Media roundtable with U.S. Southern Command J-3 (Operations) Chief Brig. Gen. Galen Jackman, October 4, 2002

Media roundtable with U.S. Southern Command J-3 (Operations) Chief Brig. Gen. Galen Jackman, October 4, 2002

October 4, 2002

Media "roundtable" w/BG Galen Jackman, J3, USSOUTHCOM

Other participants: COL David McWilliams, USSOUTHCOM PAO; Andrew Selsky, Associated Press; Carlos Rojas, EFE; Juan Tamayo & Carol Rosenberg, Miami Herald; Joseph Contreras, Newsweek; Jane Sutton, Reuters; Omar Perez, NY Times; David Adams and Tom Drury, St. Petersburg Times, Stephen Lucas, USSOUTHCOM Media Relations specialist. Recorded September 29, 2002

BG JACKMAN: First of all, thank you for being here and coming today. I think we've got some important stories in the region and my purpose here today is to try to provide you some information and perspective, at least from the Southern Command's view.

I would like to try to focus most of the discussion today on Colombia. However, I am prepared to talk about our role regionally in the war on terrorism, and also with some aspects of our operations in Guantanamo.

But again, if it's O-K with you, I'd like to try to keep it focused on Colombia, but if you want to branch out, we can do that.

So, I'll just go ahead and open it up for any questions you might have.

QUESTION (JS:) I'll start, if nobody else will. Can you discuss what way the military might have contributed information that lead to the Castaña indictment -- Castaño indictment?

BG JACKMAN: I think, as you probably know we provide intelligence support to the Colombians, this has been focused on counter-drug intelligence, primarily.

And I would tell you, without speculating, that information, if it is …if it relates to drugs, relative to him, would have been passed to the Colombians.

But I can't get into, I think, a lot of the details.

QUESTION (JS:) Can you say, though, definitely that the military did contribute?

BG JACKMAN: Yes, I think that it's pretty safe to say that we provided information to the Colombians, as we do on many of the leaders that we know to be involved in narcotics trafficking.

QUESTION (DA:) The change in the - your expanded authority - does that affect intell sharing at all? I mean, prior to the supplemental aid bill being passed, were you restricted in any way in how - in how much intell you could share with the Colombians on people like, say, Castano on a non-drug basis? Or, could you still call -- share intelligence on Paramilitary and guerilla figures even though it -- the intelligence had no bearing on Counterdrug issues?

BG JACKMAN: If it was not related to narcotics trafficking or any part of the drug process, we could not share that, nor could we actively collect on it.

And there's two reasons for that - number one, we're prohibited by P-D-D 73, which limits our support to the Colombians in counter insurgency…

QUESTION (DA:) What is P-D…?

BG JACKMAN: It's Presidential Decision Directive…

REMARK (DA:) Oh, right…

BG JACKMAN: …and this was a P-D-D that was established by President Clinton, that probably will be replaced, I would think, in the near future by a new -- what is now called a National Security Presidential Determination…

REMARK (JS?:) N-S-P-D

BG JACKMAN: …an N-S-P-D, relative to Colombia. And that's being drafted and is now with the inter-agency and National Security Council.

But the second thing that limited us in that collection and sharing is fiscal law, that is the assets that we use in collecting intelligence were appropriated by congress - the funding for those - to support those assets - was appropriated by congress, and the purpose for that appropriation was in support of Plan Colombia, and our purpose there was to support on the counterdrug side -- so that those monies were specifically appropriated for counterdrug operations.

So, we limited in what we could collect, and what could be shared, with the Colombians.

QUESTION (DA:) But is it possible that in other, more global funds, totally independent of Plan Colombia, that there was the ability - existed to collect information on non-drug targets in Colombia? Could - I mean, other things could happen in Colombia, outside of Plan Colombia, right?

BG JACKMAN: Well, they could, but, again we were still limited by - providing support - by P-D-D 73, so …

REPORTER'S REMARK (DA:) Right…

BG JACKMAN: …although there may have been other funds available, to support intelligence platforms, for example, you still had the issue of P-D-D 73

REPORTER'S REMARK (DA:) unintelligible

BG JACKMAN: which was a clear line. And of course the problem now - and this, you know, this may have been suitable back in the days when much of the narco trafficking activity was conducted by the cartels - once the --many of the large cartels were eliminated, what happened was the FARC and the A-U-C stepped into that vacuum and became involved in the drug business, whether it was encouraging people to grow coca, protecting fields, running base labs, taxing narco-traffickers, a whole host of protection and actual involvement in the narco-trafficking end of it - that is the marketing of that. And we have seen, of course, over the last year, in particular, that the FARC have - and the A-U-C - have been using drugs as direct barter for arms trafficking.

