Transcript,
hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, March 1, 2001
REVIEW
OF THE ANTI-DRUG CERTIFICATION PROCESS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH
1, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign
Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met,
pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Hon. Lincoln D. Chafee presiding.
Present: Senators
Chafee, Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, and Bill Nelson.
Senator Chafee. The
hearing will come to order.
Today the Foreign
Relations Committee meets to receive testimony on and discuss the so-called
anti-drug certification process. This law requires the President to eliminate
most forms of U.S. foreign aid and oppose international development loans
for a nation deemed not to be cooperating fully with the United States
in its anti-narcotics efforts.
Until the mid-1980's,
the U.S. Government's linking of anti-drug policy to foreign policy largely
involved little more than the granting of discretionary authority to the
executive branch. Congress became frustrated with the State Department's
unwillingness to confront governments of foreign countries that were major
sources and conduits of illegal narcotics.
So in 1986 Congress
passed a $1.4 billion comprehensive anti-drug abuse law. Provisions of
this law require the President to impose economic sanctions, including
the denial of U.S. foreign aid to any nation that is not cooperating fully
in our anti-drug efforts. I would note that this law passed the Senate
by a vote of 97 to 2, without objection to establishment of this certification
process.
So today, 15 years
later, where do things stand? It can certainly be said with accuracy that
the drug certification law has drawn the attention of governments abroad.
Cooperation abroad with the U.S. anti-drug efforts has increased markedly.
But this law also has generated resentment among nations who view the
process as overbearing and perhaps arrogant, particularly given that the
U.S. is a substantial drug- consuming nation.
In short, the law
has, some might argue, hindered the conduct of our foreign policy. A review
of the most recent listings of major certified and decertified nations
is illuminating. On November 10, 1999, President Clinton listed 25 major
drug-producing and drug transit countries. Then on March 1, 2000, of these
25 majors he certified 19 and decertified 6. Then of these six decertified
countries, he waived sanctions on four for national interest concerns.
That left just two countries on which the law's sanctions were applied,
Afghanistan and Burma, certainly nations that are not major beneficiaries
of U.S. aid regardless of the drug issue.
This experience strikes
me as more of an exercise in process and of limited effect on our policy.
It is also likely one of several reasons why a consensus seems to have
developed that alternatives to this process ought to be given a very close
look.
I do hope today's
hearing will give us an opportunity to fully explore these proposed changes
to current law, and I do look forward to the expert witnesses who will
provide testimony.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first of all thank you for hosting
and holding this very, very important hearing on an issue that has consumed
a great deal of the Congress' attention over the last decade and a half,
the certification issue, and rightly so, given the tremendous interest
there is in this country with the devastating effects of narcotic consumption.
Sixteen thousand lives are lost every year in this country in drug-related
deaths. Obviously, we as representatives of our various constituencies
reflect a desire in this country to do something about this, do something
about this to try and reduce the pain and suffering associated with this
problem.
It was out of that
frustration that this legislation was born a decade and a half ago. It
is important, I think, at this juncture with a new administration, a new
government in Mexico that has committed itself, at least rhetorically,
to addressing this issue, that we examine whether or not there is a better
way of dealing with the issue of cooperation among producing, money-laundering,
transit, consuming countries, all of those nations that are involved in
one aspect or another of the drug business.
So I think this is
very worthwhile that we are gathering here today. We are going to hear
from some very, very good witnesses this morning. I am pleased particularly
that we have so many interested Members of Congress. Senator Grassley
and Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison I know are going to be before us; Representatives
Ben Gilman and Silvestre Reyes, the head of the Hispanic Caucus and my
good friend, who I had the privilege of testifying with the other day
before the Congressional Black Caucus. I am pleased to be with you again
here this morning.
So, Mr. Chairman,
we have held hearings from time to time on this issue of counternarcotics
cooperation with respect to specific countries. We have not for some time
looked at the issue of the certification process itself, and that is what
you are going to do and that is why I think this is worthwhile.
I believe it is important
to do so. This is a procedure, as I said, that has been in effect since
the mid-eighties. The annual certification process has from time to time
provoked a great deal of controversy and debate in both the House and
the Senate. Presidential determinations with respect to whether a particular
country had cooperated fully in any given year were challenged in the
Congress, but never overturned.
Senator John McCain
and I offered legislation a few years ago to get rid of the certification
process and try and come up with something new. Senator Paul Coverdell
of Georgia had proposed some alternative ideas that we were never able
to enact into legislation, but I thought were very intriguing. The congressional
controversy and sometimes highly critical debate did cause significant
friction in the bilateral relationships with respect to the country of
concern where the debated certification was occurring, usually Mexico.
I would not suggest
for one moment, Mr. Chairman, that the threat posed by illicit drug production
and consumption-related crimes is not very, very serious. The international
impact is serious and of great concern to all of us. However, of even
greater concern to me personally are the effects it is having here at
home. Last year Americans spent more than $60 billion to purchase illegal
drugs. Nearly 15 million Americans 12 years of age and older use illegal
drugs, including 1.5 million cocaine users, 208,000 heroin addicts in
the United States, and more than 11 million smokers of marijuana.
This menace is not
just confined to inner cities or the poor. Illegal drug use occurs among
members of every ethnic and socioeconomic group in the United States.
The human and economic costs of illegal drug consumption by Americans
is also enormous. I mentioned already, 16,000 people die annually as a
result of drug-related deaths. Drug-related illnesses, death, and crime
cost the United States approximately $100 billion annually, including
the cost of lost productivity, premature death, and incarceration.
This is an enormously
lucrative business. Drug trafficking generates an estimated revenues of
$400 billion a year annually. The United States has spent more than $30
billion in foreign interdiction and source country counternarcotics programs
since 1981. Despite impressive seizures on the border, on the high seas,
and other countries, foreign drugs are cheaper and more readily available
in the United States today than they were two decades ago when we began
an intensive effort in this area.
For much of that
time, the annual certification process has been in effect. Clearly, whatever
else one thinks about certification, one must conclude that it has not
been the silver bullet with respect to eliminating America's supply or
demand for illicit drugs.
Over the course of
the 15 years that the certification procedures have been in effect, there
have been only minor modifications to the statute. I believe the time
has come to make an assessment as to whether it continues to further our
national security and foreign policy objectives. Is it really doing the
job with respect to promoting effective international cooperation to combat
illicit drug production, sales, and consumption, or could we develop some
other means that would better serve our interests in this important area
and the interests of our allies who seek to cooperate with us in this
regard?
As you know, Mr.
Chairman, I have introduced legislation to suspend the grading aspects
of the certification. I have done so, Mr. Chairman, to create an atmosphere
of some goodwill in which President Bush can discuss with other heads
of state from Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, ways to improve international
cooperation among producing, transit, and consuming nations.
During the 2-year
suspension period, the Congress would continue to receive detailed reports
with respect to what is being accomplished in the areas of eradication,
interdiction, extradition of drug kingpins, efforts to combat money- laundering,
et cetera. Moreover, the President has the option, should he choose, to
continue the certification process with respect to a country or countries
if he determines that this would further bilateral counternarcotics cooperation
with respect to that nation or nations.
Mr. Chairman, I have
visited a number of these countries over the years and I have met with
many heads of state, particularly those in our own hemisphere. I have
yet to have a conversation with one of them that thought that our certification
process was helpful to them in their national efforts to develop and sustain
meaningful and effective counternarcotics programs.
Perhaps it is time
at least to listen to whatever proposals they might suggest to do a better
job in this area. We lose nothing by trying and a great deal by making
the effort.
So with that, Mr.
Chairman, I again thank you for hosting this committee hearing this morning.
I am looking forward to hearing from our colleagues. As I mentioned earlier
before they arrived, members all have a deep interest in the subject matter,
worked hard at it for a number of years. I am anxious to hear their thoughts
on the subject matter and other members of the committee.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank
you so much, Senator Chafee, for holding this hearing. I also want to
welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, Senators Hutchison and Grassley
and Congressman Gilman and Congressman Reyes. I have had the privilege
to work with several of my colleagues, including Senator Hutchison, and
I will talk more about her colleague Senator Phil Gramm, with whom I am
introducing legislation today on this very subject, actually re-introducing
it.
We have all been
working hard to try and come up with a solution. Senator Feinstein has
teamed with Senator Hutchison, I have teamed with Senator Gramm, and Senator
Dodd has introduced legislation.
I really want to
say to Senator Helms, who is not here, I appreciate this hearing because
I thought it would be important to hear all these various proposals. I
think we need some changes, although I do respect Congressman Gilman's
points that he is going to make, I think quite eloquently because I have
read his written testimony, on behalf of the current process.
But I believe for
the last several years we have really had no good options before us when
it comes to this process. I think that became apparent in our annual debate
over the certification of Mexico's efforts in combating illegal drugs.
Certifying Mexico has been very difficult to do in light of the upsetting
statistics showing that Mexico is a major point of production and transit
for drugs entering the United States.
Coming from California,
and I know I speak for all the border states, this is a horrific problem
for our children, for our families, for our people. I continue to be concerned
about the influence of powerful drug cartels in Mexico. In fact, in 1998
I joined 44 other Senators in voting in favor of decertifying Mexico.
I want you to know that was a very difficult vote for me, because Mexico
is our friend. But I think when you have a friend you should not lie to
your friend. You should be honest. So for me it was really hard to say
I can certify that there is really no problem.
That is what we really
care about today, to see if we can come up with other options for dealing
with this situation. Right now we have the worst of all worlds, where
we either have to turn our back on a problem or we humiliate a friend.
That is just not a good choice.
I would ask unanimous
consent that my entire statement be placed in the record. Mr. Chairman,
I would like to just spend a minute talking about the legislation that
Senator Phil Gramm and I have reintroduced, the same legislation we introduced
last year. We hope it will lead to a more honest and realistic way of
addressing the international drug problem. We will replace confrontation
with cooperation. We are encouraging nations to join the United States
in fighting drugs, but we would eliminate a process which strains our
relations with our friends such as Mexico.
Our legislation would
exempt from the certification process those countries that have a bilateral
agreement with the United States regarding the production, distribution,
interdiction, demand reduction, border security, and cooperation among
law enforcement agencies. So in other words, what we are saying to countries
is, join with us, sign a bilateral agreement with us on all these areas,
and then you will not have to be subjected to the certification process.
But we do not do away with the United States process, because we think
it is a hammer that is unfortunately needed if a country turns its back
on this offer from the United States to work in a cooperative way.
So again, Mr. Chairman,
thank you very much and I look forward to reaching some consensus on this
so we can move forward.
[The prepared statement
of Senator Boxer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER
Senator Chafee,
thank you for holding this hearing on the drug certification process.
I want to welcome our witnesses on the first panel this morning, Senator
Hutchison, Senator Grassley, Congressman Gilman and Congressman Reyes.
It is a pleasure to see all of you this morning. I am so pleased to see
how much interest there is in this important issue.
Over the last several
years, Congress has had no good options when it comes to the certification
of major drug producing and drug transit countries. This has been most
apparent in our annual debate over the certification of Mexico's efforts
in combating illicit drugs.
Certifying Mexico
has been very difficult to do in light of the upsetting statistics showing
that Mexico is a major point of production and transit for drugs entering
the United States. I have also been, and continue to be, concerned about
the influence of powerful drug cartels in Mexico. In fact, in 1998, I
joined 44 other Senators in voting in favor of decertifying Mexico.
Nevertheless, I join
many of my colleagues in the belief that the certification process does
not work as it was intended. In some cases, what we have now is the worst
of both worlds. The certification process subjects some of our closest
allies and trading partners to an annual ritual of finger-pointing and
humiliation rather than supporting mutual efforts to control illicit drugs.
Today, Senator Gramm
and I are reintroducing legislation which we hope will lead to a more
honest and realistic way of addressing the international drug problem.
By replacing confrontation with cooperation, we are encouraging nations
to join the United States in fighting drugs while eliminating a process
which strains our relations with allies such as Mexico.
Our legislation would
exempt from the certification process those countries that have a bilateral
agreement with the United States.
These agreements
would have to address issues relating to the control of illicit drugs--including
production, distribution, interdiction, demand reduction, border security,
and cooperation among law enforcement agencies.
This alternative
will give both countries a way to work together for real goals with real
results. Make no mistake, this will not give Mexico or any other country
a free pass on fighting illicit drugs. On the contrary, our bill encourages
the adoption of tough bilateral agreements. It specifically spells out
issues that must be addressed in the agreements.
We specifically require
the adoption of ``timetables and objective and measurable standards.''
And, we require semi-annual reports assessing the progress of both countries
under the bilateral agreement. If progress is not made, the country returns
to the annual certification process, which involves the possibility of
sanctions.
It is sure sign of
the importance of this issue that we now have several bills to get us
out of the drug certification quagmire. It is particularly important to
those of us from border states, which are hit so hard by the traffic in
illegal drugs.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee.
Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr.
Chairman, I thank you. I have recently visited Colombia with the Armed
Services Committee and I was struck by several things and I learned a
lot. The first thing I was struck with was not not only are we fighting
the narcotraffickers, but the United States interests are clearly entwined
with trying to keep an elected democracy viable and not taken over by
the drug lords.
So that the United
States clearly had in its interest in a country like Colombia not only
fighting the drug traffick, but also helping the government remain viable
as an elected democracy.
The other impression
that I came away with, having gone into two air strips that were carved
out of the jungle in southern Colombia, was that we are starting to be
effective in our spraying of Roundup, in my judgment not enough, yet they
have pulled out of a place called Putumayo, which is the major production
of coca. But even if we are effective there, it is going to pop up someplace
else, if not in Colombia maybe across the border in Ecuador or down in
Brazil or wherever.
So as we approach
this--and I know the subject of this hearing is the certification process,
but I think we have got to constantly remind ourselves that we have got
to do something about the demand side of the equation, about trying to
help our children be educated as to the dangers of taking drugs, and then
when they do get hooked trying to help them through treatment and rehabilitation.
So one of the reasons
I am so happy to be on this committee is for this very subject. I find
commonality on this subject with the Armed Services Committee, on which
I serve also. So I am looking very much forward to this very distinguished
panel: my old friend Congressman Gilman that I had the privilege of serving
with; and of course I was back in the House in the days when Senator Grassley
was even back there. So I am delighted to be here and hear your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. I should
point out, by the way, that both Senator Chafee and I preceded Senator
Nelson by about a week, along with Senator McCain and Senator Fred Thompson
and Senator Hagel, who made the same, I think followed the same trip to
Colombia and Ecuador and down to Trace Ischenis and into the Lanandrea
military base and the Monta facility in Ecuador. I think we found it very
worthwhile as well, and I am sure we will bring that up here today, and
some of the points Senator Nelson raised are very legitimate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator Dodd. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Grassley,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON.
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA
Senator Grassley.
Thank you very much. Glad to be with you. Do you want me to start, then?
Senator Chafee. Yes,
please. Lead off.
Senator Grassley.
Thank you, Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Dodd and all of our colleagues,
including those who are here to testify.
Today is that annual
date that the President must submit his findings on the counterdrug cooperation
efforts. That process obviously is somewhat controversial or we would
not be here today for this hearing or with the different ideas to change
it.
Before discussing
my bill, S. 376, I want to say a few things about the controversy surrounding
the certification process. I begin by quoting the basic law of the mid-1980's,
chapter 8, Foreign Assistance Act: ``International narcotics trafficking
poses an unparalleled transnational threat to today's world and its suppression
is among the most important foreign policy objectives of the United States.
``Under the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and under the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances,
parties are required to criminalize certain drug-related activities.''
Then continuing to quote: ``International narcotics control programs should
include as a priority goal the suppression of illicit manufacture of and
trafficking in narcotics drugs, money- laundering, and precursor chemical
diversion.'' The international community should provide assistance, where
appropriate, to those producers and transit countries which require assistance
because, quoting again, ``effective international cooperation is necessary
to control the illicit cultivation, production, and smuggling, trafficking
in, and abuse of narcotic drugs.''
