Statement
of Rand Beers, assistant secretary of state, Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Statement
of Rand Beers
Assistant Sectary of State
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
before the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee
February 29, 2000
Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Committee:
I want to thank you for this
opportunity to speak to you today about the situation in Colombia and
about the threat it poses to regional security.
The situation in Colombia
is critical. Colombia is increasingly threatened by well-armed and ruthless
narcotics traffickers, supported by guerrillas and paramilitaries. The
Colombian Government is unable to exert effective control over thousands
of square miles of its own territory. Not only do Colombian people in
these areas suffer from the violence and extortion of the armed groups;
they also suffer from the government's inability to deliver services and
the rule of law. As long as the government cannot operate, children's
educational and health needs will go unmet, Colombia's globally critical
environment will be left unprotected, and farmers will be unable to support
their families through legitimate, protected trade. People in the border
areas of neighboring countries are put at risk by the instability and
violence as well. Unlike in past decades, when Colombia's legitimate economy
performed better than most of Latin America despite the drug violence,
today the impact of the violence on Colombia's investment climate has
plunged the economy into deep recession. The corrosive powers of narcotics
and narcotics money are ever- present threats to the institutions and
economies of the region. The environmental threat may be even greater
as coca growers clear-cut thousands of hectares of rainforest each year
and pour toxins like potassium permanganate, sulfuric acid and acetone
into the Amazon and Orinoco river systems. The situation in Colombia poses
a considerable number of direct threats to U.S. national security interests
as well, not the least of which are the thousands of Americans killed
by drugs and drug-related violence each year, the losses to our economy
from drug-related accidents and inefficiency in the workplace and the
social and human costs of abuse and addiction.
After strained relations with
the tainted Samper administration, President Pastrana's tenure offers
the United States and the rest of the international community a golden
opportunity to work with Colombia in confronting these threats. In Peru
and Bolivia, we have partners with sustained success combating the drug
industry that are eager to continue working with the United States. We
should not squander this opportunity. What the United States does or does
not do for Colombia over the next several months will have a great impact
on the future of our two countries, the Andean region and our hemisphere.
The Current Situation
Dealing with our own domestic
narcotics problem must include helping Colombia dismantle the drug networks
operating on its soil. Colombia is the world's leading producer of cocaine
(two thirds of Andean coca cultivation occurs in Colombia with even more
cocaine being processed and being transported within its borders) and
is an important supplier of heroin to the U.S. market. We have all seen
how these drugs have poisoned entire American communities, shattering
families and destroying lives.
Colombia has also paid a high
price. Illicit narcotics have corrupted its institutions and provided
funding for illegal armed groups: powerfully armed left-wing guerrillas
and right-wing militias that are perpetuating a 40-year-old insurgency.
Today, large swaths of Colombia remain beyond the control of the Colombian
government, and are incubators of lawlessness, violence and narco-corruption.
Efforts to restore order in these prime coca and opium poppy producing
zones are violently opposed by the narcotics traffickers and the various
guerrillas and paramilitary groups in league with them.
Colombia must reestablish
its authority over narcotics-producing sanctuaries. The country's many
social and economic problems cannot be successfully resolved while narco-financed
armed groups flourish in these lawless zones. Estimates of guerrilla income
from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities are undependable,
but the drug trade is definitely their largest single source of income.
Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers
and obtain much of their funding from them. Like his FARC counterparts,
paramilitary leader Carlos Castano has publicly admitted taxing the drug
trade. As a result, these groups are well funded and well armed. The strength
of Colombia's armed insurgent groups has limited the effectiveness of
joint U.S./Colombian counternarcotics efforts. In order for our counternarcotics
programs ultimately to be successful, we cannot allow certain areas of
the country, like Putumayo, to be off-limits for counternarcotics operations.
There is a need to re-establish
government order in Colombia for human rights purposes. According to the
Colombian NGO Pais Libre, guerrilla, paramilitary, and other criminal
groups kidnapped 2,945 people last year, including 51 foreigners. This
is a 33 percent increase from 1998, with the two busiest groups, the FARC
and the ELN, combining for half of the abductions. Kidnapping is neither
an insurgent nor a political statement. It is a crime. Colombia must disrupt
the narco-financing of these groups, regardless of any political orientation
they may claim, if any comprehensive solution to Colombia's problems is
going to succeed.
