"Why
Álvaro Uribe Worries Us," by the Center for International
Policy, June 17, 2002
Why
Álvaro Uribe Worries Us:
Does Colombia’s president-elect deserve Washington’s
unconditional embrace?
On Tuesday Álvaro
Uribe will visit Washington for the first time since his first-round victory
in Colombia’s May 26 presidential elections. Mr. Uribe, who takes office
on August 7, has recently called for increased social spending and UN
mediation of peace negotiations with Colombia’s guerrilla and paramilitary
groups. We applaud these proposals, as well as his nominations of women
to powerful government ministries like Defense and Foreign Relations.
However, several
of the president-elect’s positions and proposals concern us deeply. While
it is important to show support to a popularly elected president, the
Bush administration and Congress must take care to do so without appearing
to endorse all of Mr. Uribe’s positions.
- Mr. Uribe proposes
to double the number of professional soldiers in Colombia’s Army
(volunteers, not short-term recruits), to over 100,000. It is not
clear, though, how he proposes to pay the cost. Will he raise taxes
on wealthy Colombians? (Colombia’s National Association of Financial
Institutions reports that only 1.89 percent of the country’s GDP currently
goes to defense.) Will he be forced to cut social expenditure, exacerbating
one of the conflict’s key causes? Or will he find himself in Washington
every few months asking for more military aid?
- Mr. Uribe’s campaign
literature calls for giving “judicial police power to the army
and allowing the security forces to carry out preventive detentions”
and searches. But Colombia has tried this approach several times in
its history, with disastrous results. The “security statute” of President
Julio César Turbay (1978-1982), for instance, had little effect on guerrilla
groups but brought a sharp rise in politically motivated murders, disappearances
and torture. It is not clear what Mr. Uribe plans to do differently.
How does he propose to keep extra military powers from being used arbitrarily,
against peaceful political opposition (human rights groups, labor unions,
opposition political parties and others)?
- Most Colombian
and international human rights groups are aghast at Mr. Uribe’s proposal
to create a million-strong civilian militia to supplement the
armed forces throughout the country. “We will all support the security
forces, basically with information,” Mr. Uribe’s campaign ‘manifesto’
reads. “We will begin with a million citizens. Without paramilitarism.
With local security fronts in neighborhoods and the business sector.
Networks of information-gatherers [vigilantes] on roads and in the countryside.”
Again, this plan resembles past efforts that have failed tragically.
Colombia has a long and bitter history of “legal paramilitaries” acting
beyond the state’s control, terrorizing innocent civilians with impunity.
One need look no further then Mr. Uribe’s experience as governor of
Antioquia province in the mid-1990s, when he set up numerous so-called
“Special Vigilance and Private Security Services” or “CONVIVIR” units.
Many Convivir units committed serious abuses and routinely collaborated
with – or were even absorbed by – Colombia’s murderous paramilitary
groups. A failure, they were declared illegal in 1998.
The United States cannot support – directly or indirectly – any new
attempt to create such a force. The possibility of association with
a humanitarian catastrophe should deter us from supporting Mr. Uribe’s
scheme.
- Meanwhile, Mr.
Uribe’s commitment to combating paramilitaries remains unclear. Rhetorically,
he appears willing to employ the military against the right-wing squads,
which are responsible for the majority of non-combatant killings and
benefit too frequently from the armed forces’ toleration. But we remain
puzzled by reports that paramilitary units gathered voters in neighborhoods
and villages throughout the country and urged them to choose Mr. Uribe.
We are disturbed as well that Mr. Uribe and his new Interior/Justice
Minister, Fernando Londoño, were keynote speakers at an April 29, 1999
dinner in honor of Rito Alejo del Río and Fernando Millán, two generals
who were forced out of the military a month earlier (under heavy U.S.
pressure) due to widespread allegations of collusion with paramilitaries.
- Finally, Mr. Uribe’s
proposal to involve the United Nations in negotiations is admirable,
but it is unlikely that the time for UN involvement will come anytime
soon. The president-elect also insists that peace processes cannot
begin until Colombia’s armed groups first agree to a cease-fire – a
pre-condition that none is even considering right now. For the foreseeable
future, then, Colombia is more likely to endure a period of all-out
warfare as all sides try to maneuver each other into a cease-fire on
their terms. During this period of total war, the United Nations would
have no role.
During his visit,
Mr. Uribe needs to address these concerns explicitly. He needs to explain
clearly to the American people, who are giving Colombia’s security forces
almost $400 million this year, exactly how his proposals can be implemented
without adding unnecessarily to the tragic loss of life in Colombia.
The United States
must support Colombia, but it cannot do so blindly. Instead of cheerleading
for Mr. Uribe, we urge the Bush administration and Congress to ask tough
questions of their visitor. As the U.S. mission in Colombia expands beyond
the drug war to counter-insurgency support, it is crucial that we understand
where Mr. Uribe might lead us.
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