Transcript,
Hearing of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control on "U.S.
Policy in the Andean Region," September 17, 2002
U.S.
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Andean Region
September 17, 2002 - Washington, D.C.
WITNESSES:
RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, Deputy Secretary of State
ASA HUTCHINSON, DIRECTOR, United States Drug Enforcement Administration
BRIGADIER GENERAL GALEN B. JACKMAN, Director of Operations for the United
States Southern, Command, United States Army
MEMBERS OF THE CAUCUS:
U.S. SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. (D-DE)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR BOB GRAHAM (D-FL)
U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CA)
U.S. SENATOR TOM HARKIN (D-IA)
U.S. SENATOR CHARLES E. GRASSLEY (R-IA)
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL)
U.S. SENATOR MIKE DEWINE (R-OH)
GRAHAM: Call the
hearing to order. Senator Biden has been unexpectedly delayed on the train,
will be arriving in approximately 30 minutes. We will also be joined by
other members of the committee. But in difference to the schedules of
our witnesses, I would like to commence. I have an opening statement which
I will summarize and then insert in the record. I am very appreciative
that we have such distinguished Americans with a wealth of background
on the subject who will be giving us the benefit of their insights on
a very important issue, which is the blending of drug traffickers and
their nefarious activities, and the actions of terrorist group in the
Andean Region, particularly in Colombia. This blending of drug and guerrilla
empires has a significant adverse effect on the countries in which it
has occurred, and also has the potential of effecting neighboring nations
including the United States.
One effect that it
will have on the United States is to cause us to re-look at our policy.
Historically, we have recognized a division between narcotics producers
and traffickers, and guerrilla and insurgency groups. Both of those have
operated in Colombia, but each has had a different set of objectives.
For the past decade the United States aid in Colombia has focused almost
exclusively on counter- narcotics. And for the good reason that Colombia's
the primary source of cocaine and heroine to the United States, has been
an increasing source of supply, and that has fed Americans habit, which
last year resulted in the consumption of over $64 billion of illegal drugs.
While our response
to counter-narcotics has been vigorous, we have at the same time taken
essentially a hands-off policy relative to the guerrilla insurgences in
these countries. However, over time these groups have come together. The
drug organizations benefit by the terrorist military skills, weapons,
counterfeit documents and relationship with other suspect organizations.
The terrorist organizations gain revenue, access to boats and aircraft,
and money laundering experience. In many instances, the two, narco-traffickers
and guerrillas have become one.
This poses a significant
to the United States as to how it will continue to pursue its policies
against narcotics when the same person in the same uniform is also a terrorist
guerrilla. The administration has recommended some alterations to our
previous policies, which will allow for a recognition of this blending
of the two. And we look forward, particularly, to getting your insights
and recommendations as to what future policies would be.
Right now, the acts
of terror have been contained largely within Colombia, yet they are beginning
to threaten regional stability and U.S. interest through the transaction
-- national arms sales, drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion. Some
recent examples, Colombia statistically is the world's most terrorist
afflicted nation. Together, the three groups, the FARC, the ELN and the
United Self Defense Group of Colombia, the AUC, are responsible for more
than 90 percent of terrorist incidents in the Western hemisphere.
The State Department
reported that these three groups regularly engage in attacks on key infrastructure
include pipelines, dams, electric equipments, roads and bridges. As an
example, the Cano Limon pipeline in Northern Colombia was bombed 170 times
in 2001 alone. It has been bombed 918 times since 1986, spilling almost
three million barrels of oil, 11 times the amount of the Exxon Valdez
oil tanker disaster.
The narcotics terrorists
sabotage of oil pipelines have cost the government of Colombia lost revenue
in the order of $500 million per year. Colombia is facing an outright
assault by these illegal armed terrorists on its own government, society
and people. In 2001, over 3,000 Colombians were killed and 2,856 kidnapped.
In 2001, 55 percent of all terrorist attacks on U.S. interest in the world
occurred in Colombia. Colombia has suffered more terrorist abductions
than were reported in the rest of the world's countries combined. These
abductions included five American citizens and more than 70 Americans
over the past decade.
Since 1992 the FARC
and ELN have kidnapped 51 U.S. citizens and murdered 13 with three remaining
unaccounted for. The events of the past year and the past decade should
leave no doubt that these groups do not care about the political process,
democracy, Colombian citizens or even the nation of Colombia itself. In
light of these facts, the United States has recognized that cocaine and
terror have merged in Colombia and are merging in the Andean Region. The
Andean counter- drug initiative, combined with new legal authorities,
will aid Colombia in confronting the barrage of narco-terrorism.
We have three distinguished
Americans to share with us their views on this subject. And I would like
to introduce them at this time, and they will be called upon to give their
comments in the order of introduction.
The first we have
Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. His experience with government
and foreign policy is extensive. A veteran of three combat tours in Vietnam,
he has held many positions across the United States government including
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Administrative Assistant here in the Senate,
and now the number two position at the Department of State.
Our second witness
has also has extensive experience. Asa Hutchinson is the Administrator
of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Over the past year he has become
a regular and familiar face here at the drug caucus. Of course, Administrator
Hutchinson previously was a member of the United States House of Representatives
and in that position was also an active figure in terms of counter-drug
policy.
Our third witness
is General Galen Jackman, a Brigadier General in the United States Army,
the Director of Operations for the United States Southern Command. He
has served in the army for nearly 30 years, and we welcome General Jackman
join us today.
We have two members
of the committee who have joined us.
Senator Grassley,
do you have an opening statement?
GRASSLEY: A very
short one.
I would first of
all like to thank Chairman Biden for calling this hearing, and Senator
Graham, who I worked with on the work of this committee for a long period
of time, for his starting the meeting and chairing it today.
And also I think
it speaks well of the administration by sending at high level, like each
of our witness are today, of the seriousness of this problem, and how
our government takes it to heart, both from the standpoint of the international
relations and the international problem as well as a domestic problem
by having three people like you come. So I thank the administration and
you for participating.
Senator Graham and
I have talked several times about the devastation that our narcotics has
done to the youth of our country, and simultaneously to the peace and
stability of our allies in Latin America. The challenges that we face
from narcotics and Latin America are not new challenges, although they
wear new faces from time to time.
The drug threat has
not gone away, nor has it lessened since the tragic events of a year ago.
The last year has seen elections, Bolivia, Colombia, a resurgence of rebels,
Peru, violence over Coca eradication programs in Bolivia, Colombia, what
seems to be the epicenter of Coca production. And regional violence has
a seen a peace process fail. The fighting strength of the FARC and the
paramilitary terrorists groups rise while its economy has continued to
stagnate. Newspapers have printed stories of arms for drugs, plane flights
between Venezuela, Southern Colombia. Parts of Ecuador and Panama have
become resting areas for the FARC, the ELN and the AUC terrorist organizations.
Eradication is the
corner stone of our counter-narcotics strategy. This strategy has been
based on the assumption that if by spraying Coca we can make in unprofitable
for farmers to raise it that the farmer will change to legitimate crops.
Our alternative development strategy is built off this assumption, focusing
on providing farmers profitable alternatives to Coca. The military equipment
and training that we have been providing is based on this assumption,
under the argument that Coca fields must be secured on the ground so that
they're safe to spray from the air.
Now I have supported
this strategy because if Coca farmer is a decision-maker as to whether
or not Coca is grown, then the logic stands up. It is a strategy that
will take some time to work, particularly when we are working in a hostile
environment against well-funded opposition in cooperation with governments
who are too often out-manned, out-gunned, out-funded.
But despite a consecrated
effort in Colombia, Coca production has increased from an estimated 50,900
acres in '95 to 136,000, 2001. This production expansion has offset any
gains that we have made in Bolivia or Peru, we believe. We have not seen
a significant change in the aperitif price, availability levels of cocaine
during the time. We have watched Coca production move from one area of
Colombia to another and seen an expansion to opium as well.
Most recently the
president proposed, and in the supplemental appropriation bill, Congress
has so likewise consented to expand the authority for counter-narcotics
materials provided to Colombia.
In addition, we have
seen some retrenchment in the process against Coca production that has
been made in Bolivia and Peru. We are in effect expanding the mission
of a fix set of resources in Colombia while facing an increased threat
elsewhere.
With illegal drugs
produced in the countries killing Americans everyday, of course it's in
our interest to promote political stability, rule of law and economic
success in the region. Addressing narcotics trafficking, which is funding
many of the conflicts in the Andes, is a logical place to be.
But I don't think
the region of the world has become any safer or any more stable since
we significantly increased our levels of assistance three years ago. While
I do think our assistance has been beneficial, the fact is the supply
of drugs from the Andes has not decreased. Each of us can agree that we
want to do something to make a difference, and I look forward to this
discussion today to see if we can be more successful in the future.
Thank you.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Senator.
Senator DeWine?
DEWINE: Chairman,
thank you very much. Let me first thank our panelist for being here. This
is...
GRASSLEY: Senator.
DEWINE: This is, as my colleagues have pointed out, a very distinguished
panel and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
I have believed,
as I think we all do, that we really need a balanced strategy. I think
I've talked to each one of our witnesses at one time or another about
the need for that balanced strategy, and I think we constantly strive
to do that.
