Statement of Ambassador Thomas McNamara, former U.S. ambassador to Colombia

Statement of Ambassador Thomas McNamara, former U.S. ambassador to Colombia
CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT
OF THOMAS E. MCNAMARA, PRESIDENT, THE COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS
BEFORE
HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

FEBRUARY 15, 2000

I am pleased to appear before this committee to speak in favor of a more robust United States policy of assistance to Colombia at a time of great need in that country. I was privileged to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Colombia from 1988 to 1991 during an earlier crisis. Indeed, that crisis was at least as severe a crisis as the current one. Then, Colombia faced a massive narco-terror campaign of bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings in the cities and the countryside. The campaign was designed to terrorize the government and population into submission to the malevolent dictates of the Medellin drug mafia. It failed; Colombia defeated that threat with U.S. assistance and democracy was preserved.

Before going to Bogota as Ambassador I was told by the U.S. "experts" on Colombia that the government would collapse in the face of the threat. I was advised to pack only for a few months stay, for I would be back in Washington before the end of 1988. I did not believe those dire predictions then, and I do not believe similar ones made today.

Colombia can confront the current narco-guerrilla threat. As in 1989, however, it will do so more successfully if it has the moral, political, and economic support of the United States and its other neighbors. We gave that support in 1989; we should do so, again, today. The media have given much attention to the strength of the guerrillas, and to their control of 40% of Colombia's territory. Let's be clear. The guerrillas are not close to taking power in Colombia. In fact, were it not for the great wealth accumulated from their criminal activities, the guerrillas would not be the threat that they are. The areas where they are dominant are areas where few Colombians live. In the country as a whole they have little popular support. Because of their wealth, and military strength, however, the threat is serious, and it must be faced before it becomes worse.

Colombia and all of its neighbors must face it, together. That includes the United States. This is, after all, our neighborhood, and we cannot move out of it. There are five main reasons why it is in the national interests of the U.S. to assist Colombia.

* First, however bad we may think the situation is in Colombia today, it will become significantly worse if the narcos and guerrillas increase their power base inside Colombia. A weak and deteriorating government in Colombia means increased instability and less cooperation in stemming the flow of drugs out of Colombia. This problem of narcotics trafficking in Colombia is a problem we share with Colombia. We share it in two senses: we have our own very serious drug problem; and we have helped cause Colombia's problem through our insatiable appetite for drugs.

* Second, the problem has already spread beyond Colombia's borders. Traffickers and guerrillas smuggle drugs, guns, money, and other contraband, for example, to and from the guerrilla zones in the jungles bordering Panama. Increased Colombian violence and criminality already seriously affect the adjacent states of Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. It is in U.S. interests to contain this instability before it becomes worse.

* Third, the guerrillas and other narcos are not Robin Hoods or Boy Scouts, and they certainly are not supporters of democracy. In Latin America Colombia has one of the longest and strongest democratic traditions in Latin America, and one of its strongest entrepreneurial classes. We should have no doubt that our national goals for strengthening democracy, human rights, and market economies in Latin America would suffer a serious setback if this major country on the rim of the Caribbean is further destabilized and weakened by violent, anti-democratic forces.

* Fourth, we cannot hope to maintain our leadership in this hemisphere without facing, together with our hemispheric neighbors, severe challenges such as in 1989, and such as this one. It is in our national interests to lead other states, through multilateral and bilateral efforts, to assist Colombia and others suffering from the curse of drug trafficking.

* Fifth, the U.S. government, the international financial institutions, and the private sector have invested in the country, which is one of our largest trading partners in the region. It should be strongly emphasized up front that helping Colombia to work out of the current economic depression is as important to U.S. interests as providing security assistance.