QUESTION (CR:) Not the E-L-N?

BG JACKMAN: You know, I think that the E-L-N - much of their money is made in the kidnapping and extortion area, and we see less of the E-L-N's involvement in the narco-trafficking and the drug business than we do in the A-U-C and the FARC. And I'm not saying that their not involved, but I think, the FARC and E-L-N are significantly involved.

QUESTION (TD:) Got a question - this P-D-D 73 - this is still operative?

BG JACKMAN: It is.

QUESTION (TD:) And what will the N-S-P-D being drafted -- how is that going to change the field?

BG JACKMAN: I think that it will have - the N-S-P-D - and again this only in draft…

REMARK (TD:) uhhum…

BG JACKMAN: I think that our approach to Colombia recognizes that the problem in Colombia is much more than drugs, although drugs are a significant part of the problem, but the problem is beyond drugs, and as I testified the other day, the situation in Colombia and the problem there basically is a crisis of governance, where the Colombians are not able to provide a safe and secure environment in their territories that would enable the rooting and the growth of socio-economic programs.

And so, I think that the N-S-P-D recognizes there is a greater problem which is not only drugs, but includes the illegal armed groups there, and I think that the U-S Government's policy will begin to shift, probably to a greater support for Colombia relative too assisting them with the broader problem, not just drugs, but the broader problem, which includes the Colombians fight against illegal armed groups.

QUESTION (CR? barely audible, almost unintelligible:) Would you call them Terrorists?

BG JACKMAN: I think so. Certainly, they use terrorist means.

QUESTION (AS:) Does the training of the Pipeline protection brigade come under southcom?

BG JACKMAN: It does.

QUESTION (AS:) Can you, if you the (rating?) explain the timetable and how that's going to unroll?

BG JACKMAN: In the F-Y zero two supplemental that was passed, it provided, initially, six million dollars to the beginning of that effort. And then the Department of State was working on a F-Y zero three legislation that would provide the remaining money for the training of the 18th Brigade and the fifth Brigade.

In order for that money to be released by Congress, President Uribe had to meet certain things. He had to provide certain assurances back, thru the ambassador, to the Secretary of State and to - and the Secretary of defense had to make a certification as well.

Once that is rendered, then the congress, they had 15 days and after that, then the money would be released, and released down to us.

So from a timing standpoint, we expect that sometime in October we will begin the training.

QUESTION (AS:) How much money comes in the fiscal year zero-three?

BG JACKMAN: There's a number of things in the markups that are going on. I think that the largest number I've seen is a total of 98 million dollars.

QUESTION (AS:) For the pipeline protection brigade?

BG JACKMAN: For the - Yes, that effort. The training would start in October. We would do this very much like we did the training of the first Counternarcotics Brigade. We would probably start with the Command and Control elements - The Brigade headquarters, some of the Battalion Headquarters they have there -work training at that level, and then individually train each one of their subordinate Battalions.

QUESTION: The Brigades will be 950 men, or persons - how big will each Brigade be?

BG JACKMAN: Well the Brigade, generally - we looked at battalions the range anywhere from about 400 to about 700 men in each one of those. So, you know, roughly, if we just took 500 as a - you know, we're probably talking about 2000 people in a brigade.

QUESTION: So, 4000, all totaled, will be trained for infrastructure…?

BG JACKMAN: Eventually, and well probably train the first brigade - the 18th brigade, which is the first one, we will train them the first year. It'll take us a year to train that first brigade…

QUESTION: Will that take place at Tolidima (Phonetic) or Larandia (Phonetic)-what's the name of that place…?

BG JACKMAN: No, that will take place in the Arauca Department, which is up in the Northern part of the country, where the Tucana-Winon (Phonetic) pipeline -

QUESTION: In a… in Solameno? (Phonetic)

BG JACKMAN: In that…that is…that is one of the sites.

QUESTION: 'Cause the Gs have been hitting there, you know, pretty hard. What about force protection - Is that a concern?

BG JACKMAN: It's a concern - certainly is. But, part of this effort, just like we did with the first C-N Brigade, is, before we put the special operators in there to conduct the training and equipping, we normally go thru a force protection build in there to protect our soldiers. And, that is ongoing, as we speak. That effort is taking place up there.

QUESTION: In your testi…

BG JACKMAN: And, part of that, also, is making sure that we have a good intelligence architecture established up there.