The first step in
a balanced strategy is, of course, achieved by eradicating drugs at their
source. We have to go to the source. In doing this, we can take an important
step towards reducing domestic supply and demand.
Right here in our
own hemisphere, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC,
is estimated to receive --and we don't know for sure the figures, but
it's estimated to receive $300 million a year from drug sales alone. Colombia's
right-wing paramilitaries get 40 to 70 percent of their income from the
illegal drug trade. These groups use drug profits to carry out murder,
kidnappings and extortion on a routine, if not daily, basis.
Since 1990, 73 Americans
alone have been taken hostage in Colombia. And since 1995, 12 have been
murdered. On August 7, during the new president's inauguration, the FARC
launched attacks on the presidential palace killing 21 people. Four children
and one pregnant woman were among the dead. Within weeks of the inauguration,
reports emerged that the FARC has issued a direct order to its forces
to carry out attacks on American citizens in Colombia. The media also
has reported that a bomb had been sent to Colombia's Attorney General,
and fortunately, it was intercepted before anyone was harmed or killed.
In addition to shedding
to light on the increasing chaotic situation in Colombia, these recent
events highlight the fact that we're not simply dealing with a drug problem
in the Andean Region. We're dealing with a problem of regional security,
a problem the United States simply cannot ignore.
Guerrillas and paramilitary
forces battle to control rural areas causing massive internal displacement.
The drug trade funds outlaw groups are directly responsible for violence,
for internal conflict, and gross human rights violations. The conflict
in Colombia and its spillover effects have created political instability,
deterred foreign investment, and increased capital flight from the nations
of the entire region.
While nations such
as Bolivia and Peru have made progress and have seen decreased cocaine
production, their leaders remain under tremendous significant political
pressure and civil unrest is on the rise.
Mr. Chairman, we
must do everything possible to prevent illegal drug income from being
used to finance regional instability or international terrorism. This
is true whether we're talking about the Taliban in Afghanistan or the
FARC in Colombia. If we fail to sever the ties between the drug money
and terrorism, then we risk losing fragile democracies around the world.
And not just around the world, right here in our own back yard in countries
such Colombia and Haiti.
The success of the Andean Regional Initiative is critical to defeating
this threat. The ARI supports programs to protect human rights workers
in Colombia, strengthens democratic institutions in Peru, supports judicial
reform in Bolivia, and helps the government of Ecuador to fight corruption
and promote public accountability. It helps promote economic alternatives
to Coca production by including access to markets and fostering environmentally
sustainable production. The ARI provides a balance between law enforcement
and security programs, and social and economic development.
While in some cases
difficult to implement, the alternative development, judicial reform and
economic growth projects are important components of this package. Safeguarding
peace, security and democracy in the Andean Region presents some of the
most important challenges facing our hemisphere.
So I look forward
to hearing from our witnesses this morning, and to working to with each
one of them, and with the chairman, members of this committee in the future.
Thank you.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Senator DeWine.
Our first witness
is Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.
ARMITAGE: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. Good
morning, Mr. Grassley, Mr. DeWine. I remember very well the discussion
you and Senator DeWine and I had, sir, when you talked about having this
very hearing. We're very grateful that the Senate drug caucus cares so
deeply about these issues, and we've been very heartened by the support
you've given us.
Now I realize having
been up here a time or two that the patience of the committee is in inverse
proportion to the length of my opening statement, so I'm just going to
submit if for the record and I'll try to stand by and answer as factually
as I can any questions that you may have, Mr. Chairman.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Mr. Secretary.
Administrator Hutchinson?
HUTCHINSON: Thank
you, Senator Graham, Senator Grassley, Senator DeWine. It's a pleasure
to be before this caucus again.
And joining with
Mr. Armitage, I want to join in our thanks to this committee for its continued
support and I'm pleased to be on this panel as well with General Jackman,
and to offer our testimony with regard to the Andean Regional Initiative.
And I would like to make brief comments. I'll certainly try to keep them
brief, aware of the need for question and answer session.
But I want cover
three areas in my oral testimony; first of all, DEA initiative under the
Andea Regional Program, secondly, the results of these efforts, and thirdly
what's ahead.
First of all the
DEA, the Drug Enforcement Administration, focuses its efforts on targeting
trafficking organizations that have the greatest impact on the United
States. This is DEA's priority targeting system, and there are currently
22 listed priority target investigations in South America. South American
offices are focused on these targets.
The second part of
our program, that the Senators are very well aware of, would be the sensitive
investigative units that have been developed in Colombia and the adjoining
countries. This group of specifically trained and vetted police officers
carry out highly sensitive investigations that directly impact the United
States.
There are currently
four distinct SIUs operating in Colombia. They are divided based upon
their investigative responsibilities. They have offices located in the
major cities of Colombia and are completed funded by the DEA.
It has been a very
highly successful program and it has enhanced our ability to go after
the organizational structures. We, in addition, have SIU programs in other
Andean countries include Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Brazil. Since FY 2000,
the DEA has trained 579 foreign law enforcement officers in this program,
and we conduct other training initiatives as well.
Thirdly, I want to
mention extradition. Extradition has been one of the most effective tools
that we have in our arsenal to go after the traffickers in South America.
Since the Colombian constitution was amended to allow extradition in 1997,
we have extradited 26 Colombian nationals in the United States to stand
justice.
Next initiative would
be the regional intelligence sharing program that we have. In late November
of 2001, 25 unified Caribbean online regional network systems were purchased
and distributed to host nation law enforcement. These are called the Unicorm
(ph) System and they are in nine South American countries. It improves
the communication through encryption software with our host nation counterparts
and allows us, in a timely fashion, to share sensitive law enforcement
information to allow us to proceed with our investigations. Those are
a sample of the initiatives that the DEA has undertaken in the region.
What are the results
of those initiatives? First of all, we have had significant enforcement
successes. In March of this year, the Department of Justice indicted three
members of the 16th front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
or the FARC, specifically their commander Tomas Molina, and a member,
Carlos Bolas, on charge of conspiracy to bring cocaine into the United
States. It was the first time members of a known terrorist organization
have been indicted for drug trafficking.
In June of 2002,
I was very pleased that because of some good DEA investigative work and
cooperation of host nation law enforcement, we were able to arrest one
of the indicted members in Suriname, Carlos Bolas. He was subsequently
transported to the United States to face trial. He is in custody here
in the Washington D.C. area.
HUTCHINSON: Combining
this with the fact in March of 2002, this year, the Colombian national
police, in coordination with the DEA, went into the recently reclaimed
Dispay (ph) area, which was set aside for peaceful negotiation with the
terrorist organization.
And we found something
totally different. We found seven tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine
base in two cocaine processing laboratories that were operated by the
FARC in this particular area. So clearly, we found from that raid the
terrorist organization (inaudible) involved in drug trafficking activity.
In the last 20 months,
vessels intercepted from Colombia, based upon intelligence, have led the
interdiction of approximately 71 tons of cocaine destined for the United
States. I could recite similar operations in Ecuador and other countries
in the area.
I wanted to address
some of the results of this, though, to the United States. And I know
there's been discussions about what impact has it had on cocaine purity
in the United States, as well as the cocaine supply. And we've been careful
about these numbers, but I did want to share with the committee that the
purity levels of cocaine in the United States have been declining. I offer
this chart to the committee, which shows that since 1998 wholesale cocaine
purities have dropped by nearly 10 percent in the United States. The reasons
for the decline can be speculated upon, but I would like to attribute
some of that success to the enforcement operations in the South American
region of the world, the SIU programs, the targeting programs, and the
interdiction programs as well.
It's clear that while
the price might not be impacted, they adjust in others ways by reducing
the purity level of the cocaine. Secondly, there's been an impact on the
flow of cocaine. In addition to the decline of cocaine purity levels,
the importation of cocaine to the United States has decreased substantially.
From 1996 to 1999 the cocaine flow to the United States declined by nearly
200 metric tons. Since then in '99 to 2001, it began to rise again, to
great concern of us all, but still the overall estimated cocaine flow
to the United States in 2001 was still down by nearly 100 metric tons
compared to the 1996 level.
What's ahead, I'm
very pleased to announce today, that we are able to establish the heroine
task force in Bogota (ph) to address the growing concern of heroine production
in Colombia. This will be a task force comprised of 45 officers of the
host country as well as the DEA. Last Friday the House and Senate appropriations
committee approved the DEA's proposal to reallocate 13 foreign positions
in support of this Boga (ph) heroine task force. And this is critical
to our efforts to address the growing heroine problem in the region of
the world.
There certainly has
been spillover effect reflected by the increased seizures of heroine in
countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama. Extraordinary numbers
-- heroine seizures have increased by 785 percent in Venezuela, 285 percent
in Ecuador and 226 percent in Panama. This reflects the importance of
a regional approach to our drug trafficking problems and, I think, some
success of our coordination efforts in targeting the organizations.
As Senator Graham
mentioned prior to the hearing, the extraordinary concern of the narco-terrorist
activity, and the combination of those two elements, are substantial and
are of great concern. We continue to develop overwhelming evidence about
the connection between the FARC and other terrorist groups and the drug
trade.
