- I say when Thomas Jefferson was president -- (laughter) -- to give you some idea of the gray hair here.

Mr. Jose Miguel Vivanco is the executive director of the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch, and you have heard me already quote the Human Rights Watch, and you have heard the administration officials refer to your studies in positive terms, being worthwhile products for monitoring and considering human rights issues. So we are very pleased that you are here with us today as well.

And, with that, let me turn to both of you for your statements. And, again, I'll keep the clock on here to give you some indication of how time is moving -- but don't feel constrained by it -- when the bell goes off -- and then we'll get to some questions. Mark? Thank you.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And as always, it's a pleasure to be here at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify now on the current conflict in Colombia.

I'd like to convey some of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of our recent report on the elusive quest for peace in that nation. I ask the chairman's consent to incorporate the report into the hearing record.

SEN. DODD: As I said earlier, all documentation that you think may be worthwhile for the record will be included.

MR. SCHNEIDER: The ICG, as you know, is a multinational NGO based on Brussels, committed to the goals of preventing conflict; and, where it exists, of working to contain and hopefully resolve those conflicts. Former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell was the founding chair of this group, which came into being following the bombings of Sarajevo and the genocide in Rwanda. Its founders believed that early warning, drawn from field-based analysis and translated into policy recommendations might help the international community to prevent a repetition of those avoidable disasters.

Senator Chafee, Mr. Chairman, the ICG report on Colombia that I mentioned concluded -- you mentioned the stake that the United States has in Colombia and the situation there. We concluded that the United States and the international community need to help that nation respond to the threats from insurgents and paramilitary alike for the following reasons: because the conflict in Colombia already is spilling over its regional borders and posing further dangers to already fragile neighbors. With respect to that, senator, you mentioned the regional issue, and I just would note that in our recommendations we made several recommendations with respect to how to link the other neighbors to the effort to respond to the threat from insurgents and paramilitary in Colombia; also, because Colombia still remains the major source of drugs, both cocaine and heroin coming into this country; because the human costs are unacceptable, as we have heard today -- one and a half to two million people displaced, 3,000 kidnapped, mostly at the hands of the insurgents -- and, as we know, and as you listed some of them -- lastly, just two days ago the governor of Antioquia; Between a thousand and 2,500 men women and children killed in massacres, the vast majority the work of the paramilitary; an equal number assassinated, including labor union organizers, journalists, local and indigenous leaders, human rights advocates, and just generally people in Colombia; 400 credible reports of torture, 6,000 children forced into the armies on either side.

And, finally, we have a stake because the conflict threatens a democracy -- a democracy with flaws, but a democracy and one where the people are willing to brave death threats and bombs to vote, as they did last month at the congressional elections.

For those reasons it deserves support. Although it also must make progress in amending shortcomings in its judicial system, closing gaps in social and economic inequities and, most crucially, openly and clearly rejecting collusion with the paramilitary. Much more needs to be done in this area, and presumably that is why the administration has not yet certified the human rights conditions in the fiscal year 2002 appropriation bill.

ICG found in the report that the conflict itself has changed. It is no longer what we used to think of as a classic ideological guerrilla war, but a foul mixing bowl for drugs, weapons, money laundering, criminals and terrorists. The guerrilla groups also have shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War, losing popular sympathy and drawing their financing from drugs, kidnapping and extortion.

The rhetoric remains ideological, but there has been little substantive agenda behind it. And for four years they have failed to use the opportunity that President Pastrana gave them to negotiate a settlement of the conflict. It also should be noted that their paramilitary enemies are probably even more dependent on drug money, earning some 70 percent of their income from that source.

Given those concerns, ICG has focused its recommendation on four specific areas that relate to the questions that you were asking earlier. First, protecting Colombian citizens against the insurgents in the paramilitary; reenergizing the peace process; combatting the drug trade; and extending police and judicial institutions, as well as basic social services, to the rural areas. Protecting Colombian civilians from insurgents and paramilitaries requires a better and stronger military and police. There is simply no question. But as you noted, Mr. Chairman, Colombia must do more to finance its own defense. And in the draft evasion that appears to benefit the wealthy. Most immediately, it must replicates its massive protective efforts during the congressional elections to assure the safety and security of candidates and voters during the May balloting.

ICG also recommends specific actions to address the rising power of the paramilitary. For Colombia we suggest they should create special police and prosecutorial units to go after the leadership of the AUC, like the successful strike forces that ultimately dismantled the Cali and Medellin cartels in the early 1990s. Colombia should also do more to prosecute military officers who assist the paramilitary, and to prosecute all those who finance it.

We believe the United States has a special role in this area. Yes, we conclude that there is justification to extend additional military aid to the government in Colombia, and to approve the dual use of U.S. trained forces currently permitted only to fight drug trafficking, as the Bush administration has requested. But only after the Colombian military makes significant further progress in ensuring accountability for human rights violations, and in severing all inks with the paramilitaries. The existing conditionality -- the Leahy Amendment, the Byrd Amendment, Section 567 of last year's appropriations bill -- the existing conditionality which seeks to promote those ends should apply to the new funds and to the new authority.

It will help Colombia in furthering the professionalization of its own military and police. It will strengthen those inside the Colombian government and military who are seeking to build internal safeguards against human rights abuses, and break the links to the paramilitary. And it will increase the U.S. government's leverage for those same objectives.

ICG also recommends way to reenergize the peace process in the future, because we believe there will need to be a future peace process. Initially we recommend that President Pastrana pursue the talks in Cuba aimed at a verifiable cease-fire with the ELN, if at all possible before a new president takes office. You mentioned that, senator. Let me just note in that regard that while there is currently a group of five international ambassadors who form a group of friends, at one of their last meetings they and the government both requested that the United States become more actively engaged in that process. And I think one of our recommendations is that the United States examine how in fact it can do that.