QUESTION: In your testimony last week, on - you said that there was evidence - that there was intelligence that FARC has worked with Sendero Luminoso, with illegal armed groups in Bolivia and some friend in the Tri-Border area. Can you elaborate on that? That's awfully tantalizing observations…

BG JACKMAN: Yeah…

QUESTION: Can you…?

BG JACKMAN: Yeah, just a couple of things. There's a major drug vector that -- that runs from Colombia, thru Peru -- Bolivia, into the Tri-border area, and then from the Tri-border area across Brazil, some of that goes to the Urban areas in Brazil -- but some of that money, or some of those drugs, then -- are really turned into weapons, coming back the same pipeline.

And some of that moves by air, some of it moves by ground, some of it moves by water, and a combination thereof.

So, on of the things that's happening here is - we have a drug vector that's - a cocaine vector that's coming out of Colombia thru Peru - Bolivia to the coast, and arms coming back the other way. Arms typically that come from that direction are coming from the gray arms markets in central Asia - Eastern Europe.

That's one of the things that are happening. I think the other thing is, that there are several groups, Sendero Luminoso being one of them, and groups in Bolivia, that are, essentially, taking the FARC template.

That is, in order to sustain themselves, in order to have the means and the wherewithal to do what they want to do, they know that the drug business is a lucrative business.

And so, I think that we have, you know, actions and coordination that's gone on between the FARC and some of those groups out there, in fact, we know that there is.

QUESTION: But is this related strictly to drug trafficking, or is this related to the FARC advising Shining Path on how to deal with the peasantry - on, you know, dealing with Lebanese in the Tri-border area who might have ties to Hezbollah, I mean…

BG JACKMAN: I think there's a number of reasons for it. I think that there is, first of all, some, you know, monetary… you know, in order to make the money on the drugs, they got to go somewhere and someone's got to pay them, and you got to have middlemen along the way to do it, so part of it is economic.

In the case of Sendero Luminoso, there is also the business of sanctuary and support for the FARC, and is some of the spillover effect.

And, I think the third thing there is that - I think that Sendero Luminoso is interested in techniques and strategies and things like that.

QUESTION: Could you elaborate a bit about "sanctuary and support for the FARC?"

BG JACKMAN: Yes. I think that there are, I think that there are, -- I think, probably four areas where there is some sanctuary, and these are - this is all surrounding Colombia - I think you see it in Ecuador, along the borders, there. In Ecuador we see, actual drug movement thru there, because you have some river systems that actually come out of Colombia, into Ecuador, and then back into Colombia as they're moving over towards Tumaco on the west coast of Colombia. So, part of it is a way of kind of getting around efforts in Colombia that may be interdicting drugs moving thru the Andes there, for example.

We also see some of it in Peru, Venezuela, and in Panama.

Now, all these are just a little bit different, but, I think some of the things that are common are that: these are fairly large borders, in areas that are fairly remote, and often times, families, you know, work across the border. I mean, there may be families in Colombia, part of the family in Peru, there - et cetera, so there is kind of a natural movement back and forth.

But there is - moving into those areas, obtaining medical supplies - a place to bring casualties.

There is - They often get support, you know - some of the food that they may need in those areas.

They get some of the weapons that are trafficked thru those particular areas and they use those areas, too, when they break contact and they want to reconstitute or R and R, et cetera, they sometimes go in those areas, as well.

I would tell you that in Ecuador and Peru, from the military standpoint, they have been moving their Military units in there to try to limit that activity.

In Panama, it's not a question of will from the Panamanian Government, it's really a question - a problem of their wherewithal to be able to do that.

But the Presidents of both Panama and Colombia have discussed this issue along the border in the Darien region up in Panama, and they're trying to work out some things to try and minimize some of the sanctuary area there.

We probably see a lot of activity up around the Venezuelan border. We see a lot of aircraft flights across the Venezuelan border vectored into Suriname, for example. A lot of drug…I'm sorry, arms coming back from Suriname, transiting Venezuelan airspace, into Colombia.

And we see a lot of activity - what you just pointed out, in terms of the activity along the pipeline up there is very close to the border up there in Venezuela.

So, a lot of things happening on the Venezuelan border up there.

QUESTION: Wha…These Brigades that are going to be trained to protect the pipeline, then, that wouldn't be there sole job - if they, you know, could be used to reinforce the border of prevent, you know, these crossings, they Might, right?

BG JACKMAN: I think that these brigades that we're talking about will be very offensively oriented. That is focused the enemy, as opposed to a static defense around the pipeline.

Now, I would also tell you that, in addition to the training of those brigades, we're going to be training some of the National police for that effort up there.