In 1980 -- or since
1980, the FARC has murdered 13 United States citizens, and kidnapped over
100 more. Recently a high ranking FARC member reportedly gave orders to
specifically target United States personnel in Colombia. In August of
this year, the Colombian press reported that -- confirmed that Jorge Suarez,
also know as known Mono Jojoy, announced a decision by the FARC leadership
to attack United States citizens residing in Colombia. And so what we've
seen is that a terrorist organization engaged in attacks on United States
citizen, is also engaged on attacking the United States through drug trafficking
as well.
I would leave the
committee with this one point that DEA targeting of trafficking organizations
is an essential part of our continued effort, and I believe has provided
substantial success in four areas. We have created risk to the traffickers.
We've reduced the flow of cocaine. Thirdly, we've provided intelligence
for inbound seizures of narcotics. And fourthly, we have encouraged and
built regional stability by developing a rule of law in law enforcement
coordination.
I thank this committee
for receiving this testimony. I look forward to the question and answers.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Mr. Hutchinson.
General Jackman?
JACKMAN: Well, Senator
Graham and Senator DeWine, appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you to discuss the United States Southern Command's role in the Andean
Ridge Initiative.
Twenty months ago,
Southern Command began to execute the Defense Department's support to
play in Colombia, given the resources provided by Congress in the fiscal
year 2000 supplemental. Our mission has been to provide assistance to
the Colombian forces to improve their counter-drug capabilities. We have
provided that assistance to human rights, vetted, Colombian forces, and
within the 400 military person cap established by Congress. We have spent
100 percent of $300.5 million provided to the Department of Defense from
the $1.3 billion planned Colombia supplemental. This mission continues
to support the national drug control strategy and the Defense Department's
role of interdiction support.
During these past
20 months, we have provided operational-level counter-drug related intelligence
to the Colombian military and national police. We have also collected
intelligence to protect U.S. personnel in Colombia and to facilitate operations
by our joint interagency task force east in the drug transit zone.
Until April 20, 2001, we provided support for the Air Bridge Denial Program
with our long-range, over the horizon, and ground-based radar architecture,
airborne early warning systems and tracker aircraft. That program and
the Defense Department's support to it was suspended following the Peruvian
shoot-down of a civilian aircraft.
On the ground we
train and equip the Colombian first counter- narcotics brigade, currently
operating under the command and control of Colombia's military's joint
task force south headquarters and the Putumayo and Caqueta departments
of Southern Colombia. We've continued to provide periodic sustainment
training for that brigade. Additionally, we continue to provide intelligence
support and planning assistance to joint task force south.
In a major effort
to improve the Colombian military's counter- drug mobility and operational
reach. The Department of Defense is providing training to Colombian army
aviation personnel who will fly and maintain the 14 UH-60 Black Hawk and
25 Huey II Plan Colombia helicopters.
The final class of
eight UH-60 pilots completed the provided training on 10 September '02.
Overall, 45 Colombia army pilots successfully completed this training.
Additionally, the requirement for Colombian army UH-60 crew chiefs was
met in April 2002 with a total of 21 crew chiefs graduating from the DOD-provided
CONUS training.
Completion of these
UH-60 training programs were significant milestones, as the Colombian
army now has the UH-60 pilots and crew chiefs and the numbers required
to operate Plan Colombia Black Hawk aircraft.
DOD resource training
programs for Colombia army Huey II pilots and maintenance personnel for
the Black Hawk and Huey II aircraft are proceeding as scheduled. The training
program Colombian army maintenance personnel is scheduled to be complete
in February 2003, followed by the training for Huey II pilots, which is
scheduled to end in late September 2003. We've also provided maintenance
assistance and training to improve the operational readiness of their
HC-130 lift aircraft.
On the water, we
have helped to train and equip 33 of a planned 58 Colombian marine brigade
riverine combat elements. These efforts have improved our capability to
enter drugs and precursor chemicals on the rivers, and extended their
operational reach into the vast countryside. We're in the process of helping
them to establish their own mobile riverine training teams to sustain
the training and readiness of these riverine combat elements.
Additionally, joint
interagency task force east has coordinated and operated with the Colombian
navy on the important scene between the drug source and transit zones.
When we began support of Plan Colombia, Colombia's military-related infrastructure
and base force protection were inadequate for counter-drug operations.
We've helped them to construct airfields and aircraft support facilities,
barracks, riverine infrastructure, forward operating bases and radar support
infrastructure.
In addition, the
Colombian military has developed a curriculum to be taught at the new
judge advocate general core school that emphasizes the rule of law in
human rights. This curriculum will reach all military personnel in the
Colombian judge advocate general core.
Outside of Colombia
our main effort has been to employ joint interagency task force east to
support interdiction in the drug transit zone, specifically in the Eastern
Pacific where the main cocaine trafficking vector exists. For our operations
in the source and transit zones we have improved our own theater forward
operating locations or FOLs in Manta, Ecuador, Como Opa (ph), El Salvador
and Curasol, Netherlands Antilles to enhance our aircraft capacity, aircraft
maintenance, support facilities and crew force protection. We have also
provided counter-drug training and support on a lesser scale to Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela.
Our assessment of
the units we have trained and equipped in Colombia is that their tactical
capabilities have improved as indicated in the results of their operations.
Since its inception in January 2001, joint task force south has destroyed
22 HCL labs and 1,063 base labs. It has seized 3,400 kilograms of Coca-base,
240 pounds of Coca leaf, 132,500 gallons of gas and diesel, and 1,103
weapons. It has detained 125 people suspected of participating in or supporting
Coca production or trafficking, and it has killed 318 FARC and paramilitary
personnel.
There are indicators
that the FARC and AUC are moving their drug operations further away from
joint task force south operational area. Seizure statistics of the Colombia
marine riverine brigade from August 1999 to May 2002 show 6.3 metric tons
of cocaine, 246 tons of solid chemical precursors, 42,906 gallons of liquid
precursors, 395,400 gallons of gasoline, 297 tons of Coca leaf being processed,
and 14.2 tons of Coca-base.
An example of a recent
successful joint counter-drug operation occurred August 24 through 26,
2002 where Colombian navy, marine infantry, marine counter-drill, and
marine riverine units coordinated and executed operation Tomaco Mia Alto
(ph) two in the Mera (ph) river sector, Nerino (ph) department, against
eight cartel-owned AUC and 29th front FARC-guarded HCL labs.
Colombian military
units seized one metric ton of cocaine, over 45,700 gallons of precursor
chemicals, 13 microwaves, six electric generators and five hydraulic machines.
According to the U.S. country team narcotic affairs section, this operation
destroyed a combined monthly 20 metric tons cocaine production capacity.
That these HCL labs were located in the Nereno (ph) department, well west
of the Putumayo and Caqueta region is the strongest evidence yet that
the successes of the first counter-narcotics brigade and JTF south have
forced the drug producing groups to move their operation out of JTF south's
area of responsibility.
Although these tactical
statistics sound impressive along with the fact that overall strategic
cocaine seizures increased in 2001, the inner-agency assessment of cocaine
movement suggests that traffickers have maintained ample supplies of cocaine
to meet world demand.
Our analysis in SOUTHCOM
concludes that while drug production and trafficking pose a serious threat
to Colombia and the United States, the nature of the conflict in Colombia
is a crisis of governance, which, if not solved, will effect the region
to a greater extent than it has today.
The government of Colombia is unable to control much of its territory,
enforce the rule of law and provides its citizen a safe and secure environment.
It is unable to do so because of the complex security threat posed by
the FARC, ELN and AUC, all designated as terrorist organizations by the
U.S. inter-agency intelligence committee on terrorism, and by the narco-terror
traffickers. And because it currently does not the necessary strategy,
correlation of forces, and military and police capabilities to establish
a safe and secure environment in which their other government components
can be successful.
Clearly this is Colombia's
conflict to win, and they must mobilize all their elements of national
power to be decisive. We cannot do it for them. However, from a military
perspective, we can do some things to better help them. First, if Congress
grants expanded authorities in the future similar to those in the FY '02
supplemental, and the president approves the new draft national security
presidential directive, we could flexibly apply counter-drug resources
and assets to optimize our military assistance to Colombia to support
their fight against this complex threat.
JACKMAN: For example,
we could provide the Colombians intelligence that is not limited by counter-drug
nexus. We could employ joint interagency task force east and other SOUTHCOM
forces to support the interdiction of arms bound for Colombia. This arms
trafficking often takes place in the same pipelines as drug trafficking
and cocaine is often the barter in exchange for weapons and ammunition.
The Colombians could
use the U.S. counter-drug trained units and U.S. provided counter-drug
equipment with greater flexibility and latitude against the terrorist.
For example, the Colombian military could employ the U.S.-provided helicopters
against critical FARC, AUC and ELN as well as narco-trafficker targets
and in operations to free kidnapping victims.
Second, we could
help the Colombians build military capabilities they deem the most critical
in their fight against the threat. This could include helping them fashion
their military strategy in campaign plans, providing strategic operational
and tactical level intelligence collection and planning assistance, and
training and equipping additional units which could enable them to seize
the initiative and protect their critical infrastructure.
