Remarks by U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson, Washington, October 8, 2002

Remarks by U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson, Washington, October 8, 2002
Remarks by Ambassador Anne W. Patterson at the CSIS Conference

Luncheon Keynote
Willard Hotel
Washington, DC

To my friend and former boss, Phil McLean, thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here today with this very knowledgeable audience, including many friends and colleagues from Washington and Bogotá. This conference is well timed to coincide with the beginning of a new Administration. President Uribe, who has been in office barely two months, was in Washington two weeks ago to present his new plan. The United States Government is about to expand its activities in Colombia. Like many Colombians, many of us in the Embassy in Bogotá are optimistic about the Uribe Administration, which has set out quickly to build on the very considerable political successes of Andres Pastrana and his team.

To begin with, I want to speak about the measures taken by the Uribe Administration to overcome the seemingly intractable problems facing his country. Then, I would like to review the new authorities recently approved under Plan Colombia and the impact they will have on U. S. operations and policy and give you my evaluation of how things stand today.

The Government of Colombia is engaged in a struggle to control its territory and preserve its democracy. Profits from narcotics trafficking fuel the illegal armed groups and undermine the state in many ways. Colombia's enemies are three terrorist organizations: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

An estimated 3,000 Colombians per month lose their lives from the violence. An additional 3,000 people (many of them children) were kidnapped and held for ransom in the last year. A far greater number, perhaps as many as two million, have had to leave their homes, fleeing the violence.

With all its problems, however, Colombia is far from being a failed state. Colombia has a long history of democratic rule and economic growth. The FARC, at least, is getting weaker and will no longer confront the government directly. What we are trying to help the Government of Colombia do can be achieved. The U.S. Government is not trying to "save Colombia" but rather to reduce the flow of drugs to the United States and to reduce the terrorist groups to the point of being no more than the scattered rural bandits that they were for so many years.

In Colombia the U.S. is working with highly capable government, business, and civil society leaders, which is not always the case in other countries. The Government of Colombia, with our help, launched Plan Colombia in December of 2000. U.S. programs in Colombia received over $800 million of the initial Plan Colombia total of $1.3 billion to the region, including FY02 supplemental funds and estimated FY03 spending, our investment in Colombia will exceed $2 billion.

Certainly, from our standpoint, the main goal of the plan is combating illegal drugs, but there is substantial funding for social programs, human rights, and administration of justice, as well as for eradication and building up the counternarcotics capability of the police and military.

The Colombian Government has also secured funding (mostly from multilateral banks) to carry out a large number of social programs. To my surprise, the Colombian Government has received little recognition for these unilateral programs, either internationally or within Colombia. European contributions to Colombia have been and remain disappointing.

When Plan Colombia was formulated, some in this room criticized it for focusing too narrowly on narcotics and not enough on social programs or on fighting guerrillas, but the basic premise of Plan Colombia is sound: we need a concentrated effort to take the huge amounts of money generated by narcotics out of the hands of the AUC and the FARC. In fact, the more we have learned (and we have learned a lot in the past two years) the more clear it has become that both the FARC and the AUC are deeply involved in the drug business. Colombia's supporters in Congress are concerned about reducing the flow of drugs to the United States, but many have also been concerned that moving beyond fighting narcotics might put at risk the political coalition that supports our programs in Colombia.

Several things have happened recently that have caused us to modify our policy toward Colombia. The first was a change in administration in the United States. The second was September 11.

This has led, in my view, to the general acceptance of two conclusions regarding Colombia: first, Americans need to confront terrorists more directly; and second, that the U.S. cannot abandon countries to become breeding grounds for terrorism.

A third factor was President Pastrana's decision to end the "despeje zone" (the area he had granted to the FARC for negotiations) last February after what everyone saw as a determined but failed attempt to reach a peace agreement. This decision led President Pastrana and his excellent team in Washington to lobby for changes in the U.S. legislation. Finally, it became obvious that as a practical matter we could no longer draw distinctions between the FARC and the AUC and drug traffickers.

