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by Rep. Mark Souder (R-Indiana), March 1, 2001 PROBLEMS WITH ILLEGAL NARCOTICS -- (House of Representatives - March 01, 2001) [Page: H614] Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, this afternoon and this evening I would like to talk about our problems with illegal narcotics. We have a new President. We have a new Congress. I have recently, as of 2 weeks ago, been named chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources that deals with both the authorizing and the oversight on the narcotics question. Today I would kind of like to lay out where we are likely to head this year and some of the fundamental issues that we will be addressing. This subcommittee has been headed by former Congressman Bill Zeliff, by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HASTERT), the Speaker of the House, by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MICA), and we have been working together since the Republicans took over Congress to put an aggressive plan together with how to deal with drug abuse in America. What we saw in 1992 to 1994 was such a dramatic rise in drug abuse in America that since 1994 we would have to have a reduction of 50 percent among young people to get back to where we were in 1992. We had been making steady progress for over a decade, but two events, in my opinion, set the whole chart in the wrong direction. One was we cut our interdiction budget and let the drugs pour into our country, which gave a cheaper supply on the street in more purity and potency to the illegal narcotics. Secondly, the messages were sent in our culture, including at the top of our political structure, that hey, I did not inhale, kind of joked around about drug abuse. We saw such a dramatic rise. Let me repeat that, in 2 years drug abuse in America soared so much in 1992-1994 that among young people it would take a 50 percent reduction to get back to where it was the first 2 years of the Clinton administration. Let me explain a couple of things, because I am going to talk more in detail tonight about interdiction. We just had a delegation, a congressional delegation, that went to an antinarcotics conference in Bolivia. We were there for several days, as well as in South America and the former landing operations that we have now to replace Panama. And I am going to get into that in more detail as we get into this discussion of the issue. Because of Plan Colombia, we had, I believe, 5 congressional delegations, most from the Senate in Colombia, including ours, in the last district work period, because we have had a lot more focus in the United States on what is happening down in Colombia, not only in Congress, but the movie Traffic that is currently a nominated movie for the Oscars. West Wing, the TV show, in the last couple of weeks featured a question of lost Americans in Colombia and the attention to the subject has soared. Before I get into the details of Plan Colombia, it is important to lay out a more comprehensive approach. Mr. Speaker, we have to eradicate the drugs at the source. We have to work to interdict it. We need to work to arrest and prosecute those who are dealing and using it. We need to work with prevention. We need to work with treatment. That is, in fact, what we do in the budget. Frequently, those who would attract those who are trying to fight illegal narcotics say all we are concerned about is Plan Colombia. The efforts in interdiction total $2.2 billion, or 17 percent of the Federal budget, and interdiction cannot be done by State and local governments. We do not want the State of Indiana that I represent going and sending P-3 customs planes to get intelligence in the air. We do not want the State of Mississippi sending out boats to interdict in international waters. That is a Federal role. International aid is $.9 billion, or another 5 percent. So total, the international aid interdiction totals 17 percent. Domestic law enforcement from the Federal level aid is 51 percent of our budget, $9.8 billion. What we are doing in domestic law enforcement is almost three times as much as what we do in the international arena. That is only the Federal Government. The State and local government also have even larger expenditures in law enforcement, the result of drug abuse in America. In demand reduction, because sometimes we would think when we hear debates on the House floor that Plan Colombia, which is $1.2 billion, just dwarfs that. Why do we not spend it in treatment? Why do we not spend it in prevention. We spend $3.8 billion Federal dollars in treatment and $2.5 billion in prevention, or $6.3 billion, or over twice as much as we spend in interdiction. The reason that is important to note here is only the Federal Government can do international interdiction. State and local governments and the private sector do most prevention and treatment programs. The amount of dollars that we spend in prevention and treatment far dwarfs anything we spend in interdiction. It is just that only Congress can do international interdiction, whereas we have many, many State and local government and private sector programs in addition to this category at the Federal level being over twice the amount as interdiction international. Let me give my colleagues some more examples, because