Statement by Rep. Tom Davis (D-Virginia), July 8, 2003

Statement by Rep. Jim Gibbons (R-Nevada), July 8, 2003

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to offer some views as part of this evening's Special Order recognizing the third anniversary of Plan Colombia.

As a senior Member of the House Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, I wanted to take note of the significant gains that have been made since Plan Colombia was announced in July of 2000 in strengthening the rule of law and enhancing the stability of this important democratic ally. As important, the strategy set forth in Plan Colombia has achieved major positive results in initially slowing and now reducing Colombia's cocaine production during the past 3 years.

A recent U.S. Government assessment of global coca production trends notes the recent progress achieved under the Plan Colombia strategy: ``Coca cultivation in Colombia (in 2002) declined by 15 percent--the first decline in Colombia's coca crop in a decade....... This reduction was largely because of a sustained aerial eradication campaign in what had been the country's densest coca growing areas....... Cultivation in the Putumayo--site of the country's most intensive eradication effort--declined by 80 percent.'' Nevertheless, the U.S. and Colombia Governments assessed in 2002 that Colombia's coca production zones totaled nearly 362,500 acres with the potential to produce 680 metric tons of pure cocaine.

With respect to Colombian heroin production, the latest assessment in that in 2002, Colombia's opium poppy

production zones totaled some 12,200 acres with a potential yield of some 11.3 metric tons of pure heroin. According to the DEA, Colombian heroin captures approximately 70 percent of the U.S. marketplace and virtually all of Colombia's heroin production is intended for export to the United States. Unlike the aggressive strategies being applied against Colombia's coca production, the bilateral efforts to locate and eradicate opium poppy under Plan Colombia have lacked a consistent strategy and adequate resources and personnel. Both the U.S. and Colombian governments need to work much more effectively to apply new technologies to combat and defeat the heroin industry.

I wanted to briefly cite two initiatives that are elements of the Plan Colombia strategy, which have real potential to improve Colombia's security and to enhance the rule of law within Colombia's borders. With Plan Colombia funding, the United States Southern Command provided resources and training for the establishment of a Military Penal Justice Corps within the Colombian military. Since the establishment of Colombia's Military Penal Justice Corps in August 2000, over 300 military, police, and civilian attorneys have received professional legal education and training focused on military justice, international humanitarian law, and operational law. This legal training has had a direct and positive impact on the Colombian military's performance in the field against terrorists and narco-traffickers as well as on its adherence to international legal standards in very difficult combat environments.

A second initiative under Plan Colombia is the reestablishment of the binational airbridge denial (ABD) program, which is designed to interdict illegal aircraft engaged in transporting narcotics. The ABD program merits close oversight, but it has real potential to reduce narco-traficking and to limit illicit weapons support to terrorists and other criminal organizations in Colombia. When I was in Bogota last November, I had the opportunity to discuss this issue at some length with Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. President Uribe was very clear about the urgency of implementing the ABD program. I am concerned that legal disputes over the ABD program's implementation have delayed the renewal of this important interdiction program. I strongly urge the Bush administration to resolve any outstanding issues affecting ABD implementation immediately, and to provide the Colombian Government with the appropriate support to carry out an effective and accountable ABD program.

While these recent trends are somewhat encouraging, it is equally clear that our two governments need to maintain their focus on the Plan Colombia strategic objectives by intensifying ongoing narcotics eradication and interdiction programs, and by restoring security and essential government services to areas threatened by terrorists and narco-traffickers. I am convinced that Colombia's fight is also our fight--as the terrorism and the narco-trafficking that are destabilizing Colombia's democratic institutions pose real threats to America's people and our national security.

As of July 9, 2003, this document was also available online at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/B?r108:@FIELD(FLD003+h)+@FIELD(DDATE+20030708)