As for negotiations with the FARC, we believe that it first must recognize that it can neither win in a military victory, nor continue forever to strike fear throughout Colombia. As its military capacity diminishes, the FARC then would have no alternative other than to engage in substantive negotiations.

We recommend that the next president also remedy one of the flaws of the past negotiations with the FARC, the absence of third-party mediation. The next administration should invite the U.N. secretary general to play a much stronger role, appointing a special representative, and establishing a good offices mission in Colombia at the earlier useful moment. At some point clearly international monitors will likely be required to verify a cease-fire.

We also think that the U.S. has to consider how it will engage with those future negotiations. Mr. Chairman, our report, as I mentioned, also recognizes the importance of the drug issue. Our recommendations -- and I should say that these are preliminary -- we are going to be doing a separate report on the issue of counternarcotic efforts in Colombia. But we also share the concern expressed by Colombia's president and other international leaders that there is a need to review and rethink the elements of the current strategy, given the increase in cultivation over the past several years. And I know that -- and you have heard the administration is looking at some of those elements of the strategy itself. We think we should also engage the hemispheric community in that effort, perhaps through the OAS and CICAD. But wet endorse President Pastrana's call for a hemispheric summit on that subject -- like the one that took place in Cartagena in 1990 -- to help produce a new common strategy that goes beyond the bilateral.

Finally, there is a fourth issue that when one looks at the conflict one has to consider, and that's how to strengthen Colombia's institutions and their ability to deliver services into rural Colombia. At this point we believe that Colombia needs to consider, and we the international community need to consider, how to help it introduce legitimate police and justice sector forces into rural areas, and to pursue economic and social development, for 80 percent of the rural population estimated by the World Bank to be living in poverty.

You mentioned that there's -- one of the major gaps is the presence of the state in rural Colombia -- that's before the conflict and that continues today. One way that we can begin, and Colombia can being that process, is to look at former combat areas, like the former demilitarized zone -- and undertake an emergency economic, political and social recovery program in those areas to demonstrate the capacity of the state to respond to the needs of the people.

More also needs to be done building on what AID, ICRC and UNHCR are doing to help displaced persons -- and we are talking about almost two million people currently.

Finally, let me just note that Colombia's government and its new president face a significant military challenge in containing the FARC. They face an equal law enforcement challenge in confronting the paramilitary, and they face the political challenge of leading a nation to address both of those threats while initiating the democratic reforms that Colombia requires, and ultimately bringing Colombia to the peace its people so deep desire and deserve. And the United States should help Colombia achieve those goals. Thank you.

SEN. DODD: Thank you very much, Mark --very fine testimony. Jose, thank you for being here.

MR. VIVANCO: Mr. Chairman, Senator Chafee, I am honored to appear before you today. Thank you for your invitation to address the subcommittee. I am submitting --

SEN. DODD: You have to pull that microphone very close to you, Jose, for the sound to pick it up. Thank you.

MR. VIVANCO: I am submitting written testimony for the record.

Mr. Chairman, the United States p lays an important role in Colombia, and can contribute to the defense of human rights. Human Rights Watch has not a fundamental problem with the United States providing Colombia with the help it needs, including military aid. As I will stress today, human rights conditions on aid should be maintained. But limiting aids for counternarcotics purposes makes no sense in a society facing the onslaught of groups who violate human rights with such a flagrant disregard for the law and world opinion.

The critical thing, Mr. Chairman, is that the assistance should be used to combat all sources of terror in Colombia. Clearly the FARC commits acts of terror; so do the legal paramilitary groups allied as the AUC and their patrons in the Colombian security forces.

Colombia faces serious security threats. Its democracy is under attack. Over the weekend, the governor of Antioquia, and a former defense minister, who I have met with frequently over the years, was abducted as they took part in a peace march. It is impossible to go anywhere in Colombia via road, or even airplane, without fear of a roadblock by the paramilitaries or hijacking by guerrillas.

Mr. Chairman, let me be quite clear about the position of Human Rights Watch on the FARC. We criticize a peace process that gave a group guilty of so many abuses control of a territory and power over the lives of Colombian citizens. We have repeatedly condemned the way the FARC terrorized civilians, kidnapped and murdered political candidates and leaders. Most recently, on April 15th, I wrote a letter, a public letter, to FARC leader Manuel Marulanda, calling on him to release all hostages, including political figures, and to stop all kidnappings in Colombia.

But the paramilitaries pose just a great a threat to human rights and to the lives of its citizens as the FARC. Paramilitaries associated with the AUC commit most of the worst human rights violations in Colombia today. These acts of terror include massacres, targeted killings and forced displacement. Like the FARC, the AUC kidnaps, threatens and kills political leaders. Like the FARC, paramilitaries fund acts of terror by trafficking in drugs. There is a direct connection, therefore, between the profits from trafficking and human rights abuses. By their own admission, paramilitaries collect 70 percent of their funding from the drug trade. The current leader of the AUC, Carlos Castano, helped form paramilitary groups in the '80s, in coordination with Pablo Escobar.

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned in your remarks the attacks on the Colombian Supreme Court. Castano has admitted providing guerrillas the weapons they used in 1985 to seize the building of the Supreme Court. In the aftermath, 11 justices who were considering the extradition of known traffickers, died along with almost 100 judicial employees. And yet despite these paramilitary abuses, units of Colombia's military still maintain a close relationship with the AUC.

These are not isolated incidents, but rather widespread patterns of behavior and collusion. Most recently they involve active coordination during military operations; communications via radios, cellular telephones and beepers; the sharing of intelligence, including the names of suspected guerrilla collaborators; the sharing of fighters, including active duty soldiers serving in paramilitary units, and paramilitary commanders lodging on military bases; the sharing of vehicles, including army trucks used to transport paramilitary fighters; coordination of army roadblocks which routinely let heavily armed paramilitary fighters pass unchallenged, and payment made from paramilitary to military officers for their support.

