Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R-Rhode Island)

Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Lincoln Chafee (R-Rhode Island)
News From
SENATOR LINCOLN CHAFEE
RHODE ISLAND
505 DIRKSEN BUILDING 20510-3902
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 25th, 2000
CONTACT: Jeff Neal
202 / 224-7940

CHAFEE EXPRESSES SKEPTICISM ABOUT COLOMBIAN AID PACKAGE AT HEARINGS

Subcommittee Chairman Warns Increased Assistance Could Lead to Significant United States Involvement in Colombian Drug Wars

WASHINGTON, DC -- U.S. Senator Lincoln D. Chafee -- in his first hearing as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Narcotics and Terrorism -- today expressed skepticism about the Clinton Administration's proposal to dramatically increase anti-drug aid to Colombia's armed forces.

While describing America's drug abuse problems as "severe and complex," Chafee noted that it was far from clear whether this influx of aid would significantly cut the rates of drug use in the United States. The Chairman also questioned the wisdom of "dramatically and quickly escalatfing] a program that will involve U.S. military personnel training foreign troops that may well become involved in a shooting war in Latin America."

The following is an abridged version of Chafee's opening statement:

"The problem of drug abuse in the United States is severe and complex; in all, it costs our nation over $100 billion a year. The most recent estimates put the number of current users of illicit drugs at 13.9 million. There are an estimated 4 million chronic drug users in America: 3.6 million chronic cocaine users (primarily crack cocaine) and 810,000 chronic heroin users.

The drug abuse problem here in the U.S. has led to a number of questions, including "where are these drugs coming from, and how can we cut the supply?" Today, these questions have led to Colombia, a nation which has experienced a dramatic increase in its drug output, making it by far the biggest supplier of illicit drugs to the United States. The cultivation of coca in Colombia doubled between 1995-1999, helping make it the source of 80% of cocaine coming into the United States. It has also become a major source of heroin, going from virtually no production in 1990 to producing enough to meet half the U.S. demand today.

In response to these troubling developments, Colombian President Andres Pasterna has proposed Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion anti-drug program in which Colombia would assume most of the cost. President Clinton has agreed to join President Pasterna in this effort, requesting an additional $1.3 billion from Congress for the U.S. contribution to this plan. Plan Colombia seeks to dramatically step up the Colombian government's fight against drug traffickers, whose influence permeates that nation.

This subcommittee recognizes that 750/o of the funding in the Administration's plan is proposed for a fiscal year 2000 supplemental. That appropriations legislation will no doubt be taken up very quickly by Congress, giving this committee precious little time to consider the Administration's proposal. Perhaps more importantly, the American taxpayers need to understand that their tax dollars are being used to dramatically and quickly escalate a program that will involve U.S. military personnel training foreign troops that may well become involved in a shooting war in Latin America. It is our obligation as members of Congress to ensure that this massive proposal is given careful scrutiny.

There are many important questions that need to be addressed in considering this aid package:

First, what is our overall strategy in this endeavor and should we establish benchmarks for success?
Second, will a rapid increase in U.S. counter-drug assistance to Colombia further encourage cooperation between the Colombian military and that nation's paramilitary forces that have engaged in human rights abuses?
Third, does the Colombian government and the nation at large possess the necessary skilled personnel, legal structures and other safeguards to prevent corruption and ensure that this huge amount of U.S. aid is well spent?
Fourth, how can the Administration realistically argue that Plan Colombia is aimed at only fighting a war on drug traffickers and not a counterinsurgency?
Fifth, will an increase in U.S. military activity in Colombia promote latent anti-Americanism in Colombia?
Sixth, will what is the potential that this program will result in U.S. military casualties?

Perhaps most importantly, we must try to assess what will be the end result here at home, i.e., will a military operation to reduce the supply of drugs coming from Colombia in turn reduce the severity of the drug abuse problem here in the United States? In my mind, that question ought to be at the center of any debate on fighting drugs. Many argue that as long as there continues to be a demand for illicit drugs here in America, there will always be a source to supply the product.