Statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, under secretary of state for political affairs

Statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, under secretary of state for political affairs
Testimony of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Operations

February 24, 2000

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PLAN COLOMBIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss U.S. Government assistance for Plan Colombia. I know that we are all very concerned about the ramifications of the situation in Colombia on the United States. The importance of fighting the scourge of illegal drugs is an issue on which we can all agree. The problems in Colombia affect the lives of Americans at home and abroad. Illegal drugs cost our society 52,000 dead and nearly $110 billion dollars each year due to health costs, accidents, and lost productivity. Narcotics also have a corrosive effect on the democratic institutions and economies of the region. Although counternarcotics remains key in our assistance to Colombia, strengthening the economy and institutions and supporting the peace process would help to bring stability to the entire region.

I am very grateful for the support of Congress on this issue. Our approach to Colombia is one of the best examples of what can be achieved when there is a bipartisan consensus on pursuing American interests abroad. I thank you for that.

We are fortunate to be working with President Pastrana and his Administration. After strained relations with the Samper Administration, President Pastrana's tenure offers the United States and the rest of the international community a golden opportunity to work with Colombia in confronting these threats. President Pastrana's commitment to achieve peace is indisputable. He has also demonstrated his willingness to root out narcotics trafficking while remaining firmly committed to democratic values and principles.

Colombia is currently enduring critical societal, national security, and economic problems that stem in large part from the drug trade and the internal conflict that it finances. This situation has limited the Government of Colombia's sovereignty in large parts of the country. These areas have become the prime coca and opium poppy producing zones. This problem directly affects the United States as drug trafficking and abuse cause enormous social, health and financial damage in our communities. Over 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine is grown, processed, or transported through Colombia. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that up to 75 percent of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from Colombia -- although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the world's heroin.

Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-armed and ruthless guerrillas, paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking interests to which they are inextricably linked. Although the Government is not directly at risk, these threats are slowly eroding the authority of the central government and depriving it of the ability to govern in outlying areas. It is in these lawless areas, where the guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers flourish, that the narcotics industry is finding refuge. As a result, large swathes of Colombia are in danger of being narco-districts for the production, transportation, processing, and marketing of these substances.

These links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and paramilitary movements are well documented. We estimate that the FARC now has 7,000-11,000 active members, the ELN between 3,000-6,000, and that there are an estimated 5,000-7,000 paramilitary members. They all participate in this narcotics connection. Much of the recruiting success occurs in marginalized rural areas where the groups can offer salaries much higher than those paid by legitimate employers. Estimates of guerrilla income from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities, such as kidnapping and extortion, are unreliable, but clearly exceed $100 million a year, and could be far greater. Of this, we estimate some 30-40% comes directly from the drug trade. Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers, and paramilitary leaders have even publicly admitted their participation in the drug trade.

This situation is worsened by the fact the Colombian economy is undergoing its first recession in 25 years, and its deepest recession of the last 70 years. Real gross domestic product is estimated to have fallen by 3.5 percent last year, the result of external shocks, fiscal imbalances, and a further weakening of confidences related to stepped up activity by insurgent groups. Unemployment has rocketed from under 9 percent in 1995 to about 20 percent in 1999, adding to the pool of unemployed workers who can be drawn into the narcotics trade or into insurgent or paramilitary groups. This recession has also sapped the Colombian government of resources to address societal and political pressures, fight the narcotics trade, or respond to its thirty-five year internal conflict.

PLAN COLOMBIA

The Government of Colombia has taken the initiative to confront the challenges it faces with the development of a strategic approach to address its national challenges. The "Plan Colombia -- Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and Strengthening of the State" is an ambitious, but realistic, package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive Colombia's battered economy, to strengthen the democratic pillars of the society, to promote the peace process and to eliminate "sanctuaries" for narcotics producers and traffickers. The strategy combines existing GOC policies with new initiatives to forge an integrated approach to resolving Colombia's most pressing national challenges.

The USG consulted closely on the key elements that make up the Plan with Colombian leaders and senior officials. It ties together many individual approaches and strategies already being pursued in Colombia and elsewhere in the region. The Plan itself was formulated, drafted and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. Without its Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp, it would not have the support and commitment of Colombia behind it. Colombian ownership and vigorous GOC implementation are essential to the future success of Plan.

The USG shares the assessment that an integrated, comprehensive approach to Colombia's interlocking challenges holds the best promise of success. For example, counternarcotics efforts will be most effective when combined with rigorous GOC law enforcement/military cooperation, complementary alternative development programs and measures to assure human rights accountability. Similarly, promoting respect for the rule of law is just as essential for attracting foreign investors as it is for securing a durable peace agreement.

I met with President Pastrana and his Plan Colombia team on February 13-14 to discuss the Plan's implementation. To underscore the importance of integrated planning, I brought a senior counterpart team including Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Harold Koh, Assistant Secretary Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Julia Taft, Assistant Secretary Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations Low Intensity Conflicts; Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant for the Attorney General; and William Brownfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. We reviewed with the Colombians a wide array of coordination and implementation issues. I believe we have launched a process of continuous bilateral discussions that will refine and make more effective our implementation policies.