Mr. Chairman, I am quite concerned by the remarks of General Gary Speer here this morning when he says that the U.S. plan is to set up forces to protect the pipeline in Arauca, with a mixture of units coming from the 18th Brigade and the 5th Brigade. We have no information, credible information, of human rights abuses by the 18th Brigade. But we do have information about serious human rights abuses committed by units working under the control of the 5th Brigade. This is one of our latest reports on Colombia, that includes compelling, strong and credible evidence of links between that unit and paramilitary organizations in that part of the country.

Overall, President Andres Pastrana and his defense minister have failed to establish control of the security forces and break their persistent ties with paramilitary groups. Indeed, there have been serious setbacks then the release late last year of the only top paramilitary leader in custody in Colombia, Mr. Caranza.

Again, let me stress, Mr. Chairman, none of this constitutes an argument for abandoning Colombia. Colombia needs help. The question is not whether to provide aid, but how. A tempting answer for some might be to first help Colombia deal with the FARC, then the thinking goes the paramilitary threat will take care of itself. To me that's about as naive as saying that the FARC is only interested in helping the poor. Both those groups are mafias, Mr. Chairman. Both kill for money and for power. Neither is going to give up just because their purported political goals are met.

What will happen if Colombia delays confronting the paramilitaries as it fights the guerrillas? As the FARC weakens, the AUC will move in. It will become more powerful and more entrenched. The AUC will capture an even larger share of Colombian narcotics exports, giving it more money to pursue violence in Colombia.

This is not just a speculation, Mr. Chairman. It has already happened in Barrancabermeja, site of Colombia's largest oil refinery. That the Colombia police report that the AUC now controls the criminal network that steals gasoline from pipelines to resell to cocaine laboratories. The AUC will try to seize greater political power in Colombia. Again, this is not just our speculation; they already have. Prior to the March 2002 congressional elections, the group claimed that it expected to have a hand in electing 35 percent of the new legislature. Both presidential candidates, Horacio Serpa and Juan Camilo Restrepo, reported threats against their supporters throughout Colombia.

Finally, as the AUC grows in power, it will become ever harder to convince FARC guerrillas to lay down their guns. Paramilitaries have a long history of murdering guerrillas leaders after they surrender. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in 1994 paramilitaries have been linked to hundreds of killings of members of the Patriotic Union political party, formed to create a way for guerrillas to lay down their weapons and participate peacefully in the political process. The longer Colombia waits to confront the paramilitaries, the harder they will be to beat. That's why Colombia needs to deal with both the FARC and the AUC at the same time.

Secretary of State Powell recognized this when he placed the AUC on the list of foreign terrorist organizations on September 10th, 2001. Subsequently, the United States suspended the visas of suspected AUC members and supporters, and put 45 names on a watch list in case those individuals apply for U.S. visas. These were positive steps, but more needs to be done.

First, the United States should make it clear to Colombian officials that they expect military aid to be used equally against all designated terrorist groups in Colombia. With respect to the AUC, the goal should be to bring indicted leaders to justice, and to reassert the full authority of the Colombian government in those regions the paramilitary currently controls.

Second, the Colombian government must break persistent links between paramilitaries and its security forces, in particular the army and the navy. The United States must continue to condition all military aid on real and verifiable progress by the Colombian military in breaking these links to paramilitary groups and upholding human rights. Congress defined these condition to encourage progress towards compliance with standards that Colombia's own elected leaders and military commanders say they support. But, as the State Department has acknowledged, these conditions have not yet been met.

I was very pleased, Mr. Chairman, to hear Ambassador Grossman's commitment to human rights in Colombia. I would urge Ambassador Grossman to work with Congress to ensure that all conditionality remains in the law, including Section 567, requiring progress in breaking these links, and in ensuring that the AUC and their patrons in the military are brought to justice.

Finally, we also urge the U.S. Congress to ensure that there are funds allocated to support the critical institutions -- the office of the Attorney General Fiscalia (ph), internal affairs procuroria (ph) and the public advocate Defensoria. Working against great odds to enforce the law in Colombia, protect civilians and prosecute and punish those responsible for atrocities -- guerrillas and paramilitaries.

Finally, with the right kind of U.S. engagement, Colombia still has the chance to protect its people, to preserve its democracy, and to prevail against terrorism. The challenge is to help Colombia one terrorist group without simultaneously empowering another. That can be done, but it is going to take affirmative leadership from Colombia, as well as this committee and the administration. Thank you very much.

SEN. CHAFEE: Thank you very much, gentlemen. There's a vote on once again, and so the chairman has gone to do his constitutional duty, and I'll pinch hit. And it's certainly chilling testimony from both of you about the circumstances in Colombia, and it seems as though the prospects for progress seem so bleak from listening to your testimony -- the alleged integration of the military with the AUC and where we go from there.

But, as we look ahead once again to the elections, I might ask have you -- both of you or either of you -- studied the position of the candidates? And will the political influence of the paramilitaries be altered in any way by the outcome of these elections on May 26th, I believe? Mr. Schneider?

MR. SCHNEIDER: We put out a report just about a week or so ago that looked at the March 10th parliamentary elections in terms of the ballots, and we noted the comment made by the paramilitary leader, but it should be understood that that in no way is substantiated.

What we found is that in general there is not a focus on the human rights or paramilitary issue in the elections. It was much more of a local political kind of effort. The balance, however, clearly went in the direction of those candidates that were supported by the more conservative candidate for the president did very well. Those --- and then several independent candidates who we would describe as on the left, including the former head of the 19, was one of the highest vote-getters for the Senate on a national. So it's hard to make a clear judgment there was a massive shift.

In the polling for president there is no question that the more conservative candidate has been consistently higher than the other two. Some between the last polls there's 51 percent, and gone as high as 58 percent. And in general all the candidates have taken a position, clearly emphasizing the need to confront the FARC militarily. And at the same time, in terms of their public statements, I think that most of them have said when asked specifically that they clearly recognize the threat from the paramilitary.