We can assist them
in identifying these requirements, but they must take the lead and mobilize
their own resources to build these capabilities. Again, I think it's important
to underscore that this is Colombia's conflict to win, an important lesson
we learned from our experiences in Vietnam.
Your continued support
will help strengthen democracy in Colombia in the Andean Region and safeguard
U.S. national interest there. Thank you for providing me this opportunity
to discuss these issues with you today. And I'm pleased to respond to
any questions you may have at this time.
GRASSLEY: Thank you
very much, General, for three very helpful commentaries.
As I indicated in
my opening statement, one of the principal policy issues that led to the
calling of this hearing of the drug caucus was on the linkage between
counter-narcotics and counter- terrorism. General Jackman has just outlined
some of the ways in which he believes that if the United States modifies,
in a permanent way, some of its previous policies which have built a wall
between those two activities, that we would increase our effectiveness.
There are some of our colleagues that who are not yet convinced that in
fact this marriage of terrorism and narcotics has occurred.
What are some of
the elements of evidence that you would offer as to the merger of the
activities of terrorists and narcotic traffickers in the Andean Region
and the consequences, particularly the consequences in terms of increased
capability that has resulted from this marriage?
Mr. Secretary?
ARMITAGE: Mr. Chairman,
I think we could start just looking at the August 7 inauguration of President
Uribe and work backwards to get the evidence. Clearly the FARC attempted
to do massive damage, from their point of view, unfortunately only killed
21 peasants, rather than the president, the visiting delegation from many
foreign countries as well as a lot more citizens. It was only because
of inaccurate mortars and some failed mortars that they didn't do more
damage.
You yourself, Senator
Grassley, Senator DeWine, have laid out the kidnappings, the murders,
the abductions, the violence that has been perpetrated. I don't think
that there are many, even, up here that you suggest who don't now see
that there's a nexus between drugs and terrorism.
Finally, well before
that, let me say that if there was a pretension to political ambitions
by the FARC, and the ELN, and the AUC -- if there was some pretension
to really be putting forth justice for all as the reason for their activities,
I think it's been done away with. And it's certainly been done away with
in the last year- and-a-half by the unprecedented level of violence that
they're exhibiting.
And I think the new
case to look at is an old case. It's the Sendero Luminoso in Peru where
following that dictates if Hernando Desoto and others, the government
of Peru got a good leg up on the shining path. And recently they've come
back using the proceeds for drugs to fuel their ambitions, most recently
demonstrated in the March 9 attack in Lima, right prior to the visit of
our president, an indiscriminant attack which, but for the grace of God,
didn't kill Americans.
So I think it from
our point of view, sir, it's pretty clear evidence.
GRASSLEY: Mr. Hutchinson?
HUTCHINSON: I would
concur, certainly, with Secretary Armitage in regards to his statement,
but I would tie even further the drug trafficking aspect of the FARC.
What we traditionally thought was that the FARC did light the shining
path in Peru by taxed the Coca fields. And they derive revenue from taxation.
It was much more
involved in that, as we learned after we went into the demilitarized zone
in March of this year and we discovered that they were engaged not just
the taxation, but in the production, in the conversion laboratories, in
the trafficking side of it, so really at every level. As we went into
see the two conversion laboratories, we actually saw receipts issued by
the FARC for the Coca that they received that was converted in their laboratories.
And so the evidence
is really indisputable that their revenue source is substantially cocaine
trafficking, production and trafficking. The violence is well documented.
The consequences
of that is that we cannot have artificial boundaries in going after an
organization that is engaged in both. Intelligence that is counter-narcotics
related needs to be used for counter-terrorism and vice versa, because
the target is one and the same.
GRASSLEY: General
Jackman?
JACKMAN: Senator,
it's interesting to me that we used to talk about all of the groups separately.
We talked about the traffickers. We talked about the insurgents. We talked
about illegal arms groups, terrorists, et cetera, but I think it's important
to remember that after we helped Colombia dismantle the large cartels
in Colombia, that these groups filled that vacuum and essentially took
over the production, the cultivation, the production of drugs in Colombia.
And so now we see all of these groups clearly the same. We sometime coin
them as narco-terrorists, but they are all the same. They're all involved
in these activities.
I think that it's
also important to understand that this goes well beyond Colombia. Although
they use drugs to fuel the means, they use the drugs to buy weapons, or
the proceeds from drugs to buy weapons. And these weapons come from Central
America, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, weapons that existed
there after the wars in those areas. Sadly, those weapons and ammunition
also come from the United States. They come from Central Europe and they
transit, not only directly into Colombia, but through places like Suriname,
Brazil, through the tri-border area.
And in that whole
line of communication of arms for drugs, there are other terrorist organizations
in Latin America that are involved in these transactions. So this is --
this goes well beyond Colombia.
GRASSLEY: Thank you.
Senator DeWine?
DEWINE: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The original plan,
Colombia envisioned assistance from some of our European friends. I notice,
Secretary, you mentioned page two of your written statement, you see some
consensus and I quote, "We see some consensus in principal European
nations, European commission, Canada, Japan, the United Nations who pledged
up to $600 million to the Andean counter-narcotics efforts. Unfortunately,
their disbursements are not matching their generous intent."
You want to...
ARMITAGE: Yes, we're
very disappointed...
DEWINE: ... explain
that a little further.
ARMITAGE: Yes, Senator
DeWine.
We're very disappointed
in pledges of $550 to $600 million, and come up with about $245 million
of the pledges that were actually committed. I'm pleased to say that Japan,
which pledged $175 million, has actually committed $175 million. Spain
which committed $100 million pledged $100 million and committed $18 million
and are well on their way in a pipeline to committing the rest. But beyond
that, Germany and France and others, Norway, have not stepped up yet.
They've not committed this money. And this is a problem for us as the
Department of State, and we've got to go out and jawbone and push and
pressure and try to -- the final analysis maybe even embarrass people
to doing what they pledged.
DEWINE: Let me direct
this question to all of you, but it's really a follow-up for that question.
We talk about a balanced
approach to Colombia and the Andean Region. How much of our approach was
the military side and how much was the non-military? How much was more
developmental? And then, how does that fit in? What's kind of the big
picture with our other allies? What were they doing? What was envisioned
that they were going to do that we were going to do, because I think that's
important to get the overall picture to see that we do and make sure that
this is in fact a balanced program.
ARMITAGE: Senator
DeWine, there is not actual balance in the program. If you're referring
to that monies which is put against eradication and the prosecution advice
the alternative development. It's about two to one for the eradication,
not quite in Colombia. In Peru it's more closely balanced. And the reasons
are the security situations. We can't have alternative development, for
instance, in Colombia until we've gotten a much better security system.
Our allies are not
on the sharp edge or the heavy edge of this program. They're all in, what
we'd call, alternative development. They're all in the softer issues.
We didn't ask them to step up in the counter-insurgents...
DEWINE: So we're
doing more of the sharp. They're doing more of the soft if...
ARMITAGE: We are
doing much more of the sharp, particularly in Colombia. But as I say,
there's not a balance dollar for dollar in this program at all, except
in Peru it's pretty close.
DEWINE: I wonder
if you could talk a little bit about this alternative development. I'll
direct this to any one of the three members of the panel who would like
to answer it.
There was a GAO report that did in fact talk about that. And so did one
-- as I recall, and this is a summarization, but one of the problems was
that we were not making the progress that we thought we were going to
make and we wanted to make. And you want to talk a little bit about that?
ARMITAGE: I usually
dug into it. I don't pretend to be an expert in this matter, Senator DeWine,
I asked that very question. And the short answer is it didn't work. And
it didn't work for two reasons.
Initially, particularly
in the Southern part of Colombia when we tried alternative development,
it was crop substitution. And as I understand it, that was not on. And
the soil wasn't right. It wasn't working. We didn't have the right partnerships
in our NGOs, and some who were partnered with us.
The alternative development
plan we've gone to now is one I would call local participation, where
you approach the village and you talk to them about what do they need.
Is it a school? Is it a road? Is it a well? What is it? And what are they
going to do to get it?
Now, the government
of Colombia, for instance, will eradicate, will spray where they want
to spray. It's much better if the village signs up and voluntarily agrees
to aerial eradication in return for some alternative development, which
now, as they say, is the social end of things, schools and clinics and
roads. And at least I'm briefed that we seem to be making some progress
in that regard.
And that President
Uribe and yesterday Vice President Santos, who was in to visit me from
Colombia, had some pretty kind things about vice about a year-and-a-half
ago.
DEWINE: Senator Hutchinson?
HUTCHINSON: Senator
DeWine, just going back to the balance part of your question. Clearly,
the Andean Ridge Initiative originally Plan Colombia was focused on the
eradication efforts substantially, the assistance that we provide. Congress
has supplemented that with some assistance for the organizational targeting
and I believe that is a major -- should be a very significant part of
the effort in Colombia and in that region.
