Testimony of Paul Simons, acting assistant secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, House Government Reform Committee, December 12, 2002

Testimony of Paul Simons, acting assistant secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, House Government Reform Committee, December 12, 2002
"America's Heroin Crisis: The Impact of Colombian Heroin and How We Can Improve Plan Colombia"

Paul E. Simons, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Testimony Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Washington, D.C.
December 12, 2002

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the U.S. heroin strategy in Colombia.

United States counternarcotics programs with Colombia represent a response to one of the most important challenges that we confront today. The issues raised by Colombia's production and U.S. importation of illicit drugs directly affect the well-being of United States citizens, the survival of a democratic Colombia, and the stability of the Andean region as it relates to fighting the twin menaces of the illegal drug industry and terrorism. Colombian terrorist groups lack popular support, but derive their strength from an unholy alliance between terror and the illegal narcotics industry. Their coffers are filled largely by U.S. and European heroin and cocaine users.

For Colombia, confronting the intertwined dangers of counternarcotics and drug-supported terrorism is a vital element of President Uribe's broad initiative to reinforce the rule of law, build a healthier and stable economy, and instill a greater respect for human rights.

HEROIN

We recognize the significant support given the Administration by the Congress in attacking the scourge of drugs. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that U.S. counter-drug policies and programs in Colombia do not fully recognize the dangers or devote sufficient resources to attacking heroin production and the cultivation of the opium poppy crop.

In fact, we do recognize the increasing growth and impact of Colombian heroin on the United States. U.S. Government cultivation estimates document a disturbing increase in opium poppy cultivation in Colombia over the last few years - jumping by nearly 62%, from 4,050 hectares in 1998 to an estimated 6,540 hectares in 2001.

While the poppy cultivation 2001 estimate, and the potential 4.3 metric tons of heroin it represents, accounts for only four percent of the world's potential production of heroin, it translates to between 22 and 33 percent of the estimated 13 to 18 metric tons of heroin consumed annually in the U.S.
The fight against heroin and other hard drugs is a coordinated, multi-faceted campaign that includes interdiction, eradication and alternative development, as well as law enforcement.

INTERDICTION

Our financial and technical assistance to Colombia during the last few years under Plan Colombia is increasing Colombia's capabilities to interdict heroin in its production and distribution phases. In FY 2002, we directly budgeted $26 million in INL resources to the Colombian National Police (CNP) for interdiction and funded over $84 million in general CNP programs (aviation and construction) that included interdiction support. A sizable portion of the $104 million in FY 2002 INL resources dedicated to support Colombian military counter-drug programs was used for interdiction (especially funding the Counter-drug Mobile Brigade as well as maritime and riverine operations) and support of interdiction efforts. INL is also supporting DEA's airport interdiction project (to increase the detection and capture of hard drugs and traffickers using air transport) with $1.5 million in FY 2002 resources and a proposed $1.75 million in funding in FY 2003. In addition, in FY 2002, we dedicated $46.5 million on the promotion of the rule of law and support for democratic institutions.

Reflecting the value of interdiction activities, Colombia has seized over 670 kilograms of heroin and morphine in 2002 (compared with 796 kilograms in 2001) -- a significant percentage of total potential production.

AERIAL ERADICATION

We are not ignoring the opium poppy crop. In fact, we are in the second and most aggressive phase of this year's poppy spraying program, utilizing four T-65 spray aircraft in the southwestern part of the country. To date in 2002, we have sprayed 3,263 hectares of poppy, and hope to reach the year-end goal of spraying 5,000 hectares of poppy. This is a significant increase over last year's 1,846 hectares sprayed.

We recognize that 2001's spray numbers were considerably lower than 2000's total of 8,843 hectares. However, in 2001, the spray programs were faced with several limitations: insufficient spray planes; inadequate numbers of security aircraft; lack of pilots; several interruptions in the flow of the budget; and bad weather. Also, poppy spraying requires many more resources per hectare and is higher risk (due to terrain, operational mission, and weather). In light of all of that, the priority assigned by the Colombian and U.S. Governments was to attack coca.

I am also pleased to report that with the support of Congress and considerable effort and work, especially during this last year, we have significantly increased the base capability of the spray program. We now have a spray plane fleet capable of carrying out serious eradication programs targeting both coca and poppy cultivation.

Of special note is the addition of three AT-802 Air Tractors to our fleet in 2002 and the upcoming delivery of an additional five AT-802s in the first half of 2003. These aircraft, which have a greater load capacity, can efficiently be deployed for coca or opium poppy spraying. Initially, we plan to use the Air Tractors for coca spraying, which will free up T-65s. We plan to dedicate our T-65 fleet principally to poppy spraying in 2003.

Our inventory now includes (for both coca and poppy programs):
-- 10 OV-10 Broncos
-- 4 T-65 Turbo Thrushes
-- 3 AT-802 Air Tractors
-- 2 additional T-65s by February (repaired and returned to service)
-- 5 additional AT 802s (in January, February, May and June)
Just as important, we now have sufficient helicopters for reconnaissance and security to support spray missions as well as for use in interdiction and air support. Until this year, there were insufficient assets (especially those capable of operating in the mountainous areas where poppy is grown) in the country to cover an expanded spray program.

