Statement
of DEA Administrator Donnie Marshall, hearing of Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, February 28, 2001
The
Honorable Donnie Marshall
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
Chairman Grassley, Co-Chairman Biden, and other Members of the Senate.
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today concerning Plan
Colombia. I would like first to thank the Caucus for its continued support
of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and overall support of drug
law enforcement.
Since inception,
the Drug Enforcement Administration has participated in the development
of U.S. support of Plan Colombia. DEA is a law enforcement agency, and
as such, has enjoyed a long tradition of a successful and ever-evolving
relationship with our Colombian law enforcement counterparts in targeting,
investigating and dismantling significant drug trafficking organizations
of international scope. DEA believes that the international trafficking
organizations based in Colombia that smuggle their illegal drugs into
our country pose a formidable challenge to the national security of the
United States.
DEA TARGETS INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME
DEA's mission is
to identify, target, and dismantle the most powerful drug syndicates operating
around the world who are responsible for supplying drugs to American communities.
The most significant drug syndicates operating today are far more powerful
and violent than any organized criminal groups than we have experienced
in American law enforcement. Today's major drug syndicates are simply
this new century's versions of traditional organized crime mobsters U.S.
law enforcement officials have fought since the beginning of the Twentieth
Century. Unlike traditional organized crime, however, these new criminals
operate on a global scale with transnational networks to conduct illicit
enterprises simultaneously in many different countries.
Members of international
groups headquartered in Colombia today have at their disposal the most
sophisticated communications technology as well as faxes, Internet, and
other communications equipment. Additionally, they have in their arsenal;
radar- equipped aircraft, weapons and an army of workers who oversee the
drug business from its raw beginnings in South American jungles to the
urban areas and core city locations within the United States. In addition,
these international criminal groups utilize insurgent groups such as the
FARC to provide protection for coca fields, processing laboratories, and
clandestine airfields. These insurgent groups also provide local transportation
services or guarantee safe passage of drug shipments through areas under
their control. All of this modern technology and these vast resources
enable the leaders of international criminal groups to build organizations
which: together with their surrogates operating within the United States
-- reach into the heartland of America. The leaders of these crime groups
in Colombia work through their organizations to carry out the work of
transporting drugs into the United States and franchise others to distribute
drugs, themselves try to remain beyond the reach of American justice..
Those involved in drug trafficking often generate such tremendous profits
that they are able to corrupt law enforcement, military and political
officials in order to create and retain a safe haven for themselves.
The international
drug syndicates headquartered in Colombia, and operating through Mexico
and the Caribbean, control both the sources and the flow of drugs into
the United States. The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United
States continues to come from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia,
and Peru. Approximately 95 percent of the heroin produced in Colombia
is shipped to drug markets in the Northeastern US. Recent statistical
data indicate that as much as 60 percent of the heroin seized in our nations
Ports of Entry and analyzed by Federal authorities in the United States
is of Colombian origin. For the past two decades - up to recent years
criminal syndicates from Colombia ruled the drug trade with an
iron fist, increasing their profit margin by controlling the entire continuum
of the cocaine market. Their control ranged from the wholesale cocaine
base production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, to the cocaine hydrochloride
(HCL) production and processing centers in Colombia, to the wholesale
distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United States.
Colombian traffickers
continue to import cocaine base from the jungles of Peru, but in ever
decreasing amounts. Coca leaf production has increased dramatically within
Colombia itself. However, the traffickers move the cocaine to the large
cocaine hydrochloride conversion laboratories in Colombia. The vast majority
of the cocaine base and cocaine HCL destined for the United States is
produced in these laboratories. Many of these activities take place in
the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of the
coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare, Caqueta,
and Putumayo, areas where there is limited, if any, government control
or presence. Cocaine conversion laboratories range from smaller "family"
operations to much larger facilities, employing dozens of workers. Once
the cocaine HCL is manufactured, it is either shipped via maritime vessel,
aircraft, or by land to traffickers in Mexico and thereafter moved across
the Southwest Border, or is shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including
the Bahamas Island chain, to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami,
and New York. The FARC controls certain areas of Colombia and the FARC
in those regions generate revenue by "taxing" local drug related
activities. At present, there is no corroborated information that the
FARC is involved directly in the shipment of drugs from Colombia to international
markets, although we are always watchful for such developments.