In reference to the
allies, there is certainly a growing awareness. I hope that this will
be followed by a greater commitment of funding, but as the cocaine flow
has increased to the European countries, as we see -- they are starting
to invest more, at least in terms of personnel, looking at Colombia as
a source country for them and their routes that head these drugs to Europe.
And so I hope that
they will increase their effort in terms of personnel and investment.
DEWINE: Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
GRASSLEY: Thank you, Senator.
We have been joined
by our Chair, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden, we
have had opening statements, statements by the witnesses and one round
of questioning. I'm turning the chair over to you.
BIDEN: I will --
you keep the Chair, but I -- turn the mike on. Here you go. The mike's
on now. Thank you.
I apologize to my
colleagues and to the witnesses for being late. We just have to fund Amtrak
better. But we'll talk about that at another hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I don't
want to ruin the reputation of our three witnesses, but they are among
my three favorite administration officials because they are the most effective
in any administration. And I want to publicly commend Asa for one heck
of a job he's been doing. He's kept every commitment he said he would
to this committee and not just in this area, but across the board with
DEA.
You're doing a great
job, Asa, and I want to publicly acknowledge that.
And I always -- I
have an inordinately high regard for Secretary Armitage. If you ever want
a straight answer, he's the guy to go to. And I appreciate it -- always
been straight.
And General, welcome
to you.
I'm going to give
my very brief opening statement here and then continue -- let you all
continue with rounds of questioning. And then I will have some questions.
Over the past few
years, the members of this drug caucus have worked closely with both the
Clinton and Bush administrations on long- term strategy to control the
trade of illicit narcotics. And the drug trade is not only, to state the
obvious, destabilizing the politically, but it's also economically destabilizing
and particularly in the Andean Region. But it has had a devastating impact
on the street corners and the schoolyards here, in the United States of
America.
Two years ago we
renewed our commitment to the Andean Region, providing funding for Plan
Colombia, which was somewhat controversial. And it remains somewhat controversial
now. But I think it was the right decision to make, as well as for alternative
development and law enforcement efforts in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela
and Brazil.
In my view, we have
a duty to help this effort because it's America's seemingly insatiable
demand for narcotics that has helped fuel this drug trade. And it's also
in our naked self-interest.
Over the past few
years, there has been some progress. We have seen the decrease in coca
production in Bolivia and Peru, but a great deal of work has to be done.
And implementation of Plan Colombia continues, but we have yet to see
significant impact on coca or opium production.
There is no question
that the training and performance of the Colombian military, General,
I think is consequence of our training those units has shown a marked
improvement. But the United States continues to have, as you know, strong
concerns about the link between military and illegal paramilitaries.
And let's be honest,
we have some work to do here, at home, as well. After several years of
stable level drug use in the United States, this year we're up 11 percent
among 12- to 17-year-olds and 18 percent -- 18- to 25-year-olds.
Because nearly 70
percent of the world's cocaine and nearly all of the incredibly pure heroine
sold on the East Coast -- and I remember I got here a long time ago and
we were talking about heroine out of Mexico in the Nixon administration.
And we were talking about purity -- there was 6 -- 7 -- 8 -- 10 percent.
Now we're talking, as you have forgotten more about this than most will
know, purity on the streets in my state and the East Coast here -- up
in the area of 90 percent.
I mean, it comes
from Colombia and Colombia has been the primary focus of our attention.
But we have to continue
to bolster Colombia's neighbors to protect against the so-called balloon
effect where coca production goes down in one area only to increase in
another. And over the past few years, the United States government has
been a strong ally of President Pastrana. And I hope and trust that we'll
be able to develop that same sort of relationship with Uribe, who will
visit this country next week. It is my firm belief that the United States
must stay engaged in Colombia. If we walk away, we can be sure of one
thing, the human rights situation will further deteriorate and drug production
will continue to flourish.
The newly elected
president has been in office for just over a month and already his tenure
has been rocked by terrorism that has become far too commonplace in Colombia.
With a three-front
war against the drug traffic -- its guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries
-- Colombia has a level of violence that Americans cannot comprehend.
In response to the violent attack at his inauguration, the president has
declared a state of internal emergency, allowing him to issue a number
of temporary security measures to try to establish control in the country.
For better or for
worse, until recently the United States has stayed out of Colombia's insurgency
war. But with the new authority given to Colombia to use equipment provided
by the United States for counter-insurgency purposes, we have entered
new territory here. The new power has not yet been used, but I look forward
to hearing -- and I will catch up with my staff -- what the witnesses
have already said about how they anticipate it will work in practice and
to the degree to which it will affect our ongoing counter-narcotics program.
The United States
has to continue to press Colombia for improvements in human rights. Last
week, the secretary of state certified that Colombia's military is taking
steps to suspend soldiers committing human rights violations and is cooperating
with civilian prosecutors to prosecute those who have been alleged to
have committed those acts. And is taking steps to severe links with the
paramilitaries. But the military has long way to go, in my opinion. The
military continues to turn a blind eye to paramilitary violence. I believe
support for the Andean Counter Drug Initiative and will inevitably erode
in this body and in this country.
So I look forward
to catching up on what you've already said and asking a few questions
when the time is appropriate.
But, again, I thank
you all. Quite frankly, I think we have no choice but to engage in this.
It's slippery territory. It's not easy, but I know of no alternative.
As I say to people
when I am criticized for supporting the plan, which is not infrequent
-- I say, "Can you imagine a South America, with the oldest democracy
in their region, at the top of that continent being a narco-state? What
does that bode for the rest of the continent?" And I think we have
no choice.
So I'm anxious to
hear what the witnesses have said and what they are about to say and to
hear your questions, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for allowing me this
interruption and apologize for it being out of order.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Senator Biden.
I'd like to go back
to the question of the consequences of linkages between terrorists and
narco-traffickers. One of the distinguishing factors of those two groups,
historically, in Colombia is that while the narco-traffickers, because
of the nature of their enterprise, were very global -- that is, they had
contacts with and distribution systems throughout the world, particularly
in North America.
The guerrillas were
quite insular two or three years ago when Scandinavian countries invited
some of the leaders of the FARC to visit their countries. It was the first
time that most of those people had ever been outside of Colombia. It has
been suggested that now that the two are married that one consequence
is that the guerrillas -- the terrorists -- are, themselves, becoming
more global, including linkages with other international terrorist groups.
There was much discussion a year ago about a group from the Irish Republican
Army who had come to Colombia allegedly to train FARC in urban warfare
and to collect some of the drug money that the FARC had available to pay
for that training.
What is your assessment
of the current state of Colombian terrorists establishing relationships
with terrorist groups outside of Colombia?
ARMITAGE: My assessment,
sir, is that the three groups, to include the paramilitaries in Colombia,
are primarily still internal in terms of the violence they foment. It
is the case that we saw some -- at least some intelligence that the FARC
was intent on actually harming some Americans in Venezuela not so long
ago when we warned people from going to a certain area.
However, as some of the members of the Senate Drug Caucus have mentioned
already, the reach of the drugs is global. The reach of the gray (ph)
arms market. The proceeds go for not legitimate ends, but for rather nefarious
ends. And my own view is that that's where the global reach of these characters
is. But I stand to be modified corrected or ...
HUTCHINSON: No, I
would not correct. I would elaborate that our indication is that the FARC
and the other terrorist organizations in Colombia engaged in drug trafficking
are utilizing transporters, whether it be Brazil traffickers to move their
goods out. But they have not set up a network substantially outside of
that region.
I think that is something
we have to watch very carefully if they move in to taking over transportation
routes or trafficking organizations to a larger extent.
At this point, there
is not that indication. They are regional in nature and they are utilizing
other traffickers and other organizations to move their goods.
GRASSLEY: General?
JACKMAN: Senator,
I would say that certainly the tentacles of the FARC extend well beyond
the boundaries of Colombia. There is evidence -- there is intelligence
that they have worked with the Sendero Luminoso in Peru with illegal arm
groups in Bolivia and have some presence in the tribora (ph) area in Paraguay.
And it's clear based
on the intelligence that we have that they are involved with other organized
crime elements and other terrorist organizations in Latin America to facilitate
those things that they need -- primarily arms, ammunition, medical supplies
-- those types of things. So there are plenty of organized criminal elements
and other organizations out there that would be happy to make money and
make the deals to provide the means for the FARC -- for what they are
doing inside of Colombia.
GRASSLEY: Senator
DeWine?
DEWINE: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
I want to get back
to the alternative development a little bit. And we touched on it a minute
ago. But the issue about the security involved and how the terrorism and
the war, itself, impacts the ability of the Colombian government and the
U.S. government -- USAID -- to carry out any kind of alternative development
-- any kind of assistance.
Would any one of
you like to discuss that and where we are and how the two are linked,
if they are?
HUTCHINSON: I wanted
to make one comment, then I'll turn it over to the secretary.
But I think the critical part of alternative development -- crop substitution
programs -- eradication programs -- is that you have success where the
government is in control of the countryside -- they are in control of
the geography and the rule of law can be enforced.
You look at Bolivia
and Peru -- you had strong governments that were able to assure the success
of the eradication program -- enforce the rule of law. Even though there
were glitches, they had successes there.
in Colombia and Afghanistan,
we have trouble with these programs because the government is not -- civil
authority is not in control in the regions you're trying to carry these
out. And so we have to establish rule of law. We have to be able to diminish
the influence of the narco-terrorists in order to carry out a successful
program.