every once in a while somebody will say to me, whether we are down in Central and South America or here, why are we so focused on interdiction and why are we not more focused on prevention and treatment? Mr. Speaker, I also serve on the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and I have worked with the drug free and safe schools program. I also have an amendment currently, arguably the most unpopular amendment in the college campuses in America, where I said if you were convicted of either dealing or using illegal narcotics when you had a student loan, you would lose your loan for one year unless you go through a treatment program and tested clean twice. If you are caught a second time, you lose your loan for 2 years, unless you go through a treatment program and tested clean twice. The third time, you cannot get a loan, which is pretty generous. The goal here is to get people into treatment and to prevent people from getting onto drugs in the first place. If you are a dealer, by the way, that is not quite as generous a policy, it is two times. The reason that is important is because those who say they really want prevention and treatment often criticize that amount as well. It seems like they want to criticize interdiction, but they also do not want actual accountability to people who abuse drugs, even if it means they will be led into a treatment program. Rolling Stone magazine, I guess the current issue, attacks me again. They attacked me in the fall for this amendment saying somehow this is depriving, I guess, drug abusers and drug users of a tax-subsidized college education. Thirdly, we have sponsored legislation which I carried through committee, and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. PORTMAN) drafted, on community prevention grants. We have several of these in my district. This sometimes can be used for groups like Pride in Noble County, which is in my district. It can be used for other community drug prevention programs. We also passed legislation to help businesses assist in how to work with drug testing and drug treatment programs that are within the civil liberties demands of any program. We cannot just randomly test people. We have to have an equal, fair process, multiple tests so you do not get sued. Your goal here is not to play gotcha. Your goal is to help the individuals, because as businesses invest in people and develop them, they need to figure out how to help them be productive and not mess up their lives. [Page: H615] Our committee, in addition to the interdiction, part of the way we wound up with the authorizing is ONDCP gets its budget approval and authorizing from our committee. General McCaffrey is the head of that, and hopefully under this administration, the efforts and the gains we have made in the last few years will be continued, and we will not have any backup in the sense of downgrading the Drug Czar's office or of getting rid of drug certification. One important part, and I want to just take a minute, because this is another kind of hot issue being debated right now because of President Fox meeting with President Bush and President Pastrana meeting with President Bush, and that is what is the role of drug certification? Whenever we meet with Central and South American countries and other countries around the world, they are very concerned that we have a certification process here in Congress that can pass judgment on whether their countries are working on drug certification. They have a similar concern with human rights certification. If we drop drug certification, we certainly will be dropping human rights certification, too, because both things have the same rationale, and that is, we have certain standards on the money that we distribute that is passed through the government by the taxpayers of the United States, and we expect that the countries who get that aid or, for that matter, the drug certification is not tied to this directly, but it is something certainly to consider, is trade. If they want benefits from America, then we have a right to say that the American taxpayers want to make sure that they are helping us with our biggest domestic problem, and that they are helping in not using any of our funds for human rights violations. I hope that this administration, while working in a positive way with Mexico and the other South and Central American countries, will not drop the drug certification process or ask Congress to drop, because these would be bad signals, much like the bad signals that were sent out at the beginning of former President Clinton's administration. We do not want to have bad signals come out here at the beginning of President Bush's administration, even if that would not be his direct intent. There are some difficulties. I admit that there are difficulties. For example, in the President's budget, do we keep the drug free and safe schools, or do we block grant more funds to give State and local schools more of an opportunity to make the decisions what they want to spend it on? Because if we do, in fact, only create five grant categories, as is potentially going to come in the President's education bill, that means we could be eliminating the only prevention program that we fund through the Federal Government, or the primary one, which is safe and drug free