* * *

With respect to the guerrillas that have plagued Colombia for over half a century, I believe it is time to call a spade a spade. The destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels (1990-95) removed the curtain behind which the guerrillas hid their narcotrafficking. It, also, opened up new narco opportunities for them. Since the drying up of Soviet and Cuban funding in the 1980s, the FARC and other guerrillas have increasingly raised money by relying on kidnapping, extortion, and narcotics trafficking, among other criminal activities. Colombia's guerrillas are heavily involved in narcotics. The FARC leadership traffics in drugs in Colombia; they "tax" other traffickers; they protect the industry from police and military raids. Meanwhile the FARC peasant troops and low-level officials cultivate and process cocaine for added income. According to their Marxist logic and morality, drug trafficking is legitimate, since it weakens the enemy and supports the revolution.

Likewise, the extensive network of "paramilitary," or "self-defense" groups owes much to narcotrafficking. Many of these bands have been funded by trafficker organizations (and by legitimate rural farmers and ranchers) because of the military's inability to defend against the guerrillas in rural areas. The paramilitaries, also, engage in narcotrafficking and are deeply dependant on that income. If one adds to all this, the narco corruption of Colombia's legitimate institutions, it is apparent that narcotrafficking is at the base of much of the violence and corruption in the country. It is also apparent how complex are the relationships involved. In some areas the guerrillas and mafias cooperate, while in others, they fight each other.

This highlights another aspect that must be recognized. Most of the violence, corruption, and human rights crimes in Colombia stem from the weakness of the state, not its strength. The rise of the paramilitaries demonstrates this. Unlike in Central America, where governments organized, supplied, and supported the "paras," Colombian "paras" have become powerful because the military has been weak. They do not depend on government support; they are independently organized and supported. The judicial system is another example of a horribly weak institution whose failures have encouraged the "private justice" and "impunity" that result in human rights violations. The corruption and venality of the Congress is another example of a disgracefully weak institution.

* * *

To understand the situation in which the Pastrana government finds itself today, we need to look at what it inherited from government that preceded it. Today's economic depression is largely due to the disastrous economic policies of President Ernesto Samper, who left office 18 months ago. Although it was slow to initiate the necessary corrections, the Pastrana government now has a solid strategy for economic recovery. Pastrana has an energetic, well-qualified, economic team that is following a long, Colombian tradition of sound fiscal and monetary policy. The programs with the international financial institutions should bring back economic growth this year. Would that the prospects on the security front were as positive.

The weak security position that Pastrana inherited was, also, due to Samper's security mismanagement. Samper did not follow up the successful initiatives against the mafias and the guerrillas that his predecessors, Barco and Gaviria, undertook in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He spent all his energies struggling to stay in power after his corrupt campaign was exposed. A reinvigorated peace process was the keystone of Pastrana's election platform and got him more support from Washington than any Colombian president in memory. Similarly, he engendered great hopes among Colombians for peace. Unfortunately, the peace process has not fared as well as his economic efforts.

Under pressure from Washington, Pastrana announced a "three-legged" strategy for peace: strengthening the military, providing social welfare in rebel regions (Plan Colombia) and negotiations with the guerrillas. This was a reasonable strategy, but it was not implemented. The first leg has not received the priority it deserves. The second leg, Plan Colombia, is virtually moribund. Only the negotiations have received constant, but not always wise, attention and priority. A three-legged policy with one leg weak and a second one broken is a precarious base for peace. Given Colombia's economic situation, repairing these two legs will require U.S. resources.

In addressing the question of military assistance the U.S. needs to understand that without a strong, professional, effective military in Colombia there will be no peace. The guerrillas will not negotiate, until they are convinced they will suffer military losses. Fortunately, the Colombian military is capable of modernizing itself and becoming an effective, disciplined force. Our assistance can make the difference. I stress that there should be no U.S. combatants in Colombia. I would oppose such a role - as would most Colombians. But, for success we must devote a significant amount of our assistance to the military and police forces, including their efforts against the guerrillas. Military aid should promote human rights, the rule of law, and reform of the military justice system.