ARMITAGE: I...
DEWINE: Mr. Secretary?
ARMITAGE: We got
a very strong signal, I think, of what's going on in Colombia by the election
of President Uribe. The fact that he was elected on the first ballot,
which I am told is unprecedented in Colombia -- and he stood on a very
strong national security rule of law platform.
So first of all,
it indicated to me that the people of Colombia have had enough. This is
one of the reasons why I think the FARC reacted so virulently to his inaugural
day because they realized that unless they take care of the Uribe government,
they are not going to be able to disrupt his plans to extend the rule
of law.
Senator, if you were
to ask an administration witness, "What are you trying to accomplish
with the ACI?" Counter-narcotics -- alternative development -- judicial
reform, which is another way of saying respect for human rights and the
spread of the judicial system to all areas. Right now we are, as the administrator
indicates, we are forbidden to -- and the government of Colombia is forbidden
to extent that rule of law to some areas because of the insecurity and
instability which just feed the narco-traffickers.
DEWINE: General?
JACKMAN: Senator,
I think it's, as Mr. Hutchinson points out, it's very difficult, I think,
to have meaningful alternative development if you do not have a safe and
secure environment in which that can flourish.
In February, after
President Pastrana ordered the military into the former despeje, the FARC
began to move against the urban centers. And it continued and stepped
up its attacks against the infrastructure in Colombia. And, as we talked
about earlier, the critical pipeline in the northern part of that country
-- they lose about $1.5 million a day in revenue because of attacks on
that pipeline.
JACKMAN: But what this did is it forced the military, then, to change
its operations in order to protect those urban centers and seek out the
FARC in those areas -- and AUC in those areas and to protect its infrastructure.
So in areas that
were targeted for our alternative development, you just did not have the
presence of security forces from the Colombian government there to assist
then.
DEWINE: Mr. Hutchinson,
let me change the subject just a little bit, if I could.
Since September 11,
the FBI has had to change its focus. How has that impacted what you are
doing? And just to take it -- even in a country like Colombia -- your
big picture and then take it down to how many agents you might have in
an individual country -- what you might be doing in one country. And maybe
Colombia is not a good example.
HUCHINSON: Well,
first of all in regards to the FBI's decision to move 400 agents from
counter-narcotics to counter-terrorism, Director Mueller has communicated
with me regularly about where these are coming from and how we can work
together in that transition for the DEA to take on that additional responsibility.
And more has fallen
on our shoulders. Primarily it is a domestic issue. I think that would
impact us overseas because -- I mean, it gives us less flexibility. It's
a zero sum game. Unless you have new resources to move or to put places,
you just have to shuffle the existing deck.
But we are responding,
I think, somewhat effectively by -- we have -- Congress has approved the
moving of agents to the southwest border to pick up a gap there. we're
still working in that process. But there's going to be a continued review
of this.
In some areas of
the country where the FBI is in a rural area and they reassigned their
agents from counter-narcotics to counter- terrorism, we may not have an
agent there. We might have to open up a post of duty. So we are having
to do some adjustments. And we are working with the Department of Justice
to make sure that federal responsibility is met -- primarily the impacts
is here, domestically.
We have gone through
a reallocation of our foreign offices that the Senate Appropriations Committee
has signed off on. And we really hadn't effectively done that since, you
know -- in Bolivia where we have principally got our cocaine and -- it's
moved to Colombia. We have not really adjusted effectively since then.
And we have gone through that allocation to meet the ecstasy threat from
the Netherlands -- to meet the increased heroin threat from Colombia,
as well as the new issues in Mexico, where we can be helpful in our counter-terrorism
fight, as well.
So we have done a
readjustment in response to the threat, but also in response to the FBI's
moving agents out of counter-narcotics.
DEWINE: Well, my
time is up. I just think that this is something that we, in Congress,
working with you, have to be cognizant of and we have to constantly monitor.
Because this is a major shift in what the FBI is doing, obviously. And
it means that the entire effort in regard to drugs has changed. And that
puts some more burden on you.
So...
HUTCHINSON: Indeed,
it is.
DEWINE: ... thank
you very much.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Senator.
Senator Biden?
BIDEN: Senator DeWine
left off where I'd like to begin. Quite frankly, I think there is no choice
but for the FBI to reallocate its resources. But I was very disappointed
in the administration's response to that and failing to ask us for more.
You need more.
I, for one -- I know
you're going to tell me you don't need it. You've been required to tell
me you can't accept it. But we're going to do all we can -- some of us
-- and I hope Senator DeWine and others -- to see to it you get more.
It is absolutely
preposterous to suggest that we can take a whole 400 and some persons
out of a counter-narcotics effort and move them -- out of necessity --
I'm not criticizing that judgment -- and not fill that hole. It is not
reasonable. It is not reasonable. And I think you've done remarkably well
with what you have. But there are some of us -- and I'd like to talk with
Senator DeWine after this -- who are going to see if we can give you additional
resources. You badly need them.
The good news is
-- you remember back in the days when you were in the House I was the
guy that prevented DEA from being folded into FBI? The bad news is you
are on your own now and you don't have the resources.
(LAUGHTER)
(UNKNOWN): Good work!
BIDEN: And so, we've
got to get you more resources, quite frankly, in my view.
Let me, Asa, go to
one specific thing relating to your U.S. cocaine purity reduction from
86 to 76 percent.
HUTCHINSON: Sure.
BIDEN: And there
may not be an answer to this, but to help, you know, me understand this
a little better -- it seems to me there are several possible reasons for
that decline. One is that DEA programs are curtailing the diversion of
precursor chemicals, making it harder for them to get that purity.
Two, that the traffickers
may be diluting the cocaine to offset the high costs associated with paying
off the guerrillas and the paramilitaries in Colombia, because there's
a heck of a lot more of that going on than there was before.
Or three, the traffickers
don't have enough supply to meet the demand, so they're diluting product
to make it go further.
Do you have a sense
of if it's any one of those three or all of them or none of them? Could
you talk to me about what you guys -- I know you think and talk about
this. I mean, what do you think the reason is?
HUTCHINSON: Well,
I think it's a combination of factors. First, I believe it is a reflection
of law enforcement success in increasing the risk to the traffickers.
I think that there is an over supply of coca production in South America.
I think it is difficult, in terms of the conversion of it and the pressure
that we put on the chemicals that is needed in the conversion process.
Once they have it,
you have to transport it out of the country. it sounds easy, but it is
not easy. There is a lot risk. There is better use of intelligence and
there is a risk of seizure.
And then I think
it's part of marketing strategy. Rather than raising the price of cocaine
in the United States, it is easier for them to market it at constant price
level and so they adjust the purity.
BIDEN: Got you.
HUTCHINSON: And so
I think all of those factors together, a little bit speculative, but clearly
I believe that we say that it is an indication of the success of the pressure
that we're putting in the interdiction and in the law enforcement side.
BIDEN: Let's skip
to heroin for a second. You and I, again, back in your days in the House,
I wrote a report over here. And I'm not -- I think you had a companion,
if not report, point you were making that heroin is coming -- that heroin
is coming and hang on, heroin's coming. And that the greatest concern
was that, just like what happened with cocaine back in the early '80s
when crack really began in the Bahamas, that you had the ability of people
who did not want to distort their nostrils -- did not want to go it that
route -- if they could smoke it, it made it a lot easier -- crack cocaine.
And prior to crack
cocaine, if my memory serves me -- I don't do this every day like I used
to -- but it was -- there were for every one woman addicted to a controlled
substance, there were four men. After crack cocaine was under way, it
was about one to one -- about eight years later.
And heroin is the same thing. What you and I both talked about in years
past was, you know, everybody forgets back in the turn of the century
-- the 19th to the 20th century -- there was a thing called "chasing
the dragon." Chasing the dragon was an expression where you could
smoke heroin and people would get up and follow the trail of smoke inhaling
it because it was so pure you could -- it was inexpensive and pure. You
could get a high from that or you could get the effect of the heroin.
Now what's happening
is exactly that. In my state, young women -- young men in high school
who would never think of putting a needle in their arm for the first time
or, you know, putting a rubber band around their arm to make their veins
pop out, which they find grotesque, are not at all disinclined to use
it in a form that they are accustomed to. Because they have smoked pot,
they have smoked this, they have smoked -- smoking. And so, now, in little
old Delaware, since 1986 -- and you have been kind enough to come to my
state a couple of times. I know you know this. The number of people who
we list -- 18 and older -- this is just 18 and older -- who have, as their
primary drug of abuse -- primary drug -- and most of these people are
poly-abusers, anyway. But the primary drug of abuse, heroin, has gone
from 228 persons in my little state in 1986 to 2,153 in 2001. We don't
have 2002 figures yet.
And it's not a surprise
when you can buy a tenth of a gram of incredibly pure heroin for $4 on
the streets of Wilmington, Delaware, or Dagsboro, Delaware, where you
were at.
HUTCHINSON: Yes.