schools. That will be a difficult question that we have to address. Secondly, we have in the faith-based question in the new faith based office, how do you deal with the fact that many of the most effective drug abuse programs, for example, Teen Challenge, Victory Life Temples in Texas, many of the most effective programs in America are religious-based, and how do we make sure that people who are not comfortable with the religious orientation, religious content-driven curriculum have alternatives because we cannot force and should not force anyone into a program that they do not agree with, yet those programs are very effective because it can change somebody's heart. You can often get them off drugs; otherwise, they often learn just how to scam the system. We also have to face a very difficult fact; not only has it been hard to eliminate drugs at the source country level, but quite frankly, the results and the facts on everything from drug courts, which I support, to drug treatment programs, which I support, to drug free schools programs, which I support, have mixed effectiveness records as well. Sometimes it is a amount of dollars. If your drug treatment program is not long enough, the person does not get completely rehabilitated. Sometimes it is dollars at the schools levels. Their dollars are so little about all they can get done is passing out rulers or pencils. We have to figure out how to make the dollars effective. There are other reasons why they are not as effective either. We have to look at those. Are they targeting the right people? Is the message something that actually appeals to kids or do the messages appeal more to adults? Then another big question that was tackled under General McCaffrey as Drug Czar was a media campaign. We had a national media campaign that looked in lump sum like a lot of dollars, but compared to what people were getting hit with in the movies and on television and, in particular, in rock music, it was a little tiny dribble in a huge ocean, and was our ad campaign very successful in changing people's attitudes, and how do we do that. A lot of the questions that we are going to deal with in treatment and prevention are also very difficult. It is not just that what is happening in Colombia is difficult and what is happening in law enforcement is difficult, it is also difficult in prevention and treatment. Some people say, well, it is just hopeless. We should just give up. We cannot eliminate drug abuse. I happen to believe that the core problem is sin, because as long as people are going to sin, which they always will, it is going to be very difficult to eliminate it. Even if we do not accept that premise and want to say well, the problems are family breakup, their lack of economic opportunity, there is self-esteem problems, all of which are, to a degree, true, and certainly they are mostly intractable problems.
[Time: 16:15] Mr. Speaker, we know that 70 to 85 percent of all crime in America is alcohol and illegal narcotics related. We hear about so-called victimless crime where someone is thrown in a jail for using a small amount of marijuana. I would like to see those cases; there are not very many. The bulk of crime that is drug related is robbery, assault, to get money or it is because the illegal narcotics has been an enabler and have resulted in child abuse, spouse abuse, rape, you name the problem. 70 to 85 percent of those problems are drug and alcohol related. It is clearly the biggest at least enabler problem that we have in this country. Do we just give up? People say Congress has spent a lot of money, and has not eliminated drug abuse. Do we just give up. We have been spending money trying to eliminate child abuse since America was founded. Do we just give up? We have been trying to eliminate spouse abuse. Do we just give up? We have been trying to eliminate rape in America. Do we just give up? Of course not. If you think that the drug war is something that takes 12 months or 24 months, you do not understand the nature of the problem. This is a problem that comes up every time young people are born, move into elementary and into junior high years, start to be exposed to the temptations, you have a whole other market that has to be reeducated and relearn why drug abuse is a problem. Just like racism and child abuse and spouse abuse, it is a never-ending problem that sometimes we get more control over and sometimes we get less control over, and we need to work on getting control of this. There is a fad in America of ``medicinal'' use of marijuana, implying that there is anything in marijuana that is good, rather than it has one subcomponent in it that can be helpful in alleviating vomiting when you take certain things for cancer, that that component can be isolated and used other ways. Much like there is probably one good component in arsenic, there is [Page: H616] Their legalization program have made them the home port for the entire world for synthetic drugs. They can talk about how great their legalization program has worked, but they are the exporters causing problems in my hometown, and yet they have the nerve to tell the world how great their legalization program is working. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to go through the demand focus before I move into Plan Colombia. First, on this chart let me illustrate a couple of fundamental points about the drug question. We have a hearing tomorrow morning at 9:30 where we are going to have General Pace, the head of SOUTHCOM, the military command structure of our Department of Defense that has the area south of Mexico and in South America with Randy Beers, who is the narcotics chief in the State Department, and also Mr. Marshall, who is the director of the DEA to talk about Plan Colombia in particular. We know where the drugs come from, and we know where they come into the United States. That said, it is still hard to get control of it. Colombia, Peru just to the south and Bolivia, the Andean region, constitute basically 100 percent of the cocaine that comes into America, almost all of the heroin that is currently in America with the exception of some Asian heroin in the West, and most of our high-grade marijuana in America. So we know where it comes from and how it gets here. It comes through the western Caribbean, through the eastern Pacific, often then up through Mexico, occasionally up increasingly through the Caribbean corridor which has gone down as low as 38 percent, as high as 58 percent, it depends where the pressure is. Now, if you look at this, it gets harder as the drugs move from the source country. And understand Colombia, Bolivia and Peru are not little countries. They are together about the same size as the United States, so it is still a large area to cover. As they move into whole Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific and can come into the United States from any direction, and much of it also goes to Europe and Asia, it becomes more difficult as we move from those countries. The next thing is that in Colombia, it is also clear that coca and heroin poppy are not grown everywhere in the Andean country. While they can be grown in other places, it tends to be that the coca is concentrated near the equator with a certain elevation, and you can get better yields and better grades in some parts of these countries. Furthermore, the heroin poppy basically needs a high temperature, lots of humidity, that is why the Equator, at 8,000 feet or above. So within these countries, they can only go basically in some places. Furthermore, in those countries they do not want to be where there are population centers or roads because then it is easier for the military and the police to get them. In Colombia there are two basic regions where the coca is grown. What has happened over the last few years for those who say that this is a hopeless battle, Bolivia at one point, because of the Chapare and Camiri areas being such a great area to grow coca, once produced 30 to 50 percent of the coca production. It is now down to less than 10 with their President committed it getting it zero in the next few years through working with alternative development. In Peru that used to be producing 30 to 40 percent, they made dramatic efforts to reduce it in Peru. Now, the instability of their current governmental situation leads the vulnerability back towards Peru. Ecuador, which is right up and right near the big cocaine area of Colombia, has not had the same level of growing of coca for a number of reasons. But they are very worried that this may spread to them along the Putamyo River. Now, there are a number of reasons. One is the road system is a little more developed in the areas, that there is so much instability, and Ecuador has never been a target, five Presidents in 5 years. The tradition has been more in Colombia partly for access to the United States. Let me illustrate one other thing. What is our compelling national interest in this? I have been going on about 70 to 85 percent of our crime in America being related to drug abuse. But it is more than just that. Panama here, for those who are historians realize that this really is Colombia and was made Panama when Colombia would not take our offer when we wanted to build the canal there. The narcotraffickers and others, these circles represent areas where the different terrorist groups have taken over part of Colombia have moved into the southern part of Panama and are in danger of threatening and shutting off or at least gaining control of the Panama Canal. We have had our military kicked out of Panama. We cannot have our AWACS and our other spy planes which we were doing to interdict traffickers for the last few years, we cannot fly them out of Panama anymore. So we are busy building forward landing locations, one here in Ecuador, one over here in Aruba and Curacao. We have refueling stops up here in Honduras and in El Salvador because we have had to scatter around. But what that means is right now some of our spy planes because we so, in my opinion, botched the Panama Canal situation, that we are having to come down from Puerto Rico or way in the United States and spending so much time trying to get a plane down there that they can fly around a little bit and then head back. Now, in the Netherlands Antilles, we have had some usage of their fields, but we do not have an AWACS down there. Plus, quite frankly, the last administration diverted most of our intelligence capabilities over to the Balkan area. Now the reason that becomes important, as I said, there is a trade nexus here. There is a drug nexus here. But this area