CURRENT COLOMBIAN
DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS
The Drug Enforcement
Administrations primary mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt
and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. Successes against
the Medellin and Cali drug lords have accelerated the decentralization
of the international cocaine trade. We are now seeing "second generation"
traffickers emerge on the scene as major players in the Colombian cocaine
trade. They tend to be less willing to directly challenge government authority
and are much more sophisticated in their methods of operation. They employ
extensive utilization of wireless communication devices, which they change
with great frequency. Other emerging characteristics are the use of computerized
communications, elaborate concealment of clandestine cargo and avoidance
of becoming directly involved in retail distribution or even direct distribution
to the U.S. market. The successful identification, investigation, and
prosecution of these violators have become an even greater challenge to
law enforcement both in the United States and Colombia.
COCA CULTIVATION AND COCAINE PRODUCTION IN COLOMBIA
In recent years,
DEA has observed dramatic changes in coca cultivation and cocaine production.
These changing dynamics highlight the fact that Colombian cocaine trafficking
organizations continue to dominate the international cocaine trade. Colombia
has always been--and remains--the worlds number one producer of
finished cocaine HCl. As recently as 1995, however, Colombia only produced
about one-quarter of the worlds cocaine base. Colombian traffickers
were dependent on Peruvian and Bolivian sources for two-thirds of their
cocaine base. Each year, hundreds of tons of cocaine base were imported
by aircraft from Peru and Bolivia.
Since 1995, however,
net coca cultivation in Colombia has more than doubled from 50,000 hectares
in 1995 to 136,200 hectares in 2000. Scientific fieldwork carried out
in Colombia from early 1999 through mid-2000as part of DEAs
Operation Breakthrough Programhas had a dramatic impact on our understanding
of the Colombian cocaine threat. Using an updated production formula based
on Operation Breakthrough results, US estimates indicate that Colombias
potential cocaine production in 1999 at some 520 metric tons. This was
sharply higher than in previous years. Accordingly, Colombian traffickers
are far less dependent on Peruvian or Bolivian cocaine base sources of
supply.
The explosion in
Colombias potential cocaine production notwithstanding, total Andean
Region cocaine production has actually declined in recent years, from
930 metric tons in 1995 to 768 metric tons in 2000. This net decrease
is due to unprecedented coca eradication and successful law enforcement
operations targeting essential chemicals in Bolivia and Peru. In 1997,
Bolivias Government implemented the Dignity Plan, which has all
but eliminated illicit cocaine cultivation in the Chapare jungle. Bolivias
potential cocaine production decreased from 240 metric tons in 1995 to
70 metric tons in 1999. Additionally, DEA field reporting and laboratory
analysis indicates that the purity of Bolivian cocaine has dropped significantly
while local base prices have risen, an indication of reduced availability.
Much of Bolivias cocaine is now believed to be either consumed in
Brazil or shipped through Brazil to Europe.
In Peru, cocaine
production decreased from an estimated 460 metric tons in 1995, to 175
metric tons in 1999. This was in part due to Perus air interdiction
program, which shut down the cocaine "airbridge" between Bolivia,
Peru and Colombia. This resulted in a drop in coca prices, taking the
profitability out of coca cultivation. However, we are concerned about
a new development; in 2000 replanting was detected in previously abandoned
fields causing speculation that coca leaf cultivation may be on the rise.
PLAN COLOMBIA AND
REGIONAL "SPILL-OVER"
DEA has been developing
and promoting a regional strategy in terms of our intelligence gathering
and investigation methods. Realizing that drug traffickers do not respect
borders, DEA has been instrumental in encouraging countries to work investigations
and conduct operations across their common borders. We will be furthering
this strategy throughout the region having designated "Multi-regional
investigations and operations" as the theme of this years International
Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC), being held April 3-5, in the Dominican
Republic.
DEA is working along
with other U.S. agencies, with all the countries in the region to monitor,
detect and react to possible Plan Colombia spillover. For example, Bolivia
has created a comprehensive plan integrating intelligence collection,
border control initiative, investigations, and administrative judicial
reforms. Brazil has developed a Brazil Colombia border intelligence
collection project. Ecuador has initiated plans to better monitor the
movement of drugs, chemicals, and people from southern Colombia into northern
Ecuador.
