Speech by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), April 30, 2002

Speech by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), April 30, 2002
Congressional Record Statement

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA

APRIL 30, 2002

MR. LEAHY. Mr. President, the week before last, Colombia's President Andres Pastrana was in Washington for what may have been his last official visit before elections in May to choose his successor. Under Colombia's Constitution, President Pastrana cannot run for re-election. The new President will be inaugurated in August.

I have known the President for several years, and consider him a friend. I respect him greatly. He has worked diligently for peace, often at great personal risk, and while he ultimately was unable to obtain the peace agreement with the guerrillas that he so deeply wanted, his administration will be remembered for other achievements. Today, thanks to his efforts and those of Colombia's fine Ambassador, Luis Moreno, Colombia's relations with the United States, which had suffered under previous Colombian administrations, are strong and based on mutual respect.

I want to thank President Pastrana for his friendship, for the dignity that he restored to the presidency, for his dedication to his people. Although we did not always agree about U.S. policy toward Colombia, President Pastrana always treated me with respect and warmth. I am grateful to him, and wish him the best in the future. While I regret that I was unable to travel to his country during his term of office, I am determined to do so and look forward to visiting him there when I do.

Mr. President, the issue of U.S. policy toward Colombia is the subject of considerable concern in Washington, both because of President Pastrana's recent visit, and because of President Bush's supplemental appropriations request, which proposes to shift the focus of our assistance program in Colombia from counter-narcotics to counter-terrorism.

I am of mixed minds about this proposal, and want to take a moment do discuss some of my concerns.

Mr. President, before we rush to bring the war against international terrorism to Colombia's jungle as the Administration and some in Congress now urge, we would do well to understand that country's feudal history. We should also review what has been done with the nearly $2 billion we have appropriated for Colombia in the past two years.

"Plan Colombia," devised by the Clinton Administration and the Colombian Government to counter the flourishing trade in cocaine from Colombia to the United States, called for $7.5 billion. Colombia was to contribute $4 billion, and, were told at the time, the U.S. share was $1.6 billion. Donations by other countries, mostly the Europeans, have not materialized. The Colombian Government's support has also fallen far short. For fiscal year 2003, the Bush Administration seeks another $439 million in counter-drug aid, plus $98 million in military aid, for a total of $537 million.

So far, U.S. tax dollars have paid for a fleet of aircraft to spray chemical herbicide over large areas of the country planted in coca, combat helicopters to protect the planes from ground fire, and training and equipment for counter-drug battalions. More funds were provided for economic programs to give coca farmers alternative sources of income and to reform Colombia's dysfunctional justice system.

Because of the Colombian military's poor human rights record, Congress conditioned aid on the prosecution of military officers implicated in serious abuses, and on the severing of the military's links with illegal paramilitary groups. These groups, like the guerrillas, have been designated by the Administration as terrorist organizations.

Mr. President, by any objective measure, Plan Colombia's results have been, at best, disappointing.

First, the State Department predicted a 30 percent reduction in coca cultivation by the end of 2002. Although 84,250 hectares were sprayed last year, coca cultivation in Colombia actually rose, by at least 21,100 hectares. There has not been any reduction in the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S., and virtually no one in the Administration thinks there will be.

Second, while aerial spraying may at some point reduce the coca crop, there is vast territory ripe for future cultivation and a huge U.S. demand for drugs. Serious questions have been raised about the health and environmental impact of the spraying which need to be satisfactorily answered if this program is to continue. Manual eradication, as was done in Bolivia and Peru, should be reconsidered, and we should target the large growers, drug labs and traffickers. Moreover, any of these eradication efforts will ultimately fail without economic alternatives for those displaced by coca eradication.

Third, U.S.-funded economic programs have produced little in the way of viable alternatives. It is dangerous and difficult to implement these programs in conflict zones where coca is grown. The Colombian Government has not invested enough of its own money in these areas, and however much it has invested has produced few tangible results. Nor has it done enough to reform its sagging economy. This needs to be a partnership, and our support for alternative income programs should focus where the needs are greatest and programs can be sustained.

Fourth, senior military officers implicated in the murders of civilians, or who abet paramilitary violence and drug trafficking, have not been jailed despite the conditions on U.S. aid. Many remain on active duty and some have been promoted. Human rights investigators and prosecutors have been threatened, killed or forced to flee the country. While some soldiers have been suspended, none have been prosecuted and some have joined paramilitaries.