Before I describe for you our proposal to assist Plan Colombia, let me remind you that the Plan cannot be understood simply in terms of a U.S. contribution. Plan Colombia is a $7.5 billion plan of which President Pastrana has said Colombia will provide $4 billion of its scarce resources. He called on the international community to provide the remaining $3.5 billion. In response to this request, the Administration is proposing a $1.6 billion assistance package to Colombia of new monies and current funding. Our request for new monies includes a $954 million FY 2000 emergency supplemental and $318 million in FY 2001 funding. A significant share of our package will go to reduce the supply of drugs to the United States by assisting the Government of Colombia in its efforts to limit the production, refinement, and transportation of cocaine and heroin. Building on current funding of over $330 million in FY 2000 and FY 2001, the Administration's proposal includes an additional $818 million funded through international affairs programs (function 150) and $137 million through defense programs (function 050) in FY 2000, and $256 million funded through function 150 and $62 million through function 050 in FY 2001. We are looking to the European Union and the International Financial Institutions to provide additional funding.

The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, as well as the Agency for International Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy all played major roles in proposing and crafting the Plan Colombia two year support package. They will all play essential roles in the interagency implementation effort.

The Administration's proposal for support for Plan Colombia addresses the breadth of Colombia's challenges, and will help Colombia in its efforts to fight the drug trade, foster peace, increase the rule of law, improve human rights, expand economic development, and institute justice reform. Much of the assistance for social assistance programs will come from the International Financial Institutions (IFI), future potential bilateral donors and Colombia's own funds.

There has been an explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo, in southern Colombia and, to a lesser extent, in Norte de Santander, in the northeast. Putumayo is an area that remains beyond the reach of the government's coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence and weak state authority have contributed to the lawless situation in the Putumayo. As our success in Peru and Bolivia demonstrates, it is possible to combat narcotics production in the Andean region. This package will aid the Government of Colombia in their plans to launch a comprehensive step-by-step effort in Putumayo and Caqueta to counter the coca explosion, including eradication, interdiction, and alternative development over the next several years.

The push into drug producing southern Colombia will give greater sovereignty over that region to the GOC, allowing the CNP to eradicate drug cultivation and destroy cocaine laboratories. Increased interdiction will make the entire drug business more dangerous for traffickers and less profitable. Meanwhile, funding for Plan Colombia will support internally displaced people with emergency relief in the short term and will fund alternative economic development to provide licit sources of income in the long term. USAID and DOJ will fund programs to improve human rights conditions and justice institutions giving the Colombian people greater access to the benefits of democratic institutions.

Our counternarcotics package for Colombia was designed with the benefit of knowing what has worked in Bolivia and Peru. With USG assistance, both countries have been able to reduce dramatically coca production. This was achieved through successful efforts to re-establish government control and bring government services to former drug producing safe havens. Both Bolivia and Peru combined vigorous eradication and interdiction efforts and with incentives for small farmers to switch to legal crops. We aim to help Colombia accomplish a similar record of success.

In doing this, we cannot, and will not, abandon our allies in Bolivia and Peru. Their successes are real and inspired with 66-73% reductions of coca production in each country. But they are also tenuous against the seductive dangers of the narcotics trade. This is why our Plan Colombia support package includes $46 million for regional interdiction efforts and another $30 million for development in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. These countries deserve our continued support to solidify the gains they have striven so hard to obtain. We are not content to allow cultivation and production of narcotics to simply be displaced from one Andean country to another.

Components of U.S. Assistance Package

The proposed U.S. assistance has five components:

l. Boosting Governing Capacity and Respect for Human Rights:

The Administration proposes funding $93 million over the next two years to fund a number of programs administered by the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Departments of State and Justice to strengthen human rights and administration of justice institutions. Specific initiatives include increasing protection of human rights NGOs, supporting human rights NGOs' information and education programs, creating and training special units of prosecutors and judicial police to investigate human rights cases involving GOC officials, and training public defenders and judges. We propose to allocate $15 million to support GOC and NGO entities specifically focused on protecting human rights. Boosting governing capacity also includes training and support for GOC anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and anti-kidnapping personnel.

2. Expansion of Counternarcotics Operations into Southern Colombia:

The world's greatest expansion in narcotics cultivation is occurring in insurgent-dominated southern Colombia. With this package, the Administration proposes to fund $600 million over the next two years to help train and equip two additional special counternarcotics battalions (CNBN) which will move into southern Colombia to protect the Colombian National Police (CNP) as they carry out their counter-drug mission. The program will provide 30 Blackhawk helicopters and 33 Huey helicopters to make the CNBNs air mobile so they can access this remote and undeveloped region of Colombia. It will also provide intelligence for the Colombian CNBNs. These troops will accompany and backup police eradication and interdiction efforts. They will also provide secure conditions for the implementation of aid programs, including alternative development and relocation assistance, to those impacted by the ending of illegal narcotics cultivation.

3. Alternative Economic Development:

The Administration includes new funding of $145 million over the next two years to provide economic alternatives for small farmers who now grow coca and poppy, and to increase local governments' ability to respond to the needs of their people. As interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less profitable, these programs will assist communities in the transition to licit economic activity.