Now that Colombian
Government has significantly expanded and sustained aerial coca eradication
operations into southern Colombia, DEA anticipates that initial "spillover
effect" in coca cultivation will be limited to Colombia. As expected,
coca cultivation back in the traditional growing areas of central Colombia
(the Guaviare) as well as expanded new cultivation in northern Colombia
(Norte de Santander), has already been detected.
Likewise, when the
Colombian Government is able to expand and sustain coca eradication operations
in central and northern Colombiawhile sustaining pressure on southern
Colombia(a challenge which may require some time to achieve) some
of Colombias coca cultivation and cocaine processing might be driven
into Ecuador and Venezuela. This has not yet been detected. Traffickers
would also be expected to encourage expanded coca cultivation and cocaine
production in Peru and Boliviatwo countries that collectively produced
about two-thirds of the worlds cocaine base as recently as 1995,
as mentioned earlier. In order to effectively address the changing dynamics
of the drug trade resulting from Colombias success, a balanced approach
would include, in addition to eradication, focusing on these other elements
of organized drug trafficking transportation, chemicals, and distribution
networks, and command and control of trafficking organizations.
INSURGENTS' INVOLVEMENT
IN THE DRUG TRADE
DEA is concerned
about the connection between the FARC and other groups in Colombia and
the drug trade. The Colombian government is now engaged in responding
to this challenge. DEA will continue to closely monitor the situation.
A required alliance
between guerillas and drug traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s,
drug traffickers based in Colombia have been forced to develop temporary
alliances with leftist guerillas, or with right wing paramilitary groups,
which charged surtax for protection and other parasitic services. In some
cases, this has been done to secure protection for the drug trafficking
interests. At other times, the drug traffickers have financed their own
private armies to provide security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary
groups have, in fact, become little more than bands of well-armed thugs
extorting a fee for their services to drug traffickers.
The presence of the
insurgents in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern rainforest--the
country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions--hinders
the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counter-drug operations.
The frequent ground fire sustained by Colombian National Police eradication
aircraft operating in insurgent occupied areas shows the extent to which
some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of their
"local constituents" (i.e., coca farmers and drug traffickers).
Likewise, insurgent attacks continue to pose a threat to CNP personnel,
supported by the DEA, while conducting operations against clandestine
laboratories. In some cases the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories
in southern Colombia, in return for cash payments or possibly in exchange
for weapons.
The most recent DEA
reporting indicates that some FARC units in southern Colombia are indeed
involved in drug trafficking activities, such as controlling local cocaine
base markets. Some insurgent units have assisted drug trafficking groups
in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In
particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern
Colombia. There remains, however, that despite the fact that uncorroborated
information from other law enforcement agencies does indicate a nexus
between certain traffickers and the FARC, there is no evidence that any
FARC or ELN units have established international transportation, wholesale
distribution, or drug money laundering networks in the United States or
Europe.
Northern and central
Colombia continue to be the primary base of operations for paramilitary
groups. Recent reporting, however, indicates that paramilitary groups
have become more active in southern Colombia. Most of these paramilitary
groups do not appear to be directly involved in any significant coca,
opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano
has recently admitted in open press, however, that his group receives
payments - similar to the taxes levied by the FARC -- from coca growers
in southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas.
Several paramilitary
groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory
operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castano organization,
and (possibly other paramilitary groups) appears to be directly involved
in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appear
to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia.
DEA reporting indicates
that some Colombian traffickers are transporting cocaine base out of Colombias
Putumayo Department through northern Ecuador and into Colombias
Narino Department in an effort to avoid insurgent interference and taxation.
Some Colombian traffickers reportedly also use the reverse routefrom
Narino to Putumayo via northern Ecuadorto smuggle into Colombia
the essential chemicals used to produce cocaine.