Although there has been considerable support in the U.S. Congress and the Administration for moving more aggressively against terrorism in Colombia, there was also a widespread belief in the U.S. that the Colombians were not pulling their weight. Colombian tax collections were considered too small a fraction of GDP for a country engaged in a significant internal conflict; Colombians were contributing too little of their national income for security; and their draft laws were criticized as favoring the children of the rich. This perception was a simplification of the situation, but was widely held in the United States.

As you know, President Uribe assumed power on August 7 amidst shelling aimed at the Congress and the Presidential palace. Nothing could have demonstrated more dramatically the challenges he would face in restoring security in the country, or the FARC's total disregard for domestic or international opinion. It soon became clear that the Uribe Administration had understood the concerns of the U.S. Congress and the Administration: political support for Colombia in the United States would not be sustainable unless Colombians did more for themselves. This meshed with President Uribe's own priorities, and provided a foundation for what my friend Bernie Aronson calls the "grand bargain" with Colombia: the U.S. would provide more support for Colombia as Colombia made a greater effort on its own behalf.

The first step President Uribe took was appointing a cabinet known for its expertise and emphasis on results. In many areas, such as the professionalization of the military, President Uribe could build on the significant progress of the Pastrana Administration. Using emergency authorities, he moved quickly in other areas as well: imposing a wealth tax to fund defense that will approach 1% of GDP and will bring security spending up to nearly 3% of GDP. This is still low for a country at war, but certainly an improvement. The Uribe administration also eliminated the gasoline subsidy, which may make as much as $1 billion available to the central government.

The new government has introduced a tax reform package, which requires the approval of the Colombian Congress. This could increase taxes by another 1% of GDP. Finally, the Uribe Administration is moving to cut spending by securing congressional and public approval in a referendum to reduce government expenditures.

In the past, our policies were criticized on the grounds that neither the U.S. nor the Colombian government had a strategy; that we did not know where we were going. In its first five weeks, the Uribe Administration has formulated a National Security Strategy. His government will follow up with detailed plans for the military, counternarcotics, and social sectors. The key to this plan is the restoration of government presence and authority throughout the country, the age-old problem of governing in Colombia. I urge you to read this document. It encourages the broader participation of Colombians of all social classes, in and out of government, in their struggle against the terrorists. These are serious steps, but no one is under the illusion that the struggle will be easy.

The Uribe Administration faces a serious economic situation, much more difficult than most of us envisioned, aggravated by problems elsewhere in the Hemisphere. Growth has been lower than predicted. Debt levels are high.

The Colombians have been candid about their need for increased assistance from the IBRD, the IDB and the IMF, and these issues were frankly discussed during President Uribe's trip to Washington. Even here, there is room for optimism. For many years, Colombia has been distinguished by the quality of its economic management, and this government is no exception. The referendum on public expenditures, for instance, will require a considerable cut in public employment, some of which we hope can be offset by increased employment due to the Andean Trade Preference Initiative.

The measures President Uribe has taken have impressed those of us in the U.S. Government who work with policy toward Colombia: this President clearly has the courage and resolve to make difficult decisions and to face problems squarely. Even more important, the people of Colombia support these actions. President Uribe and his party were elected with a large margin of victory and a strong mandate for change.

Currently, more than 72% of Colombians favor his recent initiatives, according to a poll by a major television network, Caracol TV. An informal poll by leading Bogotá daily El Tiempo showed that 91% agreed with the new measures. There is a widespread air of optimism in Colombia, sustained by Colombians' confidence that the President and his Government are determined to solve the country's problems and are working overtime to achieve solutions.

The United States, for its part, ought to give President Uribe the opportunity and the tools to succeed. This is in the interest of the Colombian people; it is just as certainly in our own.

Accordingly, our strategy is to assist the Colombian Government with the wherewithal to confront the terrorist and narcotics trafficking groups throughout Colombian national territory. The fight against terrorism is now an important element of our policy in Colombia.

Last August, President Bush signed the FY02 Supplemental Appropriation. This provides new authorities for use of funds and equipment previously provided by the U.S. Government to support Plan Colombia. The use of those funds and equipment is no longer restricted solely to counternarcotics activities, but may also be used against terrorists.

As a practical matter, what will this mean? U.S. resources in Colombia are limited. U.S. helicopters and intelligence will not in themselves enable Colombians to eliminate terrorism in a country the size of France and the United Kingdom combined. We cannot stray too far from our counternarcotics mission, which will remain an essential element of our activities in Colombia.