The law empowers
the President to conclude international agreements to implement these
objectives. It then requires a method of accountability, and that is what
this process is about. What the law says in summary is that we acknowledge
that international production and trafficking are bad, that the United
States and other countries have obligations under their own laws and under
international laws to stop production, trafficking, and use, and that
it is reasonable and responsible to expect these countries and others
to be accountable for those efforts, even if they do not want to be and
do not like it.
There seems to be,
however, some dissatisfaction with these expectations. We hear charges
of unfairness, of unilateral decisionmaking, of living in a glass house.
While I understand that some are unhappy, I do not think it is time to
throw the baby out with the bath water. I do not believe that the circumstances
that led Congress some 14 years ago to establish this standard have substantially
changed. If anything, production and trafficking are worse. The criminal
organizations engaged in these activities have grown more powerful and
bolder.
Our obligations to
protect and defend the people across the country is no less real or demanding.
The need for tough responses and tough-mindedness about those responses
remains a call upon our best efforts.
I do not believe
that the need for accountability is any less today than it has ever been.
The United States, with others if possible, without if necessary, must
be a leader in ensuring that we and others are taking adequate steps to
meet our obligations. This is not some philosophical discussion. It involves
what we propose to do about something very basic that is happening across
the land. Drug availability and use are causing direct and real harm today,
right now, in our homes, schoolyards, neighborhoods, in our hospitals
and on our streets.
Most of the drugs
that do this harm are from overseas. They are produced and trafficked
by major criminal gangs. In some cases those activities are aided and
abetted by foreign governments or corrupt officials with them. This is
not something that we can or should ignore, overlook, or make excuses
for. We do not do this in respect to our battle against terrorism and
the state support of state terrorists, and we should expect no less when
it comes to drugs.
I repeat the words
from the law. This is one of our most important political, foreign policy
objectives.
That being said,
I do believe that we can make some changes in the current certification
process. The changes I propose will retain the important accountability
aspects while retooling efforts to be more effective. Our goal should
not be to spend time debating the certification process. We need to spend
our time in doing something about the problem it is meant to address.
I also believe, in
part a result of certification, that other countries now take the need
to deal with drug trafficking more seriously. It is important to take
that fact into account. That is why Senator DeWine and I offer S. 376.
A quite simple approach. It replaces the current three-tiered certification
decisionmaking process with a single determination. My proposal requires
a decertification notice only. There is no more ``major list.'' The focus
is on the international bad actors.
This parallels what
we do with state support of terrorism. By doing this, we focus attention
then on the bad guys. We keep the important accountability aspect of our
law. We keep the useful reporting process. We keep the leverage with bad
actors that is one of the most useful features of the law.
But the change gives
us a chance to reduce the tension with some of our friends and allies
over the process. It gives us some Zantac for the foreign policy heartburn
that we seem to have had with many administrations; and it gives us a
3-year trial period to see how it works.
I believe these changes
offer us a good chance to retain the usefulness of certification, and
so I would thank the committee for their kind attention to my proposal.
[The prepared statement
of Senator Grassley follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF SENATOR CHUCK GRASSLEY
Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank the committee for holding this important hearing. Today
is the first of March, the annual date for the President to submit his
findings on international counter drug cooperation. This certification
process lately has become somewhat controversial. Today's hearing, as
I understand it, is to examine this process and several bills to change
it now before the committee.
Before I discuss
my bill, S. 376, and the changes it proposes, I want to say a few things
about the certification process and the controversy that now accompanies
it.
Let me begin by quoting
briefly from the original law that created the certification process back
in the mid 1980s. Chapter 8 of the Foreign Assistance Act reads, in part,
as follows:
International narcotics
trafficking poses an unparalleled
transnational threat
in today's world, and its suppression is
among the most important
foreign policy objectives of the
United States.
Under the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and
under the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking
in Narcotic and
Psychotropic Substances, parties are required
to criminalize certain
drug-related activities. . . .
And following from
this:
International narcotics
control programs should include, as
priority goals,
the suppression of illicit manufacture of and
trafficking in narcotic
. . . drugs, money laundering, and
precursor chemical
diversion. . . .
The international
community should provide assistance, where
appropriate, to
those producer and transit countries which
require assistance
Because . . .
Effective international
cooperation is necessary to control
the illicit cultivation,
production and smuggling of,
trafficking in,
and abuse of narcotic . . . drugs.
The law empowers
the President to conclude international agreements to implement these
objectives. It then requires a method for accountability.
What the law says,
in summary, is that we acknowledge that international production and trafficking
are bad. That the U.S. and other countries have obligations under their
own laws and under international law to stop production, trafficking,
and use. And that it is reasonable and responsible to expect this country
and others to be accountable for those efforts. Even if they don't want
to be and don't like it.
There seems to be,
however, some dissatisfaction with these expectations. We here charges
of unfairness. Of unilateral decision making. Of living in glass houses.
While I understand that some are unhappy, I do not think it is time to
throw the baby out with the bath water.
I do not believe
that the circumstances that led Congress some 14 years ago to establish
this standard have substantially changed. If anything production and trafficking
are worse. The criminal organizations engaged in these activities have
grown more powerful and bolder. Our obligations to protect and defend
the people across this country is no less real and demanding. The need
for tough responses and toughmindedness about those responses remain a
call upon our best efforts.
I do not believe
that the need for accountability is any less today that it has ever been.
I am also of the opinion that the U.S.--with others if possible, without
if necessary--must be a leader in ensuring that we and others are taking
adequate steps to meet our obligations.
This is not some
esoteric discussion about airy philosophical ideas. It involves what we
propose to do about something very basic that is happening across this
land. Drug availability and use are causing direct and real harm today.
In our homes, schoolyards,
and neighborhoods. In our hospitals and on our streets. Most of the drugs
that do this harm come from overseas. They are produced and trafficked
by major criminal gangs. In some cases, those activities are aided and
abetted by foreign governments or corrupt officials in them.
This is not something
we can or should ignore, overlook, or make excuses for. We do not do this
in respect to terrorism and state support for it, and we should expect
no less when it comes to drugs. I repeat the words from the law, this
is one of our most important foreign policy concerns.
That being said,
I do believe that we can make some changes to the current certification
regime. The changes I propose will retain the important accountability
aspects while retooling certification to be more effective. Our goal should
not be to spend time debating the certification process. We need to spend
our time in doing something about the problem it is meant to address.
I also believe, in
part a result of certification, that other countries now take the need
to deal with drug trafficking more seriously. It is important to take
that fact into account.
That is why I offered
S. 376 along with Senator DeWine. What it does is quite simple. It replaces
the current three-tiered certification decision making process with one
determination. My proposal requires a decertification notice only. There
is no more ``Majors List.'' The focus is on international bad actors.
This parallels what we do with states that support terrorism. By doing
this, we focus attention on the bad guys. We keep the important accountability
aspects of the law. We keep the useful reporting process. We keep the
leverage with bad actors that is one of the most useful features of the
law. But the change gives us a chance to reduce the tensions with some
of our friends and allies over the process. It gives us some Zantac for
the policy heartburn we seem to have had with Administrations. And it
gives us a three-year trial period to see if it works.
I believe these changes
offer us the best chance to keep certification and retain its usefulness.
I want to thank the committee for its time and attention.
Senator Chafee.
I would like to thank the distinguished Senator from Iowa and welcome
the distinguished Senator from Texas.
STATEMENT OF HON.
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison.
Thank you, Senator Chafee, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say that I
think it is very encouraging that so many members are now really involved
and interested in this issue. Many of us have worked for several years
to try to come up with an alternative process that would promote mutual
cooperation and respect and result, rather than this certification process
which has not really done the job that we wanted it to do.
The certification
process has the alternative of giving an A for cooperation, an F for noncooperation,
or an F with a waiver like a social promotion. That is not really a good--at
least it has not been a process that has produced the results of significantly
lowering the drug trafficking and the number of illegal drugs that are
coming into our country.
So I would ask the
committee to move forward and keep all of the people in mind who have
bills introduced. We now have four. The legislation that I offer this
year has Senators Feinstein, Domenici, Kyl, Sessions, Graham and Bingaman.
Senator Boxer and Senator Gramm, Senator Dodd and his group, and Senator
Grassley all have very good nuggets. If we can work together, this would
be enough that we could actually make a difference.
I think we are seeing
a new day in Mexico. President Fox has taken significant steps to eliminate
corruption. He fired or transferred 45 of 47 customs inspectors along
the U.S.- Mexico border. In the first month of this year, 150 tractor-
trailer trucks containing contraband were stopped by Mexican customs officials.
That is in 1 month. Last year for the entire year, only 38 tractor-trailers
were stopped for contraband.
So I think President
Fox is certainly showing that there is a new day in Mexico and I think
that we should take this opportunity with our partner to see if we can
do something that would promote mutual cooperation.
One of the things
that I would suggest is a multilateral approach, where we develop through
our multilateral institutions--the Organizations of American States, other
treaty organizations--systems which insist on accountability and cooperation
to win the war on drugs. A nation that fails to meet acceptable international
standards should be subject, not to sanctions just from the United States,
but from the international community.
These sanctions and
the mechanism should be harsh and swift. All nations must know that failure
to work cooperatively in the drug war has consequences.
So, Mr. Chairman,
I would just hope that you would take my legislation, the other three
pieces of legislation. Let us all have a part in the discussion, and I
hope you will mark up a bill, go to the full Foreign Relations Committee,
and let us stop certification before we have the same situation next year
and let us show President Fox and the others that are grappling with this
problem that there is a different approach, we want it to be cooperative,
but we want it to have results. I think that is all of our goal.
Thank you very much.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator, and we will try and work together as we go forward on this.
The distinguished
Congressman from New York, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON.
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
FROM NEW YORK
Mr. Gilman. Thank
you, Senator Chafee.
I want to thank our
panelists who are here today, the committee members, and we welcome this
opportunity of sharing some thoughts with you on the annual drug certification
process. I am pleased to join our panelists, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Senator Grassley, and Congressman Reyes, who are here sharing their views.
I am here to participate
because I am a Member of Congress who strongly supports the current law
on the certification, among many other Members of Congress. Our annual
drug certification is a simple process, straightforward, but often misunderstood.
It simply requires that 30 or so major drug producing and major transit
nations like Mexico, before they receive any direct United States aid
and-or support for their multilateral loans, must demonstrate that they
are fully cooperating with us in fighting drugs, which have been destroying
our communities and particularly our young people here at home.
Historically, I note
that this annual drug certification approach has been overwhelmingly supported
by American taxpayers. The U.S. Conference of Mayors under Mayor Daly
of Chicago, who at the local level can do nothing about the international
trade that targets our communities, has strongly supported this process
in the recent past.
Our Federal Government
has the lead responsibility in stopping drugs coming from abroad. The
local mayors have wisely seen the annual drug certification as a key and
a powerful tool for the Federal Government in its primary role in helping
to protect their communities and citizens from those drugs which originate
overseas.
Surprisingly, a Wall
Street Journal poll reported not too long ago that 65 percent of the Latin
American people also favor U.S.-imposed sanctions on countries which do
not do enough to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. Our Hispanic
neighbors know that the United States must undertake serious steps to
address these serious problems of illicit drugs.
Many of us in the
Congress who were around when drug certification was developed by the
Democratic Congress for a Republican President in 1986 continue to believe
that it is not too much to ask for any nation's full cooperation in fighting
drugs before we provide American taxpayer assistance to that nation. Along
with the majority of American taxpayers, I think many of us see eye to
eye on that issue.
For years here in
the Congress before 1986 we all heard good words and lofty promises from
many of the foreign governments about their promised cooperation on the
supply side in their interdiction efforts, but all we got at that time
were words until drug certification came along. Only then did the major
producing and transit nations know that our Nation was serious and we
were prepared to withhold our aid if need be.
As Senator Nelson
has noted, there is no question that our Nation needs to do a great deal
more in solving the demand problem. We welcome that challenge and we are
spending billions of dollars on demand reduction here at home and doing
our share on that front.
Drug certification
has been a valuable tool in our supply side arsenal, an equal part of
the battle against drugs. As we all know who have been in the battle for
far too long, we must simultaneously reduce both supply and demand and
do it at the same time. It helps to keep drugs out of our Nation in the
first place by reducing supply.
Moreover, as we address
demand here at home, we must not ignore the impact that an unlimited supply
of cheap, pure and addictive drugs from abroad has had in creating new,
as well as sustaining, demand at home. That is precisely what drug certification
is intended to address. For example, on the supply side Colombian-led
drug dealers who were providing free samples of their heroin to our young
people here at home in the early nineties helped initiate the current
Colombian heroin crisis in the Eastern United States, according to our
own DEA experts.
Today Colombia is
cooperating in eliminating the opium in the Andes before it ever arrives
on our shorelines. Bolivia, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Thailand
are also cooperating and making substantial progress at eliminating illicit
drugs from their nations which previously targeted our Nation.
We receive that cooperation,
not just due to drug certification, but as part of it. They began doing
more and more to cooperate with us in our common struggle when they recognized
that we were serious in our efforts. Accordingly, I am urging our Congress,
urging this Senate committee, not to unilaterally disarm ourselves by
doing away with our annual drug certification process.
This vehicle, which
was once described by the Clinton administration's Assistant Secretary
of State for International Narcotics Control, Randy Beers, who is here
with us today, and I quote him as saying: ``It is a policy tool which
is controversial, not because it has failed, but because it is working.''
That was Randy Beers' statement. Other Clinton administration drug-fighting
officials have said the same thing and I certainly fully agree with them.
Whether the proposal
we are considering, whether those proposals that we are considering today
are to do away with our own certification process and replace it with
an OAS multilateral evaluation system or suspension of the certification
process for a number of years, or other proposed reforms as some in the
Senate have proposed, I urge our respective bodies to stay the course,
make no change in current law. As Senator Grassley has noted today, let
us not throw out the baby with the bath water.
The OAS system has
no teeth, no sanctions, and its ratings are often the lowest common denominator
of the performance of each nation's individual efforts in fighting drugs.
The utilization of
our annual drug certification tool geared to U.S. aid should not be abandoned
because it makes some of our nearby neighbors and foreign allies uncomfortable
or embarrassed. The American taxpayer and the people of Latin America
know better, as was underscored at our recent international conference
on drugs in Bolivia just last week, which I had the opportunity of attending.
International cooperation in fighting drugs is essential for all of us
to succeed, and I think all of our constituents recognize that.
Let me just note
that when we were attending an Atlantic conference that was organized
by former President Carter not too long ago the President of Bolivia sat
alongside me at that meeting and he whispered over to me that without
the threat of decertification his government would never have enacted
the laws of asset seizure, money-laundering that they truly needed to
fight drugs. Today, as we all know, Bolivia is about to become free of
illicit coca and remove the stigma of association with the cocaine business
for that country.
I urge our colleagues,
the United States must lead in the international fight against illicit
drugs that clearly threatens not only our national security, but the national
security of too many other nations. Drug certification has provided us
with an extremely powerful tool in that struggle. We must be prepared
to tell it like it is about what other nations are doing or not doing
to help in our national fight to reduce supply in this serious threat
from illicit drugs from abroad.
It is essential that
we protect our young people and our communities by using and leveraging
our foreign assistance wisely and effectively, and let us make use of
every available tool in doing that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement
of Representative Gilman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN GILMAN (R-NY)
Thank you, Senator
Helms. I welcome this opportunity for sharing our thoughts on our annual
drug certification process. I am pleased to have been invited to participate
in this hearing as one of those of us in the United States Congress who
strongly and unabashedly supports the current law on certification.
Our annual drug certification
is a simple and straightforward process, but much misunderstood. It simply
requires that those 30 or so ``major'' drug producing and ``major'' transit
nations like Mexico, before they receive direct U.S. aid and/or our support
for their multilateral loans, must demonstrate that they are fully cooperating
with us in the fighting drugs which are destroying our communities and
our young people here at home.
