Letter
from 45 members of the U.S. Congress to Secretary of State Powell, July
23, 2002
Secretary of State
Colin Powell
The US State Department
2201 C Street
Washington, DC
Dear Secretary of
State Powell,
We are writing to express our concern over the State Department’s
decision to certify Colombia’s compliance with section 567 of the
FY2002 foreign operations appropriations bill. We are not convinced that
the evidence supports the contention that the Colombian military is suspending
personnel credibly alleged to have committed serious human rights violations,
cooperating with civilian judicial authorities, and taking effective measures
to sever links with paramilitary groups. As you consider your decision
on the second round of military aid, which we understand may be made in
September, please take the following comments into consideration. The
Congress included conditions in the FY2002 foreign operations legislation
to ensure that the Colombian Armed Forces, which receive the bulk of the
funds destined to Colombia through the Andean Regional Initiative, are
respecting human rights.
We appreciate the State Department’s efforts to make clear to the
Colombian government the importance of improving the human rights situation
and meeting the specific requirements of section 567. We are dismayed,
however, by the lack of response from the Colombian government. In particular,
we are unconvinced that the short list of primarily lower-level soldiers
and officers who have been suspended for human rights violations from
January 2001 to April 2002 constitutes progress, given the substantial
evidence against a number of high-level officers who remain on active
duty despite credible evidence that they have tolerated, aided or abetted
paramilitary forces. In addition, there is disturbing evidence that the
Colombian attorney general lacks the political will to investigate and
prosecute army officers implicated in grave violations.
The State Department’s report on the certification decision cited
the appointment of General Rodrigo Quiñones to a military attaché
position as evidence of progress. But, despite an outstanding decision
by the Procuradería concluding that General Quiñones had
planned and ordered the murders of at least 57 trade unions, human rights,
and community leaders in the Barrancabermeja area in 1991-92, this officer
remains on active duty. In 2000, troops under his command were implicated
in helping paramilitaries to carry out the El Salado massacre. A year
later, those same troops, with Quiñones as commander, allegedly
allowed heavily armed paramilitaries to travel past them to Chengue, where
paramilitaries committed a massacre. A Navy sergeant under Quiñones’
command was subsequently charged with supplying weapons to paramilitaries
and helping coordinate the attack in Chengue. Quiñones was charged
with ignoring detailed information received in advance about paramilitary
movements near Chengue. The failure to investigate, prosecute, and punish
high-level officers like Quiñones, General Gabriel Diaz, and others
who are strongly implicated in aiding and abetting paramilitary forces
has a profound impact on the attitudes of other members of Colombia’s
military.
Events surrounding the Chengue massacre case also demonstrate the Colombian
military’s continued resistance to cooperate fully with civilian
justice officials. Prosecutor Yolanda Paternina Negrete, who led the Chengue
investigation, told her superiors that officers in Colombia’s Marine
Infantry failed repeatedly to provide her with the support necessary to
search a ranch where witnesses claimed the paramilitaries responsible
for the massacre were located. On May 27, 2001, two investigators working
on the case were detained by known paramilitaries and are now presumed
dead. On August 29, 2001, Prosecutor Paternina herself was killed by unidentified
gunmen in Sincelejo, Sucre. The office in Colombia of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights called these killings “a systematic campaign of
retaliation and intimidation” by those seeking “total impunity
for the most serious crimes committed in the country.”
We are also disturbed by the characterization of army actions in Barrancabermeja
as an example of progress in breaking army-paramilitary ties. Despite
the high concentration of security forces in Barrancabermeja, the city
remains under virtual paramilitary control. Paramilitaries move freely
through the city, issue rules of conduct, and exert control over the civilian
population, who live in an atmosphere of terror.
We would like to see further evidence of what happens after paramilitary
troops are captured. We understand that the numbers of paramilitary captures
reported by the Colombian Ministry of Defense has increased. It is important
to analyze whether those captured are prosecuted and punished, or released;
as well as whether some high-ranking officials are among those captured
and prosecuted.
We believe that the Colombian government’s failure to act effectively
to sever army-paramilitary ties, despite pressure from the U.S. State
Department and the requirements of section 567, bodes ill for the future
of U.S.-Colombian military cooperation and for the protection of human
rights in Colombia. Moreover, we have been assured that U.S. assistance
and training would promote the professionalism of the Colombian military
and improve the human rights record of the Colombian military. To date,
we believe there has been little progress. Again, we urge you to take
our concerns into account when determining whether to approve additional
military aid for Colombia this year.
Sincerely,
Schakowsky
Sherrod Brown
Lee
Hinchey
McGovern
Evans
Lipinski
Doggett
Joe Wilson
Leach
Miller
DeLauro
Jackson
Lofgren
Kaptur
Rush
Lynch
Lantos
Woolsey
Oberstar
Waters
Blagojevich
Sawyer
Doyle
Serrano
Lowey
Coyne
Conyers
Sanders
McKinney
Rodriguez
Kleczka
Farr
Kucinich
Payne
Cummings
Mink
Clay
Borski
Markey
Baldwin
Berman
Wu
Danny Davis
Rahall 