SEN. CHAFEE: And have the paramilitaries, Castano in particular, given any indication of being involved in the political process as these presidential elections come forward?

MR. SCHNEIDER: They allege -- I mean, the paramilitary clearly alleges that they are pressuring candidates who they will then have influence over. There's also demonstration of influence from drug money that we expressed concern about.

I think that it's also accurate to say that the presidential candidates, while they have been very strong in terms of the terrorism issue, that there has probably been a greater degree of focus by some of them on the paramilitary issue than by others. No one that I have heard has in any way attempted to downplay the threat posed by the paramilitary.

SEN. CHAFEE: Before we go, Mr. Vivanco, in your testimony earlier, Mr. Schneider, you suggested that the U.N. secretary general should be involved, and appoint a special representative, and establish offices in Colombia. Is there an entity to deal with -- if the United Nations were to get involved with -- or are these organizations so elusive that that would not be productive?

MR. SCHNEIDER: We suggested two things --

SEN. CHAFEE: -- an organized entity obviously, because an entity -- but one that would --

MR. SCHNEIDER: Clearly in terms of the ELN process, as it moves further towards a cease-fire, the U.N. involvement would be very hopeful in terms of helping to define how you would manage a cease- fire, verify it, et cetera -- monitor it. And at some point we would hope that the same situation, after there has been clear evidence that the FARC has I think been confronted militarily -- at some point we would hope that there would be an opportunity to restart negotiations, and at that point the U.N.'s presence would be quite helpful.

Also, it should be noted that since any kind of future negotiations would take place outside the country, no one is talking about reestablishing a demilitarized zone inside Colombia. And so in that context the U.N. again could play a significant role.

SEN. CHAFEE: Very good. Mr. Vivanco, also going back to the elections, maybe you could comment on those and what you see coming forward. And are the -- particularly the paramilitaries, the AUC -- are they going to be influencing these elections? Is there any indication they want to be involved in the democratic process?

MR. VIVANCO: Senator Chafee, the political environment in Colombia today, given the failure of a peace process, and the recalcitrant attitude of the leftist guerrilla, the FARC in particular, and the record of kidnappings and killings, is very much -- the environment is kind of in favor of a military solution to this problem. There is a serious security concern in Colombia in every region, and some fear from paramilitary groups, some from the FARC. So but that means that the leading presidential candidates --their discourse is quite similar in terms of they are very, very tough in criticizing the peace efforts in which President Pastrana engaged. And they announce that they are committed to some sort of military solution for Colombia.

But to try to address your question more directly, I have heard that one of the leading presidential candidates, Mr. Horacio Serpa, the leader of the Liberal Party in Colombia, has alleged that Mr. Uriva (ph), who is at the top of the polls, has been receiving active support from paramilitary organizations in Colombia. So that is at least the perception of Mr. Horacio Serpa and his supporters.

In addition, as I said during my testimony, the Carlos Castana himself, and some other leaders of paramilitary organizations, have publicly acknowledged that they have been involved in a process of congressional elections, and they claim that they have the sympathy and the support of local representatives in the -- deputies and members of Congress today in Colombia by around 30 percent or 35 percent of them.

SEN. CHAFEE: So, to play that out, if the leader in the poll, Uribe, is elected, and just for the sake of argument there are connections to the AUC, not that we take that as fact -- it's an allegation from the other candidate -- but just for the sake of argument, how does that play out in the future of Colombia? What happens next if Uribe wins and is inaugurated?

MR. SCHNEIDER: It makes it even more important that the kind of conditioning that we have been discussing is established, in order to ensure that the United States is clearly going to be focused on this issue in its dialogue with the new president and with the new administration, in order to ensure that we don't become complicit in any direct -- in either the continuation or the extension of the relationship between the military and the paramilitary.

SEN. CHAFEE: Mr. Vivanco, you allege that these groups are similar to a mafia, to criminal enterprises. Yet, there seems to be some indication that Carlos Castana does want to get involved in the democratic process. Am I accurate in that? He has written some kind of a biography -- is that right -- an autobiography?

MR. VIVANCO: Yes, sure.

SEN. CHAFEE: He makes TV appearances.

MR. VIVANCO: Senator Chafee, I think Carlos Castana and his group have a better sense of PR. In other words, they try to project the image of, quote, a "reasonable," you know, group, and they're unlike the guerrillas. The guerrillas, you know, the FARC in particular, they don't pay any attention to what the public in Colombia and the international community might think about their record, their actions.

These are, you know, Marxist guerrillas that are still in the '60s, and the logic that they apply is extremely ideological. So they know better what is in the best interest of the persons and the population of Colombia. On the other hand, the leaders of paramilitary groups -- in particular Castano is, I would say, very savvy in the way that he sends messages using the media and, you know, to Colombians. But still, I do believe that the methodology of repression of both groups are quite similar.

SEN. CHAFEE: In your testimony, you said that he takes credit for the attack on the supreme court. How does that play into positive public relations? What was -- how did he defend that, if he's taking credit for it?

MR. VIVANCO: He acknowledged direct participation in the killings of presidential candidates in the past. He (indicated?) his actions. But he gives you an explanation. You know, he tries to justify his atrocities as reaction to the atrocities committed by the other side. And that is his logic.

I mean, he's still a criminal. He's not, you know -- but his technique has been to tell the Colombian public that the only way to effectively deal with leftist guerrillas is by his way, you know. And he has shown some concrete results, like, you know, the vast areas of Colombia under his control. But I will argue that those who live under the control of paramilitary organizations live under control of the Mafia, that you have to pay for security; you have to -- they live under systematic extortion and fear.

SEN. CHAFEE: And also in your testimony, you say that AUC is responsible for killings in the Patriotic Union movement, a political party. If they don't have -- what does Carlos Castano say about being involved in a democratic effort if even that party which they're trying to be involved in, they're assassinating members of it? How do those two reconcile themselves?