Historically, I note
this annual drug certification approach has been overwhelmingly supported
by our American taxpayers. The U.S. Conference of Mayors under Mayor Daley
of Chicago, who at the local level can do nothing about the international
trade that targets their communities, has strongly supported this process
in the recent past.
The federal government
has the lead responsibility in stopping drugs coming from abroad. Our
local mayors have wisely seen the annual drug certification as a key and
powerful tool for the federal government in its primary role in helping
to protect their communities and citizens from those drugs which originate
overseas.
Surprisingly, as
a Wall Street Journal poll showed not too long ago, 65 percent of the
Latin American people also favor U.S. imposed sanctions on countries which
do not do enough to combat illicit drug production or trafficking. Our
Hispanic neighbors know the U.S. must undertake serious steps to address
such a serious problem as illicit drugs.
Many of us in the
Congress who were around when drug certification was developed by a Democratic
Congress for a Republican President in 1986, continue to believe that
it's not too much to ask for any nation's full cooperation in fighting
drugs before we provide American taxpayer assistance to that nation. Along
with the American taxpayers, we see eye to eye on this front.
For years here in
the Congress, before 1986, we all heard good words and lofty promises
from foreign governments about their promised cooperation with us on the
supply side and interdiction efforts. But all we got were words until
drug certification came along. Only then did these major producing and
transit nations know that we were serious and were prepared to withhold
our aid, if need be.
The United States
needs to do even more in solving its demand problem, and we welcome that
challenge. We are spending billions on demand reduction here at home,
and doing our share on that front. Drug certification is a valuable tool
in our supply side arsenal--an equal part of the battle against drugs.
It helps to keep drugs out of our nation in the first place.
Moreover, as we address
demand here at home, we must not ignore the impact that an unlimited supply
of cheap, pure, and addictive drugs from abroad has in helping to create
new, as well as sustaining, demand at home. That is what drug certification
is intended to address.
For example, on the
supply side Colombian-led drug dealers who were providing free samples
of their heroin to our young people here at home in the early 1990's,
helped initiate the current Colombia heroin crisis in the Eastern United
States, according to our own DEA experts.
Today, Colombia is
cooperative in eliminating the opium in the Andes before it ever gets
here. Bolivia, Peru, Dominican Republic and Thailand are also cooperating
and making great progress in eliminating illicit drugs from their nations
which targeted our country. We received this cooperation not just because
of drug certification, but as a part of it. They began doing more and
more to cooperate with us in our common struggle, when they recognized
that we were serious.
Accordingly, I urge
the Congress not to unilaterally disarm ourselves by doing away with our
annual drug certification process. This vehicle was once described by
the Clinton Administration's Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics Control, Rand Beers, as ``a policy tool which is controversial,
not because it has failed, but because it is working.'' Other Clinton
Administration drug fighting officials have said the same thing. I fully
agree with them.
Whether the proposal
is to do away with our own certification process and replace it with an
OAS multilateral evaluation system or suspension of the certification
process for a number of years, or other reforms, as some in the Senate
have proposed, I urge our respective bodies to stay the course and make
no change in current law. The OAS system has no teeth, no sanctions, and
its ratings are often the lowest common denominator of the performance
of each nation's individual efforts in fighting drugs.
The use of our own
annual drug certification tool, geared to U.S. aid, should not be abandoned
because it makes some of our nearby neighbors and foreign allies uncomfortable
or embarrassed. The American taxpayer and the people of Latin American
know better. International cooperation in fighting drugs is essential
for all of us to succeed, and our constituents recognize that.
The United States
must lead in the international fight against illicit drugs that clearly
threatens our national security. Drug certification has provided us a
powerful tool in that struggle.
We must be prepared
to ``tell it like it is,'' about what other nations are doing or not doing
to help our country's fight in this serious threat from illicit drugs
from abroad. It is essential that we protect our young people and our
communities by using and leveraging our foreign assistance wisely and
effectively.
Senator Chafee.
Thank you, Congressman Gilman.
The distinguished
Congressman from Texas, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON.
SILVESTRE REYES, MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
FROM TEXAS
Mr. Reyes. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Senator Dodd, as
well as members of the committee, for inviting me to be here this morning.
I am honored to be sitting here with three of my distinguished colleagues:
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senator Chuck Grassley, and Congressman
Ben Gilman. I welcome the opportunity to be here and testify on the annual
drug certification process, which I believe has outlived its usefulness
and should be eliminated or dramatically changed.
I speak from a unique
perspective, one which I believe no other Member of Congress has. I am
not a career politician. I am not an academic who has analyzed data, nor
have I consulted with scholars or think tanks. I was born, raised, and
worked, and today continue to live on our Nation's border with Mexico.
I have firsthand knowledge and experience of our Nation's war on drugs,
because I spent more than 26\1/2\ years of my life on the front line of
that war as a Border Patrol agent enforcing our Nation's immigration and
narcotics laws. For 12 of those 26\1/2\ years, I was the Border Patrol
Sector Chief in McAllen, Texas, and El Paso, Texas.
Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee, the most important lesson that I learned while
working on the border is that to be successful in our fight against drug
trafficking we must help Mexico reform its police apparatus as well as
its legal and judicial systems. If the United States and Mexico are to
stop drug smuggling, we must cooperate and work in an environment of mutual
understanding.
Because about 60
percent of the cocaine on the streets of the United States passes through
Mexico, its cooperation is vital to any counterdrug effort that we impose.
Merely criticizing Mexico achieves nothing. The U.S. consumes more than
$5 billion a year in illegal drugs. We should own up to our responsibility
and stop trying to blame others.
Indeed, a recent
survey found that 46 percent of Americans believe that Americans are indeed
responsible for the problem of illegal drugs in the United States. However,
interestingly enough, 50 percent of those same Americans believe that
the certification process should be made tougher. They believe that we
as a country are responsible for creating the demand, but we need to punish
foreign nations for our problem.
We should not continue
to use the certification process as a forum to vent frustrations that
we as a Nation feel about the devastating impact of drugs on our communities
and neighborhoods. The Mexican Government every year bristles at the annual
certification process, viewing it as an affront to their nation and an
infringement on their sovereignty. The former Mexican Ambassador to the
United States, Jesus Reyes- Heroles, refers to this certification process
as ``the most stressful period each year in the relationship between our
two great nations.''
This stress does
not in my view enhance the cooperation essential to defeat this mutual
scourge. We must continue to build upon the kind of process we have seen
in the last few years. The United States policy of judging the drug-fighting
efforts of other countries is counterproductive and must be changed if
we are to have any real impact on the international drug trafficking scenario.
We must develop a
process in which we engage our partners through cooperation rather than
confrontation. Today I am going to introduce legislation modeled after
Senator Dodd's bill, which suspends the certification process for 2 years.
The legislation states that ``It is the sense of Congress that the President
should convene a conference of the heads of state of major illicit drug
producing countries, major drug transit countries, and major money-laundering
countries to present and review drug reduction and prevention strategies
for each of those countries.''
My legislation will
ask the President to come up with an alternative to the annual certification
process by November 1, 2002.
Mr. Chairman, today
I am encouraged at the direction which this debate is heading. It is quite
a contrast from the ugliness associated with this debate 4 years ago,
when legislation was introduced to actually decertify Mexico. President
Bush has indicated that he will review the certification process and congressional
leaders like my good friend Senator Hutchison and Congressman Jim Kolbe
have introduced bills to suspend or waive the process.
Last week I and eleven
Members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus met with President Fox and
members of his administration in Mexico City. Among the many issues we
discussed was the issue of certification. I believe there is a real commitment
from President Fox and his administration to the fight against drug trafficking.
Moreover, President Fox fully understands the dangers involved in this
partnership and simply expects from us a commitment to that partnership.
Finally, Mr. Chairman,
I look forward to working with all of you to come up with an alternative
that is productive rather than confrontational, because I believe that
the President and Congress can come up with a workable solution.
I want to thank you
again for giving me this opportunity to testify this morning and I would
be pleased to answer any of your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement
of Representative Reyes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES (D-TX)
Thank you Chairman
Chafee and Senator Dodd for inviting me to be here this morning. I am
honored to be sitting here with three of my distinguished colleagues,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senator Chuck Grassley, and Congressman
Ben Gilman. I welcome the opportunity to be here and testify on the annual
drug certification process, which I believe has outlived its usefulness
and should be eliminated.
I speak from a unique
perspective, one which no other Member of Congress has. I am not a career
politician. I am not an academic who has analyzed data, nor have I consulted
with scholars or think tanks. I live on our nation's border with Mexico.
I have first-hand knowledge and experience of our nation's ``war on drugs.''
I spent more than 26 years of my life on the front line of that ``war''
as a Border Patrol agent, enforcing our nation's immigration and narcotics
laws. For 12 of those 26 years, I was the Border Patrol Sector Chief in
McAllen, Texas and El Paso, Texas.
The most important
lesson I learned while working on the border is that to be successful
in our fight against drug trafficking, we must help Mexico reform its
police apparatus as well as its legal and judicial systems. If the U.S.
and Mexico are to stop drug smuggling, we must cooperate and work in an
environment of mutual understanding. Because about 60% of the cocaine
on the streets of the United States passes through Mexico, its cooperation
is vital to any counterdrug effort. Merely criticizing Mexico achieves
nothing.
The U.S. consumes
more than $5 billion a year in illegal drugs. We should own up to our
responsibility and stop trying to blame others. Indeed, a recent survey
found that 46 percent of Americans believe that Americans are responsible
for the problem of illegal drugs in the U.S. Interestingly enough, 50
percent of those same Americans believe that certification should be made
tougher. They believe that we as a country are responsible for creating
the demand but we need to punish foreign nations for our problem. We should
not continue to use the certification process as a forum to vent the frustrations
we as a nation feel about the devastating impact of drugs on our communities.
The Mexican government
bristles at the annual certification process, viewing it as an affront
to their nation and an infringement on their sovereignty. The former Mexican
Ambassador to the United States, Jesus Reyes-Heroles, refers to the certification
process as ``the most stressful period each year in the relationship between
the two nations.'' This stress does not, in my view, enhance the cooperation
essential to defeat this mutual scourge.
We must continue
to build upon the kind of progress we have seen in the past few years.
The United States policy of judging the drug- fighting efforts of other
countries is counterproductive and must be changed if we are to have any
real impact on international drug trafficking. We must develop a process
in which we engage our partners through cooperation rather than confrontation.
Today, I am going
to introduce legislation modeled after Senator Dodd's bill, which suspends
the certification process for two years. The legislation states that it
is the sense of Congress that the President should convene a conference
of the heads of state of major illicit drug producing countries, major
drug transit countries, and major money laundering countries to present
and review drug reduction and prevention strategies for each country.
My legislation will also ask the President to come up with an alternative
to the annual drug certification process by November 1, 2002.
I am encouraged at
the direction this debate is heading. It is quite a contrast from the
ugliness associated with this debate four years ago, when legislation
was introduced to decertify Mexico. President Bush has indicated that
he will review the certification process, and Republican leaders, like
Senator Hutchison and Congressman Jim Kolbe, have introduced bills to
suspend or waive the process.
I look forward to
working with all of you to come up with an alternative that is productive
rather than confrontational. I believe that the President and the Congress
can come up with a workable solution. Thank you again for asking me to
testify this morning and I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Senator Chafee.
Thank you, Congressman Reyes. You have got what they say in the Army,
boots on the ground time.
Mr. Reyes. Yes, I
do.
Senator Chafee. Senator
Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr.
Chairman, I appreciate the time. I am going to ask unanimous consent my
opening statement be placed in the record, if I may, and summarize it
very, very briefly.
I, like Chairman
Gilman, was here, as a matter of fact was a co-author of this legislation
that we are talking about changing. I just want to set the record straight
on a few things. No. 1, at the time we introduced the legislation we got
zero cooperation from any head of state. The Mexican head of state would
not even talk to us. The Colombian head of state would not talk to us.
No one would discuss this issue with us. It was considered our problem.
The truth is it is
demand-driven. But I find it kind of fascinating. If you apply the logic
of suggesting that because it is demand-driven we should not hold those
who are supplying and those who accommodate it as accountable, then we
might as well decide that organized crime that is spawned in the United
States of America, that is involved in the drug trafficking, should not
be held responsible; it is a demand problem.
I do not find it
a demand problem when in my State of Delaware Colombian heroin now which
is 94, 95 percent pure, is given out for free by organizations that go
through and are coordinated out of Colombia and out of Mexico and given
free to high school kids. Now it is a demand problem.
This is a disease
of the brain. Once in fact you get hooked on drugs, it is a disease of
the brain. It is not something you are able to control. So when an organization
comes along and concludes that they are going to give out free samples
to kids who are below the age of being able to make judgments about whether
or not they should go out on a date or not and then says, well, this is
a demand problem, it is our problem, and we are not going to hold any
other nation accountable, I think that is garbage. I think that is absolute
garbage.
I would point out
a second thing, that once we did this, once we did this, it has caused
serious problems, but now we actually have cooperation. Mexico would not
even talk to us in 1978, in 1981, in 1983, would not even talk to us about
the corruption of their system and what was going on, would not even discuss
it with us. I got all these lectures about how this is only our problem,
it is a gringo problem, nobody else's.
Since this has been
put into place, it has worked in fits and starts. I am prepared to change
it, unlike the chairman. I am prepared to sign on to Senator Dodd's bill.
But I do not like this revisionist history about how none of this made
any sense at the time we did it in the context in which we did it. I strongly
take issue with that.
The third point that
I would make is that it is time to give these leaders a chance. Guess
what, we now have someone in Mexico who is serious, not a corrupt leader,
not a corrupt head of state, which we often dealt with the previous 20
years.
So this is a different
world. Fox is serious, putting his life on the line, as is, I might add,
Pastrana putting his life on the line. So now we have people who are serious
about it, and I am willing for one to say: Now you are serious, you have
been serious, now your elected leaders are taking real chances. Pastrana
has taken more chances in Colombia, literally putting his life on the
line to clean up everyone from the police department to their military
and going after the paramilitary. He deserves a break, in my view. Fox
deserves to have a breather here.
So I am prepared
to lift this for 2 years because it is not working now. I admit it is
now counterproductive. But I respectfully suggest, everybody go back and
remember, remember what kind of responses we got from Mexico when you,
Congressman Reyes, were on the line there, doing a job I would not take
on a bet. God bless you. As my mother would say, no purgatory for you,
straight to heaven, nothing in between.
So I do not want
us to get into this thing where somehow this is merely, merely a consequence
of an avaricious drug market here that is born by the lack of discipline
on the part of the American people and the unwillingness of the American
Government to do anything about it, et cetera. This is an economy, a drug
economy, that has in fact a relatively small group of people who are inclined
to seek it, but has an incredibly sophisticated marketing apparatus.
We sit here and say
we do not want the cigarette companies to put Joe Camel on a pack. Well,
go look, as you well know better than I do, Congressman, look at the way
they package everything from LSD these days all the way to heroin. They
even have their own colors. This is packaging.
So to suggest that
people do not do anything about those who are packaging and aiming at
our kids is to me--and I am not saying you suggested that--to me absolutely
makes no sense. If you apply that logic, criminal organizations here who
are totally home-grown--by the way, more marijuana comes out of California
than any other part of the world. That would be like saying, OK, here
is what we do, those organizations distributing that, you know, let us
not focus on them, let us focus on the kids what are using it and get
them.
By the way, the last
point I will make and I will stop: I have every single year since the
drug czar legislation was written issued a lengthy report, and a study
on drugs in America. Every single one of those years I have pushed for
more and more support for dealing with the demand side.
It is true, the criticism
I think is absolutely true, until recently we have as a Congress been
unwilling to pay serious attention, and I say recently, the last 4 or
5 years, pay attention to the demand side. It is the place we should be
expending a great deal more of our money. The reason I am prepared to
spend less money on interdiction is because it does not work very well,
not because it is immoral to attempt to do it, not because we are offending
other nations not because of anything else, but because you do not get
the biggest bang for the buck.