But Colombian forces will now be able to use U.S.-provided helicopters in counterterrorist operations. To give an example: before the new authorities were in force, our helicopters could have been used in an operation to apprehend a FARC leader who was an indicted narcoterrorist, but not in an operation against the FARC leader who was a kidnapping mastermind in Bogotá. This will change.

We will work with the Colombians to set up special intelligence units to go after terrorist leadership. In fact, improved intelligence collection and processing will be a central element of implementing the new authorities. We will work with the Colombians to target the leaders of the AUC and the FARC and to extradite to the U.S. those already indicted and those who will be.

Spraying of coca fields will continue to be a major element of our policy. The Uribe Administration has been very committed to aerial eradication and has encouraged us to provide more resources to spray throughout the country. The spray program has eradicated record amounts this year, as spraying has resumed in the principal area of coca cultivation in the world, the provinces of Putumayo and Caqueta in southern Colombia. The Colombian National Police, with U.S. Embassy assistance, has sprayed about 105,000 hectares this year; we should reach between 120,000 and 130,000 by the end of the year. Since July 28, there is no longer any differentiation between "small" and the "industrial" plots. If you grow coca, the Colombian Police will spray it.

We found that voluntary eradication did not work without the threat of spraying. Not surprisingly, as the threat of spraying becomes real, voluntary eradication has become more and more successful. At the same time, we have worked with the Drug Czar's office to establish a compensation program for those rare cases in which plots are sprayed in error.

There is increased public acceptance in Colombia of spraying, as claims of health and environmental damages have been proven to be unfounded.

In a program unrelated to the new authorities, we plan to train Colombian military brigades to protect the Caño Limón pipeline in Arauca, which was closed for seven months last year because of terrorist attacks. Colombia lost $500 million in revenue because of attacks on this pipeline. In response, an initial $6 million was approved in the FY02 Supplemental; and U.S. Special Forces should be on the ground in a few weeks to begin training. Senate and House committees have approved additional funding for FY03 that will enable us to purchase helicopters and continue training.

In a vivid demonstration of what state agencies can achieve, the newly established presence of a representative of the Fiscal's office in Arauca resulted in 39 arrests in seven months, of terrorists who were trying to blow up the pipeline. This compares to three arrests in the past 15 years. Colombia has enormous potential in petroleum production but can realize it if only the security situation can be stabilized enough so that exploration and development can take place.

The Supplemental also provided funds for a program that we hope will reduce the incidence of kidnapping. Nothing would have a more dramatic effect on the perceptions of investors than a decline in kidnapping.

We are also working with the Colombians to reorganize the counternarcotics and the Special Forces brigades to make them more mobile and more responsive. We expect to increase support for vetted units and to certify more units. We will increase our focus on joint and expanded operations and we will continue our very sizable support for the police, with whom we have a long relationship. This policy has not evolved without controversy. Many predicted a dark future with United States forces doing battle on Colombian soil. Others asserted that these initiatives would undermine our commitment, and the Uribe Administration's adherence, to protecting human rights.

Let me assure you that this view is incorrect. We have no intention of sending U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines to engage in combat in Colombia.

The Byrd Amendment provides for a maximum of 400 military and 400 civilian U.S. personnel in the field at any given time, and we have no intention of seeking changes to that Amendment. As of September 2002, there were 144 U.S. military personnel and 228 U.S. civilian contractors in Colombia. These individuals provide advice, support, and training of human rights vetted military units. This does not mean that U.S. citizens, particularly our contractors, are not engaged in highly dangerous activities. Aerial eradication planes, to take one example, were hit 180 times last year. Sooner or later, official Americans will be killed in Colombia carrying out their duties; when that happens, it will be big news.

As the Uribe Administration fleshes out its new strategy, we need to be responsive, altering or modifying our programs to face changing circumstances. I think that those of us in the U.S. Government have tried to be candid about the problems we have faced in implementing some Plan Colombia programs. Some programs were not successful and have been redesigned; others were slow in getting off the mark. Some, like those which provide assistance to the displaced through private voluntary agencies, have been extremely successful, but represent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombia's displaced persons. A good example of the sort of program we will be working on next year will support restoring police presence throughout the country, starting in Arauca. With some 162 municipalities throughout Colombia without police, this is a desperate need and it is certainly a first step toward restoring a broader state presence. We will be talking to Congress about our plans to help in this area in FY04. It is worth remembering that in 1998 the police were pulled out of Bojaya (a village in Choco where citizens were massacred in a church this year) because they had been overrun.