is our choke-point on oil. Seventeen percent of America's oil comes from the Lake Maracaibo Venezuela area. Colombia and Ecuador and Venezuela together supply more oil to America than the Middle East. We have had our attention diverted into every skirmish and every terrible human rights crisis in the world, and we are not watching in our own hemisphere. Our trade choke-point, the agriculture products that come from the Midwest and down and go to Asia come through here. We are not watching our energy choke-point. We whine if gas hits $1.50. What if we lose this area to the narcotraffickers and they have a gun to our head and gas goes to $4 or $5 a gallon. What happens to the pickup makers in my district? What happens to people who drive trucks? What happens to the people who make RVs? What happens to the people who build boats? Ask the question, What are we going to do if we have this area fall under the narcotraffickers? We have a compelling national interest in these areas. I want to respond, too, to two other things. One is in Plan Colombia. One would think from hearing much of the debate that Plan Colombia is predominantly a military exercise. Now, I would like to insert into the RECORD two parts from the U.S. support for Plan Colombia from the U.S. Embassy document. And I have marked the pages, and I will insert that. I want to read a couple of the highlights. We are spending 25 million to establish a human-rights task force. So it is 25 million to establish a human-rights task force, 7 million to strengthen human-rights institutions, 4 million to enhance protection of human-rights workers, 15 million to witness and judicial security and witness protection in human-rights cases, 2.5 million in child soldier rehabilitation, 1.5 million in human-rights monitoring, support for U.N. human-rights offices another million. [Page: H617] We also have different programs on asset forfeiture, on countering organized financial crime, on prison security, on judicial police training academy, on multilateral case initiatives, and a whole series of things. I wanted to point that out because what we realize here is our drug consumption, America has literally nearly destroyed one of the oldest democracies in South America, a democracy as old as America. The narco-terrorists represent a public support percent of 4 percent. The number of people in American prisons is approximately 1.5 percent. With one family member, they would represent 3 percent of our population. This is not a rising up of a dissident movement in a country. These are people who predominantly are terrorists, funded by our drug habit in America that have undermined their governmental structure. Now, as we work with trying to get control of the country, enable their structures to work again, and anybody who saw the movie ``Clear and Present Danger,'' while it was a fictitious movie based on a fictitious book by Tom Clancy, I asked former Ambassador Morris Busby, who was ambassador at the time that so many of those judges were killed, whether the movie was accurate. He said not completely. I died in the movie. It was basically accurate in the sense of nearly one-third of their judges were killed. Their police departments in many of these countries are terrorized because of the weaponry and the dollars that the dissident groups have.
[Time: 16:30] ``In short, the hopes of the Colombian people and the work of the Colombian government have been frustrated by drug trafficking, which makes it extremely difficult for the government to fulfill its constitutional duty. A vicious and pervasive cycle of violence and corruption has drained the resources essential to the construction and success of a modern state.'' President Pastrana has set aside a demilitarized zone for the FARC. The right wing terrorists are now into narcotics and almost as large as the FARC, but there is a demilitarized zone where the president is trying to work with the peace process so at least those who have been concerned about land reform and other issues in Colombia have the ability to separate themselves from the narcoterrorists. He is working at that. But we have grave concerns that it has become a launching area and a protection area under the guise of a DMZ for the other areas. Now, in trying to reestablish all those dollars I said for criminal justice reform and for legal reform, first there has to be order and the crops have to be eradicated; and then they can do the alternative development, which gives people an alternative to illegal narcotics. Now, in addition to that, I worked with the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan) in last year's foreign operations where the University of Notre Dame, the Kellogg Institute, the Ford Foundation and others have put together a human rights center for Colombians who fled, often with $1 to $2 million prices on their head. Many of their top writers, many of their top people in the movie industry, people in all forms of cultural life in Colombia have gravitated to the University of Notre Dame because of Catholic ties and because of this center; and we need to help keep their culture together. This is an old democracy being destroyed in large part because of our drug consumption. Now, they have to fight the battle there. A part of Plan Colombia I ask to insert is very