So again I will conclude
by saying, I make no apologies for having coauthored this and written
this in the first instance. I think it did have an effect. It has had
an effect. It has had some negative effects, but by and large it has been
much more positive than it has been negative. I respectfully suggest we
would not be here unless we embarrassed other nations, as they view it,
by focusing on this.
I remember meeting
with the President of Colombia in 1978, I believe it was, and saying:
You will change your mind when one thing happens, when you become drug
addicted. You cannot be a grower and a transit place without your own
country getting addicted. Guess what is happening in Mexico now. Guess
what is happening in Mexico now. So now Mexico is a lot more focused than
it was before, not only because it has a decent leader, not only because
it has a leader who I think is committed to this, but also because, guess
what, they have got themselves a demand problem, and it is growing.
So I am prepared
to join Senator Dodd and the Congressman in his bill to call for that
waiver, because the single most important part of this--and I will cease
and desist; it would have been easier if I had read my statement. It would
have been shorter, but, as you can tell, I feel kind of strongly about
this. I have been doing this for 20 years with as much energy as anybody
who has ever worked in this place, and I am frustrated.
The thing that Senator
Dodd is proposing and you are proposing, Congressman, is the key. That
is the call for the nations involved in this to get together and try to
come up with a genuinely serious approach, because I respectfully suggest
Chairman Gilman is generally correct about the Organization of American
States and what they have done so far. So I think this gives us a chance.
We will find out who is serious. We will find out who is not. I think
the two leaders in Colombia and in Mexico warrant this opportunity, and
I am willing to sign onto it.
But I do not accept
the notion that this was a bad idea at the outset.
[The prepared statement
of Senator Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
Mr. Chairman, 15
years ago, I joined several other colleagues in co-authoring the law to
require the annual certification of counter- narcotics performance by
foreign nations.
For my part, enactment
of the law was necessary to send a wake-up call. It was necessary, in
my view, to push the major drug producing and transiting countries to
take our concerns about the drug issue seriously. It was also necessary
to force Congress and the Executive Branch to review, on a systematic
basis, the counter-drug performance of our allies and our adversaries.
I still believe it
is reasonable for the United States to require aid recipients to cooperate
on narcotics control. I still believe that there is a value to forcing
the Executive Branch and Congress to review the state of international
cooperation on an annual basis.
I still believe,
finally, that certification is a useful--if imperfect--diplomatic tool.
Even the State Department, which prefers to confront foreign nations privately
rather than publicly, conceded in last year's international narcotics
report that ``though controversial, throughout the 14 years it has been
in effect the certification process has proved to be a powerful policy
instrument . . . [a]s uncomfortable as it may be for all concerned, it
is a healthy process.''
All that said, I
have an open mind about alternative proposals. And I'm willing to take
a time out, as Senator Dodd's bill would provide, as we search for those
alternatives.
The Dodd bill does
not get rid of certification entirely--it permits the President to keep
the certification process for certain countries if he believes it is useful
to do so. If the Dodd bill becomes law, the burden would still be on Senator
Dodd to pass a bill for permanent repeal.
The main reason I
am willing to suspend the process is that one major rationale for it--to
prod major narcotics producing natons to take action--seems unnecessary
at this time. The two most significant nations from which drug trafficking
to this country occurs--Colombia and Mexico--have presidents who are clearly
committed to working closely with us to address the drug problem.
Two other countries
in the hemisphere which had been major producers of coca--Bolivia and
Peru--have also made significant strides in reducing drug cultivation.
Suspension of certification
does not mean that we are going to stop paying attention to the actions
of foreign nations in combating narcotics cultivation and trafficking.
Under the Dodd bill, the State Department will continue to issue its annual
report on narcotics. Congress will continue to monitor the situation closely.
Also, the Organization
of American States has begun work on a multilateral mechanism in which
nations of this hemisphere will jointly assess each country's record.
The process will be showcased for the first time at the Summit of the
Americas in April.
Though it is too
soon to assess the effectiveness of this mechanism, I believe it holds
some promise in fostering greater cooperation among the nations of the
region.
In closing, I welcome
this debate. I commend Senator Dodd for starting it, and I thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing today.
Senator Boxer. Mr.
Chairman, I wonder if I could say something here, because California was
mentioned.
Senator Biden. I
did not mean----
Senator Boxer. No.
California was mentioned, and I think it should be mentioned when I talk
about this because it is our kids that are suffering probably more than
anybody else because of where we are. But I want to make a point. I agree
with my friend, if we did not do this certification and hold the threat
of decertification we perhaps would have no progress whatsoever and, we
were talking before, we have made a little.
The point is, I think
the Dodd bill goes too far. The bill that Senator Gramm and I have keeps
the certification system in place if a country will not sign a bilateral
agreement with us and make measurable progress. So I think my colleague
ought to take a look at that one, because I think it is a little tougher.
We do not do away with certification, because I do agree. No one could
have said it better than you did.
You know, it is like
your kids. In my case, they are quite grown now, but when they were little
they complained, complained, and complained about pointing out the error
of their ways, but in the end it was a good thing. Here is the point about
this. This is about equals, not kids. But we need to work together, because
we have got the demand problem and they have got the supply problem and
now, as Senator Biden points out, they are starting to get the demand
problem.
We are equals. We
have to work together. That is why we offer this bilateral agreement.
I just want to put
a couple of facts on the record. Today three million drug users are in
need of treatment now, but they cannot get it because they do not have
money to pay for it and we do not have it. Some 2.1 million are receiving
treatment. Now, there is nothing worse than someone finally deciding to
kick a habit and going to the county health department or wherever they
have to go and being told, come back in 3 months, you are on a waiting
list. By then, God knows what could happen, what crimes could be committed.
Senator Biden. Ninety
more crimes.
Senator Boxer. And
they lose the desire to kick the habit or they may die. We do not know.
So the fact of the matter is, as Senator Biden has said, we need to do
more. That does not mean that you do not blame the people who are pushing
the stuff. It all has to happen. We need a balanced plan. It is what Senator
Nelson said before, Senator Biden, you arrived at the hearing. He made
the point about looking at everything.
Congressional Research
Service says that reduction of supply accounts for 66 percent of the Federal
anti-drug control budget, 66 percent. So we really do not have a balance
and we need to do more on all ends. But I am really glad we are having
this hearing because there is a lot more than meets the eye to all of
this. I think Senator Biden put this all into perspective. Certification
has its problems, but it caught everybody's attention. We now have to
make some changes in it, but let us not, in my opinion, throw the baby
out with the bath water. I agree with the Honorable Ben Gilman on that
point.
I hope we can come
up with some compromise that keeps some vestiges of the certification
and still takes a little from all of our bills on the rest.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator Boxer.
Yes, Congressman
Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. I might
just ask for a few more minutes. I have to return to a hearing we are
conducting in our House International Relations Committee.
Senator Chafee. We
appreciate your patience, yes.
Mr. Gilman. I want
to thank the gentlelady, Senator Boxer, for the comments she made. I want
to commend Senator Biden for his outstanding service over the years in
fighting the drug war and Senator Boxer for what she is doing in California.
We struggled to get
the drug certification measure adopted. Senator Biden led that effort
in 1986. It was a Democratic Congress and a Republican President, as I
noted before.
Senator Dodd. A Republican
Senate, too, by the way.
Mr. Gilman. Yes,
a Republican Senate.
But it was a worthy
effort because it accomplished a great deal. How well we remember how
important it was then to make the countries who were not listening to
us turn around and start working with us. I think that should be enough
of a lesson to us, that countries who did not want to cooperate started
cooperating because we withheld aid.
Why should we be
paying taxes and giving tax money to countries that are not cooperating
with this serious problem? I urge my colleagues, give that a great deal
of consideration. For the 30 years that I have been involved in fighting
the drug war, we find there are five essential elements, five battlefields,
and we have got to reduce supply and demand simultaneously.
We do that by starting
with the drug producing nations. They have to eradicate, they have to
provide alternative crops. Then when it gets into the supply routes, we
have to interdict and we have to provide intelligence to help in interdiction.
Then when it reaches our shorelines, to make certain that our enforcement
officials have the wherewithal to do the job to put the drug traffickers
behind bars. Then on the demand side, educate our young people by all
means to prevent the utilization of narcotics, teach them how deadly these
illicit drugs are, that they are not recreational, and then to treat and
rehabilitate.
Eradicate, interdict,
enforce, and then reduce demand by education, prevention, and treat and
rehabilitate. This certification tool is an important tool in all of that,
because we are telling the drug producing nations, we are asking them:
Cooperate with us, but if you do not cooperate then we are not going to
give you any Federal assistance. Is that too much to ask? I think that
is something that all of our taxpayers would like to see us do.
I thank you for this
opportunity, and I want to thank our colleagues on the committee for focusing
attention on this very important issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Congressman.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman,
if I could make a couple comments. Senator, did you have something?
Senator Hutchison.
Do you all have votes going?
Mr. Reyes. I have
got a vote, and I just wanted to make a couple of comments particularly
about Senator Biden's comments. The first one is I think it is a mistake
if we do not look at the issue of drug trafficking and the drug problem
and fighting it on three different levels. We have got to fight it on
the interdiction level, the education level, and the treatment level.
Any one of those
components that you slight, you are slipping away from a balanced approach
to fighting it. As the Senator was talking there about his frustration
and perhaps a frustration shared by others here this morning in terms
of what brought about the certification process and the fact that he referred
repeatedly to Mexico would not talk, I was thinking about the many times
that I as a chief received cooperation at the local operational level
from many fine and outstanding Mexican colleagues that were on the front
line of fighting drugs, that were making those kinds of sacrifices.
The sacrifices that
I am talking about are, purely stated, getting killed, getting killed
because they would not succumb to corruption, because they would not look
the other way. You know, one of the things that I think we should keep
in perspective is the terrible price that Mexico has paid as a country
while engaging in this fight with us against drug trafficking. You know,
we have seen a man of the church gunned down in Guadalajara. We have seen
repeatedly prosecutors that are either killed outright or disappear. We
have seen police officials that get killed, their families intimidated,
families get killed.
I am speaking from
my own personal experience from being on the border and fighting. So I
think it is useful to have a process that puts us all in the mix, because
just to simply point fingers and just to simply manifest our frustration
directed at a single country or a single portion of the problem does us
no good. I think we have to have a balanced approach. I think we have
to have the wisdom to know that we are all in this together.
The certification
process was well intended and has brought about a lot of the benefits
that people have spoken about. But it is time to modify it. It is time
to use it for something other than just a bully pulpit to just bash a
segment or a country or a frustration that we feel. That is what I am
saying.
I think the true
wisdom in this is to understand that we are in it together, to understand
that in order for it to continue to be successful we have to modify it.
Third and I think most important of all is to understand that we must
be flexible from a public policy. I was saying--I do not know if you were
in here, Senator, when I said it--but you know, there are two arenas that
we need to understand we are engaged in. There is a political arena, which
is the one that produced the frustration that you articulated so well
a few minutes ago; and then there is the operational arena. That operational
arena is where I think we sometimes lose sight of not just the commitment
individually that Mexican law enforcement and prosecutors and others make
to the effort, but that also we have to be mindful that we need to continue
to fund and support.
So again I appreciate
that opportunity. I think the perspective that I bring is one of 26\1/2\
years of being there. So I will be glad to discuss any of these experiences
with you in the hopes that we can have a public policy that works for
all of us. That is the most important thing, because today we are frustrated
because of the scourge of drugs and the impact that they are having on
all our neighborhoods, Mexico included and Latin America included as well.
So thank you again
for the opportunity.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you.
Congressman, Senator,
anything to add? Are you preparing to leave?.
Senator Hutchison.
Yes, unless there were any questions I was going to leave.
Senator Dodd. No,
just to say, I mentioned earlier before you came in, Kay, that Senator
Hutchison and I have worked together closely on this issue for the last
few years, and she cares about it very, very much and brings, obviously,
a tremendous experience with a border state like Texas, not unlike Congressman
Reyes, who deals with this issue in a very direct way all the time.
I am hopeful in the
next few weeks here we will be able to develop a piece of legislation
that everyone can feel very comfortable with. I do not want to take up
the time. We have got other witnesses to come and the Senator has to move
on. Obviously, one of the problems is in a sense that today is March 1,
is the certification day, so we will have to slip, I guess, on the proposal
you have made because of the 1-year. We are already into the year, so
we would have to modify, I guess, the dates on that, which you may want
to comment on.
Second, just to make
note of the fact that I am for the suspension. Obviously, we keep in place--I
do not want to get into a debate here, but we keep in place the President's
right to decertify, in a sense to make notice of where we are getting
cooperation and where we are not. So it does not eliminate the entire
process. It merely eliminates the congressional process for 2 years. We
can still have the President, President Bush, make determinations about
the cooperation we are receiving with any number of nations that are involved
in the business of narcotrafficking.
My concern would
be now, and this would be the challenge, that this 2-year suspension is
designed to generate some real effort. We can do so much up here, but
the administration has really got to take this up now. If it is merely
just buying some time so we do not have an embarrassing foreign policy
debate for 2 years and then ask for an extension for another year and
one after that, this will have been nothing more than just an interim
period and we will be right back where we were before.
So I know your close
ties and I know some of them are here in the audience, so, taking advantage
of your presence, and maybe you would like to comment on that, whether
it is the 1- year that you have recommended or the 2 years that we have
recommended. I suspect we both agree that that period of time, whatever
it is, better be used very effectively if we are going to come up with
an alternative that means something.
Senator Hutchison.
I agree with you. I would be very disappointed if we do not have something
in concrete that is different and workable at this time next year. So
I believe that your 2 years was not meant to be a full 2-year moratorium,
but rather to give us the time to do something that would be workable.
Senator Dodd. One
Congress, yes.
Senator Hutchison.
So in my legislation it requires the President to have a plan in place
by June 30 and report to Congress with that plan. I would like to see
us have a multinational approach rather than a binational approach with
our other country neighbors and friends.
Senator Dodd. I agree.
Senator Hutchison.
So I would just like to ask the chairman of the subcommittee to consider
calling a kind of a working meeting with those who want to participate,
and I would say looking at the sponsors of each of our bills, and let
us talk about what we would really like to propose. I would like to move
legislation right away and have something that can go to the President
and bring the White House into our working meeting and see what they would
propose as well. Let us hammer something out and do it this year and send
it to the President, so that we have a process in place that we think
will be more workable, rather than, as we have in the last 4 years, as
Senator Dodd knows, come to the deadline, not liked the alternatives,
tried to forge a consensus, and we have not been able to, so we wait another
year. That is not acceptable today.
Senator Dodd. Thank
you.
Senator Hutchison.
Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator.
I guess we have had
some good ideas put forth here, and some divergence of opinions. I think
that it is a good suggestion to have a working meeting and get together.
We appreciate that suggestion. Thank you for your time and patience.
Now I would like
to welcome the Honorable Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the State Department. Good morning.
STATEMENT OF HON.
R. RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Beers. Mr. Chairman,
thank you. Senator Dodd, Senator Biden, thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the narcotics certification mechanism and the President's certification
decisions for this year with the committee. As has been indicated before,
we are focused here on certification, which is a supply side issue, and
that is appropriate, but I also would like to take note, in light of several
Senators' comments, that this administration, as indicated by both Secretary
Powell and President Bush and others, fully supports the efforts to reduce
demand within the United States, and this discussion should not take away
from the importance of that purpose and the need to move forward and to
do a better job in that regard as well.
Certification is
a straightforward procedure. Every year the President must certify that
governments of the major drug producing and transit countries have cooperated
with the United States or have taken adequate steps on their own to meet
the goals and objectives of the international standard that most countries
signed onto, the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention.
If the President
does not certify a government, it is ineligible for most forms of U.S.
assistance, with the exception of humanitarian and counternarcotics aid.