MR. VIVANCO: I'm not sure, you know, whether they want to eventually become -- I mean, (whether) the AUC wants to become a formal political party in Colombia and to engage in politics, as the other parties in Colombia. But what I -- my point is that the AUC leadership, and particularly Castano, it's quite open to the media.

And he has no remorse, no problem to, you know, recognize responsibility for past killings and assassinations. He actually -- he believes that helps him with the Colombian people, you know, in terms of raising more sympathy and support for his actions. But I don't know whether his intention is to become himself fully involved in the political process one day and to participate in elections and that sort of thing.

SEN. CHAFEE: And that is more true of the ELN. They're making more positive steps towards moving in that direction. Is that accurate?

MR. SCHNEIDER: I mean, they've been engaged in negotiations most recently and indicated at least some willingness to move toward a cease-fire, with the assumption that that would then lead to a negotiation over substantive issues. That would include their demobilization and political involvement. But it is not by any means something that's going to happen tomorrow. And they've raised some additional demands apparently recently that make it appear that they may be attempting to stretch the process out until a new president takes office.

SEN. CHAFEE: And of these three groups we most frequently talk about, all of whom are on the terrorist list -- am I correct? -- the AUC on the right and the two, ELN and FARC, on the left -- are they equally dependent on the narco-trafficking revenues?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, you heard the statistic that we've received, because the AUC asserts it themselves and the U.S. government has repeated it, so presumably the administration believes it's accurate; 70 percent of the income of the AUC comes from drugs. In the case of the FARC, it's probably the second. They, in addition to the money that they receive from drugs, which is significant, several hundred million dollars, they obviously also receive a significant amount of money from kidnappings and from other extortion.

The ELN apparently receives less from drugs and more from kidnappings and more from extortion of the oil companies.

MR. VIVANCO: Oil companies, right.

SEN. CHAFEE: You say ELN less so.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Less so in terms of drug activity.

SEN. CHAFEE: Well, that's all the questions I have. I see the clock has run out on my vote. I think I'll call a recess, and if I can implore on you to have some patience. The chairman will return and I'm sure he'll have some good questions and engage in some dialogue. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

(Laughter.)

SEN. DODD: How's that? You go vote. It's a tag team we've got here. Thank you very much, Linc.

Well, thank you both again. If I ask any questions that my colleague from Rhode Island has already asked, you can just -- either you can tell me or I presume our good staff here will say that question has already been addressed.

Let me, if I can -- you've answered a couple of questions that I have in my -- that I was going to raise with you; the question of whether or not, in your view, there can be a military victory here. (On the other side?) you both indicated that's not likely to be the case. I don't presume either one of you would say it's impossible, so I don't believe that to be the case either.

You can end up -- and if you end up with a million displaced people -- and hundreds of thousands of civilians are leaving Colombia every year; I'm told it's hard to get a seat on a flight out of Bogota. There are literally hundreds and hundreds of Colombian children now attending schools in the United States rather than be living in their own communities.

You heard Senator Chafee talk about his family and how they literally have locked themselves, 80-year-old people, in their home, fearful to go out because of the potential consequences to them. You've got, at least, if the numbers are accurate, Human Rights Watch says almost 4,000 kidnappings a year. That's at least 10, 15 a day occurring. I'm told it's a regular basis that you have people even if modest means, now -- we're not just talking about -- when you talk about 4,000 a year, you've obviously gone far beyond that small percentage of affluence and you've reached out into the middle classes and below.

So this has now created a reign of terror in the country. You combine the forces of the ELN, the FARC, the AUC. You're talking now in the neighborhood of 25,000, 30,000 people who are engaged in this business of kidnapping, assassinations, narco-trafficking and the like. It seems we're looking at the complete shredding of civil society here in this oldest continuing democracy in the hemisphere; in Latin America, excuse me.

I hear -- Mark and I have talked about this already. I'm very impressed with the report that's been prepared by ICG. But you heard Marc Grossman say earlier that to prioritize the issues for them would be security first. You can't talk about, while they're not totally unrelated, the idea that you're going to be able to restore democratic institutions and democratic processes, economic vitality, all of the other related issues, in the absence of people feeling secure. There's nothing more fundamental.

That's why, in this country, I suppose that if we had to allocate resources to just one area of the budget alone, the one that would probably trump all others would be defense, if it came down to that, in terms of where people would place their priorities.

How do you address the issue, then? First of all, do you agree with that assessment? If you had to -- I'll ask you the same question. In that litany of priorities that our policy ought to be directed to -- human rights, democracy, economic vitality and security and the like -- do you agree with his prioritization of those issues?

And, secondly, how do you address the underlying question that if we condition entirely the support for the military on an improved human rights record here, which I don't disagree with, but if you do that, do you not then give, it seems to me, the AUC and the FARC sort of veto power over the aid, in a sense?

I mean, you now have turned, to the extent that they can just perpetuate human rights violations here, and even though they mount, how do you, if you subscribe to the notion that the AUC basically doesn't operate effectively without the imprimatur, implicit or explicit, of the military, and if they continue to watch human rights violations, and you condition the aid to them on that particular question, then does it not give, in fact, the AUC, and the FARC indirectly, the ability to sort of determine whether or not U.S. support is going to be forthcoming and to the extent we're going to be able to deal with the security issue?

And if you complete the syllogism here, the logic of it, that then the ranks of the AUC expand, because people look to somebody, anybody, who will protect me and my family against these things, and I'm willing to hire the vigilantes, in effect, to do it if my government can't do it for me. How do you address that?

Maybe I'm not articulating that as well as others might, but that's sort of the quandary that I think a lot of people are asking, who don't disagree with your conclusions about what's going on on the ground, but in terms of your formulation of how we ought to provide assistance to this government, which no one else is going to provide.