DEA PARTICIPATION
IN PLAN COLOMBIA
Although neither
DEA nor any other U.S. Colombian law enforcement agency received any direct
appropriations under the U.S. emergency supplemental appropriation for
Plan Colombia. The funding is to support programs as opposed to specific
agencies, U.S. or Colombian. In this effort, DEA has been an active and
major participant in the planning and implementation of projects included
in the $88 million allocated to the Justice Sector Reform projects of
Plan Colombia. DEAs participation in the planning and implementation
of the Justice Sector Reform projects of Plan Colombia is coordinated
through the Department of Justice Criminal Division which acts in partnership
with the Department of the Treasurys Office of Enforcement. DEA,
in collaboration with our Justice and Treasury Department enforcement
counterparts, has participated in the development of a comprehensive and
integrated Justice Sector Reform Program for Justice Sector Reform Program,
DEA will serve as the lead agency in project implementation or as substantial
partner in the combined efforts of our U.S. and Colombian counterparts.
Projects such as the multilateral case initiative, the enhanced and expanded
Colombian specialized vetted unit program, the cellular telephone interception
facility, enhanced and expanded forensic programs, and a variety of prosecutor
and police training programs, while focused on supporting our Colombian
counterparts, will also directly and substantially support and enhance
DEAs efforts in Colombia and throughout the region. These projects
re-enforce DEAs focus on attacking the major criminal organizations
that cause the greatest harm to Colombia and the U.S. and the projects
also recognize the importance of a regional effort.
In particular, DEA
will serve as the lead implementing agency in the establishment of a cellular
telephone interception facility in Colombia to enhance the capabilities
of Colombian law enforcement authorities to conduct telephone intercept
investigations properly authorized under Colombian law.
For a number of years,
the DEA in Colombia has provided technical material support and personnel
resources to various Colombian law enforcement units of the Colombian
National Police (CNP), the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS),
and the Cuerpo Technico de Investigaciones (CTI) in furtherance of hard
line telephone intercept initiatives. These units operate in most of the
major metropolitan cities in Colombia. In recent years, this program has
expanded to enhance the investigative capabilities of Colombias
law enforcement agencies. Computer equipment, computer software and funding
will allow these units to more effectively conduct investigations against
major drug trafficking organizations.
Intelligence and
evidence obtained by these units from wire intercepts have been used to
support prosecutions of drug traffickers, support active investigations
and provide leads on bilateral Colombian/United States investigations.
While there have been major investigative successes, there have been severe
technical limitations on overall enforcement effectiveness.
The ability to effectively
intercept communications has been seriously limited due to a variety of
factors such as the lack of modern equipment and the inability to establish
monitoring sites in certain areas of the country. The equipment to be
obtained through funding provided by Plan Colombia will make significant
strides to close this technology gap between drug traffickers and law
enforcement authorities in Colombia.
EXTRADITION
We are extremely
pleased with the commitment shown by the Government of Colombia to reinstitute
one of the most effective judicial tools against Colombian drug traffickers,
that of extradition. The extradition reform act of the Colombian constitution,
allowing for the extradition of Colombian nationals for crimes committed
after the date of enactment, entered into force on December 17, 1997.
Since that time, we have successfully extradited 13 Colombian nationals
in order to face justice in the United States. Among the extradited include
significant violators such as Jorge ASPRILLA-Perea and Alberto ORLANDEZ-Gamboa,
as well as five defendants from the highly successful OPERATION MILLENIUM
which culminated in October 1999.
Two recent Colombian
Constitutional Court decisions, however, require that Colombian law enforcement
authorities determine whether a criminal case in Colombia should be opened
against the subject for whom extradition is sought. These decisions raise
two potential problems. First, if a case is opened by Colombian authorities,
the extradition could be delayed until the investigation, prosecution,
and sentencing of the subject is complete. Second, if a subject is convicted
of the same crime in Colombia as is being charged in the United States,
principles akin to "double jeopardy" might pose a bar extradition.
Although the actual impact of these decisions on pending or future extradition
requests remains to be seen, any impediment to our renewed and exemplary
extradition relationship will be a major setback.
OVERVIEW OF PRIORITIES
AND PROGRAMS
Due to the precarious
and ever-changing dynamics of the cocaine trade in South America, the
DEA Bogota Country Office (BCO), in conjunction with the United States
Embassy in Colombia, developed strategies to identify, investigate and
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. The DEA South American
Regional Plan (SARP) and the United States Mission Performance Plan (MPP)
are the primary strategies developed by the BCO and U.S. Embassy in Colombia
to guide the U.S. counter-drug efforts in Colombia. In essence, the SARP
and the MPP prioritize targeting the significant drug trafficking organizations
operating throughout Colombia.