4. More Aggressive Interdiction:

Coca and cocaine are produced in a relatively small area of Colombia, while the Central American/Caribbean/Eastern Pacific transit zone is approximately the size of the United States. Enhancing Colombia's ability to interdict air, water-borne, and road trafficking is essential to decreasing the price paid to farmers for coca leaf and to decreasing the northward flow of drugs. The Administration proposes to spend $340 million on interdiction. The program includes funding over the next two years for radar upgrades to give Colombia a greater ability to intercept traffickers, and also to provide intelligence to allow the Colombian police and military to respond quickly to narcotics activity. It will support the United States forward operating locations in Manta, Ecuador, which will be used for narcotics related missions. These funds will also provide $46 million to enhance interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador to prevent narcotics traffickers and growers from moving into neighboring countries.

5. Assistance for the Colombian National Police (CNP):

The Administration proposes additional funding of $96 million over the next two years to enhance the CNP's ability to eradicate coca and poppy fields. This request builds upon our FY-99 counternarcotics assistance of $158 million to the CNP. Our additional assistance will upgrade existing aircraft, purchase additional spray aircraft, provide secure bases for increased operations in the coca-growing centers, and provide more intelligence on the narcotics traffickers.

All U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia will continue to be in the form of goods and services. The counternarcotics components of Plan Colombia will be implemented by the Colombian police and military, and there are no plans to commit U.S. forces to implement militarily any aspect of this Plan. On the ground, our military assistance will be limited to training vetted counternarcotics units through the temporary assignment of carefully picked U.S. military trainers.

Human Rights Dimension

We have also strongly supported the efforts of the Pastrana Administration to advance the protection of human rights and to prosecute those who abuse them. Complicity by elements of Colombia's security forces with the right wing militia groups remains a serious problem, although the GOC has taken important steps in holding senior military and police officials accountable for participation in human rights violations. Since assuming office in August of 1998, President Pastrana has demonstrated his Government's commitment to protecting human rights by the dismissal of four generals and numerous mid-level officers and NCO's for collaboration with paramilitaries or failure to confront them aggressively. There have also been repeated government declarations that collaboration between members of security forces and paramilitaries will not be tolerated. More must be done, however.

U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided strictly in accordance with Section 563 of the FY 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act -- the so-called Leahy Amendment. No assistance is provided to any unit of the security forces for which we have credible evidence of commission of gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary is able to certify that the Government of Colombia has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to justice. We are firmly committed to the Leahy Amendment, and have a rigorous process in place to screen those units being considered for assistance.

The Government of Colombia also acknowledges the urgent need to improve physical security and protection for human rights workers and the NGOs to which they belong. Currently, the GOC has dedicated $5.6 million to provide physical protection to approximately 80 human rights activists and their offices. The Plan outlines measures to strengthen the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, as well as to establish a Permanent National Commission on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.

One of the most serious problems in Colombia, a "silent crisis", is the plight of its internally displaced persons (IDPs). The scope of the problem is enormous. The vicious conflict between paramilitaries and guerrillas is largely responsible for the forced displacement of Colombians. As many as 300,000 persons, mostly women and children, were driven from their homes in 1998 by rural violence. NGOs report that Colombia has the fourth largest population of displaced persons in the world. The USG provided, in FY 1999, $5.8 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) Western Hemisphere operations, with an additional $3 million earmarked for Colombia. Additionally, $4.7 million was contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) general fund for the Western Hemisphere, a portion of which was used for institutional capacity building in Colombia. Responsibility for assistance to IDPs has been assigned to the Colombian government's Red de Solidaridad (Solidarity Network) which will work closely with the UN system, NGOs, and other Colombian agencies to coordinate services for IDPs throughout the country.

Peace Process

President Pastrana has made bringing an end to Colombia's civil strife through a peace agreement with the various insurgent groups a central goal of his Administration. Pastrana believes, and the United States Government agrees, that ending the civil conflict and eliminating all of that conflict's harmful side effects is central to solving Colombia's multi-faceted problems.

A peace agreement would stabilize the nation, help Colombia's economy to recover and allow for further improvement in the protection of human rights. A successful peace process would also restore Colombian government authority and control in the coca-growing region. We hope the peace negotiations going on now between the GOC and the FARC and the GOC and the ELN prove successful. We applaud the Colombian Government's determination to press the guerrillas to cease their practices of kidnapping, forced recruitment of children, and attacks against the civilian population.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, the Administration has been pleased by the bipartisan support from both houses that share our concern for Colombia's future. At this moment, Colombia is a partner who shares our counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute the needed reforms and operations. Our challenge, as a neighbor and a partner, is to identify ways in which the U.S. Government can assist Colombia in resolving these problems. Concerted action now could help over time to stem the illicit narcotics flow to the United States. Action now can contribute to a peaceful resolution of a half-century of conflict. Action now could return Colombia to its rightful historical place as one of the hemisphere's strongest democracies.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)

As of March 13, 2000, this document is also available at http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/picker24.htm