The United States is also obliged to vote no to any assistance loans in
the multilateral development banks for countries that are denied certification.
Most governments
are now aware that U.S. law requires the President to provide this annual
assessment of counternarcotics cooperation. Many resent what they describe
as a unilateral and subjective assessment of their performance with no
reciprocal accountability from the United States. I would point out, however,
that each determination is the product of a year-long consultative process.
We have worked with our partners to establish realistic mutually acceptable
goals for certification evaluation purposes based on the goals and objectives
of the United Nations convention.
The relevant benchmarks
are established by mutual consensus and the factual basis for any judgment
is clearly set forth in the certification determinations. Though certification
throughout its 15-year existence has proven to be an effective, if blunt,
policy instrument for enhancing counternarcotics cooperation.
Prior to the March
1 deadline for certification each year, we have seen countries introducing
legislation, passing laws, eradicating drug crops, and capturing elusive
drug kingpins. The timing is no coincidence. These countries know that
their actions will have an impact on the President's certification decisions.
They also know what the U.S. expects from them.
Over the past several
years, we have made the administration of the certification process more
transparent. As I indicated, each spring after the decisions are announced
our embassies give a formal demarche to each country explaining the prior
year's decision and working with those countries to set benchmarks for
the coming years. The benchmarks become the standards by which the country
is reviewed in the following year's process.
Throughout the year,
the embassy goes back to the governments to discuss progress and barriers
in meeting the benchmarks, supplemented by high level U.S. Government
visits. When the President finally makes these decisions on the 1st of
March, there would be no government taken by surprise.
That said, we are
aware that there is a growing sense among some in Congress that there
may now be more effective approaches to strengthening international drug
cooperation. Several different bills recently have been introduced in
the Senate that would change the certification process in some way. While
I have long supported certification and believe that it is a useful tool,
we should not hesitate to investigate other ways to encourage cooperation
on counternarcotics.
Recent years have
seen a dramatic shift toward greater cooperation in this area and certification
or any alternative should reflect the evolving international environment
in an effort to strengthen that cooperation. One of the most encouraging
developments is the multilateral evaluation mechanism, or MEM, a peer
review system for assessing individual and collective performance mandated
by the 1997 Summit of the Americas. Developed by the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission and the Organization of American States, the
MEM involves an intensive review by a group of independent experts of
information submitted by the 34 OAS member states about their anti-drug
efforts.
The MEM process provides
a consensual framework for a frank exchange of views and an evaluation
and recommended remedial action. While the process is still evolving,
the MEM seeks to cover national and regional compliance with international
norms and treaty obligations. This parallels the goals and standards of
the U.S. certification process and could potentially make our unilateral
process an anachronism in the Western Hemisphere.
We in the administration
are reviewing the legislation recently introduced in the Senate that would
revise the certification process in some way. We believe that it is appropriate
to consider how the current process might be altered to reflect the changes
in the international situation that have occurred since narcotics certification
was first introduced.
That said, any regime
that might modify or replace certification should have an enforcement
mechanism to ensure continued international cooperation. Moreover, if
there were efforts to suspend the certification process we believe the
President must retain in the interim the power to decertify or sanction
individual countries using the standards of the current process. We do
not believe that there should be exemptions for individual countries or
regions at this time. Future carve outs, however, may be appropriate for
regions where there is a mutually acceptable and credible mutual evaluation
process in place and working.
I know that all of
us, both in the administration and in Congress, are interested in developing
the best and most effective mechanisms to counter the threat of international
narcotics trafficking, whether that be through the certification process
or some other procedure, and I look forward to working with all of you
to that end.
Now, as required
by law, on the 1st of March and determined by the President of the United
States, I have the following announcement to make. The following countries
that were identified on the 1st of November of last year have been certified:
Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
The following two
countries, Cambodia and Haiti, were decertified with a national interest
waiver; and the following two countries, Afghanistan and Burma, were decertified.
Sir, that concludes
my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement
of Mr. Beers follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF HON. R. RAND BEERS
COUNTERNARCOTICS
CERTIFICATION
Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate this opportunity to discuss the narcotics certification mechanism
and the President's certification decisions for this year with the Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Certification is a straightforward procedure. Every
year the President must certify that the governments of the major drug
producing and transit countries have cooperated with the U.S.--or have
taken adequate steps on their own--to meet the goals and objectives of
an international standard that most countries have signed onto, the 1988
UN Drug Convention. If the President does not certify a government, it
is ineligible for most forms of U.S. assistance, with the exception of
humanitarian and anti-drug aid. The U.S. is also obliged to vote ``no''
to any assistance loans in the multilateral development banks for countries
denied certification.
BACKGROUND
The certification
process is a statutory requirement. In 1986, the Congress--frustrated
by what it perceived at the time as reluctance on the part of the State
Department to take effective measures against the governments of drug
source and transit countries--introduced the drug certification process.
It requires the executive branch to identify the major drug producing
and transit countries and impose sanctions on those that do not cooperate
with us--or take adequate steps on their own--in meeting international
drug control goals. The law provides a waiver for those countries which,
because of their vital interest to the United States, should be exempted
from the sanctions related to a denial of certification.
Most governments
are now aware that U.S. law requires the President to provide this annual
assessment of counternarcotics cooperation. Many governments resent what
they describe as a unilateral, subjective assessment of their performance,
with no reciprocal accountability from the United States. I would point
out, however, that each determination is the product of a year-long consultative
process. We work with our partners to establish realistic, mutually acceptable
goals for certification evaluation purposes, based on the goals and objectives
of the UN Convention. The relevant benchmarks are established by mutual
consensus and the factual basis for any judgment is clearly set forth
in the certification determinations.
Though controversial,
throughout its 15-year existence the certification process has proved
to be an effective, if blunt, policy instrument for enhancing counternarcotics
cooperation. Prior to the March 1 deadline for certification each year,
we have seen countries introducing legislation, passing laws, eradicating
drug crops, and capturing elusive drug kingpins. The timing is no coincidence.
These countries know that their actions will have an impact on the President's
certification decisions. They also know what the U.S. expects from them.
Over the past several
years, we have made the administration of the certification process more
transparent. Each spring after the decisions are announced, our embassies
give a formal demarche to each country, explaining the prior year's decision
and setting benchmarks for the coming year. The benchmarks become the
standard by which the country is reviewed in the following year's process.
Throughout the year, the embassy goes back to the government to discuss
progress and barriers in meeting the benchmarks, supplemented by high-level
USG visits. When the President finally makes his decisions on March 1,
there should be no government taken by surprise.
That said, we are
aware that there is a growing sense among some in Congress that there
may now be more effective approaches to strengthening international counterdrug
cooperation. Three different bills have recently been introduced in the
Senate that would change the certification process in some way. While
I have long supported certification and believe that it has been a useful
tool, we should not hesitate to investigate other ways to encourage cooperation
on counternarcotics. Recent years have seen a dramatic shift towards greater
international cooperation in this area, and certification, or any alternative,
should reflect the evolving international environment in an effort to
strengthen that cooperation.
MULTILATERAL EVALUATION
MECHANISM
Over the past decade
the international community has intensified its collective efforts to
counter illegal narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse, moving away
from finger-pointing and toward greater emphasis on shared responsibility.
One of the most encouraging developments is the Multilateral Evaluation
Mechanism or ``MEM,'' a peer review system for assessing individual and
collective performance, mandated by the 1997 Summit of the Americas. The
MEM was developed by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS).
The MEM involves
an intensive review by a group of independent experts of information submitted
by the 34 OAS Member States in a detailed questionnaire breaking down
the components of their anti-drug efforts: their policies, strategies,
and programs. The experts' findings were reviewed and approved at a Special
Session of CICAD in December 2000 and the OAS formally released this first,
baseline report on February 2. Having participated in the CICAD Special
Session, I was struck by the frankness and openness of the discussions
about national policies and programs that were prompted by these objective
preliminary evaluations. With the baseline study completed, the second
phase of evaluation will include follow-up on the initial recommendations
as well as the addition of other, more qualitative, indicators that will
probe more deeply into performance.
The MEM process provides
a consensual framework for such frank exchanges of views, as well as critical
evaluation and recommended remedial action. While the process is still
evolving, the MEM seeks to cover national and regional compliance with
international norms and treaty obligations. This parallels the goals and
standards of the U.S. certification process and could, potentially, make
our unilateral process an anachronism in the Western Hemisphere. The proof
will, of course, be in the actions governments take to address the gaps
or weaknesses in their anti-drug efforts that have been identified by
the MEM. We believe, however, that most governments will be more responsive
to constructive criticism offered by a community of nations after an objective
and collaborative process, than to requirements imposed by a subjective,
unilateral process accompanied by the threat of sanctions for non-compliance.
PENDING LEGISLATION
We in the Administration
are reviewing the legislation recently introduced in the Senate that would
revise the certification process in some way. We believe that it is appropriate
to consider how the current process might be altered to better reflect
the changes in the international situation that have occurred since narcotics
certification was first introduced. Any regime that might modify or replace
certification should have an enforcement mechanism to ensure continued
international counternarcotics cooperation. If there were efforts to suspend
the certification procedure, we believe the President must retain in the
interim the power to decertify or sanction individual countries using
the standards of the current process.
We do not believe
that there should be exemptions for individual countries or regions at
this time. Future carve-outs may be appropriate, however, for regions
where there is a mutually acceptable and credible multilateral evaluative
mechanism in place.
CERTIFICATION DECISIONS
FOR 2001
(See attached Decision
Memo below.)
SUMMARY
I know that all
of us--both in the Administration and in the Congress--are interested
in developing the best and most effective mechanisms to counter the threat
of international narcotics trafficking--whether that be through the certification
process or some other procedure--and I look forward to working with you
to that end.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MARCH 1, 2001
Presidential Determination
No. 2001-12
Memorandum for the
Secretary of State
Subject: Certification
for Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug
Transit Countries
By virtue of the
authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended (the ``Act''), I hereby determine and certify
that the following major illicit drug producing and/or major illicit drug
transit countries have cooperated fully with the United States, or have
taken adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance with the
goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:
The Bahamas, Bolivia,
Brazil, People's Republic of China,
Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India,
Jamaica, Laos, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Thailand,
Venezuela, and Vietnam.
By virtue of the
authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine
and certify that, for the following major illicit drug producing and/or
major illicit drug transit countries that do not qualify for certification
under section 490(b)(1)(A), the vital national interests of the United
States require that assistance not be withheld and that the United States
not vote against multilateral development bank assistance:
Cambodia and Haiti.
Analysis of the
relevant U.S. vital national interests and risks posed thereto, as required
under section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is attached for these countries.
I have determined
that the following major illicit drug producing and/or major illicit drug
transit countries do not meet the standards for certification set forth
in section 490(b):
Afghanistan and
Burma.
In making these
determinations, I have considered the factors set forth in section 490
of the Act, based on the information contained in the International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report of 2001. Given that the performance of each of
these countries has differed, I have attached an explanatory statement
for each of the countries subject to this determination.
You are hereby authorized
and directed to report this determination to the Congress immediately
and to publish it in the Federal Register.
Senator Chafee.
Thank you, sir, very much.
My question relates
to the multilateral evaluation mechanism that was mandated by the 1997
Summit of the Americas. Is there a similar mechanism for those countries
outside the hemisphere?
Mr. Beers. Sir, as
a result of the 1998 U.N. General Assembly special session, there was
mandated coming out of that session a requirement to develop such a mechanism.
The Committee on Narcotics and Drugs of the U.N. General Assembly has
met on that issue. It has begun a process to create something similar
on a global basis. But it is far, far from being at a stage even of the
multilateral evaluation mechanism within the Western Hemisphere. That
in fact was used as the model for the look on a global basis of a similar
mechanism.
Senator Chafee. It
might be noted that not quite half of the countries that were certified
but nonetheless on the list are from outside the hemisphere.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Chafee. Senator
Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank
you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Beers,
for your work, by the way, over the years in this area. We appreciate
your continued involvement with it.
That change, by the
way--in this year's list there are two changes on it from last year; is
that correct?
Mr. Beers. That is
correct, sir.
Senator Dodd. Why
do you not identify the change for us?
Mr. Beers. Last year
Paraguay received a national interest waiver and Nigeria received a national
interest waiver. This year they are judged to be certified.
Senator Dodd. The
law actually says ``fully cooperating.''
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. As
we all know, that is the word that oftentimes attracted a lot of debate,
because, while there is a lot of cooperation, sometimes to get full cooperation
is always where the lines can get drawn, I suppose. It makes it more difficult
to some degree.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
There is clearly judgment involved in each of those decisions.
Senator Dodd. We
appreciate the effort you make to do so.
Just a couple of
points. One, you know we have introduced a bill, and I do not know whether
the administration at this point is prepared to talk about specific pieces
of legislation. But I think you sort of outlined what we have tried to
describe here and that was the suspension for a Congress. I use the Congress
because by the time Congress gets up, you get a new administration in
place--we do not even have a lot of the officials to be named to be confirmed
yet who would be dealing with these issues. So my concern is that we are
going to lose probably 6 or 8 months just getting personnel in place before
you try and put together a proposal.
But in the meantime,
we keep and allow the President to do exactly what you have described.
So I am not going to ask you to endorse a particular piece of legislation,
but we have been listening carefully to your ideas and thoughts on this
process as we try to come up with a new scheme and a framework, and I
appreciate it.
Two questions. One,
a lot of criticism has been raised about international organizations and
their efforts and how successful or unsuccessful they have been, particularly
the OAS and the U.N. What have they been doing in your mind and are their
programs something that we could look to to build on or replace that ought
to give us any encouragement at all? Or in your observation--and use your
own language here, obviously-- have the OAS and U.N. efforts in this area
been a failure?
Mr. Beers. Thank
you, sir. To answer those questions, if I might just specifically answer
your alluded-to first question. We are not going to comment on any of
the specific bills at this particular time, but we do certainly remain
open to discussions on any and all of them and hope that this committee
and other work will coalesce into a single proposal, if you will, that
we could then be in a position to take.
Senator Dodd. Well,
it would be helpful to know what the administration feels about it. None
of us want to go ahead and draft something and then have you object to
it. So obviously it would be important that you indicate whether we are
heading in the right direction or the wrong direction on various ideas.
Mr. Beers. That is
why the core of this position is that we would like to retain an enforcement
mechanism of some form in any final form that this might take. But we
are open to discussing how we get from here to there.
With respect to the
international organizations, let me speak first about the OAS. As a result
of the 1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago, which then directed the
OAS to actually begin the process of developing the multilateral evaluation
mechanism, I participated in the negotiations of the final framework that
was to be used for the evaluation. It took more than a year to come up
with. We then created the system of creating international experts independent
of governments to actually go through that review.
By all of our estimation,
those of us who participated in this process, it was a true example of
the changes that have taken place in the hemisphere first, as indicated
earlier. We do not talk about producers and consumers in the same way
that we used to, in the same confrontational way. We talk about it being
a hemispheric problem, about all of us having the problem and all of us
needing to work together, and shared responsibility is the sort of foundation
of all of that discussion. That is the way it proceeded.
That said, no one,
no one, would say that what we did in terms of the first year's evaluation
represents yet a fully functioning, credible multilateral evaluation mechanism.
We laid down a benchmark, if you will. We looked at what nations were
doing, we looked at what nations were planning to do. We made some judgments
about that, the experts did, and then the OAS endorsed those recommendations.
We are going to take
several years for this process to mature to the kind of system that in
fact would be a credible replacement for certification. But it is a process
that I think is working, and I say that from personal experience, and
we should be supportive of that process as it moves forward.
With respect to the
United Nations, as I indicated in response to Senator Chafee, it is much
further away, but we do have programs of credible cooperation with the
U.N. system and with other international partners in the U.N. context.
The one that I would point to now, which is still in the early stages,
though, is an effort to focus on Afghanistan as a major heroin producing
country, not so much for the United States, but certainly, for the European
Union and states of the former Soviet Union.