We also will have a very good civil affairs program that we're putting in there and some of Information Operations that are there, Because the essence of the problem in that area, again, is one governance - government presence.

And so, the idea there is to help secure the pipeline, so that that region can benefit from the revenues of that. Secure the region there, and then get some of the social and economic programs going there.

So there has to be kind of a - what we would call a Civil-Military operation there, to help the folks - help the Colombians that are on the ground, that live in that area.

QUESTION: Who's going to be training the National Police and then where - where and when will that happen?

BG JACKMAN: We will be involved in training the National Police there, and that will happen in the same area. Typically, the way that the Colombians will organize an effort like that: for every one of the Battalions that they have, they normally have an associated National Police Platoon, there.

And, the role of that platoon is, generally, the enforcement of the rule of law there.

So, they will be trained, normally with each of those Battalions.

QUESTION (DA:) Going back to Sendero Luminoso…

BG JACKMAN: Uh-Huh.

QUESTION (DA:) Is this an effort by Sendero Luminoso to get itself sort of back up and running, too - the involvement with the FARC and with drugs, and supplying guns, whatever?

BG JACKMAN: It appears to us that that is…that's correct.

QUESTION (DA:) Can you… and how successful have they been at it?

BG JACKMAN: I think that that … I that they've grown, I think that they've become involved in some activities, obviously we seen some incidents - some terrorist incidents -- increased terrorist incidents, et cetera.

But, I've would also tell you this: that the Peruvians are watching this very carefully.

About a month and a half ago, we had the Chief of defense up here, with the Chief of defense for Ecuador and Colombia and we talked about these cross-border issues and we talked about these various terrorist groups, and I think that there is a good bit of coordination and cooperation that goes on, on the military side on these.

QUESTION (CRojas:) What's happening with Venezuela?

BG JACKMAN: I think, Venezuela…I would tell you that our relationship with the Military there is good, it has been good, historically.

There are a lot of internal problems that the Venezuelans are dealing with at this point in time. We've encouraged them to assist the Colombians there, but, I think, we don't see as much activity on the Venezuelan side.

But, I think a lot of this has to do with their own internal problems.

QUESTION: Do you expect the interdiction of the flights - you know, that have been suspended in Peru and Colombia, is that going to be resumed, you said?

BG JACKMAN: In Colombia, the target - and this, of course, is a…now, a State run program - a Department of State run program. We provide support for that with our radars and with the flights - the airborne early warning systems and some of the tracker aircraft. But, the state department's goal right now is to resume that in Colombia in October.

Colombian pilots and the ground and air safety monitors that are part of the program are undergoing training, now, up in Oklahoma. And when they're trained, then they will go back down into country, we'll continue to work on the procedures to insure this is safe and preclude accidental shoot-downs.

There's a number of other things that have to happen - there has to be a Memorandum of Agreement signed between Colombia and the United States, which really lays out kind of the rules.

The second thing is we have aircraft title for some of the tracker aircraft over to the Colombians, and finally, President Bush has to make a Presidential determination that everything is straight and is ready to go and that it's safe.

So, there're a lot of things that have to happen, you know, before this is resumed, but, I think the intent is to resume it in Colombia, and I think that Peru will probably take a little bit longer, and part of the reason for that is there is a greater turnover of people on both on the political side and on the military side in Peru and it's just going to take a little bit longer to get that implemented there.

QUESTION (crosstalk:) Where in Oklahoma is the training going on?

BG JACKMAN: You know, I don't recall…I did know it, But I don't recall.

MR. LUCAS: Tinker, Sir?

BG JACKMAN: No.

COL McWILLIAMS: We'll get an answer for that. We don't (unintelligible)

QUESTION: Sorry, those are Colombians or Americans that are getting this training in Oklahoma?

BG JACKMAN: These are Colombians and … the Colombian pilots…

QUESTION: are they Air Force pilots, or …(unintelligible)

BG JACKMAN: Colombian…Yeah, Colombian pilots, and I believe most of them are Air force pilots, and Colombian ground and air safety monitors that'll be located in the aircraft and at command and control centers on the ground.

These are all Colombians. It is a U.S. firm that has the contract to train these people.

QUESTION: Do you expect all of those prerequisites to be done in the next couple of weeks, if there're going to be up in October in Colombia?

BG JACKMAN: Well, I don't…I don't, personally, have a lot of visibility on it. Again, the Department of State is running this program. But, our latest information - they - the mark on the wall for the Department of State is October.

QUESTION: How many pilots and people are we talking about training and how many airplanes are we signing over?