In implementing these
plans, the BCO operates on the premise that the organizations controlling
the manufacture and transportation of cocaine HCL are the most vulnerable
elements of the drug trafficking organizations. As such, the BCO directs
available resources at these factions in an effort to identify and ultimately
immobilize them.
Using this strategy,
the BCO will enhance resources in the area known as the Colombian Source
Zone. This is an area southeast of the Andes mountains characterized by
few roads, no rail transportation, very little commercial air traffic,
many clandestine airstrips and an extensive river system linking this
area to Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. The BCO and United States Country
Team believe that by augmenting resources in the Colombian Source Zone,
the amount of cocaine HCL available for transportation to the United States
will be significantly reduced.
The BCO will continue
to direct assets and resources at the command and control structures of
major drug trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia. These
organizations operate primarily northwest of the Andes Mountains and throughout
major Colombian cities. These organizations also control transportation
of cocaine HCL from the Colombian Transit Zone (that area adjacent to
both Colombian coasts) to the United States, as well as other countries,
for eventual distribution.
As alluded to earlier,
the BCO has noted a significant increase in seizures of Colombian heroin,
both in Colombia and the United States. The BCO will strengthen its resources
dedicated to targeting the organizations controlling the manufacture and
transportation of heroin from Colombia to the United States.
All BCO programs
will focus on the identification and immobilization of major drug trafficking
organizations operating throughout Colombia. To further augment these
objectives, programs such as the Andean Initiative, Sensitive Investigations
Unit and Intelligence Collection will be the primary support for the BCO's
enforcement efforts.
Furthermore, the
Sensitive Investigation Units, Heroin Task Force, Operation Selva Verde
and other law enforcement entities such as DAS and CTI, are tasked to
initiate significant investigations targeting the command and control
structure of the major drug trafficking organizations. These units target
organizations operating in the Colombian Source Zone and other areas of
Colombia. The units work simultaneously with DEA domestic offices in coordinated
transnational investigations targeting all aspects of these organizations
so as to maximize both the effect and the return on the investment.
The United States
is assisting with programs to help the police, Colombian Customs (DIAN),
prosecutors, and judiciary as well as civil society. Programs focus on
human rights, prisons, airport and seaport/ maritime security, Customs
interdiction, inspection techniques, land border interdiction and investigative
techniques, and reform of the criminal code. DEA, Customs, and the Coast
Guard are involved in this assistance.
On Customs, I saw first hand last week the critical role the Customs P-3
aircraft play in the region. PLAN COLOMBIA provides $68 million for Customs
to upgrade four of its oldest P-3 Airborne Early Warning (DOME) aircraft
with the latest generation radar, the APS 145. This radar modernization
will ensure Customs continued robust support to source country interdiction
efforts and PLAN COLOMBIA specifically.
RECENT BILATERAL
INVESTIGATIVE SUCCESSES
Operation White Horse
The Operation White
Horse investigation targeted a large scale heroin trafficking organization,
directed by Wilson SALAZAR-Maldonado, responsible for sending multi-kilogram
quantities of heroin from Colombia to the Northeastern United States via
Aruba. The investigation was conducted jointly by the CNP, DEA Bogota,
Curacao, Philadelphia and New York, and the Special Operations Division.
This investigation resulted in 96 arrests, the seizures of multi-kilograms
of heroin and cocaine, weapons and US currency. The investigation began
in September 2000 and culminated on January 18, 2001.
Operation Broker
II
An investigation
conducted by the Departamento Administrativo de Investigaciones (DAS)
SIU in conjunction with DEA targeted a Colombian money laundering organization
connected to the Colon Free Zone, Panama. This organization has been involved
in the black market peso exchange through the importation of precious
metals and jewels into Colombia in exchange for drug related proceeds.
On February 1, 2001,
acting on DEA information, the DAS arrested four pilots and seized two
airplanes in the city of Medellin, Colombia, upon their arrival from Panama.
A search of the aircraft revealed approximately $600,000 worth of gold
and silver concealed within the planes.
On February 19, 2001,
the DAS conducted a roundup of defendants implicated in money laundering
violations as a result of this investigation. A total of 21 persons were
arrested with seizures of two additional airplanes, approximately $100,000
in currency, $110,000 worth of jewelry and 12 weapons.