BIDEN: Anyway, so
what I would like to get a sense of is have you all -- how have you readjusted,
if at all, your attitude toward your allocation of resources relating
to your sense about where the heroin problem is going? Because I just
see this as continuing to be the burgeoning problem -- heroin. I mean,
in a way that is very, very -- and, as you know, pretty hard to deal with
in terms of treatment, as well.
HUTCHINSON: You have
correctly stated, as usual, Senator, the problem. There was, historically,
a resistance to the injection of heroin that sort of kept it at a modest
level of use in this country. And since they have moved to different means
of receiving that drug to inhalation, we have seen an increase in heroin
in Delaware, but also in other areas of the country.
That up-tick in heroin
use is of great concern to us because of the extraordinary difficulty
in treatment of that addiction and the difficulty overcoming it.
What we're doing
to address it is that, obviously, that is an increased -- it has always
been a priority for on the enforcement side. We see the same organizations
that traffic in cocaine will traffic in heroin, as well. They go to wherever
the most profit is and where they can market it.
Part of our strategy
is to engage the domestic organizations. But also it is part of an international
strategy.
Heroine is one of
those drugs that we can't have a significant impact because it is not
produced in the United States. There is four regions of the world where
it comes from. And we can't have a strategy that simply targets one area.
we have to target all four areas, because as soon as we put pressure in
one, as you mentioned, the balloon effect is going to pop up somewhere
else.
But we can have a
global strategy addressing heroin. We have addressed that in a global
fashion. We have put new resources to help to slow down that supply of
heroin coming in. Hopefully it will impact, as we have on cocaine, the
purity level.
BIDEN: Do you guys
get a sense -- any of the three of you -- whether or not the paramilitaries
-- the FARC, the guerrillas, generally, whether or not they have a drug
of choice that they want to be part of the problem with? I don't mean
in terms of consumption. I mean in terms of wanting to control-- siphoning
off. I mean, is there a sense in Colombia?
I mean, one of the
reasons why Asa and others, and I include myself in that group, were --
we weren't so brilliant being able to predict heroin was coming, because
what was happening is you pretty well saturated the cocaine market. And,
you know, they're looking for a new product. You know? They're looking
for a new product that expands their base.
I mean, do you get
a sense? Is there any distinction being made among the paramilitaries
and/or the guerrillas as to which of those avenues they go to? I mean,
is it based on geography?
I know you had the
maps up before. You know, there is distinct areas where coca is produced
and distinct areas where -- I mean, I'm not suggesting there is, I'm just
curious. Is there any...
HUTCHINSON: Senator,
our...
BIDEN: ... intelligence
on it?
HUTCHINSON: ... indication
is that the terrorist organizations are principally engaged in the cocaine
trafficking. There are other criminal organizations in Colombia that are
heavily engaged in heroin, but also have moved toward even ecstasy, because
there's profit there. And that's where they're going to generate.
I think that we have
to be seriously concerned that the terrorist organizations will also move
in the same direction because of the availability and the profit that
is in the other drugs, including heroin.
Heroine has increased
in its production in Colombia, and increased in the output to the United
States. Thus far, we're not seeing significant terrorist involvement in
the heroin side.
BIDEN: Can I ask,
with your permission, two more questions, if I may?
Mr. Secretary, Venezuela
has been an interesting adventure the last year. Do you have -- are you
able to, in an open hearing, give us any sense of the degree to which
Venezuela contributes to, helps diminish and/or is agnostic on the problem
of drug trafficking -- the paramilitaries and their ability to operate,
particularly north -- well, particularly along the border up in the northeastern
part of Venezuela? And is there anything you can say in open session about
that?
ARMITAGE: Yes. And
notwithstanding the fact that our relationship with Venezuela is somewhat
strained, I think it's fair to say that we've got strong suspicions that
there are, at a minimum, there is the ability of the FARC to R&R --
and some others R&R, if you will, for lack of a better term, in Venezuela.
And we do have some questions about arms flows.
I am not the intelligence
expert, but I think that that's a pretty much established case.
BIDEN: General?
JACKMAN: Sir, I think
it's clear from our intelligence reporting that the FARC, in particular,
enjoy some sanctuary across the Venezuelan border. They do this for a
variety of reasons, as the secretary pointed out -- for reasons of rest
and reorganization.
They also obtain
some of the needed supplies to sustain their operations. And sometimes
they use it, frankly, just to break contact from pressure that they have.
We have not seen
any concerted effort on the part of the Venezuelan military to address
this problem.
I would also note
that there are air transit routes that depart from both northern and eastern
Colombia that cross Venezuela with destinations into Suriname, in particular,
where drugs are often bartered for arms.
And we don't see
any interdiction from the Venezuelans.
Certainly, there
are land routes for the drugs, along the mountain chain -- along the Andes
to the northern border of Venezuela.
Having said all of
this, during my tenure there at the Southern Command, there have been
instances where the Venezuelans have provided us information that has
enabled us to interdict drugs in the transit zone that come off of their
coast. So I would say that in some cases they have been cooperative, in
some cases they have not.
BIDEN: It would seem
to me that -- I know this is a bit of a stretch, but I remember back in
1980 -- actually '78 I think is was -- at that time the Colombian government
was not at all interest in dealing with interdicting the drug trafficking.
They were not a supplying nation at the time. And they were not much of
a consuming nation. But they were an entrepreneurial nation where the
Cali and Medellian cartel were doing quite well and growing and there
was no help, in those days, from the Colombian government.
I don't know -- and
Venezuela will listen to this -- but there has never been a country that
has been a transit country that hasn't become a consuming country. There
has never been a country that has not engaged in trying to stop this that
hasn't become engaged in being consumed by it. I'm not suggesting they
have reached that point. But I do -- it just is amazing how history repeats
itself.
And you would think
that since that pipeline is coming out of Venezuela with Venezuelan oil
there would be a greater interest they would have in seeing to it that
they would do more.
But let me -- my
last question, with permission of the Senator from Florida, is that --
General, one of the reasons why I so strongly supported the initiative
in the last administration and this relating to Plan Colombia is that
although people said we couldn't make any progress, I've been here so
long and presided over the Judiciary Committee and this caucus for so
long that I remember them telling us we could not make any progress with
the Medellian cartel or the Cali cartel and we could not vet their police
departments, which were totally corrupt -- their federal police -- which
is a little more like Dezondarnge (ph) in Europe and a little less like
what we think of as local police here.
And through the work
of the FBI and the DEA during the late '80s and early '90s, I think we
made remarkable progress -- remarkable progress in vetting their police
departments and putting serious people in place.
My last two visits
to Colombia, there was still a lingering tension between the police and
the military in Venezuela as to who were the good guys, who was in charge
and who had what authority, which leads me to this question, General.
And I'm not looking for a complication. This is generally an inquiry.
As you indicated, and as all of you, stating the obvious, that -- particularly
I think Secretary Armitage's point about how the newly-elected administration
has really sent shock waves through the guerrillas in deciding that they
-- and the response of the public in that electoral process. So that they've
engaged now in a more overt, direct guerrilla activities in their urban
areas.
Now, you indicated
-- or some of you indicated that the military is having to divert some
of its resources -- and I assume means some of those counter-narcotics
battalions we have trained -- some of their assets toward that effort.
Does that mean that
the law enforcement -- the, quote, "police" -- the police in
the urban areas are not as efficacious as they were? Or is this president
looking to the military, as opposed to the police? Because, as you know,
there has been that conflict for a long time.
Could you talk to
me a little bit about police -- not versus, but police and military and
this Colombian administration's inclination to allocate resources relative
to the guerrillas? Or is it just that police don't do guerrillas?
JACKMAN: Sir, I think
you're quite correct in your assessment of what may have existed over
the past years in terms of cooperation between the military and the national
police.
In my opening statement,
I did note the operation that took place in late August in the Tumaco
Region, which is a region that has been essentially bad guy country. The
military and the national police generally have not operated in that area
because of the strength of the FARC and the AUC.
But it was through
the cooperation of the military and the national police and almost every
element of the military, along with the national police, that made that
operation successful.
I think that the
new heads of the military and the national police that were appointed
by president Uribe are the type of individuals that understand that you
have to cooperate in order to be effective.
I would note that
in the brigades that we plan to train for the infrastructure security
in the Rowque (ph) area include training and integration of the national
police...
BIDEN: Good.
JACKMAN: ... in that
area up there. So my sense is that we see from that administration --
from President Uribe's administration -- a commitment to cooperation among
those two arms of the government.
BIDEN: Finally.
ARMITAGE: If I may,
Mr. Chairman, there is an additional data point I think -- which is important.
He's been in a month and a week -- couple of days. And he has expressed
a willingness and desire and, in fact, he will go forward with a one-time
tax on the wealthy for $800 million to $1 billion, which will be applied
to the security forces, to include the police. And he's looking, over
all, for a 1 percent increase in the amount of GDP, which is applied to
the security problem for the police and the military.
In addition, he's
been very clear and we've been very clear with him on the need to expand
the military beyond the 55,000 in it now to, perhaps, 100,000 and to give
serious consideration to changing the law, which right now basically keeps
high school graduates out of the heavy lifting...