I recognize that many of you have concerns about the measures that the Uribe Government has put in place in parts of the country, the "estado de conmoción" which gives emergency powers to the government. I know that many are concerned about the "red de informantes." I know these will be monitored closely by the international community and by NGOs within Colombia.

As in our own country in the aftermath of September 11, the balance between individual rights and collective security has been hotly and openly debated, but it is undeniable that Colombians overwhelmingly support the measures that President Uribe and his team have taken. Furthermore, I believe that a large majority of Colombians are convinced that President Uribe is committed to protecting the lives and the rights of Colombians.

From our standpoint, human rights will remain central to our policy in Colombia. We have a wide range of programs designed to improve the human rights performance of the military, the Prosecutors office, and other government agencies. We have funded an Early Warning System, a human rights program still in development. It is not perfect or complete, but it has prevented massacres.

If we are to talk about human rights policy, we must address our position toward the illegal armed groups. U.S. policy and strategy toward the paramilitaries is the same as it is toward the FARC, and we believe the Colombian Government shares this view. Both are terrorist groups, deeply involved in drug trafficking, and we intend to bring the full weight of U.S. intelligence collection and U.S. law to bear against both.

Everyone in Colombia is understands that unless the human rights situation in Colombia continues to improve, support in the United States for funding will end. The Uribe Administration is clearly committed to the protection of human rights. The Minister of Defense, here with with us today, completely shares this understanding and this commitment. In fact, the number of complaints against the military itself is almost negligible, and polls show that the military is the institution Colombians respect above all others.

The collaborative efforts of the U.S. Government address the problematic areas I have mentioned today. The U.S. will commit more than $2 billion by the end of FY03. Colombia will continue to be the third largest recipient of U.S. aid, after Israel and Egypt.

But the United States should not stand alone in providing such support. And indeed, we see some consensus, in principle; European nations, the European Commission, Canada, Japan and the United Nations have pledged up to $600 million to the Andean counternarcotics effort. Unfortunately, their disbursements have not matched their generous intentions. Another major priority for the Department of State will be to work with these like-minded nations to ensure that commitments made are commitments delivered.

Let me turn in closing to the peace process. Andrés Pastrana made a valiant effort to negotiate with the FARC, but the FARC could not or would not negotiate in good faith. Alvaro Uribe has made clear his intention to keep the peace process alive, to keep the "doors open" as he puts it, if the FARC, the AUC, or the ELN will negotiate seriously, release kidnap victims, and agree to a ceasefire. If these terrorists groups are under military pressure, if some of their more intractable leaders are removed, if some of the children and teenagers can be persuaded to leave their ranks, a negotiated settlement may once again become possible.

The Pastrana Administration came tantalizingly close to an agreement with the ELN but, I believe, simply ran out of time. The Uribe Administration is working hard to continue these negotiations.

We are particularly pleased that U.N. Secretary General Annan has agreed to use his good offices with the FARC and that contacts with other groups continue.

We in the U.S. Government must look ahead to consider what role we can play if and when peace should come; in reinsertion or demobilization programs or in designing security assurances for ex-combatants, for example. Should a peace process be successful, the need for international support will be immediate; we have to be prepared to provide it.

I would like to close with a reminder. Support for Colombia was never meant to be a permanent feature of our foreign policy, but rather a capital investment in a long-term struggle. We intend to help the Colombian people regain control of their own country and develop the tools to maintain this control. Once that is done, we will continue to stand with Colombia to help in its efforts to develop economically and to play its proper role in the international community. For now, we will continue to work closely with the Government of Colombia to implement a policy that is sustainable and effective, and to fight a battle that must be won for the sake of their people and our own.

Thank you.

Washington, D.C.
October 8, 2002

As of October 24, 2002, this document was also available online at http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/co1/wwwsa034.shtml