Operation Seis Fronteras
Between November
13 and November 28, 2000, six South and Central American countries joined
forces to conduct an international enforcement operation aimed at disrupting
the flow of precursor chemicals. The participating countries included
Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Brazil, and Ecuador. Participating
agencies conducted searches and inspections of chemical supply companies,
land and maritime transportation companies, warehouses, and clandestine
laboratory sites.
Operation New Generation
In November 2000,
the CNP, with assistance from DEA, dismantled the Carlos Mario Castro
Arias cocaine trafficking and money laundering organization. The operation,
dubbed "Operation New Generation," resulted in the execution
of over 100 arrest/search warrants and the arrest of at least 45 suspects
in Colombia (and eight in the U.S.) Prior to the takedown, the Medellin-based
organization was responsible for the transportation of multi-ton quantities
of cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and the U.S. In October 2000, the CNP
seized 450 kilograms of cocaine from the Castro Arias organization that
was secreted in heavy machinery in a warehouse in Cali.
CONCLUSION: HOPE
FOR THE FUTURE
We can and should
continue to identify and build cases against the leaders of the new criminal
groups from Colombia. These criminals have already moved to make our task
more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining
a much lower profile than their predecessors did. A number of initiatives
hold particular promise for success:
The special program
of vetted units, funded by the U.S. Congress under the Vetted Unit Initiative,
continues to make it possible to convert existing partially vetted units
of the CNP into fully vetted teams. These teams of investigators will
work closely with DEA and will conduct high-level drug investigations
in Colombia and the region without fear of compromise. This program is,
by far, our most important investigative tool.
We intend to carry
out even more of the cutting-edge, sophisticated investigations like WHITE
HORSE and MILLENIUM, as part of a joint DOJ Criminal Division/DEA bilateral
case initiative with our Colombian counterparts. Such operations benefit
from the closest possible cooperation between the DEA and CNP. These investigations
will continue to lead to the dismantling of major portions of the most
significant drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia today.
Operation Millennium successfully targeted major traffickers who had previously
operated without fear of capture or prosecution in the United States,
believing that only their low-level operatives were at risk. These operations
effectively demonstrated that even the highest level traffickers based
in foreign countries could not manage drug operations inside the United
States with impunity. Operation Millennium was made possible by direct
support from the governments of Colombia and Mexico. These operations
underscore the importance of cooperation among international drug law
enforcement agencies.
DEA will continue
to work closely with specially trained and vetted Colombian task force
units to develop joint cases, such as Operation Millennium. The Justice
Initiative portion of Plan Colombia provides for specific support for
these types of initiatives, including training and support for a counter-narcotics
task force and an anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture task force.
We look forward to supporting these training programs and then working
with our Colombian counterparts in the day-to-day investigative work.
The government of
Colombia faces dramatic challenges to the rule of law, many of which are
directly related to drug trafficking. Plan Colombia addresses many of
these challenges. The support to multilateral investigations, counter
drug units and money laundering sections of the Justice Initiative portion
of Plan Colombia can help DEA, Colombian National Police, DAS and Colombian
Prosecutors efforts to fight drug trafficking in Colombia. Other sections
of the Justice Initiative of Plan Colombia can provide indirect support
to DEA, Colombian National Police, DAS and Colombian Prosecutor Generals
efforts to investigate major Colombian Drug Trafficking Organizations.
These initiatives include support to money laundering and asset forfeiture,
training for police prosecutors and judges, security for victim and witnesses,
prison assistance and procedural and legislative reforms to the Colombian
legal system.
The DEA remains committed
to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug
traffickers in the world today. In particular, we will continue to work
in close partnership with our counterparts in Colombia, a partnership
that we have invested time and resources in for the past twenty years
with great success. These successes include the previously mentioned investigations
and the demise of the Cali and Medellin Cartels. The ultimate test of
success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control
their vast empires of crime which bring misery to so many nations. They
must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries
to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited
to the United States to face justice in U.S. courts. Plan Colombias
emphasis on bringing the Colombian Military into the fight against drugs
is laudable; and necessary. At the same time we must continue to aggressively
support civilian anti-drug units such as the CNP.
No one agency or
country can win this fight alone.
Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the Caucus today. I will be happy to respond
to any questions you may have.
As of January 4,
2002, this document was also available online at http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/hearings/colombia01/marshall.html