We currently have nine pilots who have been trained for the Air Tractors. This training includes intensive mountain flying which means the versatile pilots can spray coca or poppy. Six more pilots are in training in New Mexico and are due to graduate during the February-March time-frame. An additional pilot will be trained by April 30. This means that our complete contingent of sixteen mountain qualified AT-802 pilots will be trained and ready in time to match the incremental delivery of the additional AT-802 aircraft to Colombia.

With these improvements, we plan to achieve the 2002 spray goal of 5,000 hectares of opium poppy -- an increase of 170 percent over 2001. For 2003, the goal is to spray all remaining Colombian poppy -- up to 10,000 hectares -- along with the remaining Colombian coca -- up to 200,000 hectares. Full funding of our FY 2003 request for Colombia will be essential to achieving these goals.

As ONDCP correctly points out in their testimony, targeting the opium poppy crop is a complex and costly proposition, and it is important to highlight the difficulties we confront in opium poppy eradication. Poppy is grown in well-hidden, widely dispersed fields in rugged cloud-covered mountains, often defended by FARC or paramilitary groups. Reconnaissance and spraying of the poppy crop is significantly dangerous, as tragically illustrated by the October 23 crash (due to bad weather) of a Colombian National Police helicopter. Four people died on board this routine reconnaissance mission. Also, spray planes have been hit by ground fire, including three at the end of November on the same day. For the same factors -- hidden small fields, wide dispersion, mountain terrain, bad weather, and growing areas far from coca zones -- supporting poppy spraying requires spending approximately three times the resources per hectare as spraying coca.

To ensure that these eradication gains remain permanent, USAID continues to implement Plan Colombia alternative development programs in poppy growing areas. These programs focus on four main activities: strengthening private, public, national and local institutions; expanding rural infrastructure; increasing licit economic opportunities; and improving management of natural resources. Since initiating its $10 million program in 1999, USAID has signed agreements with small farmer associations in poppy growing areas resulting in the cultivation of 2,124 hectares of licit crops benefiting 3,357 families. USAID supports alternative income-generating programs such as cultivation of specialty coffees, cold climate fruits and vegetables, raising dual-purpose (meat/milk) livestock, as well as development of infrastructure in poppy-growing departments. USAID will continue its robust alternative development programs in poppy areas, and plans to establish an additional 765 hectares of licit crops and assist an additional 2,320 families in the coming year.

INCREASED COLOMBIAN SUPPORT

In closing, I would like to touch on what is perhaps the most positive element in our drug policy and programs in Colombia. As you know, in August, President Alvaro Uribe took office, bringing with him a bold vision of how to resolve the problems confronting Colombia coupled with the political will and public support to do it. Within the first four months of his administration, he has already begun to act decisively and concretely:
-- Even before assuming office, Uribe recognized the need for a comprehensive and viable plan to achieve his ambitious goals, and undertook the creation of the Colombian National Security Strategy (NSS). Although not yet released, and as we have reported to the Congress, the draft NSS includes pledges to enhance resources for security, undertake a comprehensive counternarcotics campaign, improve human rights protection, continue funding social/humanitarian programs, and make a determined effort to completely sever military-paramilitary ties. President Uribe wrote President Bush that Colombia is undertaking the commitments in the NSS to ensure the effectiveness of joint efforts with the United States to achieve our common goals in combating narcotics trafficking and terrorism.
-- President Uribe has publicly and repeatedly emphasized his personal
commitment to a total war against the Colombian drug industry on all fronts. He is working closely with the United States Mission in Bogota to broaden the spray program, enhance the capabilities of all counter-drug forces, increase the effectiveness and coverage of interdiction, and enhance alternative development programs. His administration has already directly assisted in concrete areas, including speeding up the acquisition and employment of new spray aircraft and helicopters. This enabled the spray program to undertake one of its most aggressive and effective spray campaigns in the second half of 2002 -- a vigorous initiative that is the first sustained, large-scale aerial eradication effort in Colombia. This campaign is currently attacking coca in the Putumayo/Caqueta areas (spraying over 60,500 hectares as of December 1 for this campaign) and (beginning in November) poppy in the Cauca and Narino areas (spraying over 1,500 hectares as of December 1 for this campaign).
-- President Uribe also recognized that fundamental to resolving Colombia's problems is the need to establish security throughout rural Colombia where the central government's traditional lack of presence has allowed the FARC, paramilitary groups, and drug organizations to run rampant. The new administration has already begun implementing plans to systematically re-establish government presence and public security throughout the country. This effort has a direct and important long-term impact on our broad counter-drug strategy. This is the first step towards developing a more developed culture of law in remote areas where drug crops are grown -- a culture designed to discourage involvement in illegal activities. Also, general public safety and stability are required to create a self-sustaining and developed economy that provides viable licit alternatives to drug crops from which people can make a living.

We believe that the commitment already shown by the Uribe Administration represents a unique opportunity for both of our countries to make serious, significant, and permanent progress in combating drugs, and in turn, the terrorism that drug profits support. In the four months since President Uribe has been in office, we have seen unprecedented cooperation and the highest level of support for our drug policies and programs. We also recognize that President Uribe, in his unflinching commitment, is taking a major political and personal risk.

The United States must follow through with its commitments in its fight to combat both heroin and cocaine in Colombia. We know the enemy and what we need to do. We have assets in country deployed to do the job, and we have effective and strong leadership in Colombia prepared to do its part. Full funding of our FY 2003 budget request for the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative ($731 million) will be essential to achieving our goals.

As of December 13, 2002, this document was also available online at http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/011/lef401.htm