BG JACKMAN: I believe that there are three tracker aircraft, these are the, I think, the 560 Citations will go the Colombians, two of the aircraft will go to the Peruvians, keeping in mind that the Colombians and Peruvians have their own tracker Aircraft.

But these are tracker aircraft that were being used by the U.S. Government in the Air Bridge Denial, and part of the program is, now, to give the tracker mission to the Colombia and Peru for their respective airspace.

QUESTION: And, how many people?

BG JACKMAN: I don't know. I don't know.

QUESTION: How many Citations was that, General? I'm sorry….

BG JACKMAN: There were three Citations that would go to the Colombians and Two…

REMARK: two to Peru…

BG JACKMAN: …two to Peru.

QUESTION: And the idea is that there will be Host country total personnel in the cockpit - in the aircraft, or that those countries in turn will contract the people that were contracted previously (in Colombia?)

BG JACKMAN: (Chuckles) Better run that one by me again.

QUESTION: There were Americans flying those planes during the shoot-down…

BG JACKMAN: That's right.

QUESTION: Are the Colombians expected to now Hire them to fly them, or are the expected to put their own nationals …

BG JACKMAN: The Colombians will be flying those aircraft.

QUESTION: They're not going to be turning around contracting the same personnel…

BG JACKMAN: Not to my knowledge. I think these are all Colombians that they…

The way this … The way this works is that we have three have three long-range Relocatable Over-the-horizon Radars at several places in the United States. And, then we have a series of ground-based radars that are set-up in the Andean ridge.

And all of that information on those radars goes back into the Joint Southern Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations Center in Key West, Florida - all that information goes in there.

Now, that is the ground radar piece of this. We also have - we fly - Airborne Early Warning Systems, from the customs. And those are "dome" aircraft, and they provide radar coverage…

QUESTION: are they like AWACs?

BG JACKMAN: Like AWACs, yeah. We used to fly E-3s, after September 11th when we started focusing, the E-3s moved, but we fly custom P-3 A-E-Ws as we call them and Navy E-2-C dome aircraft - but they're radar aircraft. And they also provide that feedback to JSSROC.

And what happens in JSSROC, here in Key West - they're looking at all thease Radar tracks of aircraft and they have a sort protocol that says - OK, this one's squawking in accordance with, you know, aviation protocols, et cetera - And you start working down this, and you get to tracks that are flying that are, for example, not squawking, or there's something about that track that would tell you that this is the profile of an aircraft that is not just…you know, that is flying for some other reason out there.

Then, that information is provided back to a tracker, and its provided - in Colombia, for example, it goes to the Counterdrug Operation and Control center in Bogotá - and then that information is provided to a tracker aircraft…

QUESTION: I'm sorry; it goes to the where in Bogotá?

BG JACKMAN: It goes to the Counterdrug…Operations…Control…Center.

QUESTION: Is that something with the U-S Embassy or is that Colombian Government…?

BG JACKMAN: It's in the Colombian Military…

QUESTION: Not police?

BG JACKMAN: …in the CAN (as heard). No.

And, its there, and there are both U-S people and Colombian people. Right now that information is not going back there, Because, after the shoot-down the Secretary of Defense said we're going to cut that feed into the - what we call the C-Doc.

But, when we resume this, that feed will come in to the C-Doc, and then that information then goes to an airborne tracker, which can be one of these 560 tracker aircraft, it can be other Colombian aircraft, and their role, then, is to get closer to this air track of interest and determine what it is.

And they normally do that by radar means - radar in the nose of the aircraft - or they do it with visual means, and they identify what that aircraft is. And then, there are finally the - what we call the force-down aircraft. These are the aircraft that, you know, use the normal signals out there to direct these types of aircraft to land.

QUESTION: How many attacks have there been on the pipeline this year?

BG JACKMAN: there have been…I don't know that I can give you the number, other than I can just tell you: many - many.

QUESTION: last year. (cross talk - unintelligible)

BG JACKMAN: I don't know. (cross talk - unintelligible) Yeah. I know that it's less, but I can't, I can't tell you (unintelligible)

QUESTION: General you used the term "sanctuary and support" to describe what Shining Path gives the FARC, if I understood you correctly?

BG JACKMAN: Yes.

QUESTION: Is that right? Now the Shining path is nowhere near the border with Colombia, so that would suggest the FARC is coming well, well into Peru. Is that right?

BG JACKMAN: Yeah, I wouldn't say that we have large formations of FARC that are going deep into Peru.