Under our law, the Secretary of State must certify that certain human rights conditions have been met prior to the release of military aid. Earlier this year, a number of high-ranking Administration officials traveled to Colombia, and informed Colombian military officers that more progress was needed. Unfortunately, as far as I am aware, no such progress has taken place and therefore, to his credit, the Secretary has not made the certification. However, I am told the certification could come at any time, and if that is true I hope that it is based on facts and reflects a good faith application of the law.

Fifth, top paramilitary leaders, implicated in hundreds of murders, travel around the country and give press interviews despite numerous warrants for their arrest. One has to ask why these arrest warrants, many of which have been pending for years, have not been executed? Local military commanders share airfields, intelligence and logistics, and in some instances even coordinate attacks. While some members of paramilitaries have been captured, their influence has grown throughout the country and they are responsible for a large share of targeted assassinations and gruesome attacks against unarmed civilians. Like the guerrillas, the paramilitaries are deeply involved in drug trafficking. Continued U.S. aid to the Colombian military must be tied to accountability for abuses and to aggressively fighting the paramilitaries, particularly the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia ("AUC").

Sixth, President Pastrana's brave efforts to negotiate peace, cynically spurned by the guerrillas, have collapsed. The violence has intensified and the guerrillas, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"), have sharply escalated kidnappings, assassinations and other terrorist acts. They are unlikely to be able to defeat the Colombian military, but they can lay siege to cities by cutting off water and power supplies. Colombia's generals are now asking the U.S. for aid to fight the war.

Mr. President, Americans need to understand that Colombia is really two "countries," which is at the heart of its problems. The thinly populated, impoverished eastern half, which the government has ignored for generations, is mired in the 19th Century, while the sophisticated, urban west is edging toward the 21st. There are deeply rooted social, economic and political reasons why Latin America's oldest conflict is no closer to resolution, and why drug money, corruption and lawlessness permeate Colombian society. These problems, which ultimately only Colombians can solve, will not be fixed by attacking the symptoms, and an all out war against the twin terrorist threats -- guerrillas and paramilitaries -- would cost far more, take far longer, and wreak more havoc than anyone in Washington has acknowledged so far.

Until now we have confined our aid to fighting drugs. In the first sign of a shift, the Administration asked Congress for an additional $98 million to protect 100 miles of an oil pipeline that has been a frequent target of guerrilla attacks that have cost Colombia $500 million a year in oil revenues. The White House is now seeking broad, new counter-terrorism authority in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental, opening the door to a deeper, open-ended U.S. involvement in Colombia.

If we go down that road what would be the likely result? Colombia is not Afghanistan, and no one supports sending U.S. troops. But while no two countries are the same, we gave over $5 billion to the military of El Salvador, a country with 1/50th the land area of Colombia, and they could not defeat the guerrillas there. Are we, and the Colombian people who currently spend a meager 3 percent of GDP on the army, prepared for a wider war, the huge cost, many more displaced people, and the inevitable increase in civilian casualties? Is the only alternative to continue a limited, ineffective counter-drug strategy, and the growth in public support for the AUC which may ultimately pose a greater threat to the country than the FARC? Can the military be made to see their oft-times allies, the AUC, as terrorists to be fought as aggressively as the FARC? Should we send an envoy of the caliber of Richard Holbrooke to push for a cease fire, and actively support a much more inclusive negotiating strategy than was pursued previously? What about attacking the security problems that have given rise to the AUC, by strengthening Colombia's National Police, who have a cleaner human rights record and who may be more effective in responding to kidnappings and other terrorist acts?

We want to help Colombia, particularly as the FARC has evolved from a rebel movement with a political ideology to a drug-financed terrorist syndicate. But we and the Colombians need to be clear about our goals and what it would take to achieve them. We should not commit ourselves to a costly policy that is fogged with ambiguity, and we should not subvert our other objectives of promoting the rule of law, protecting human rights, and supporting equitable economic development. Goal-setting should also be coordinated, after the elections in May, with Colombia's new president, who may favor an entirely different approach.

Finally, just as Colombians need to take far more responsibility for their own problems, Colombia cannot solve America's drug problem. Too often, we unfairly blame Colombia, and the other Andean nations, for the epidemic of drug addiction in our own country. Our meager attempts to reduce demand for drugs have failed, and unless we devote far more effort to what we know works -- education and treatment -- the drugs will keep coming and Americans will keep dying.

I yield the floor.

As of May 3, 2002, this document was also available online at http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/foreign%20policy/ColumbiaPolicy.htm