I mean, I don't know of anyone else -- you don't know -- is there a European government that's going to help, an Asian government? Are some of the Latin American governments going to step up to the plate and provide military assistance, helicopters?

So if we don't, and we condition it on this, are we not abandoning a country that's under siege from no one I see here on the opposition side, whether it's the ELN or the FARC or the AUC, that seems to be much more interested in anything but narco business and sustaining themselves as sort of a mafia, to use the word that you have here. You call them mafia. I subscribe to that. So no one's going to step in and help these poor countries from the mafia unless we do it. How do you get around that question?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Let me start by taking that term. If you have a town where you've got two mafia gangs operating, you go after them both. You strengthen security and you go after them both. You don't ally yourself with one of the mafias to deal with the other or else you undermine the whole legitimacy of your own capacity to operate as an institution, as a democratic institution.

And I think what we're saying is that response to security threats in the case of Colombia requires that you also, at the same time, go after the AUC, maintain the human rights conditionality. And I think the answer historically is that it's been done.

And the classic example was going down to Salvador and saying that you -- when the vice president then went down, supported with congressional legislation that was going to cut off aid, if it didn't happen, "You're going to have to disband the death squads, period."

Only after that happened did you begin to see a change in the process; a very high-level, clear, "This is unacceptable." And in this particular case, I think that that's what we're saying is that, yes, provide them with the new authority to use the equipment, et cetera, not only in counternarcotics, but it has to be while they are also taking action with respect to human rights and cutting off their relations with the paramilitary. And we believe they can do that.

The other is that you don't -- in terms of how do you begin to deal with questions of strengthening law enforcement or the judicial system and economic development when you don't have full security? You may not have full security nationwide, but you may be able to clear them out in a particular area and then provide an economic package in that area.

And that's what I was suggesting in the demilitarized zone, in fact; that in an area where you can direct your military forces to clear out both the FARC and the AUC, to then respond with something positive.

But the broader question -- I think that the statement today, yes, security is crucial, and we'd like to see the Colombian government, in terms of their tax levies and their allocation of funding, demonstrate the higher priority. You know the percentages as well as I do.

Clearly they have not dedicated the level of resources to their own military and police that the threat would indicate that they should. But I think that the answer to your question is that we cannot say, "Use the weapons. We're not going to be concerned about the relationship with the paramilitary." I think it undermines the effort in the long term, undermines their democracy in the long term; clearly undermines our own.

SEN. DODD: Okay. So, -- because you raised the El Salvador issue, which you will recall I was very involved in; in fact, authored the legislation that conditioned -- in fact, Jose Napoleon Duarte, the president of El Salvador, was here in the country the very day the amendment was offered on the floor of the United States Senate, and he agreed, in fact, with the conditionalities that we placed on military aid at the time.

There the sources of funding for the FMLN, if you will, in that particular time were either pretty much an indigenous thing -- there may have been some that were coming from Castro, some training and so forth, but I don't recall any suggestion that they were being funded by narco-trafficking. And so it was a -- there was support for them, but nothing that quite equals, I gather, anyway, the level of financial backing that the FARC and the AUC get as a result of their narco business. Do you agree with that?

MR. SCHNEIDER: Absolutely. No question about it.

SEN. DODD: So, you know, I guess I'm getting -- what I'm trying to get at here is how do we -- when you're dealing with two organizations that are getting almost an equal amount of funding, it seems, from -- in fact, the irony in all of this is the United States is funding both sides of this conflict, one through private donations through the illicit drug trafficking and use in this country, and the other through taxpayer money; maybe one of the unique situations in the world where we're actually underwriting the cost of all of this conflict through our habits on consumption and as a result of our commitment to try and support civil society.

My concern here is -- in fact, there are people, I gather, who move between the FARC and the AUC. This is whoever offers better deals financially. It's almost like a draft or you have free agency; people move back and forth based on what either side is willing to offer and pay. That's what this has come to. This idea of any kind of great social motivation seems to have disappeared almost entirely. And so you end up with the resources, financial resources, from Europe and the United States, mostly from the United States, underwriting it.

So why don't you respond to this, Jose, if you would?

MR. VIVANCO: Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to comment on your first question. There is no question, based on our research, but also based on the research done by United Nations, the OAS, Inter- American Human Rights Commission, and so on and so forth, and even the State Department report, that there is a great deal of dependency on the paramilitaries by the Colombian military. In other words, the military, in some areas, not across the country but in some areas where the paramilitary have, you know, a very, very strong presence, and virtually control territory and population, the military rely on the paramilitaries to keep the zone, the area under control.

And in our view, in our experience, based on our experience, the little amount of progress that has been done in terms of human rights in Colombia, and particularly in terms of attempts to break those ties between military and paramilitary organizations, has been done under international pressure, and specifically under U.S. pressure.

We have no real hope that the Colombians will be able to address this issue of links with these criminal organizations by themselves. We do acknowledge that the discourse, the public position of the Colombian leadership is perfectly compatible with international human rights standards. I have met several times with General Tapias, and his line, his public position, his discourse is, I would say, impeccable on these issues. But, what we unfortunately we are able to argue and to demonstrate is that in the field, those links, that relationship is stronger and closer than ever. And so this is a very, very fierce and I would say a very complex, very difficult issue for the military to deal with.

There is one precedent that shows a very interesting degree of progress, which is the ability of the Colombian police to improve its record and to break some links with paramilitary organizations. The Colombian police has been able to make some, you know, I would say serious progress. It's not -- it's not clear from human rights abuses or from relationships with human rights -- with paramilitary organizations, but their policy, their line, you know, their internal -- the way that they deal for this kind of problem is very, very different that the way that the army and the navy in Colombia has been, you know, reacting to charges that they are working with paramilitary organizations.