I think that we have certain people out of the FARC that are meeting with certain people out of the Sendero Luminoso.

QUESTION: uh…OK. Then…Why then, has the Peruvian government been so reluctant to admit that the FARC is coming - certain people, as you put it from the FARC - are rendezvousing with the Shining Path, and if they're doing so, by definition, they're doing it well inside the national territory of Peru.

And yet, you know, the Toledo government - Wiessman, they all said, "No, this is not true."

BG JACKMAN: Ah…

QUESTION: Are they unaware of this intelligence, or, are they trying to…?

BG JACKMAN: I don't know, personally, if they're aware of the intelligence, or not.

QUESTION: UmHum. And then, these certain people out of -- from FARC, are they - what? Field Commanders? People at the very, very senior level of the FARC?

BG JACKMAN: I don't think they're people at the very senior level.

REMARK: All right.

BG JACKMAN: No, I think that the people at the very senior level rarely leave Colombia.

QUESTION: (unintelligible) trying to understand (unintelligible) What does it mean that they in some ways reconstituting themselves out of this relationship (unintelligible)

BG JACKMAN: I think the concern that everyone has there is: obviously the FARC has been able to sustain themselves in Colombia as a result of the drug trade -- I think the concern is: that the same type of pattern may establish itself in Peru. And, I think that the same concern exists in Bolivia.

QUESTION: But, what is the evidence that, somehow, this is, like, the new business of Sendero Luminoso? Like…

BG JACKMAN: (didn't hear clearly - repeating what she might have asked:) What is the big deal? About…?

QUESTION: No, what is the evidence?

BG JACKMAN: OK. What is the evidence that they've been involved in Narco-trafficking?

QUESTION: and this is how they're getting their new lease on life?

BG JACKMAN: Yeah. Well, I think that there is evidence, certainly, that they're involved in narcotics trafficking in Peru. I think that there has been a resurgence of activity regarding Sendero Luminosa. So then, the next logical question is: Where they…where do they get the wherewithal to do that?

And I think that…you know, certainly, if you ask yourself: Where are the weapons, explosives, ammunition and all coming from, and where are they going too?

I think that, as I noted in my testimony, they are coming from Central America, primarily Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras.

They are coming from the United States. They are coming from Europe. They're transiting thru Suriname. They're transiting thru Ecuador. They're transiting thru Brazil. And they're transiting, in some cases, thru the Tri-Border area and up thru Bolivia and Peru.

So, the terrorists, I mean: someone like Sendero Luminosa, they have to certain things to be able to sustain themselves and grow, et cetera, and so, if they need these types of means, then they have to get them somewhere, and they have to pay for them somehow.

And, I think the FARC has been fairly successful in sustaining themselves. And, we know that after the Colombian Military went back into the Despeje, I mean there's a considerable amount of evidence, I think, that they were able to gain out of that, and we do know that the FARC have had increasing difficulties in organizing this support for themselves, after the Colombian Military went in the Despeje. Because, they're now much more decentralized.

QUESTION (DA:) General Valasco, the Air Force General, was quoted about a month ago in the Colombian newspapers as saying that they were having a lot of increased success in targeting rebel camps, and bombing them. He… just last week, the Air Force Command said they'd 200 FARC in a rebel camp.

And, General Valasco said about a week before this was - that since the expansion of authority, the level of intell sharing, including satellite technology, was helping the Colombian Air Force pin-point guerilla camps deep in the Jungle they hadn't ever been able to see before.

Can you tell us a little bit about that?

BG JACKMAN: Well, again, we… we're still limited, by what we can share with the Colombians - by, you know, what I pointed out earlier.

But clearly, if there was a drug nexus, and we provided that information to them, you know, then they can use the information. I don't know, specifically, the case that you're talking about, there.

But, what we do try to do is - all the available technology that we have, that can be allocated to us here in the Southern Command, we try to use in order to gain that information that we can pass to the Colombians.

So, if it is, for example, satellite imagery, or if it is other intelligence, we do that.

We try to work the best technological means of doing that that we possible can.

QUESTION (DA:) So, you're…you mean, you're saying that we basically pulling all of the intell resources that we have available to help in that endeavor now, and when the Clinton Presidential decree is replaced, then it'll be, sort of, open season, intell-wise on targeting guerilla air forces (as heard.)

BG JACKMAN: I don't…That isn't the only reason why it's gotten better.

Part of the reason is we've worked with the Colombians in terms of their own processes of determining, you know, How is it you develop requirements for intelligence?

You know, and what intelligence procedures do you go thru to say: OK, where is it that I would like to have these assets focus their collection?