clear. They have asked us for help. If they are not willing to do the fighting on the ground, if they are not willing to work to rebuild their institutions, there is not much we can do here. We have been through that before. But when people like the Colombian National Police, where they have had 30,000 police officers killed as they battled illegal narcotics, how can we not help them? The bullets being shot at them are coming predominantly with American and European money. All the battle is because in the soaring into Colombia, most of which has occurred in the last 5 to 8 years, is because of our habits. Now, if we can help them, and that is all they are asking, is will we help them financially; they will do the fighting, they will do the rebuilding, but can we help them financially, our answer should be, since we have at stake our energy, or kids' and families' lives on the street with drug abuse and our trade, our answer should be, yes, what can we do. We should thank them for being willing to risk their lives to help fight our battles. My colleagues can also see in the President's budget additional funds for the Andean region. Because if we are successful working with Colombia and giving them the resources with which to fight this battle, the narcotraffickers are not just going to give up. They will endanger other countries in the zone. As we heard the vice president of Bolivia so articulately say, what we need to do is convince people. People do not want to deal in narcotics that destroy people's lives; but we have to give them an alternative life-style to say, look, at least decent living can be made in other things. To some degree that means infrastructure questions; to some degree it means helping them with marketing, with training and different things so that they do not go back into narcotrafficking. I do not believe they have a moral claim on us. I do not believe anybody who grows illegal narcotics or deals in illegal narcotics has a moral claim on the United States that says we must give them money. But I believe it is in our self-interest to help them, or they in fact will grow coca and will deal it. So it is in our self-interest to do so. Plus, I believe it is our moral charity that says, look, certainly they would not be doing this illegal activity if we were not consuming it. So we are going to help them. But there is a difference from the cocaleros, the people who grow the coca, demanding a moral right to X amount of money in their life-style. We do not tell the kids on the street who are making $300 for 10 minutes' working as a lookout that if they go to McDonald's that they can earn $300. But we do have an obligation in America to try to make sure that people have a decent education; that there are economic opportunities for all Americans and that they can make it if they work at it. But they are not going to make $300 for 10 minutes as a lookout. Some of these countries seem to be thinking that we are going to replace their cocaine income. No, what we want to do is, through trade policies and through helping them and their countries, get enough of an income that a mother and dad can support their kids with an acceptable life-style, where they are not hungry, where they have a shelter above their heads, where they can learn to read and write and have the potential to advance themselves. And to some degree we owe it to them because we have moved and fueled this narcotics effort. So I thank my colleagues for giving me this opportunity today. As I say, we have a hearing tomorrow on Plan Colombia. We have money in the current President's budget, and this will be a hot debate over the next few months. As our colleagues who have just been down there, with many more going in a couple of weeks, and as the national media focuses on this issue, we will hear lots more about it. I intend to come down to the House floor and continue to stress the overall Andean package, of which Plan Colombia is part. It is part of a comprehensive approach to drug abuse, which is our number one source of crime in America, 70 to 85 percent, according to every sheriff and prosecutor in the country. And also it is a threat to our energy and economic trade in America and our very economic system. Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD those articles I referred to earlier. Alternative Economic Development and Resettlement--Facts and Figures Alternative Development (Voluntary Eradication): US $30M. Assists farmers growing coca on small plots (three hectares or less) to obtain a licit income from agricultural, forestry, or livestock production and marketing. The activity concentrates in three areas: (1) technical assistance in production, processing and marketing of licit, alternative products; (2) social infrastructure, such as schools and health clinics, and productive infrastructure, such as access roads and agro-industry; and (3) strengthening of local producer, community and government entities to eliminate illicit crops. Environmental Programs: US $2.5M. Protects Colombia's globally important biological diversity. By introducing economic alternatives to deforestation for communities living on the edges of protected areas, these programs offset ecological damage done by coca and poppy production in the Colombian Amazon and protect watersheds. Support