PLAN COLOMBIA
The Government of Colombia
has risen to this challenge and is confronting these threats. The "Plan
Colombia" is a package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive
Colombia's battered economy, to strengthen the democratic pillars of society,
to promote the peace process and to combat the narcotics industry. The
strategy combines existing Colombian policies with ambitious new initiatives
in forging an integrated approach to that nation's most pressing challenges
by strengthening government institutions, promoting economic recovery,
carrying out social reform and boosting counternarcotic efforts. The United
States did consult with the Colombian leadership throughout the plan's
development. But the plan was formulated, drafted and approved by President
Pastrana and his team in Colombia.
Plan Colombia cannot be understood
simply in terms of the U.S. contribution. In all, Plan Colombia is a $7.5
billion program toward which President Pastrana has pledged some $4 billion
of Colombia's own scarce resources. He called on the international community
to provide the remaining $3.5 billion. In response to this request, the
Administration is proposing a $1.6 billion assistance package to Colombia.
A significant share of our package will go to reduce the supply of drugs
coming into the United States by assisting the government of Colombia
in its efforts to confront the cocaine and heroin industries. This focus
on enforcement-related assistance, the so-called "stick", will
allow other sponsors to provide support for the "carrot," developmental
and humanitarian assistance projects for which they have special interests
and expertise.
Now, the Colombians have asked
us to provide support in implementing the Plan. Just as we consulted with
them on "Plan Colombia," they have consulted with us regarding
this proposed assistance package. The result is a package of assistance
that Colombia needs and can use. The composition of this proposal factors
in Colombian contributions and the expected contributions of other supporters.
International financial institutions are already engaged. Both the Colombians
and we fully expect additional support to be forthcoming from bilateral
and multilateral sources, primarily to assist economic development and
social services.
Our assistance for Plan Colombia
is intended to meet the needs that the other sources cannot. It is based
on the shared hope of achieving peace and prosperity in Colombia through
the overall reduction of illicit drug production and trafficking, thereby
allowing the Colombian government to establish democratic control and
provide services and infrastructure throughout its national territory.
Plan Colombia was designed
with the benefit of knowing what has worked in Bolivia and Peru. With
U.S. assistance, both countries have been able to reduce coca production
dramatically. This was achieved through successful efforts to re-establish
government control and bring government services to former drug producing
safehavens. Both Bolivia and Peru combined vigorous eradication and interdiction
efforts with alternative development incentives for small farmers to switch
to legal crops and other licit ways to make a living. Colombia's aim is
to achieve a similar record of success.
In doing this, we cannot,
and will not, abandon our allies in Bolivia and Peru. Their successes
are real and inspired. But they are also tenuous against the seductive
dangers of the narcotics trade. This is why our Plan Colombia support
package includes $46 million for regional interdiction efforts and another
$30 million for development in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. These countries
deserve our continued support to solidify the gains they have striven
so hard to attain. We have no intention of allowing cultivation and production
of narcotics simply to relocate in an international game of cat-and-mouse.
Colombian Efforts
The Colombian National Police
(CNP), under the direction of General Serrano, has upheld its standing
as one of the premier counternarcotics forces in the world. Now, the Colombian
armed forces have adopted a similar commitment to counternarcotics in
support of the CNP's counternarcotics mandate.
At the same time, important
cultural changes are also taking place within the armed services. Defense
Minister Ramirez and General Tapias, Commander of the Armed Forces, have
acted to remedy the tradition of human rights abuses and impunity that
have tainted the military's international reputation and strained our
bilateral relations. Respect for human rights remains an issue of high
priority in Colombia, and the record shows that the current civilian and
military leadership has the will to tackle this challenge. That said,
all assistance to Colombian security forces will continue to depend on
the vetting of all intended recipients as required by U.S. law.
The new leadership realizes
that one of the best ways to attack the guerrillas is to attack their
financing, in the form of narcotics profits. The Colombian Army has greatly
expanded cooperation with and support to the Colombian National Police,
and formed its first counternarcotics battalion. This battalion is a 950-person
unit with a CNP platoon attached. We must continue working with the Colombian
military to bring their capabilities up to a level where they can successfully
operate alongside the CNP and contribute to the counternarcotics effort.
The CNP alone is simply not large enough or properly trained to provide
the security necessary for major operations against cultivation and trafficking
in southern Colombia.
The need for counternarcotics
assistance to Colombia is great and we will continue to provide it in
the form of goods and services. However, we do not intend or desire to
commit U.S. forces in Colombia. On the ground, our assistance will be
limited. We will train approved units, we will provide technical assistance
and we will help develop programs. Still, there is more we can do. The
United States can continue to urge the international community to support
Colombia in this struggle and we encourage other potential donors to follow
the example of the Administration's proposed $1.6 billion assistance package.