There is indication
now that the ban that the Taliban have put on the production of opium
poppy may in fact be working in the sense that there may not be as much
opium poppy growing in Afghanistan today at this point in time as there
was last year. But I would also say that that is very much the beginning
of a process. There was so much overproduction in years past that there
are huge stockpiles.
Senator Dodd. That
may be the only positive thing you can say about the Taliban, by the way.
If someone was trying to find something positive you could say about the
Taliban, you have told me. But the things they do that are terrible would
outweigh----
Mr. Beers. They are
horrible, but on this issue and with U.N. pressure on them we may be seeing
some progress. I do not want to claim victory by any stretch on that,
but we may be seeing some progress. It will be interesting over the years
ahead to see if in fact that U.N. sanction, that U.N. look at Afghanistan,
in fact may lead to some success there.
Senator Dodd. Get
some results.
Two quick ones. My
time is up. I unfortunately am not going to be able to stay, and I want
to apologize to Bernie Aronson, my friend, if I do not stay for his testimony.
He has been sitting here patiently. I know what he has to say. I read
his comments. Two quick things.
No. 1 is, there have
been some proposals that just would take Mexico out of the loop for the
obvious reasons, here our neighbor, new administration. My concern about
that is the potential problems we create with other allies in the hemisphere
by sort of separating one out and leaving others in and creating its own
sort of tensions. I wonder if you would comment on that.
No. 2, I have been
down in Colombia here the last few days with Senator Chafee, and Senator
Biden has been down several times I know of, I think, in the last year.
Senator Nelson was down with Carl Levin and others after we were down,
the week after we were down. I always felt that the concern--we decertified
Colombia back in 1996 and 1997. When I look today at the paramilitary,
the FARC members that move back and forth, and this narcobusiness now
in Colombia, which it is hard to separate the lines--everybody seems to
be in the business one way or another--that that period, that 2 years
when we basically decertified Mexico, we sort of, we almost created a
vacuum in which a lot of this began to happen.
Now, it did not all
happen at once. But I am curious just from your observations whether or
not, looking back now retrospectively, whether or not that decertification,
which for the Samper government obviously created some serious problems,
but sort of walking away in a sense did not in some way contribute to
the problems we are seeing today in that nation, the magnitude of the
problems we are seeing.
Mr. Beers. Sir, first
with respect to the Mexico issue, as I indicated in my prepared and oral
remarks, we also do not favor any singling out for exemption of any individual
country, for exactly the reasons that you allude to. It is more problem
overall than it is benefit for that individual country perhaps.
With respect to the
issue of Colombia, you pose a very interesting question and I am sure
people will disagree about this for some time to come. I would first focus
on the fact that during the period of decertification the level of cooperation
between our DEA and the Colombian national police and the level of effort
on the part of the Colombian national police increased a great deal. It
was during this same period that the Colombian national police in fact
became an organization within Colombia that came to be viewed as a credible
police organization, as opposed to a corrupt organization.
Now, obviously a
lot of that is dependent upon General Serano and his leadership of that
organization at that time. But I certainly have the impression, and I
think a number of others do, that he was given a free hand to do that
because of the extreme pressure that had been put on the Government of
Colombia by the fact that they were decertified.
So cause and effect?
I am not sure. But I certainly would not concede the point that in fact
decertification was what led to the increased effort on the part of the
Colombian national police and it was that increased effort that built
the foundation for the level of cooperation that we are in fact able to
undertake today and that the absorptive capacity of Colombia for the Plan
Colombia supplemental might not be today what it is if it had not been
for that ramping up of cooperation with the Colombian national police
during that timeframe.
Senator Dodd. Very
good.
I have taken more
time than I should and I apologize. Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and please
forgive me if I do not stay for the rest of the hearing.
We thank you. We
look forward to your soon cooperation on this. We do not have a lot of
time on this thing.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. So
we are interested--if we are going to do something in a 2-year framework,
you better do it fairly soon, because then you are not going to meet--you
are going to have a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure on this and that
is not going to serve anyone's interest. So we would appreciate as soon
as possible to hear back on some of these ideas that are out there and
any recommendations you would make, so we can put something together here
fairly quickly and present it to our colleagues.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Thank
you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank
you.
Rand, thank you,
by the way, for your service. It took the longest time to get the State
Department to pay attention to this issue. As you know, I have been the
thorn in the side----
Mr. Beers. Certification
has had a value, sir, if only within the State Department.
Senator Biden. I
have been a thorn in the side of the State Department on this issue for
15 years or longer. I think you have done a really fine job.
I would like to followup
on the question that Senator Dodd just asked you. It is true and it can
be argued that it is possible that by decertifying, some domestic programs,
some programs that would aid the domestic economy of Colombia were hurt
and theoretically that could have had some negative impact upon the economy
and upon the psyche even of the Colombians.
But I would point
out that people who say that there has been no progress, maybe I have
been doing this too long and maybe you have been doing this too long,
but I remember the days when we would sit here and the Medelin Cartel
and the Cali Cartel were things of which movies were made and where billions
of dollars were exchanged and they literally controlled entire areas of
Colombia. Now a different group controls entire areas of Colombia.
I want to remind
everybody--you know better than I do--that it literally took the purging
of the entire national police force, close to 5,000 people, to put together
what no one ever thought would happen. If we had had this debate, this
discussion, in 1992 about Colombia and said, you know, by the year 2000
they are going to have basically eliminated the Cali Cartel and the Medelin
Cartel and, by the way, it is going to be the police force in Colombia
that is viewed as the good guys and they are going to be the ones what
people are going to look to and we will look to, I think most people would
have thought you and I certifiable.
But that is what
has happened. That is what has happened. Now, not everything is perfect,
but what has happened is there has been tremendous progress. I think that
if we got some leaders of the various countries we are talking about in
private, you will find they may tell you that they needed our threats
to be able to carry out their initiatives.
If I could make an
analogy, one leader in the last several months--and I have been meeting
with a lot of these folks-- indicated to me that the thing he most wanted
done was to get American generals and the Joint Chiefs of Staff literally
to come to his country and sit down with his military and say: Hey, fellows,
here is the deal.
What we keep forgetting
is some of these very countries that we have talked about having put such
a burden on by this process, we are able to allow that leadership occasionally,
and it has worked occasionally, to say the devil made me do it; I do not
want to have to do this to you folks; I do not want to have to purge you;
I do not want to have to not appoint so and so and so and so and so and
so in charge; but look, if I do we are not going to get the following
assistance; so as good citizens of whatever country, step down.
But yet the debate
persists here, and it is the only thing--I do not think there is anything
I have disagreed with Senator Dodd on in the 20-some years we have worked
together except the emphasis, the emphasis on where our pressure comes
down. Is it a net negative or a net positive?
But let me get to
my question, and that is that one of the things I have been impressed
with in recent visits to the region is the astounding progress Peru has
made and the astounding progress that Bolivia has made in terms of cultivation.
Now, that could all turn tomorrow. This thing could just flip tomorrow.
But there has been significant assistance from the U.N. on those initiatives.
One of the reasons
why Colombia is where it is today is because it used to be, as you know
better than I do, it was the place where the coca leaf was turned into
cocaine. Now it is the place where the coca leaf is grown as well as turned
into cocaine as well as exported. Part of that is because other countries
have acted in a way effectively to shut down their production.
So my question is
this. As it relates to the producing countries--and right now Mexico is
more a transiting country than a producing country--as it relates to the
producing countries, it seems to me we are approaching an opportunity,
an intersection here, where if we follow through on what we did not follow
through on on the Andean Project, when George the first was President,
if we did that, if we act--I did not mean that facetiously. It came off
the wrong way. How do you say, the former President Bush? The first George,
OK.
He had an Andean
plan where crop substitution, trying to invigorate the copper mines, trying
to build infrastructure that would not, meaning roads and highways and
water systems, et cetera. But the commitment waned.
I think our biggest
failing on dealing with the producing countries has been our unwillingness
to provide and seek among our allies and friends more support for the
economic side of the equation for these countries. You may recall, at
the very moment we really had made a dent and the Colombians had made
a dent on production and export out of Colombia and the region, what did
we do? We let the International Coffee Agreement collapse. And we cut
off their ability to sell cut flowers in the United States, their two
single biggest industries and exports to the United States. We got into
a fight with them.
So while we were
trying to keep cocaine off our streets, we got in a fight because coffee
prices were rising too high in the supermarkets. So we instead crushed--not
crushed; wrong word--we impacted negatively on their one cash crop that
we do not mind having exported to us, coffee, and we impacted on, as related
to our accusation of unfair trade practices, on their cut flower industry,
which is a gigantic industry to them and to us.
I find that counterproductive.
Now, it is not the same circumstance now. So it is a very long prelude
to a short question. Do you think we can, and if you do should we, be
emphasizing, as relates to Colombia in particular but also the whole Andean
region, so we do not let this success in Peru and Bolivia escape us, provide
more economic assistance? Were I President, I would be asking our NATO
allies, who also are the victims of this--victims; are the recipients
of this export--to be sitting down and saying, you do not like Plan Colombia
that much, how about let us come up with Plan Andean and us come up with
several billion dollars to help them begin to transform their economy
and put these folks to work, who we are putting out of business by the
fumigation process?
Talk to me just a
little bit about that, Rand. And I will cease, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Beers. Thank
you for this opportunity, and I truly do mean that. As you, I too have
been around for a long time, through several administrations, from both
sides of the aisle, and I do believe that this is the best opportunity
that we will ever have. It is not so much that it is new ideas, but that
it is ideas whose time has, I hope, finally come. But, as has been our
problem in so many instances, it is not something that we are going to
solve at a single stroke or in a single year. It is going to have to be
a process that we all agree or have agreed to begin.
Senator Biden. If
you will allow me, or on the cheap.
Mr. Beers. Or on
the cheap. I was getting to that point too, sir.
Senator Biden. OK.
Mr. Beers. I believe
that we are going to have to do that. I think that the Plan Colombia supplemental
represented an excellent start, but it is only 1 year's worth of funding.
As I said yesterday two floors below, this administration will come forward
with a package which will be significant, which will be regional, which
will be more devoted to alternative development and social programs and
economic assistance than the preceding package was.
We have heard you
and we have heard others in that regard. It will reach out internationally
again and make exactly the points that you have made, sir, in terms of
economic assistance in partnership with international donors.
If I might, just
one brief historical comment. One of the dilemmas that we had with respect
to the earlier aid package that was put forward during the first Bush
administration was that Colombia, because of the state of its economy,
was too rich to be an aid recipient. So while we did do counternarcotics
assistance, we did not do at that particular point in time any economic
assistance.
But I think one of
the problems, if I can look back historically on that period, was we did
not persist with that effort.
Senator Biden. And
I am not casting blame on anybody.
Mr. Beers. That is
not casting blame on either the Bush administration or the subsequent
Clinton administration. It is simply that we sort of did not finish the
job. We only began the job. I think that if there is a lesson to be learned
from that point in time, it is that this is not a short-term and it is
not an inexpensive proposition. We have to look seriously and we have
to look over time at trying to deal with this process.
If we do and if we
do it in a comprehensive and integrated fashion--and your comments about
trade policy intersecting with counternarcotics policy and creating a
dysfunctionality are absolutely on the mark. This is a policy approach
which has to be comprehensive across the range of U.S. and international
policy toward this region, and we have to look at all of those decisions.
Senator Biden. Rand,
I think you and I and a few others finally have everybody's attention
here--I mean this sincerely--because of a confluence of certain things
that have happened, some of them very good, like the two new leaders in
Mexico and Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, I know
I have gone over my time and I will cease with this. I truly welcome,
as the ranking member of this committee, your interest in this issue and
this subcommittee. I hope that we all understand, though, that no matter
what we do on the certification or decertification process, no matter
what we do on significant increases in my Judiciary Committee and the
Health committee dealing with making sure that we provide more treatment
and education, that we finally figured out-- Congressman Gilman said they
are the pieces. I think the pieces have changed slightly.
The way to deal in
my view with the producing countries is not only to put them in a position
which we have focused on of late, of giving their counternarcotics capability
a reasonable shot, and they have been reluctant to do that until recently,
but also deal with, help them deal with their internal economic problems
that allow for--if you study Colombia, if you study any of these countries,
you realize that they end up where they are in large part because of dysfunctional
systems they have, because of dysfunctional societies relating to access
to opportunity within those societies.
There is a lot we
could do to be helpful now that there are leaders emerging from those
countries who see this not through a single prism, not through a single
lens. So I hope we think about, when we think about the notion of producing
countries, not only whether or not we give them more time as it relates
to decertification, not only give them more assistance as it relates to
helping them on the enforcement side of the equation, but also go to them
now at a time and undercut, for example, the FARC, undercut the ELN, by
going in and giving them significant assistance relative to the wide disparity
in income opportunities in those countries.
There are things
we can do that I think will give us a better shot of gaining hold of this.
But as you know, Rand--and you and I have had this discussion--the last
4 years, including the Clinton administration, the last 5 years, to get
anybody's attention here in the Senate or in the House or in the administration
to do something bold about dealing with our drug problem, it has not been
there.
In the late eighties
and the late seventies when I wrote this legislation, I could have asked
for a zillion dollars and everybody would have given it. Anything we asked
for we got, because everybody was--every poll in America showed the No.
1 problem people were concerned about was crime and drugs, and so we got
it.
It is kind of like,
it is like cutting grass. You have got to keep cutting it, you have got
to keep cutting it. You cannot cut it once and say, I got it down now
and now I can go home.
So I hope, Mr. Chairman,
I can work with you and others, many others on both sides of the aisle,
to come up with a comprehensive notion and support the administration,
because I believe this is something President Bush understands. I believe
this is something that he is interested in. I hope this is something that
he will be willing to use his leadership to follow through on, because
we have a real opportunity right now, a real opportunity.
I thank you for your
time.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you, Senator Biden. Yes, we have to keep cutting the grass.
Senator Biden. That
is right, you really do. It is like what is going on in law enforcement
now. We are talking about cutting the budget for the crime bill. Give
me a break. We got crime down 8 years in a row, an average 7 percent a
year, and people go: OK, we got that done now; we do not need another
100,000 cops; we got that finished; we do not need to do any more.
It amazes me. But
it is like cutting the grass. You let it go now--there is no way we can
spend less money. We have to spend more money to deal with these problems.
The moment you spend less money, I promise, that grass grows.
Senator Chafee. We
will also be having hearings on, as Mr. Beers said, the administration's
proposal on expanding Plan Colombia, whether it is an Andean plan or something
along those lines. There will be other opportunities.
Thank you so much
for your time and testimony.
Mr. Beers. Thank
you, sir.
Senator Chafee. I
would like to welcome the Honorable Bernard Aronson, former Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs.
STATEMENT OF HON.
BERNARD WILLIAM ARONSON, MANAGING PARTNER, ACON INVESTMENTS, AND FORMER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Aronson. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you for your patience. Good morning.
Mr. Aronson. Good
morning. Given the lateness of the hour, maybe I will just make a few
comments if I could.
Senator Chafee. I
look forward to them.
Mr. Aronson. First
of all, I want to commend you and the committee for holding this hearing.
In my experience, usually, we pay attention to Latin America when there
is a crisis and we are trying to put out a fire. I think you and the committee
are trying to be preemptive and take advantage of an opportunity, and
I commend you for that.
If you listen to
the discussion it seems to me there is a large degree of consensus, which
I think bodes well for your chances of shaping legislation. There is a
consensus that narcotics production, distribution, and transit is a national
security threat to countries in the region and has to be dealt with and
that interdiction plays a role. There is clearly a consensus that we have
to do more on the demand side.
I think there is
a consensus that we need accountability in the certification process,
and I applaud the fact that in Senators Dodd and McCain's bill the reporting
requirements and the designation of major suppliers and transit countries
continue.
But there also seems
to be a consensus that certification is a tool and that we ought to take
a look at it and see if we can perfect it. That is what I understand the
2-year hiatus to be. So let me suggest a few thoughts about how to perfect
it and what you might do with the 2 years.
