Statement of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, February 28, 2001

Statement of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, February 28, 2001
Statement of Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control

February 28, 2001

PLAN COLOMBIA: AN INITIAL ASESSMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I want to thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today about the situation in Colombia. Let me begin by saying that while I am encouraged by the current narcotics situation in Colombia, I also recognize that much more needs to be done and done as quickly as possible.

Last week, we completed our annual coca crop estimate for Colombia. That report showed an estimated eleven percent increase in the size of Colombia's coca crop, from 122,500 hectares in 1999 to 136,200 hectares in 2000. That increase is a disappointment, as any increase would be, but it is, in fact, the smallest increase reported for Colombia in more than five years. The year before, by comparison, showed an increase of twenty percent. This estimate may indicate that the explosion of coca that has ravaged Colombia in recent years is finally peaking. Furthermore, the report indicates that the increase generally occurred away from areas of the Colombian government's focused eradication efforts. In addition, the Plan Colombia-related expansion of the aerial eradication program is specifically intended to provide the Colombian National Police with the capacity to apply eradication pressure in more places simultaneously, to counter the "balloon effect," and to cap and begin the reduction of coca in that country in the years ahead. The data for the crop estimate did not factor in the major eradication effort in southern Colombia that began in mid-December. While those efforts would have had little visible impact by the end of calendar year 2000 in any event, they represent the real beginning of Plan Colombia and I look forward to seeing their impact on the next crop estimate.

The USG strongly supports Plan Colombia and last June, Congress, with the leadership of many in this room, approved a $1.3 billion emergency supplemental to assist the government and people of Colombia to implement these programs. While most of this funding is for projects in Colombia, there are funds targeted for regional programs as well.

About $750 million of our assistance to Colombia is for items such as the training and equipping of two Colombian Army (COLAR) counternarcotics battalions (the Second Battalion finished its training in December and the Third Battalion, which will complete the Brigade, is due to finish training in May), helicopters, communications equipment, infrastructure, weapons, and other equipment. The most high profile of the items being provided are fourteen UH-60 BlackHawk helicopters for the Army's Counternarcotics Brigade and two UH-60 BlackHawk helicopters for the CNP. A contract for all sixteen helicopters was signed on December 15, 2000. Deliveries of three aircraft per month are scheduled to begin in July with the delivery of the two CNP helicopters and the first of those for the COLAR. The thirty-three UN-1N helicopters provided by the supplemental as interim lift for the Brigade have all been delivered and are being put into service. Work has been initiated to supply the CNP with nine additional Huey II helicopters and all necessary conversion kits have been purchased. The first four aircraft are expected to be completed by late summer 2001. U.S. Southern Command and the government of Colombia recently completed consultations to determine the optimum configuration for the 25 Huey IIs the COLAR is to receive. A contract delivery order is expected shortly for the modification of that group of helicopters. In anticipation of that work, we have already obtained nineteen of the required conversion kits. While all these helicopters are moving to meet delivery dates determined in large measure by the availability of Colombian pilots, crews and facilities, we continue to work to accelerate all the various moving parts. In particular, we are working to see if pilots and crews can be made available earlier than the currently planned January 2002 timeframe.

A contract for five additional spray planes was signed February 8 and includes an option for four more. Delivery of those aircraft to the CNP is expected to begin this summer. We are also currently refurbishing and modifying three OV-10D airplanes to further supplement the spray fleet. Those planes are also expected to be ready beginning in the summer of 2001. Similarly, the first of the Colombian Air Force's upgraded intercept aircraft, to be used to interdict airborne trafficking shipments, is also expected this summer.

Of equal importance, approximately $230 million of this package is allocated for social and economic development programs. This includes programs to provide humanitarian relief for displaced persons, help small farmers and low-level coca workers find legitimate alternatives to the drug trade, and to strengthen governance, the rule of law, and human rights.

Although it already cooperates with the USG on counternarcotics projects throughout the country, the Colombian government has decided to focus on the situation in Putumayo, as was indicated in Plan Colombia when it was introduced. The specific objectives for the first two years call for programs to strengthen the Colombian government's presence in southern Colombia while reducing the production, processing, and trafficking of illegal drugs in the area. One initial objective will be to establish the security conditions necessary to permit the implementation of other, civilian-run, programs. During these first two years, the interagency action plan focuses its counternarcotics energies on southern Colombia in an attempt to reverse the current surging expansion of coca cultivation and, through the implementation of sustainable alternative development and institution building, to make dramatic inroads towards a coca-free Putumayo.