to Affected Municipalities: US $12M. Encourages participation by municipalities in deciding investment priorities, on agreeing how to use social development funds, and in establishing oversight and monitoring procedures. This program will assist approximately 100 municipalities that have been involved in illicit crop eradication and that are aiding displaced persons. Assist Internally Displaced Persons--Small Infrastructure Projects: US $22.5M. Up to 50 municipalities are being identified in northern Colombia where support for displaced persons can be established. Medium term support for displaced persons is being implemented in cooperation with international organizations through grants for public infrastructure projects such as schoolrooms, water systems, road and bridge constitution and repair, and market shelters. The communities themselves select the projects, provided they meet criteria for participation in the development of municipal decisions, transparency in financial management, and active participation in alternative development or other governance activities. Approximately 100,000 displaced persons will benefit from these programs. Alternative Development (Small Infrastructure Projects for existing Communities): US $10M. Unless a community is able to improve its social and economic situation it is likely to return to illicit crop cultivation even after it has completed an eradication effort. These funds provide public infrastructure projects such as schoolrooms, water systems, road and bridge construction and repair, through municipal governments to provide the conditions in which communities continue to raise licit crops. Alternative Development in Southern Colombia: US $10M. Provides technical assistance and material support to municipal governments and local NGOs to strengthen local social services including education, health, and potable water. The program also provides agricultural extension services, agricultural inputs and marketing support. In exchange, some 2,000 farmers, through farmer associations, sign agreements voluntarily to abandon coca production. The entire Alternative Development zone, comprising eight municipalities in southern Colombia and 18,000 families, will benefit from this program. Emergency Assistance in Southern Colombia: US $15M. This program provides temporary food and shelter assistance for up to six months to families displaced by conflict and coca eradication in southern Colombia. USAID Operating Expenses for Managing these programs: US $4M. Total U.S. Plan Colombia support for alternative development and displaced persons: US $106M. -- HUMAN RIGHTS Establish Human Rights Task Forces: US $25M. Strengthen Human Rights Institutions: US $7M. Enhance Protection of Human Rights Workers: US $4M. Witness and Judicial Security and Witness/Judicial Security in Human Rights Cases: US $15M. Child Soldier Rehabilitation: US $2.5M. Human Rights Monitoring: US $1.5M. Support for U.N. Human Rights Office: US $1M. IMPROVING GOVERNING CAPACITY AND REFORM TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. Prosecutor Training: US $4M. Oral Accusatory Public Trials and Training of Judges: US $3.5M. Public Defenders: US $2M. Casas de Justicia: US $1M. Policy Reform--Criminal Code: US $1.5M. Policy Reform--Enabling Environment: US $1M. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR COLOMBIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT Asset Forfeiture/Money-Laundering Task Force/Anti-corruption program/Asset Management Program/Financial Crime Program Counter-narcotics Investigative Units: US $15.OM. Countering Organized Financial Crime: US $14M. Prison Security: US $4.5M. Judicial Police Training Academy: US $3M. Multilateral Case Initiative: US $3M. Banking Supervision Assistance and Revenue Enhancement Assistance: US $1.5M. Maritime Enforcement and Port Security: US $2.5M. Train Customs Police and Customs and Training Assistance: US $3M. Military HR & Legal Reform: US $1.5M. Anti-Kidnapping Strategy: US $1M. Army JAG School: US $1M. Total U.S. Plan Colombia support for protecting human rights, improving governing capacity and reform to the judicial system: US $119M. -- We understand that reaching our objectives will depend on a social and governmental process that may take several years--a time when it is critical to achieve a lasting consensus within a Colombian society where people understand and demand their rights, but are also willing to abide by their responsibilities. In the face of all this, my government is absolutely committed to strengthen the State, regain the confidence of our citizens, and restore the basic norms of a peaceful society. Attaining peace is not a matter of will alone. Peace must be built; it can come only through stabilizing the State, and enhancing its capacity to guarantee each and every citizen, throughout the entire country, their security and the freedom to exercise their rights and liberties. Negotiaiton with the insurgents, which my government initiated, is at the core of our strategy because it is one critical way to resolve a forty-year-old historic conflict that raises enormous obstacles to creating the modern and progressive state Colombia so urgently needs to become. The search for peace and the defense of democratic institutions will require long effort, faith