In my experience,
one of the problems with certification is that the choice is all black
or white. You either do it and invoke the full level of the sanctions
or you do not. I think if we had a longer time to debate Colombia, both
sides were right; decertification had a positive effect, but it also helped
create a vacuum into which the FARC and others took advantage.
So one suggestion
I would have would be to provide a menu to the President which he could
use and to offer more sanctions than currently exist. For instance, one
of the greatest sanctions the United States has in Latin America--this
may come as a surprise--is to lift the visas of those who are engaged
in the drug trade or are suspected, or are not cooperating. I think that
ought to be a tool in the certification process that the President might
use alongside economic sanctions. So you might maintain the economic benefits
and lift the visas of 100 people in the Congress, police, army, and the
business community who are drug traffickers. It has an effect when it
is a visa to the United States.
A second suggestion
I would make to use this 2-year hiatus is to review something that we
began in the first Bush administration, which was drug summits with producing
and consuming countries. We started in Cartagena in 1990 with Peru, Bolivia,
and Colombia. We went to San Antonio and included Mexico. I think it takes
some of the sting out of the certification process if we first bring the
countries involved in on the development of the standards and we set goals
for them and us that they are part of formulating.
It is the old saying
that is good advice for the executive: if the Congress is not in on the
takeoff they are not going to be in on the landing. I think the same is
true on a common drug strategy. So I think that is another thing that
the executive should consider doing. Those drug summits send a message
and reinforce certification.
Third, I would strongly
associate myself with those who have made the point that we have to stay
the course. I was part of the original Andean drug strategy. We spent
some money, and we charged up the hill, and then we charged back down
again. That does not work.
I think Senator Biden
is dead right both about domestic law enforcement and international law
enforcement. This is a long- term struggle to defend democratic institutions
and the rule of law. Interdiction is important because if we do not interdict
then countries are going to become criminalized and they are going to
be Lebanized and they are going to be taken over by criminal gangs, and
it is not just drugs we are going to face, it is going to be immigration
trafficking, and gun trafficking, and there will be hell to pay.
Interdiction has
to be part of it, but we cannot fight this war like Desert Storm. I think
we have gotten impatient as Americans. This is like World War II, where
you take an island and then you take another island, and it is a long,
drawn-out struggle, and it has to continue. I totally agree with that
point.
I think the 2-year
extension is a good one. As I understand it, the President would still
have discretion to invoke certification if he thought that was necessary.
I think that ought to be a part of the bill, including the sanctions.
But, again, if you create a Chinese menu of sanctions that the President
can use, he does not have to either send a nuclear missile or do nothing.
He can pick and choose, or she can pick and choose, and he can invoke
sanctions for 3 months and then lift them. Then, it seems to me you have
the leverage that is correctly needed. I think Senator Biden and Congressman
Gilman are right, if you do not have leverage and consequences you are
not going to have any teeth in this. But if it is simply a blunt instrument,
you are put in the position of either using something that is too heavy
or doing nothing.
So, I think some
process where we set goals for ourselves as well as Latin America, where
we are held to standards, too, so there is more dignity in the process
would be an important change in certification. I believe also the President
should have a lot of discretion about whether to invoke this or not and
it is not mandatory, a range of sanctions that he can pick and choose
among, invoke, or take back if there is a positive response. In Colombia,
if we had decertified perhaps for 6 months, but waived economic sanctions
and lifted visas for 100 people, it might have had the same incentive
effect, but it would not have destabilized Colombia at a very difficult
time that others have taken advantage of.
I think if we can
build some bipartisan trust and a working consensus with the administration,
I think we can do what the committee wants to do. I applaud it again for
doing so: which is to perfect this instrument and to make it more useful,
but it has to be part of a larger strategy.
I would just remind
the committee that, with regard to Colombia, there is nothing you could
do right now that would help create economic alternatives more than to
expand and renew the Andean Trade Preferences Act. Colombia right now
is disadvantaged because the good work you did with regard to the Caribbean
Basin on textiles and apparel now disadvantages Colombia because they
are behind, and they are going to lose several hundred thousand jobs unless
the Congress moves in the same direction with regard to the Andean countries.
I also agree with
Senator Biden's point about our allies. I think Europe is still practicing
a kind of denial about this issue, like we did 20 years ago. It is a huge
consumption problem there. I think with regard to Plan Colombia they are
sort of missing the forest for the trees. Part of our agenda for the G-7
and other groupings ought to be to enlist Europe and Japan in reaching
out and providing aid, and providing the same kind of trade preferences.
I think an Andean
Trade Preference Act that included the European Union, the United States,
Canada, and Japan would be a powerful instrument to help these countries
as we wage this battle. But it has got to be a broader strategy and it
has to be a long-term strategy. We get very impatient as Americans, but
look at how many years it took us to take down our own mafias in this
country. It took 50 years. Everybody knew the Mafia controlled the Fulton
Fish Market and the cement trade and the garbage-hauling in New York City,
but until we developed the RICO statute and the will to take them on they
operated in our countries, too, and we are a heck of a lot richer and
better organized than some of these countries in Latin America.
So I think we need
to have the will to do this right and to do it on a bipartisan basis.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you very much once again. Very well said.
You were talking
about Andean trade. Getting off the subject of certification would you
care to comment on the Free Trade Area of the Americas? Is that also beneficial?
Mr. Aronson. It is
extremely beneficial, and I hope that we can also resolve this legitimate
domestic debate about the terms of trade. When we were moving forward
with the vision of extending free trade throughout the hemisphere, we
empowered all the reformers, all the good guys. They had leverage to take
tough decisions internally to open up their economies because there was
a great prize to be gained, which was access to our market.
When we retreated
from that, we undermined the reformers. Now the cohesion and the sort
of momentum that we had where the hemisphere was moving together toward
a common goal has been dissipated, and you see a heck of a lot more centripetal
forces in the region. Frankly, Latin America has a lot of troubles these
days. The Andean region has never been in more trouble politically and
socially and in terms of national security in the last 50 years, and it
does affect us.
So I think we should
move forward with the FTAA. I think that there is a decent bipartisan
compromise to be struck on labor and the environment, if we have goodwill
and are truly committed to finding a compromise we could that would allow
us to have fast track, which has now been renamed ``trade promotion authority.''
But I think we need
to get going on that as well, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. I
do think that trade policy does affect narcotics and the specific focus
of today's hearing.
Mr. Aronson. There
is no question about it. What Senator Biden and others said is correct.
Largely on the growing side, these are campesinos. They do not make the
money. They are in many ways exploited. The people who grow coca leaf
in these regions are very poor people, and in many cases they do not want
to be in the drug trade. But you cannot take away the trade they have
to feed their families and put nothing in its place and expect them to
stay out of the drug trade.
They will grow coca
leaf--if that is the only licit crop, if that is the only place where
they can get the product out, if that is the only place where there is
a transportation network, which is true in many regions in Colombia. So
I think we have to have a broad strategy that recognizes that this is
defending democratic institutions and building democratic institutions,
it is extending alternative development, it is taking down these criminal
enterprises.
I agree with the
Senator also on the Medelin Cartel. I remember when Newsweek ran a cover
story and said they were the ``Kings of Cocaine,'' they were untouchable,
they were all 15 feet tall, they were more powerful than the state, and
they listed 50 of them. Virtually everybody on that list is either in
jail or has gone, not to purgatory, but wherever they should have gone.
And they were taken down with a strong effort by Colombians and with a
lot of help from the United States.
Senator Chafee. Senator
Biden.
Senator Biden. Bernie,
thank you very much. I appreciate your being here.
Just one thing that
I--there are many things that I have overlooked, but one of the things
that I have overlooked in as much time as I have spent on this, and I
did not realize its potential significance, was the lifting of visas.
You and I both know there are certain people in some of the countries
we have mentioned where we have asked the leadership to make difficult
decisions to purge them, jump over them, let them go, et cetera, sometimes
on our own advice, and then we turn around and we give them visas and
they are dining in Miami, they are up in New York for a play.
I must tell you,
I underestimated the significance of denying visas to those 10 or 100
people in the various countries. You do not have to do it now, but at
your leisure I personally would like to know, and maybe the committee
as a whole would, too, if you were in my spot who would you be going to
in this administration to make the case and how would we be drawing up
that list?
In other words, it
is an area that I am a little like that--they used to have the joke about
Texas. It is not about Texans. I am like that guy from Texas who said:
I do not know much about art, but I know what I like. Well, this is the
one area I really have not looked at. I personally, and maybe the committee
as a whole, could use some very specific advice on how we get--and maybe
the administration is already looking at it, in fairness to them--how
we get to the point where in the near term we take some of these leaders
off the hook by denying visas to some of the very people we have said
are a problem.
Mr. Aronson. Senator,
I totally agree with you. There is a former Colombian general right now
who was purged from the Colombian military who meets with Carlos Castana,
the leader of the paramilitaries, and supports their activities, and he
has a visa to the United States. The signal it sends is that somehow it
is a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Mr. Aronson. Conversely,
when you take it away the signal is this guy is no good.
But I would suggest
that the committee look at a whole range of sanctions that you could build
into a certification process, like visas, like asset seizures, like going
after assets in the United States, like proscribing their business activities
from any form of U.S. assistance or participation.
It is very similar
to the debate you have been having up here about economic sanctions. It
is such a blunt instrument when you wield it on an entire society, many
of the victims are people what do not deserve it. Yet you want to find
a way to target the people you want to target. It seems to me that you
take some of the sting out of the certification process, or some of the
difficulties, in addition to all these other mechanisms we have talked
about like multilateral mechanisms, putting ourself under the microscope,
if you came up with a whole range of sanctions, such as visas, targeting
assets, and maybe some others that we have not thought about, you laid
them out and let the President choose among them. Then he might say: I
am not going to stop OPIC and Eximbank and IMF for Colombia at a time
when it is fighting for its life against guerrillas, but there are 250
people who are complicit in the drug trade who are going to get sanctions,
whom we are going to make them pariahs internationally, whose assets we
are going to attach, and that would have as much effect.
Senator Biden. Would
you be willing to work with me on that, drawing up such a list with Brian
and myself, to actually sit down and do that?
Mr. Aronson. Sure.
In my experience, those kinds of lists are a lot easier to put together
than people think. I think we always know.
Senator Biden. I
think you are right. I must tell you, though, it has just been recently
in a couple conversations over the last 6 months with some of the folks
what are making these hard calls and they look at me and say: But Joe,
general so and so is in town. What does that say back in wherever?
Mr. Aronson. Exactly.
Senator Biden. Well,
thank you, Bernie. I will call you.
Mr. Aronson. Happy
to do it.
Senator Chafee. Thank
you very much for your time and testimony.
Mr. Aronson. Thank
you.
Senator Chafee. We
look forward to working with you in the future.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08
p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
STATEMENTS SUBMITTED
FOR THE RECORD
PREPARED STATEMENT
OF MATHEA FALCO, PRESIDENT, DRUG STRATEGIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Chairman, I
am delighted to have the opportunity to submit testimony to the Foreign
Relations Committee on the utility of the certification process.
I am President of
Drug Strategies, a non-profit research institute that promotes more effective
approaches to the nation's drug problems. My own interest and expertise
in international drug control policy date to my service as Assistant Secretary
of State for International Narcotics Matters from 1977-1981.
Drug Strategies has
played an active role in the debate over certification and the debate
about the trajectory of U.S. international drug policy more generally.
In 1995, I published an article on the certification process in Foreign
Affairs. In 1997, I chaired the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force
responsible for the report Rethinking International Drug Control: New
Directions for U.S. Policy. In 1998, Drug Strategies published Passing
Judgement, a review of certification's implementation and impact. For
the report's release, we convened a major media forum featuring Members
of Congress; key U.S. and Latin American government officials; and journalists
from leading newspapers and magazines in the United States, Mexico and
Colombia. The Century Foundation commissioned Drug Strategies' Senior
Research Associate, John Walsh, to conduct an in-depth analysis of certification
and possible alternatives. I would be happy to furnish all of these materials
to your committee.
When Congress debated
the legislation that created the certification process in 1986, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee cautioned against expecting too much from a
sanctions approach, noting that
U.S. efforts to
persuade other countries to increase their
antinarcotics efforts
are ultimately limited by the difficulty
of dealing with
sovereign countries, the boundaries of U.S.
leverage, the competition
of other U.S. national security
interests, and by
the lack of a persuasive U.S. domestic
commitment and effort.
Experience has demonstrated that
politically attractive
solutions such as ``cutting off foreign
aid'' or vastly
increased funding for international narcotics
activities will
contribute only marginally to combating this
problem. (International
Narcotics Control Act of 1986: Report
to Accompany H.R.
5352, Report 99-798, 1986).
Fifteen years later,
the Committee's words have been repeatedly and resoundingly confirmed.
A charitable assessment of certification would find that it has proven
irrelevant. A more accurate appraisal is that certification has proven
detrimental, in both practical and symbolic terms. Intended to improve
foreign cooperation with U.S. drug control efforts, certification has
instead become a stumbling block to cooperation. Enacted to underscore
U.S. resolve in confronting drugs, certification has helped perpetuate
the myth that foreign supply rather than demand for drugs in our own communities
is at the heart of America's drug problems.
Despite its failures
as a policy, the certification process persists because many Members of
Congress still find it to be politically advantageous. The drug issue's
potency in electoral politics (or at least its perceived potency) means
that certification is not treated as some more or less arcane foreign
policy matter or as a dry, technical matter of executive branch oversight.
Instead, certification has become an annual platform for sounding tough
on drugs--by attacking the administration, other countries, or both.
BUILDING ON SHAKY
PREMISES
Certification's
policy failure extends directly from the flawed premises on which it was
built. The 1986 certification legislation was rooted in bipartisan confidence
in the supply-side approach to drug policy. Stepped-up drug control efforts
in drug producing countries and at the border would translate into higher
drug prices and reduced drug use at home. ``Winning the war on drugs,''
according to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski's House Ways and Means Committee, meant
that ``the problem must be attacked at its source. . . . Increased pressure
on foreign governments and increased enforcement at the border should
substantially diminish supplies and drive up prices.'' (International
Drug Traffic Enforcement Act: Report to Accompany H.R. 5410, Report 99-
794, 1986).
Second, certification
was based on a willingness in Congress to employ unilateral economic sanctions,
and a belief in their effectiveness in pressuring other governments to
do as the United States wished. If certain drug source countries were
reluctant to control illegal crop production and smuggling activities,
then, according to the House Ways and Means Committee, ``Greater economic
pressures must be brought to bear on such countries.'' (Report 99-794,
1986). The dual operating assumptions behind the certification legislation
are that (a) the United States, with the threat of economic sanctions,
can compel other countries to curb drug production and exports, and (b)
if other countries would only do more to curtail drug supplies, our drug
problem would be diminished.
A PAPER TIGER
Neither of these
premises has proven valid. As the House Foreign Affairs Committee foresaw,
the leverage that the threat of decertification was meant to provide has
never materialized. In the vast majority of cases, the threat is hollow,
because of three key factors.
1. For certain targeted
countries, such as Afghanistan and
Burma, the sanctions
entailed by decertification are
essentially redundant.
U.S. relations with such countries are
already frayed,
and little if any economic aid of any sort is
at stake in the
certification process. In the 14 years of
certification decisions,
just five countries--Afghanistan,
Burma, Iran, Nigeria
and Syria--have accounted for almost all
of the decertifications
issued. Only three other countries have
ever been decertifled:
Panama (1988 and 1989); Laos (1989); and
Colombia (1996 and
1997).
2. Even for the
majority of targeted countries who are not
already considered
pariah states, the sanctions actually
triggered by decertification
amount to far less than the
rhetoric implies.