BIDEN: Yes.
ARMITAGE: ... which
is absurd.
BIDEN: Yes. I know
it is.
ARMITAGE: And, I
mean, it's controversial in Colombia, but he's moving forward with discussions
with the relevant congressional committees to talk about it.
BIDEN: Well, I'm
glad to hear you're pushing on that because -- well, anyway, I'm glad
to hear it.
And by the way, let
me close by saying congratulations to you and the secretary on Iraq. It's
not over yet. But I really, really want to publicly state how impressed
I am with the secretary, and I know your work, in moving us in the direction
we're moving now -- checking off the boxes and going the right way, in
my view. Congratulations to you.
With that, Mr. President,
I have no further questions and I thank you for your indulgence.
ARMITAGE: I just
might add the secretary, this morning, told me he's looking forward to
-- I think he's coming up...
BIDEN: Yes. He's
going to come up. We're anxious to have him.
ARMITAGE: ... with
you and your committee and look forward to it.
BIDEN: Yes. Good.
Thank you. Good.
GRASSLEY: Thank you,
Senator.
We had made a commitment
to the members of the panel that we would try to conclude by noon. I think
we will be able to meet that commitment.
I have a few questions,
which are primarily in the nature of follow up to questions that have
already been initiated.
First, on the issue
of Plan Colombia, my own sense is that one of the reasons that there may
have been some less-than-desired results from the alternative development
program is my assessment that the nature of the issue in Colombia is different
than it has been in other places where we've tried alternative development.
And the difference
is that many of the people who are working in the coca fields of Colombia
are not native -- ruralists to that area. They are, in fact, urban people
who, because of economic circumstances were attracted to go into the rural
areas and work the coca fields. And for them, alternative development
is not developing agriculture, but rather developing jobs back in the
urban areas, where they have their natural affinity.
And that was one
of the reasons why I was so anxious that the United States both extend
and expand the Andean Trade Preference Act because that was our principle
means -- United States -- by which we were encouraging more jobs in those
urban areas.
A, do you agree with
that analysis that alternative development for Colombia is more of an
urban than a rural issue? And B, if you do, what can we do to make the
recently enacted and expanded Andean Trade Preference Act as effective
as possible in creating those jobs that are going to be necessary to pull
some of the economic attractiveness of work in the coca fields out?
ARMITAGE: Yesterday
in my discussion, Mr. Chairman, with Vice President Santos, I was kind
of amazed, and it shows you the lack of knowledge that I had in Colombia,
when he told me that 70-odd percent of the population was in the 10 largest
cities, which doesn't leave much, sort of, naturally out in the countryside.
And when I asked
him about unemployment and under-employment, which are, obviously, two
different figures, we're up in the 30 percent plus range. So that gives
truth to the exact comments that you mentioned.
The ATPA -- I can't
say it -- we all pushed it forward with just Colombia, among others in
mind. My understanding is there are some hurdles that Colombia has to
go through before eligibility. But it will, clearly, assist in employment.
But I don't think, it, in itself, will be enough. We've got to come up
with a forestry or livestock -- other things -- even micro-lending at
some point to really develop enough employment to reduce, dramatically,
the problem.
HUTCHINSON: I would
just add, Mr. Chairman, that the -- your work on the Andean Trade Preference
Act is just as important as our counter-narcotics strategy in South America
-- as anything else that we're doing. Clearly, we have to have the economy
provide jobs down there -- alternative programs -- employment for them
so that they are not tempted to move in that direction. So I applaud you
in your work on that.
JACKMAN: Senator,
if I could just add, I think that there is potentially another factor
out there. You know, in some cases the FARC force the sons and daughters
of those people that are working out there in the rural areas into joining
the FARC. And if you're a parent and you have a son that has been forced
into assisting in the fighting with the FARC, it's very difficult for
you to join and support government programs based on the potential consequences
there.
So I think it continues
to go back to this business of a safe and secure environment.
GRASSLEY: All right.
General Jackman,
you commented on some questions asked by Senator DeWine and Senator Biden,
as well as did Administrator Hutchinson, about some impacts in the post-September
11 environment.
I would like to ask
about another one of those impacts and that is on our intelligence resources.
You mentioned, in a couple of contexts, the importance of intelligence
to this battle against narco- traffickers.
GRASSLEY: How would
you assess the current level of intelligence resources that are available
to you and with some changes that are being made will also be now more
available to the Colombian government in this conflict?
JACKMAN: Well, Senator,
it's true that after 9/11 we did lose some assets in theater. Specifically,
we lost some of the E3 AWACS aircraft and the Customs airborne early warning
systems that we did have.
And, as Mr. Hutchinson has pointed out, there have been agents in other
agencies that have been diverted from the counter-narcotics effort, which
does have an impact, then, on your overall intelligence architecture.
We, additionally,
because of the election in Colombia and the subsequent inauguration, kept
some of our intelligence assets in Colombia that were due to rotate for
maintenance purposes, et cetera. And so at this point in time, we do have
some reduction of our intelligence assets.
But I would also
like to point out that one of the things that we did do is re-double our
efforts on the interagency level with the DEA -- with the FBI, Customs,
et cetera, to make sure that we were making use of all of the information
that was available out there. And, indeed, some of the information --
intelligence that came from cases that were being prosecuted, et cetera,
we turned in the tippers that have been successful, particularly for jatafeast
(ph) in the transit zone.
So it has had an
impact. Some of those assets have begun to come back. But we are still
short some of those assets.
GRASSLEY: We have
less than three minutes before we reach the noon hour. I have two questions
and I'm going to ask both of them. And if you would like to comment on
either or both, please do so.
The first is President
Uribe has clearly signaled a more aggressive policy by his government
and has followed up his words with some deeds. What affect will this more
aggressive campaign against the FARC and other narco-traffickers have
on U.S. policy and U.S. requirements in the region?
And the final question
-- there was a news account recently that the paramilitaries have started
to fracture into somewhat conflicting sources. Is that an accurate report,
based on your assessment of the situation? And if so, what are the implications
to successful pursuit of the war against narco-traffickers of the fracturing
of the paramilitaries?
ARMITAGE: To both
questions -- on the first question, sir, it seems to me that what President
Uribe has both signaled and said is exactly in line with what U.S. policy
has been and what we've heard from the U.S. Congress in terms of the direction
they want them to go in, in all phases. That is, to be more supportive
of the military; to devote more of their own resources to their own well-being;
to further respect human rights. And I would note the appointment of his
vice president -- a noted crusading journalist and human rights advocate
-- seems to signal that he's got the message on that. That's right down
the line with both U.S. policy and U.S. congressional intent.
And on the latter,
my understanding -- and I deferred it to someone who's there every day
-- is that there is a fracture in the AUC. And it's both -- it's a business
proposition in terms of who wants to do drugs and who wants to follow
other illicit activities and it's a representation, I think, of the fact
that both former President Pastrana and now President Uribe is very vigilant
in trying to sever completely the links between the military and the AUC.
And we were up briefing staff members the other day on this, following
the certification I made. And I think the tag line that we used was "If
you're killing and imprisoning the AUC, you're not colluding with them."
And that seems to be the case.
And with your permission,
Mr. Chairman, I want to insert into the record a list of the recent military
activities against the AUC.
HUTCHINSON: I would
just add to those comments that there is a, perhaps, a difference of viewpoint
on the AUC within the organization. But they are still heavily engaged
in drug trafficking -- deriving proceeds from that. And I believe that
they also have the capability to engage in a public relation ploy to diminish
the scrutiny on them or hopefully to do that.
And I think they
are feeling the heat.
GRASSLEY: General?
JACKMAN: Senator,
I would just say that at least from our perspective, although we have
seen these reports, I think that we're taking a wait-and-see attitude
to see how that particularly develops.
On your first point
that you made about President Uribe and his administration, I think it's
a clear signal that he has taken on the challenge and he is stepping up
to the plate of what's going to be required to solve the problems in Colombia.
And, again, it is their conflict to win. If they take that challenge on,
I think that U.S. policy should follow.
GRASSLEY: Gentlemen,
I want to thank you very much for a very illuminating hearing this morning.
This is an issue which is extremely important to the United States. But
from time-to-time we have to be reminded of its importance. With so many
other issues on the world scene, it's easy for one -- even one that's
so close to us in terms of its geographic proximity and the impact on
our people -- to be lost in the clutter of all of the competing matters.
I hope this hearing
has helped to get us refocused on the importance of this and on some of
the new challenges of policy in action to the United States, which will
compliment the new changes in policy in action that are being taken by
the Colombian government.
So I thank you very
much.
The hearing record
will stay open for seven days for any supplementation of your comments,
as well as the possibility that members of the committee might wish to
submit written questions for further response.
HUTCHINSON: Thank
you, Senator.
ARMITAGE: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
GRASSLEY: The hearing is adjourned.
JACKMAN: Thank you.
###
NOTES:
[????] - Indicates Speaker Unknown
[--] - Indicates could not make out what was being said.[off mike] - Indicates
could not make out what was being said.
As of September 30,
2002, this document was also available online at http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/hearings_events.htm