And, I think that that, for a long time, had been a problem with the Colombians, I mean I, you know, sometimes people tend to think that we're just omnipotent, you know, that we see everything, and can see everything - it's just a matter of what we share, and that's really not the case.

I mean, Colombia, you know, is a very large country. I mean it's, you know, the South-Eastern United States. So…or the size of the South-eastern United States.

So, What we have to do is -- we have to kind of narrow, you know, what we trying to collect against out there. And, I think, one of the areas the Colombians have become better at is identifying what those requirements are, and then pass those requirements to us, and again, if there is a C-D nexus, then we'll collect against those and share that information with the Colombians.

QUESTION (AS:) But, does there always have to be a C-D nexus, like…

BG JACKMAN: Yes

QUESTION (AS:) … is that envisioned in the future - that that, you know, fire-wall may drop, just as it has for the counter-narcotics Brigades - can it be used for, you know, pure counter-insurgency?

BG JACKMAN: Yeah, and that's what we would like to see. And the reason for that is: it has become increasingly difficult to figure out whether these guys are involved -- in a specific incident - whether they're involved with drugs, or not.

But we do know, you know, using all of our intelligence sources, that these organizations - The FARC, and the AUC, are up to their neck in the drug trade, OK.

So, what we need to be able to do is to take this narrow interpretation of how to help the Colombians and expand that, and provide them information then that can enable them to provide security to those areas out there. And the FARC and the AUC are part of the problems with security out there.

QUESTION (AS:) If, for example…you know, the N-S-A…the United States captured this Romsey (Phonetic) Guy in Karachi by, you know, getting a voice print from a satellite phone call that he made…

BG JACKMAN: Right.

QUESTION (AS:) Now, So, if you get Tito Frijol and Manica Hoy (Phonetic) calling on their sat-phones someplace and the N-S-A or you guys eavesdrop and pinpoint them…

BG JACKMAN: Right.

QUESTION (AS:) …He doesn't have to be talking about, you know, a drug-deal, because, they're on charges of drug-dealing organization, he could be talking about anything…

BG JACKMAN: Well, this is…

QUESTION (AS:) is this sort of, you know, intell that you could…

BG JACKMAN: Yeah, see, I mean, unfortunately, the, you know, the lawyers don't quite interpret it that way, Because…

(chuckles from reporters)

Because, we have this P-D 73. And so what we need to do is - we need to clear all of that.

Say: "What is the U-S policy, relative to these organizations?

We need to treat them as they are (end of tape side)

(During the tape change over, BG Jackman explained that the Illegal armed groups constituted terrorist groups and should be targeted for intelligence gathering and sharing, but that other criteria and guidance fro U.S. aid, such as Vetting of Units would remain in place.)

BG JACKMAN: (speaking as tape side two begins:)…not change.

COL McWilliams: We got time for maybe one more follow-up question.

QUESTION (DA:) So if you were…let me -- Carlos Castaño, contrary to his own words, probably won't volunteer himself to U-S law enforcement and come to stand trial in the United States, and -- in which case, someone's going to have to go and find him. The fact that he has been indicted, as a drug trafficker, in the United States, does that mean that Andrew's scenario wouldn't that apply, I mean for the FARC, and Wouldn't apply to Him?

BG JACKMAN: That's right. If he's been indicted by the United States on drug-trafficking or drug-related charges, that's clearly a counter-drug nexus.

QUESTION (DA:) Whatever he's doing, whatever he's saying?

BG JACKMAN: Yeah. That's right.

QUESTION (DA:) And…

BG JACKMAN: And, there have been, as you know, quite a few people that have been indicted…

QUESTION (DA:) In the FARC, too…

BG JACKMAN: Yes.

QUESTION (DA:) All right. Now, if… in that case… You're familiar with the Pablo Escobar case, where the Colombians couldn't catch him, so Delta Force and something called Centra Strike from the U.S. Army had to go and find him.

And, obviously, they did. And he ended up…we all know how he ended up. I s that foreseeable - something like that scenario foreseeable in Carlos Castano's case, if the Colombians ask for it?

BG JACKMAN: Well…

QUESTION (DA:) No…

BG JACKMAN: Let me say this: I think our whole approach, and I want to go back to something I said in Colombia, because I think this is a, you know, a lesson we learned out of Viet Nam, and that is: this is the Colombians war to win.

And they have to step up to the fight.

And they have to put their country on a footing to be able to do that.

We think that we should support them in that effort, but our intent is not to support them with boots on the ground.