and determination, to deal successfully with the pressures and doubts inherent in so difficult a process. The fight against drug trafficking constitutes another important part of Plan Colombia. The strategy would advance a partnership between consumer and producer countries, based on the principles of reciprocity and equality. The traffic in illicit drugs is clearly a transnational and complex threat, destructive to all our societies, with enormous consequences for those who consume this poison, and enormous effects from the violence and corruption fed by the immense revenues the drug trade generates. The solution will never come from finger-pointing by either producer or consumer countries. Our own national efforts will not be enough unless they are part of a truly international alliance against illegal drugs. Colombia has demonstrated its absolute commitment and made heavy sacrifices to forge a definitive solution to the phenomenon of drug trafficking, to the armed conflict, human rights violations and destruction of the environment caused by drug production. Yet, in truth, we must acknowledge that more than twenty years after marijuana cultivation came to Colombia, along with increased cocaine and poppy cultivation, drug trafficking continues to grow as a destabilizing force, distorting the economy, reversing the advances made in land distribution, corrupting society, multiplying violence, depressing the investment climate--and most seriously, providing increased resources to fund all armed groups. Colombia has been leading the global battle against drugs, taking on the drug cartels and losing many of our best citizens in the process. Now, as drug trafficking becomes a more fragmented network, more internationalized, underground, and thus harder to combat, the world continues testing new strategies. More resources are being targeted for education and prevention. We see the results in the increased confiscation and expropriation of profits and properties obtained from illegal drug trafficking. In Colombia, we have recently launched operations to destroy processing laboratories and distribution networks. We are improving and tightening security and control of our rivers and airspace to assure better interdiction, and we are exploring new ways to eradicate illegal crops. The factors directly related to drug trafficking--like money laundering, smuggling of chemicals, and illegal arms trafficking--are components of a multifaceted problem that must be dealt with across the globe, wherever illicit drugs are produced, transported, or consumed. Our success also requires reforms at the very heart of our institutions, in particular, in our military forces to uphold the law and return a sense of security to all Colombians everywhere in Colombia. Strong, responsible, responsive military and police forces committed to peace and respect for human rights are indispensable to consolidating and maintaining the rule of law. Also, we need--and we are committed--to securing a modern and effective judicial system sworn to defend and promote respect for human rights. We will be tireless in this cause, convinced that our first obligation as a government is to guarantee that our citizens can exercise their [Page: Finally, Colombia requires aid to strengthen its economy and generate employment. Our country needs better and fairer access to markets where our products can compete. Assistance from the United States, the European community and the rest of the international community is vital to our economic development. That development, in turn, is a critical counter force to drug trafficking, because it brings alternative legal employment, for individuals who might otherwise be lost to organized crime or to the insurgent groups that feed off drug-trafficking. We are convinced that the first step toward meaningful worldwide globalization is to create a sense of global solidarity. This is why Colombia is asking for support from its partners. We cannot succeed without programs for alternative development in rural areas, and easier international access for our legitimate exports. This is the only way to successfully offset the illegal drug trade. There are reasons to be optimistic about the future of Colombia, especially if we receive a positive response from the world community, as we work to create widespread prosperity combined with justice. This will make it possible for Colombians to pave the way to a lasting peace. The Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno wrote: ``Faith is not to believe in the invisible, but rather to create the invisible.'' Today, a peaceful, progressive, drug-free Colombia is an invisible ideal--but we are determined to make it the reality of our future. With the full commitment of all our resources and resolve, with the solidarity and assistance of our international partners in the common fight against the plague of drug trafficking, we can and will forge the new reality of a modern, democratic, and peaceful Colombia, not just surviving, but thriving in the new millennium as a proud and dignified member of the world community. As of March 16, 2001, this document was also available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/B?r107:@FIELD(FLD003+h)+@FIELD(DDATE+20010301) |
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