Efforts in southern Colombia have gotten off to a good start. On December 2, 2000, the first "community pact" for alternative development was signed near Puerto Asis. This program offers local farmers an opportunity to abandon the cultivation of coca in exchange for developmental assistance and a local suspension of aerial eradication. A second such pact was signed on January 15. Combined, the two agreements involve more than 1,400 families and some 2,900 hectares of coca. Funds for these projects are in place and development officials and local representatives are currently developing assistance packages tailored to the specific needs of these communities. That said, more needs to be done. Demand in towns and municipalities throughout Putumayo is greater than the Colombian government's current ability to respond.

In parallel with the alternative development voluntary eradication campaign, the efforts in Putumayo utilize aerial eradication to tackle the large, agro-industrial size growing operations that dominate much of the area. Plan Colombia-related aerial spray operations commenced on December 19, 2000 in the southern department of Caqueta and moved into neighboring Putumayo on December 22. As of February 5, data from onboard monitoring systems indicate that over 25,000 hectares, or 62,000 acres had been sprayed with herbicide in the two departments, primarily in Putumayo. Further analysis, including field tests, is still several weeks away, but when available will indicate how much of the sprayed coca was actually eradicated.

Together with alternative development and aerial eradication, the final element of counternarcotics operations in southern Colombia is interdiction, principally through ground raids of processing labs. As of February 22, Colombian forces, including the U.S.-trained and supported counternarcotics brigade, have destroyed 56 labs. While the majority of these have been base labs, five of the labs were used for processing finished cocaine hydrochloride (HC1). The most recent raid of an HC1 lab resulted in the seizure of more than 1000 kg of cocaine base.

Overall, operations in southern Colombia have gone much better than expected with only minimal local opposition, few logistical problems, and no major increase in displaced persons. Those who do cross into Ecuador cite violence from insurgents and self-defense groups as the cause, not the counternarcotics efforts. Nonetheless, we must continue to prepare for worse contingencies.

The flight of any displaced Colombians into Ecuador or any of Colombia's other neighbors, raises questions about the risk for spillover effects in all the countries in the region. Spillover, whether it is in the form of displaced people, violence, or drugs, threatens the goals for which all our nations are working. Those goals, which include the strengthening of institutions, the development of sustainable economies, liberalized trade, and an end to corruption, are meant to form the foundation for prosperity in this hemisphere and will benefit the United States as well as the people of the Andean region.

Finally, the government of Colombia has also begun a significant effort to strengthen its institutions to deal more effectively with the violence, drug trafficking, and general crime and corruption that exists in the country. In that regard, the United States is assisting with programs to help the police, prosecutors, and judiciary as well as civil society. Programs focus on human rights, prisons, ports, reform of criminal code procedures, police investigative techniques, and other activities.

All of this, of course, demands a great deal from United States government personnel serving in Colombia. It is already clear that implementation of Plan Colombia's counternarcotics elements will require continued close coordination between the U.S. and Colombian agencies involved. The synchronization of equipment deliveries and the operations that the equipment is intended to support is a particularly demanding task. To date, we have limited the growth of our administrative team working on these issues in Colombia due to our desire to control costs, manage space and avoid future conflicts with the personnel limits established with last summer's emergency supplemental. We do recognize, however, that strong administrative support is essential and we are exploring how to improve that support within personnel limitations. These issues are being considered in the budget request that the President is sending forward, as is the need to sustain the increased tempo of operations in Colombia.

I am proud that the United States is supporting the government of Colombia in its commitment to making an all out effort to resolve that country's problems. With our assistance package, the United States has pledged much-needed support. While operations begin and teams in both countries adjust to operational modalities, the process is now solidly underway. I am confident of the success of these projects and of Plan Colombia, and I look forward to working closely with the Congress as we continue to address these critical issues.

As of March 1, 2001, this document was also available online at http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/011/lef311.htm