In addressing the overall strategy the U.S. needs to place particular emphasis on the reestablishment of justice in Colombia. There can be no peace in a democracy without justice. And, there is no justice in Colombia. I would give a very high priority to the reform of the justice system. That is not something that we can just throw money at and be successful, but we can make great improvements. Indeed, I would consider it as a "fourth leg" in an overall strategy, giving it equal status with the other three.

* * *

Although there is no doubt of Pastrana's commitment to peace, there is good reason to doubt the FARC's. Pastrana's every gesture has been met by FARC arrogance, intimidation, terror, military action or, at best, non-cooperation. The FARC leaders have evaluated the "objective conditions" (in the Marxist sense of that term) and concluded, correctly, that they are the stronger and can benefit from their new negotiating tactic, while continuing their usual guerrilla activities cost-free. In return for simply coming to the negotiating table they now dominate a large zone in eastern Colombia. They freely conduct military operations from it, and retreat into it when necessary. With no ceasefire the FARC freely operate, while insisting on more concessions from the government. This was an early mistake of the government. To get the FARC to the table, they gave too much, and got too little.

Yet, since neither side can gain military victory, any solution must be political. The Pastrana government, with two and a half years left, appears determined to press for peace within that period. The FARC have a much longer perspective and can wait, while gathering in benefits that come their way. To make substantial progress towards peace there will have to be some policy adjustments. I will list several.

* Pastrana has set a goal of a full peace agreement during his term of office. Given guerrilla intransigence, this is not a realistic goal in the time remaining to him. To retain this goal will give the FARC more incentive to stall and place the pressure for "success" on Pastrana. A less ambitious goal will be a more successful one. If Pastrana can get agreement on part of the peace framework, he will have done Colombia and its hemispheric neighbors a great benefit.

* The domestic political base underpinning the government's peace strategy is narrow and weak, even within Pastrana's own party. And the guerrillas know it. Pastrana needs to broaden that support to include a wide spectrum from the country's main political parties. There are many, now excluded, who could give additional strength and cohesion to his strategy. Pastrana should reach out to them. His negotiating team is weak, inward looking, and lacking in strategic vision. There will be little success without major changes in the team.

* The United States must state publicly that it understands that in Colombia fighting narcotraffickers means fighting guerrillas. This will give a great boost to the morale of the population, and force the guerrillas to negotiate in good faith.

* In the U.S. and in Colombia there is inadequate attention paid to the need for settlement of the paramilitary problem. It is time to rid Colombia of these criminal bands. The government needs to address this issue early. The U.S. can help because of its experience gained in the Central American negotiations. Some combination of prosecution, dissolution, and incorporation into a disciplined military structure should be seriously considered. Without a strategy for solving the paramilitary problem, there will be no settlement with the guerrillas, and no assurance that the government will regain control of rural areas.

* Colombia and the U.S. must involve the other neighboring states more than heretofore. Obviously, the states bordering Colombia have suffered from the instability in Colombia. They and some of the other large states in the region (Mexico, Argentina, etc.) will benefit from a successful peace process in Colombia. There is a need, inter alia, for a credible international verification and monitoring organization with an effective mandate in every area and zone of the country. It is especially important that it have wide Latin American participation.

* The economic depression that Colombia has gone through has further weakened the government. We should, at least, continue the Andean trade preferences for Colombia. Preferably, we should give Colombia the benefits of the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Neither of these two steps would cost the U.S. much (they are "off budget"), but they would be a great benefit to Colombia.

In sum, the U.S. needs to have a proactive policy of engagement toward Colombia as we enter the new century. Such a policy will strengthen legitimate democratic government in Bogota and give it the tools to force the guerrillas to negotiate, and to reduce the scourge of drugtrafficking. A four-part approach such as the one outlined here will, in my opinion, be the best approach for bringing peace to Colombia, for safeguarding its democratic institutions, and for protecting our economic and political national interests.

As of March 18, 2000, this document is also available at http://www.house.gov/reform/cj/hearings/00.02.15/McNamara.htm