And we have a 400-person Military cap in Colombia; we don't envision that's going to change. Typically we have, maybe, a couple hundred people in country at any given time.

The Colombian Military is, I think is a good Military. It needs to expand. It needs to have a good national military strategy - a game plan to go - to prosecute.

And I think that we can help them in increasing their capabilities, and that's what we really want to do there.

So, I don't envision that we will have U.S. Soldiers out on the ground looking for the characters and taking direct action against these characters. What we want to do is give our partner nation - to help them in developing their capability to be able to do those types of things.

And that's been our approach here…

QUESTION: Just one follow-up question: On the armed groups in Bolivia, the illegal armed groups in Bolivia who you mentioned in your testimony, you said earlier, there's some - some concern exists as to Bolivia, in the context of answering questions about Sendero Luminosa. Who do you have in mind by illegal armed groups? Do you have in mind…?

BG JACKMAN: Well…

QUESTION: guerilla forces in Bolivia, or…

BG JACKMAN: Yes, I think that there's some groups that are involved with the cocaleros there, that are trying to organize the cocaleros. And, certainly the FARC has been in Bolivia. So, it those…it some of those groups, and I won't elaborate on that.

QUESTION: They're organizing cocaleros into violent, armed activities as opposed to shutting down roads, or…?

BG JACKMAN: I don't know - I can't speculate on what they will eventually do down there, but I think that it's disturbing that the FARC down there working with some of those people.

If I could say something else, and I'd just kind of like to expand this, just a bit.

After September 11th, because of some guidance at the National levels, we began to look at Latin America -- at this region - Latin America and the Caribbean.

We stepped back and tried to look at it just a little bit differently than we had in the past.

I would say, largely, we've been very Colombia-centric, and we have tended to look at things thru the lens of counter-drugs - counter-drug operations.

We stepped back and decided to look at the region just a little bit differently.

One of the great competencies that we have here in the Southern Command is our interagency coordination, and we gained that competency because of the drug war, and if you look at Joint Interagency Task Force East down in Key West, which is our operational arm that works counterdrug operations in the transit zone out there, you'll find that it is a multi-national and an interagency element that is working.

What we did this - beginning in October - is we formed up an interagency coordination group - we called it a Joint Interagency Coordination Group here in the Headquarters.

It has all the major government agencies represented here. And, I'm talking about all the intelligence agencies, we have all of the…we have Customs, Coast Guard, Department of Energy, we have the Department of Treasury, the office of foreign asset control, we have the I-N-S.

And we began to look at - not only drug trafficking, we started looking at arms trafficking, smuggling aliens, looked at money laundering and all the money networks, and we looked at corruption.

And, we began to form, in the whole region, here, a good interagency picture of what was going on.

We also started looking at all of the terrorist organizations in the region.

And we've continued that process, and I think that we have a very good picture of what's going on in the region.

That information is shared. We have a representative from the O-A-S that sits in with us. That information is also shared with all the ambassadors, they come in here - the Commander brings the ambassador in the sub-regions every quarter, we share that information with them. He brings the Chiefs of Defense in and we share that information.

And, we have tried to help our partner nations as much we could relative to the war on terrorism, as a result of this intelligence sharing.

And, I think that there's been very good action by our partner nations down-range relative to many of the organizations that exist in Latin America. I think, that they've been very helpful. The Brazilians have been helpful. The Paraguans have been helpful. The Argentineans, Chileans, Peruvians, the Ecuadorians and certainly, the Colombians. The Nicaraguans…

And, our approach here, again, has been to share information with them and to help them develop capabilities to deal with these problems.

We do not look at U.S. unilateral action in Latin America. We look at information sharing, and we look at enhancing the capabilities of our partner nations.

And, I think that it's been pretty successful - I won't get into a lot of the details, but I believe that there have been a lot of actions that have prevented things from happening in Latin America.

One of the things that I just want to underscore here is that if you look at the interagency in our government -- that is really one of our competencies here in the Southern Command.

And, we got on that one very fast and it was easy to leverage for two reasons:

One, we had the experience as a result of what we've done in counterdrug operations, and secondly, in Miami here, all of those government agencies are represented here, so its easy for us to pull all of that in. We have an excellent working arrangement with the FBI, here, for example and the A-T-F, et cetera.

COL McWILLIAMS: That's it

(BG Jackman, and certain members of his, and the PAO, staff continued to interact off-mike with reporters for some minutes - providing answers to "taken questions" concerning the "mark-up" funding for the Infrastructure Protection Brigade training [SASC - 88 Million - HASC-- 98 million - yet to be finalized] and answering additional follow-ons)