The President can continue providing drug-
related assistance
(economic, military and police aid) to
countries that have
been decertified. Humanitarian aid--such as
disaster relief,
food, medicine, and refugee assistance--is
also exempt from
suspension. Successive U.S. administrations,
for example, have
considered virtually all bilateral aid to
Colombia to be drug-related,
leaving little at risk of
suspension in the
event of decertification. Colombia received
$56 million in U.S.
aid in 1996 and another $82 million in
1997, despite having
been decertified both years.
Decertification
requires the United States to vote against
any multilateral
development bank (MDB) loans to the designated
country. U.S. opposition
to MDB loans for a decertified country
is unconditional;
no exemptions are made for loans to meet
basic human needs.
But the significance of the U.S. vote
depends on the U.S.
share of voting power (largely a function
of capital contributions)
and on the voting rules of the
particular multilateral
bank. Only in the Inter-American
Development Bank's
(IDB) concessional Fund for Special
Operations (FSO)
do U.S. voting power and the voting rules
combine to make
a U.S. ``no'' vote tantamount to a veto. Among
the 14 Latin American
countries currently subject to
certification, only
Bolivia and Haiti are restricted to FSO
loans and would
therefore be directly affected by a U.S. ``no''
vote were they to
be decertified. The other 12 countries are
eligible for the
IDB's ``ordinary capital'' loans, which are
not vulnerable to
a U.S. veto. For example, despite being
decertified in 1996
and 1997, Colombia received 18 World Bank
and IDB loans totaling
$930 million. In 1996, the country was
awarded more in
MDB loans ($676 million) than in five of the
previous nine years,
a period when Colombia was always
certified, either
fully or under the vital national interests
provision. In sum,
for most countries neither the MDB nor the
U.S. aid sanctions
are nearly as significant as they might
appear at first
glance.
3. Where U.S. relations
with a given country are considered
so important that
decertification is never considered a real
option--despite
the negligible sanctions that are actually
entailed--the threat
of decertification rings especially
hollow. The extraordinary
case of Mexico illustrates the
failures of certification.
Although the actual sanctions
triggered by decertification
would be barely perceptible in
Mexico, and although
Mexico has always been certified as
``fully cooperating,''
Mexicans detest the certification
process itself as
a hypocritical ploy on the part of U.S.
politicians to blame
Mexicans for America's own failure to cope
with its drug problems.
Other Latin Americans join Mexicans in
questioning Washington's
moral authority to judge other nations
when U.S. demand
for drugs fuels the illegal trade. Mexico's
apparent impregnability
as far as decertification is concerned
does not diminish
Mexican contempt for the process, even as the
double standard
gives credence to the claims of the governments
of smaller Latin
American countries that the process is
basically unfair.
(Mexico is the United States' second largest
trading partner.
In 1999, total U.S.-Mexican trade was more
than double the
total U.S. trade with all the other 13 Latin
American nations
subjected to certification that year.)
Proponents of decertifying
Mexico contend that unless the
U.S. government
shows that it has the will to deny
certification to
Mexico, cooperation will remain
unsatisfactory.
But if the United States were to decide that
the risks of antagonizing
Mexico by denying certification were
justified, there
is little reason to believe that Mexican
antidrug cooperation
would improve as a result. The sanctions
triggered by decertification
pose little threat to Mexico: Very
small amounts of
U.S. aid are at stake, and U.S. opposition
cannot prevent approval
of World Bank or IDB loans to Mexico. A
decision to decertify
Mexico would have to count on the
political embarrassment
of the situation to prod Mexican
officials into line
with U.S. priorities. Mexican contempt for
the certification
process, combined with the political need to
avoid even the appearance
of bowing to U.S. pressure, point to
an outcome of less
cooperation, not more.
A FLAWED STRATEGY
The certification
process was devised as a tool to enhance the performance of the United
States' supply-side approach to drug policy. Does the overall strategy
in which certification is embedded make sense? If the supply-side strategy
is fundamentally ineffective, then even perfect fidelity in implementing
that strategy--including maximum cooperation from foreign governments--will
not deliver the desired results.
The appeal of a supply-side
approach to drug policy is undeniable. Focusing on drug production overseas
provides an easy way to sound ``tough'' on drugs by excoriating foreign
governments. The supply-side approach is also attractive because it appears
to be logical: The easiest way to stop drug abuse would be to eliminate
drugs before they get to the United States. According to the State Department's
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) budget
presentation for fiscal year 1999, ``By stopping drugs from ever being
produced or reaching our shores, INL programs probably deliver the largest
returns of any federal anti-drug program.''
The primary purpose
of U.S. interdiction and international drug control programs--on which
the United States has spent more than $33 billion dollars since 1986--is
to raise the price and reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the
United States. By now, we should certainly expect there to be some evidence
that the supply-side strategy works to make drugs more expensive and less
available. In fact, despite our efforts, heroin's average U.S. retail
price has fallen by 45 percent since certification was enacted, while
the price of cocaine has dropped by 42 percent. Nor do supply-side efforts
seem to have lowered availability. High school seniors in 1999 perceived
crack cocaine to be just as available as seniors perceived it to be in
1987 (in both years, 41 percent of seniors considered crack to be ``fairly
easy'' or ``very easy'' to get). Over the same period, the proportion
of high school seniors who see heroin as ``fairly easy'' or ``very easy''
to get has risen from 24 percent to 32 percent. In the face of considerably
escalated U.S. supply-side efforts since certification went into effect,
the key measures of success have plainly been headed in the wrong direction.
These dismal results
suggest that the supply-side strategy is itself seriously flawed, and
that the alluringly simple logic of ``going to the source'' is belied
by a more complicated reality. Four major obstacles severely limit the
potential of international supply- control initiatives to reduce U.S.
drug problems.
1. The idea that
eliminating drug production in foreign
countries would
stop drug abuse at home overlooks the fact that
illicit drugs can
be produced in the United States as well. For
example, domestic
production accounts for an estimated one-
quarter to one-half
of U.S. consumption of marijuana, by far
America's most widely
used illicit drug.
2. Drug crops can
be grown cheaply almost anywhere in the
world, and America's
annual drug demand can be supplied by a
relatively small
growing area. A 30 square mile poppy field--
about the area of
northwest Washington, D.C.--can supply the
U.S. heroin market
for a year. The annual U.S. demand for
cocaine can be met
from coca fields extending about 400 square
miles, roughly one-third
the area of the State of Rhode Island.
In reality, of course,
drug crop cultivation is not
conveniently located
in one place. Farmers have strong economic
incentives, to shift,
expand or modify cultivation as required
to protect their
livelihoods. Enforcement directed at growers
tends to disperse
cultivation to ever more remote areas, making
detection and eradication
even more difficult.
3. Interdiction
may achieve impressive tactical successes
against drug traffickers,
but these efforts are overwhelmed by
the volume of drug
production. Drugs are now so plentiful that
even the largest
seizures have little impact on drug
availability in
the United States. Traffickers quickly move on
to new sources,
shipments and routes. As U.S. Coast Guard Vice
Admiral Roger Rufe,
Jr. explained to reporters in 1997: ``When
you press the balloon
in one area, it pops up in another. . . .
It's a market economy;
with demand as it is in the U.S., they
have plenty of incentive
to try other routes.'' For example, in
the late 1980s,
intense interdiction efforts in southern
Florida and the
Caribbean pushed cocaine traffickers to switch
to routes through
northern Mexico, where they formed
partnerships with
Mexican trafficking organizations. The result
has been wealthier
and bolder traffickers in Mexico, but no
diminution in the
drug flow. New smuggling routes are
practically without
limit, whether in the Amazon jungle or at
the U.S. border.
This is especially so for a country intent on
easing the barriers
to legal trade: Each year an estimated 436
million people enter
the United States by land, sea and air;
116 million motor
vehicles cross U.S. borders; and more than
nine million shipping
containers and 400 million tons of cargo
enter U.S. ports.
The amount of cocaine estimated to come
across the U.S.-Mexico
border each year would fill only six
trucks--yet more
than 3.5 million trucks and rail cars cross
the border annually.
4. The price structure
of the illegal drug market ensures
that even the most
successful overseas drug control operations
will have minimal
impact on U.S. prices. Almost 90 percent of
the price of drugs
on U.S. streets is the result of the value
added due to the
risks of distributing and selling drugs after
they enter this
country. The total cost of cultivating,
refining and smuggling
cocaine to the United States accounts
for less than 15
percent of retail prices here. As one Drug
Enforcement Administration
(DEA) official has explained, ``The
average drug organization
can afford to lose as much as 70
percent to 80 percent
of its product and still be profitable.''
As a consequence,
even the most effective eradication and
interdiction campaigns
in producer countries have little, if
any, effect on U.S.
drug prices.
STATE OF THE DEBATE
The inherent obstacles
to supply-side drug policy have been discussed for years. Detailed accounts
have been published by RAND, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), as well as in the academic literature.
For example, a 1988 RAND analysis concluded that, ``Increased drug interdiction
efforts are not likely to greatly affect the availability of cocaine in
the United States,'' primarily due to ``the small share of total drug
distribution costs that are accounted for by the smuggling sector.'' A
1994 RAND report found treatment to be ten times more cost effective than
interdiction in reducing cocaine use in the United States, and twenty-
three times more cost-effective than source country drug control programs.
U.S. government publications have also described some of the basic obstacles
to supply-side success. The GAO has reported to Congress on the speed
with which drug traffickers adjust to enforcement pressures. The CIA and
the State Department published the proceedings of a 1994 conference on
the economics of the drug trade that featured a presentation of how the
illegal drug market's price structure limits the value of antidrug operations
at the ``source.'' In short, analysis that raises basic questions about
current policy--and a growing body of supporting evidence--have been in
the public domain for some time, and readily available to Members of Congress
and their staffs.
Yet, the recurring
debates in Washington over international drug policy show barely a trace
of this fundamental critique. Having raised expectations about what can
be accomplished through supply-side polices, officials are now loathe
to tell voters that in fact very little has been achieved. The key question
for policy makers should be whether the evident lack of success to date
stems from inadequate implementation of an otherwise sound policy or whether
the poor results reflect more fundamental strategic flaws. But policymakers
have not addressed whether the strategy is appropriate, arguing instead
that success simply requires more resources, more time, and better coordination.
Operational problems--faulty coordination, lack of continuity, and resource
constraints--may contribute to the policy's poor record, but they are
not decisive, even when taken together.
The certification
process has not improved the track-record of supply-side policy in meeting
its own goals: U.S. drug prices--which supply-control policies backed
by the certification process were supposed to push higher--have instead
declined. Policymakers have focused on how U.S. supply-side policies might
be better implemented; the annual Congressional debates surrounding particular
certification decisions are now a staple of this discussion. But the debates
over certification have always been limited by the implicit assumption
that U.S. supply-side policy can achieve its objectives. Unfortunately,
that policy suffers from elemental flaws, which limit interdiction and
international drug control programs to a marginal role, at best, in U.S.
efforts to reduce drug abuse. Certification compounds the problems inherent
in the supply-side approach by reinforcing the notion among policymakers
and the American public that foreign governments can play a decisive role
in reducing drug abuse in this country.
______
WOLA <BULLET>
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA
EXERPTS FROM ACROSS
THE SPECTRUM CALL FOR REFORM OF THE ANNUAL DRUG
CERTIFICATION PROCESS
(January 30, 2001)
``Congress should
end the requirement that U.S. Presidents annually certify Mexico's cooperation
with its anti-narcotics efforts. In 1997 and 1998, President Bill Clinton
certified a non-compliant Mexico while not certifying Colombia, despite
evidence that efforts in both countries did not merit certification. Such
dual treatment is an irritant to hemispheric relations and undermines
the effectiveness of the certification process.''
Stephen Johnson,
The Heritage Foundation
U.S.-Mexico Relations:
No More Business as Usual, July 20, 2000
``Recommendation:
Undertake a full-scale reassessment of anti-drug strategy at home and
abroad, with a view toward devising a more effective and better coordinated
approach that our neighbors will be able to support as allies. This might
include streamlining and clarifying the chain of command regarding narcotics
policy, recalibrating the increasing imbalance in Latin America and the
Caribbean between the U.S. military and civilian law enforcement institutions
in the drug war, and pursuing options related to an annual hemispheric
`cooperation' certification process proposed at the Santiago Summit.''
North-South Center
The Case for Early
and Sustained Engagement with the Americas:
A Memorandum to
the President-Elect and His Foreign Affairs/
National Security
Team, December 2000
``The OAS, with strong
support from the United States, has now developed a promising multilateral
procedure for assessing anti-drug efforts by every nation in the hemisphere.
Replacing U.S. certification with the OAS procedure would enhance cooperation
regionwide--and should be a high priority for the new administration [in]
Washington.''
Inter-American Dialogue
A Time for Decisions:
U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,
December 2000
``At an absolute
minimum, we should immediately end the arrogant and hypocritical congressionally
mandated annual `certification' of Latin American countries by which we
judge how well they are fighting our drug use problem.''
William Ratciff,
Hoover Institution
Undoing ``Plan Colombia,''
December 27, 2000
``Certification is
bad drug policy, bad foreign policy, and bad for our national conversation
on both. First, it sends mixed signals to other countries about the rewards
or punishments for their efforts in the war on drugs. Second, while cast
as a means to increase cooperation, the process repeatedly fosters conflict.
Third, and most importantly, certification symbolizes and reinforces a
misguided broader U.S. international drug policy that aims to stop the
supply of illegal drugs from entering the United States.''
Bill Spencer, Washington
Office on Latin America
Failing to Make
the Grade: The Case Against U.S. Drug
Certification Policy,
February 1999
``Now the theory
of the certification may be fine, but I think the practice is seen primarily
as one of threatening punishment, which seems to me a dubious way to solicit
voluntary and enthusiastic cooperation. If the threat is followed by actual
decertification, it builds enormous hostility and resentment generally,
not only in the decertified country, which, again is hardly conducive
to the goals we are pushing.''
General Brent Scowcroft,
National Security Advisor to President
George Bush Sr.
Hearing before the House Committee on
International Relations,
April 29, 1998
``The primary measure
of success for the United States has been reductions in foreign opium,
coca and marijuana production. Reductions would presumably lead to higher
drug prices in the United States, which in turn would prevent new drug
use and drive addicts into treatment. However, annual worldwide opium
production has doubled in the past decade, while coca production has nearly
doubled . . . The certification process--by focusing on one aspect of
often complex bilateral relationships--can distort the management of U.S.
foreign policy.''
Drug Strategies
Passing Judgement:
The U.S. Drug Certification Process, 1998
In a letter to Senator
Christopher Dodd supporting legislation to suspend certification: ``Wanted
to confirm that the Administration supports the Dodd-McCain legislation
on international drug cooperation. Believe your thinking supports U.S.
drug policy by recommending a mechanism that would allow us to make fundamental
improvements in the way we cooperate with major drug producing and transit
countries. At a minimum, your bill promises to remove a major cause of
foreign policy friction, especially with Latin American and Caribbean
countries . . .''
Barry McCaffrey,
then-Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy,
July 16, 1997
In a letter to Senator
Christopher Dodd supporting legislation to suspend certification: ``We
believe your amendment would allow the Administration to develop and implement
a new multilateral strategy to stem the flow of illegal narcotics. We
believe the passage of this amendment will lead to a more effective multilateral
effort in the war against drugs.''
Samuel L. Berger,
then-National Security Advisor to President
Clinton, July 16,
1997
``The criteria are
vague and inconsistently applied, while the punishments are often more
apparent than real. More important, the process itself is corrosive in
its effects on U.S. relations with other countries, which often have a
complex of problems that cannot be effectively addressed by this type
of intervention.''
Council on Foreign
Relations
Rethinking International
Drug Control: New Directions for U.S.
Policy, 1997
``The certification
process whereby the U.S. government rules on the anti-narcotics efforts
of drug-producing or drug-transit countries is at the heart of (the drug)
war. Certification is an arbitrary and hypocritical exercise.''
L. Jacobo Rodrigues,
Cato Institute
Time to End the
Drug War, December 3, 1997
Time to End the
Drug War, December 3, 1997
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