Components of U.S. Assistance
Package
The Administration is proposing
a $1.6 billion assistance package to Colombia combining new monies with
current funding. Building on current funding of over $330 million in FY
2000 and FY 2001, our request for new monies includes a $954 million FY
2000 emergency supplemental and $318 million in additional FY 2001 funding.
This will result in assistance totaling just over $1.1 billion in FY 2000.
Over the two-year funding life of the proposal, 88 percent of the monies,
roughly $1.383 billion, will go for Colombia specific programs while the
remaining 12 percent, approximately $190 million, will support projects
in neighboring countries and the region. And, while discussions of the
proposal center on the security assistance it provides, 21 percent of
the monies funds projects to strengthen the economy, assist farmers, promote
human rights and generally support other social programs. What's more,
spending between enforcement and social programs becomes even more balanced
when the $7.5 billion Plan Colombia is taken as a whole. This balanced
and integrated approach is the strength of the plan.
The Administration's proposed
assistance package has five components:
1. Push into Southern Colombia:
The world's greatest expansion
in narcotics cultivation is occurring in insurgent-dominated southern
Colombia. With this package, the Administration proposes to fund $600
million over the next two years to help train and equip two additional
special counternarcotics battalions which will move into southern Colombia
to protect the Colombian National Police (CNP) as they carry out their
counter-drug mission. The program includes 30 Blackhawk helicopters and
33 UH-1N helicopters to enable the counternarcotics battalions to access
this remote and undeveloped region of Colombia. It will provide $16 million
in developmental assistance providing technical assistance and agricultural
inputs to the farmers of southern Colombia as well as $15 million to help
those displaced by conflict in the region.
2. Andean Interdiction:
Enhancing Colombia's ability
to interdict air, water-borne, and road trafficking is essential to decreasing
the price paid to farmers for coca leaf and to decreasing the northward
flow of drugs. The component includes funding $341 million for radar upgrades
and to provide narcotics intelligence to Colombian security forces. It
will support the forward operating location in Manta, Ecuador, which will
be used for narcotics related missions. Additionally, these funds will
provide assistance to enhance interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and
Ecuador to prevent narcotics traffickers and growers from moving into
neighboring countries.
3. Assistance for the Colombian
National Police (CNP):
The Administration proposes
additional funding of $96 million over the next two years to enhance the
CNP's ability to eradicate coca and poppy fields. This will upgrade existing
aircraft, purchase additional spray aircraft, and provide secure bases
for increased operations in the coca-growing centers. The CNP's ability
to eradicate cultivation deep in guerrilla territory and at high altitudes
has been hindered by security concerns and equipment needs. This funding,
in conjunction with the counternarcotics battalions, will enable the CNP
to reach into narcotics-growing areas previously beyond their reach.
4. Economic Development:
This element, totaling $145
million, includes more than $45 million of new funds to provide economic
alternatives for small farmers in Colombia who now grow coca and poppy
plus another $30 million for regional efforts. Also included are programs
to build schools, roads and clinics. Local governments will be strengthened
through a $15 million program. There are also funds to support efforts
to protect fragile lands and watersheds. We anticipate that these seed
monies will encourage other donors to support the Colombian government's
robust agenda for alternative development, environmental protection, education
and health. We will actively encourage such support.
5. Boosting Governing Capacity:
The final component totals
$93 million and includes a number of programs to increase the protection
of human rights by supporting NGOs, creating human rights units in the
CNP and the prosecutor's office, and offering protection to human rights
workers. It contains more than $20 million in programs to reform the legal
system and train judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. It also will
enhance Colombian abilities to attack financial crimes and kidnapping.
Conclusion
Colombia faces complex and
daunting problems. Collectively, we may find it convenient to think of
Colombia in terms of the narcotics crisis. In truth, that is only one
element and it is linked, in a fundamental way, to the equally complex
issues of economics, society, and an ineffective government presence in
large areas of the country. At this moment, Colombia is a partner who
shares our counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute
needed reforms and operations. Our challenge, as a neighbor to the north
and a partner, is to identify ways in which we can assist Colombia in
resolving its narcotics-related and other problems. I look forward to
working closely with Congress as we continue to address these critical
issues.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office
of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site:
usinfo.state.gov)
As of March 13, 2000, this
document is also available at http://www.usia.gov/regional/ar/colombia/rand29.htm