I will say that some of the credit should be given to General Roso (ph) Jose Serrano for taking that line, and for discharging more than 12,000 members of the police on grounds of corruption, narco- trafficking and human rights abuses. But the -- but, I don't think we should underestimate that that -- that practice, that that change was possible as a result of U.S. engagement and U.S. conditionality, U.S., you know, foreign policy conditionality, and the pressure from this Senate to -- to improve their record and to effectively deal with those one who, you know, engage in abuses.

SEN. DODD: And I appreciate your comments. And I know, by the way, I know that you've got to catch a plan.

MR. VIVANCO: In a -- sometime, yes, soon.

SEN. DODD: Well, let me just -- just move on to a couple of other subject matters here, but let me --

MR. SCHNEIDER: Senator, could I just make one little point on that?

SEN. DODD: Sure.

MR. SCHNEIDER: When -- both when I was in the government and now, in talking to current government, there's no question that the conditionality is used by those who are trying to push the policy in the right direction. And without it, they would be weaker in terms of getting the policy right.

SEN. DODD: Right. Well, let me, I mean, make the case here. I mean, I don't -- it's about whether language is including in the bill, or not included in the language this year -- it is certainly a fact that if and -- if and -- if there is a growing connection, if in fact more evidence is forthcoming that there is a -- a systemic problem here related between the military forces and the AUC, then I would just predict flat out what's going to happen here, and that is that, of course, the Congress of the United States, the American people will walk away from this with a great sense of disappointment in many ways because of what the outcomes may be. But I would predict that would be the result.

And so I again hope -- if hearings have any value beyond extracting sort of restatements or clearer statements of policy, and can also serve as a means of communication -- then let me just predict that if in fact we end up with a growing evidence here of connections between the Colombian military and the AUC, then there will be an overwhelming reaction to that.

There is a reluctance anyway on the part of the American people to be involved in these kinds of matters. This is a hard sell under the best of circumstances. And when you give anyone an argument to step away from it, particularly one that involves brutality, where we're seen as underwriting that, sustaining it, subsidizing it, then people will retreat from it. And I predict that would happen here.

So, I'm hopeful that those in positions of authority, including those who will emerge victorious in the upcoming elections, hear clearly -- and for those of us up here who are very anxious to be helpful and constructive, and to build the kind of international support, particularly regional support for a sustainable effort here, need to know that this is a very, very important issue, and to not deal with it is to place all of this in jeopardy. And I hope they understand that.

Let me ask you about the peace process itself. And I have -- having again been involved in the Central American effort, where we went from -- I didn't think the Contador effort, when we were dealing with Nicaragua and El Salvador was going to be very effective because it was --

If you need to go, Jose --

MR. VIVANCO: I have to.

SEN. DODD: We will leave the questions and we'll have you submit some in writing.

MR. VIVANCO: Thank you very much.

SEN. DODD: Thank you for being here today.

MR. VIVANCO: Actually, I have to fly to Colombia this afternoon.

SEN. DODD: All right. Be careful.

MR. VIVANCO: Okay. Thank you.

SEN. DODD: Mark, let me ask you this. I mean, I always felt that when we made -- moved from the Contadora process, which was sort of a friends group that involved Mexico and Brazil and other nations in the hemisphere and shrunk that down to the Central American countries, very directly -- the ones more directly affected -- it changed the dynamic considerably. We were involved, obviously, but we were not a participant in those meetings in Esquipulas that ultimately produced the framework under the leadership of President Arias of Costa Rica, along with others from the region who supported him, and that brought about, along with other factors, a resolution. In this case here, there's been a suggestion that somehow we ought to be involved in this peace process rather directly. I am uneasy about that. And I would much prefer to see an Andean approach to this, where we play a supporting role rather than a principal role.

Tell me the pros and cons of both approaches and which one you -- you seemed to indicate that the more direct U.S. involvement was necessary.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I think it will be -- there are two things. I -- one, if you take the ELN process separately from the FARC. The ELN process now is one which is focused on how do you get a verifiable cease-fire, and from there, then, in that context of the cease-fire, then move beyond that for substantive negotiations on what would ultimately would be a settlement and a demobilization of the ELN. They're, as you know, as you have mentioned, they're in Cuba, and in one of their recent sessions, one of the conclusions was that they ask the United States become part of that group of facilitators. And, it -- it seems to me that there are two things that are quite important. One is that the parties on both sides understand that the United States will be a supporter of the ultimate settlement helping -- if there's -- helping to finance, helping to convince others to carry out what's needed with respect to monitoring of the process.

And the second is, to be very frank, given our relationship with the Colombian military, and our assistance to the Colombian government, the insurgents, the ELN will be much more convinced that their safety and security will be protected if we are part of that process. If they think that -- if they're satisfied that we are close to, if not part of, the negotiating process that resulted in agreement that -- on which they're going to rely to essentially at some point give up their arms, as we know has happened to past insurgents in Colombia -- once they give up their arms, they were, obviously, many of them were killed. And so, that role is very important.

Whether we have to be there at the table today is another question. It seems to me that we're capable of finding a mechanism in which we are linked to the negotiations. And I think that we should examine what those might be -- whether it's --

SEN. DODD: Why would you negotiate if you're the FARC? Why -- I mean -- you've got a great business going here --

MR. SCHNEIDER: I was just talking about the ELN.

SEN. DODD: Okay, but I'm going to move to the FARC.

MR. SCHNEIDER: On the FARC --

SEN. DODD: Why would you even bother? You've got a great deal going here. Forty years around, living in the woods. Obviously, you're used to that. You've got a billion dollars or more a year coming from the narco business.

MR. SCHNEIDER: You had it good when you had the DMZ.

SEN. DODD: Things are looking pretty good.

