Statement of Ambassador Morris Busby, former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, February 15, 2000

Statement of Ambassador Morris Busby, former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, February 15, 2000
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MORRIS D. BUSBY

Before the House Sub-Committee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the committee for the opportunity to appear here today. As you know personally Mr. Chairman, I have very strong feelings about Colombia. I have always been inspired by the enormous bravery of the Colombian people as they have struggled against the violence that has engulfed their country. It is a special honor for me to offer my opinions about what we face in Colombia.

Colombia policy has been a difficult proposition for the United States for the last two decades. Although the country has always been violent, the emergence of large-scale narcotics trafficking has complicated our relationship enormously.

Colombia should occupy a high priority in our foreign policy and national-security thinking. Unfortunately that has not always been the case and it is only recently that this administration seems to have awakened to the real dangers facing Colombia and the attendant risks to United States interests.

Over the last five to six years, the security situation in Colombia has dramatically worsened. The United States and Colombia engaged for much of this period in an unfortunate political skirmish brought on by the presidency of Ernesto Samper. President Pastrana inherited a terrible situation, which has not improved. The guerilla groups are stronger than they have ever been, and the government seems to have lost the confidence of the people. More importantly, the Colombian military and police are being challenged directly by the FARC and ELN, with mixed results. This is a major shift in power from years past.

Three years ago yesterday I testified before this very committee on the same subject. At that time, I urged that the administration support Colombian counter-narcotics in spite of our distaste for Mr. Samper. I also warned that if we failed to recognize the role of the so-called insurgent groups in the drug problem, we would fail in our counter-narcotics efforts. Sadly, the situation in Colombia is worse than ever. The FARC and ELN are stronger and better financed than they have ever been.

Although the situation on the ground has worsened, the policy dilemma for the United States is no different. The guerillas are an integral part of the drug problem in Colombia and it is naive to think we can divorce the two issues. There will never be a cessation of drugs coming out of Colombia so long as the insurgency is viable. You cannot solve the counter narcotics problem in isolation. I appear here today to once more strongly support increased levels of aid and assistance to the government of Colombia. It is clearly in the United States interest to help Colombia avoid a slide into instability and chaos.

Please do not misunderstand or think that I am here advocating war. I am a vigorous proponent of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Colombia. A successful negotiation is the only realistic and moral outcome to this tragic conflict. But until both sides have a genuine interest and need for a negotiated solution, or until one side is so overwhelmingly strong as to force negotiations, the war will go on.

What is needed in Colombia is a significant change in the actual situation on the ground. Only then can real negotiations take place. The package of aid currently before the Congress could cause that change to take place.

However, I would like to sound some cautionary notes, which temper my support for the administration's package.

For years the issues of drugs and guerrillas in Colombia have been so interrelated as to be virtually indistinguishable. The FARC and ELN are an integral part of the narcotics problem. So long as we refuse to recognize that fact our counter-narcotics efforts are doomed to fail. This has been self-evident for some years yet through several administrations and Congresses we have pretended otherwise.

We have been able to de-link the policy issues surrounding drugs and guerrillas for two reasons. First, the Colombian government was capable of keeping the guerilla problem under control and coca production was largely outside Colombia. Second, we did not want to admit that we were involved in a situation that had overtones of Vietnam and El Salvador. To do so would have, re-opened the painful debates of the past, and in the last analysis we did not need to do so.

The deteriorating situation in Colombia now dictates that we help that beleaguered government, but we should be clear as to what we are doing. I am very much in favor of bolstering the infrastructure of the Colombian military, police and judicial system in order to reverse the downward slide in the security situation, and force the guerrillas to the negotiating table. But this aid package is not going to stop the flow of drugs from Colombia to the United States in the near term and we should not pretend that it will. Rather it will help stabilize the situation so that counter-drug efforts can again be effective.

We must avoid the kind of divisive debates we have had in the past. I urge the Congress and the administration to establish some agreed upon measures of effectiveness. Everyone should understand clearly what the desired outcome of this assistance is meant to be. Not to do so will invite continual debate and misunderstanding as we go forward.

I have studied carefully Plan Colombia. It seems to be more a justification for receiving aid from the United States and others than a real prescription for success. I have known President Pastrana and many of his advisors for a decade and have the greatest admiration for them personally. However, I am not impressed with the manner in which the Government of Colombia has handled the situation, in particular the negotiations with the FARC and now the ELN.

Real negotiating leverage comes from power, political capital and intellectual toughness. It seems to me that the Colombian government has squandered its negotiating advantage in a futile attempt simply to get negotiations going, and without having a real strategy in place. It will be important for the Congress and the administration to carefully monitor how this aid is used to ensure that it is not wasted supporting a peace process that is ill-conceived or haphazard.

I have long believed that a true bipartisan approach is necessary if we are ever to successfully assault the problem of narcotics. I also strongly believe that the only lasting and true solution to our drug problem is to raise a generation of Americans who do not have this terrible taste for drugs. Until that day arrives, we must continue to fight drug demand in this country while simultaneously attacking drugs at the source. I consider increased aid to Colombia as a central part of any successful source country strategy in Latin America.

Mr. Chairman you asked my opinion as to what we are facing in Colombia. With my previous remarks as prologue, I will tell you I am not encouraged.

The FARC is a complex blend of terrorists, ideologues, drug lords, and kidnappers that draw support and manpower from poor farmers as well as hardened criminals. I see no evidence that the FARC leadership is seriously interested in a negotiated solution nor do I believe the United States and Colombia understand what the insurgents really want, if anything. In my worst moments, I wonder whether the Colombian peace process is nothing more than political theater.

Mr. Chairman, we are facing a very dangerous and explosive crisis in our hemisphere, which if not given policy priority, and handled proactively and with intelligence, could degenerate with tragic consequences for the Colombian people and for our interests in this region. I strongly urge the Congress to approve a substantial package of assistance to Colombia. I strongly urge this committee and the Congress at large to exercise strenuous and intensive oversight of Colombia policy. Moreover, I strongly urge that you act quickly, for I fear that we are losing one of our best allies in this hemisphere.

I want to again thank you allowing me to appear here this morning. I would be more than happy to entertain questions if you or your colleagues so wish.