MR. SCHNEIDER: You had it good when you had the DMZ. I think it's not quite so good now. But I think the answer is that until the FARC in fact feels threatened militarily, until they see that they're -- they cannot achieve a maintenance of their income and a maintenance of their institutional structure, by doing something other than carrying out these terrorist acts and acting as a -- a pretty brutal insurgency -- until there is a military threat, then I think the negotiations are unlikely to be successful. I think that the issue is to be prepared to have a more effective negotiating structure when that moment comes, not wait and say, well, at some point when it seems clear that they're ready to accept, let's say a cease-fire -- they've never been willing to accept a verifiable cease-fire. And if three months from now they say, "Yes, we are," well, somebody should be prepared with what does that mean, and what do you need to next? And all I'm saying is that what we're recommending is that that process needs to begin so that you're ready when that negotiating possibility exists. But we're also saying right now that the first step in achieving substantive negotiations is ensuring that the FARC doesn't believe that they have a military avenue to achieve their goals and maintain themselves as they are.

SEN. DODD: Yes. Let me ask you the question I asked Secretary Grossman. And first of all, I'll -- let me ask the question that forms the premise. And that is, there seems to be deafening silence from some of our very good friends in the region who are there, you know, they wanted me to support the Andean trade agreement, they want me to support all these things and provide foreign aid and step up to the plate, here we've got 95 percent of cocaine and heroin pouring out of this country, killing kids and families in this country here. A lot of that responsibility falls on us to try and deal with it here at home, but obviously part of the solution rests as well in trying to deal with it on the ground in Colombia.

Why aren't my friends here, who are asking me for help all the time, and I want to help and care about -- why are they more involved in helping us come up with some answers here? And is that necessary, in your view, to a successful conclusion of this effort?

MR. SCHNEIDER: I am -- one of the things that we recommended, in fact, was that the United States should work closely with the neighboring countries, the Andean countries and Panama, in attempting to formulate policies for improved security, intelligence sharing, mutual controls on contraband, assistance to refugees, and also some -- in the places where you have population centers, namely in Ecuador and Southern Peru, and then some integrated border development activities. Yeah, we think that there should be more, and we think that the regional -- the Andean countries should be brought into the process of discussing what some of the steps ought to be. And I wouldn't just focus it on the security drug issue.

SEN. DODD: But in general, it seems to me -- I don't disagree with that -- but it does -- I mean, I don't get a sense that there is -- that there is an effort being made here --

MR. SCHNEIDER: Part of the reason is, to be very frank, I think those countries want to keep away from it because they're afraid -- they're afraid that if they become active in terms of support for the Colombian government, active militarily, that they'll be threatened more by the FARC, they'll give a reason for the FARC to go after some of them.

SEN. DODD: And the AUC as well.

MR. SCHNEIDER: I suspect that that may be a factor.

SEN. DODD: Well, those are very helpful observations. And, we -- I raised the issue earlier about the --

MR. SCHNEIDER: If I may, Senator, let me just say one other thing in terms of our allies. The Europeans, as you know, are stepping up in terms of doing more on the aid for displaced persons and looking at the -- some economic and social activities with respect to peace laboratories. One of the questions that I would ask is whether the -- why the EU and others should not become more engaged on the justice side as well. In other countries, as we know, around the world, they have. It seems to me that we might be able to engage them in this area as well.

SEN. DODD: Well, you're right. And, of course, one only has to look back to their -- their lack of appetite to get involved in the Bosnian situation, which was far closer to home, geographically. And this one here, they've been involved, but more as critics than offering, in my view, any constructive efforts here. If they don't want to get involved in the military issues here, but only in the economic development side of the question, their participation has been rather anemic, and rather disappointing. That's another set of questions. I mean, I -- there's a limited ability to what neighboring countries can do in the region. I think, though, border security is one of them, and certainly helping contain this. And the obvious answer to the question you pose -- or at least the observation you made -- that if in fact, for whatever reason, successful in Colombia, this shows up someplace else, and you could be next. And so it seems to me it's -- it's, you know, it's that old -- that old statement made by the Protestant minister in Nazi Germany when -- he said, "When they went after the Jews, I wasn't a Jew, so what difference did it make? And then after the gypsies, and I wasn't a gypsy. They went after the homosexuals, and down the line, and finally they came after me, and I looked around and there was no one there." In a sense, this scourge poses risks for everybody.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Absolutely.

SEN. DODD: And if you sort of pretend it's not affecting you and you stay away from it in fear that it might show up, I can almost predict it will, to some degree. And so I hope we can get more participation and support from the European community as well.

But I'll have some additional questions you may submit for the -- for the record, but I want to thank you again for your report. I think it's an excellent job. I think the points that you've made about the human rights issue is extremely valid. And again, I hope these hearings serve a number of purposes -- not the least of which is to communicate to those on the ground in Colombia that for those up here who have been very supportive, I think, over the years, and clearly want to stay involved here and recognize the importance of this issue, we'd hope that we can only help those who really are interested in helping themselves. And if they're not, that becomes obvious and evident. And then despite all of our desires to be cooperative and supportive, become very hard to convince other members of the Congress to cast ballots, to allocate taxpayer resources, if in fact there's a growing sense that people here are unwilling to take the necessary steps.

And again, I want to state, as I did at the outset, I -- I repeat these statistics about the civil society has suffered in Colombia from members of the press, and the judiciary, executive branch, congressional branches, candidates for office, mayors, small towns, my admiration for their courage to stand -- to be a mayor in a small town in Colombia where there's going to be no notoriety for doing so, but merely because you believe democracy is the way people ought to be able to live their lives. And when you merely offer yourself up to try and deal with the problems of your town, you become a target for assassination and kidnaping, is something we cannot ignore. And to -- and so I want to be involved in this, and I want to be supportive, and I know you do as well.

With that, I want to thank my colleagues who were able to make it by here this morning for this hearing. We'll leave the record open. This is an ongoing discussion. There will be more hearings and more debate about this issue as we move forward, but I think this morning's hearing has been helpful. And I thank all of our witnesses.

The committee will stand adjourned.

 

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